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2Abstract
Contemporary research on externalities from FDI suffers from two central problems. 
First, estimates of such externalities may be biased when FDI is endogenous to the 
empirical model. Second, there is an important lack in empirical research regarding 
the identification of structural factors influencing the type and level of FDI-induced 
externalities.
The goal of the thesis is to address both issues. It starts with a theoretical 
discussion of FDI and externalities, followed by an overview of contemporary 
empirical research, highlighting the main estimation problems. Next, theories of 
agglomeration economies are discussed, in an attempt to identify a determinant of 
FDI-induced externalities in the form of geographical proximity of manufacturing 
activities. This discussion, supported by an overview of the limited related available 
empirical evidence, indicates that this concept is a likely candidate to be such a 
determinant.
The next two chapters use unpublished and thus far unexplored data from the 
1993 Mexican economic census to estimate FDI-induced externalities in Mexican 
manufacturing industries. In this part, the main empirical model is developed and 
estimated. In addition, the robustness of the initial findings of this empirical model is 
assessed. Furthermore, the estimation issues that are identified in the first part of the 
thesis are addressed. Most importantly, I introduce an instrumental variable estimation 
that controls for the problem of endogenous FDI. This instrumental variable 
estimation functions satisfactorily; as such, it represents the first successful empirical 
unbiased estimation of FDI-induced externalities in a cross-sectional setting.
Finally, the last part of the thesis offers empirical evidence of the effects of 
geographical proximity on FDI-induced externalities. The findings indicate that 
geographical proximity does influence such externalities in a multi-faceted fashion. 
First, the level of geographical concentration of an industry enhances the occurrence 
of positive externalities within an industry. Second, from a regional point of view, 
geographical proximity enhances the occurrence of externalities that arise within and 
between industries in a region. Third, FDI-induced externalities that arise between 
industries also appear to spill over between neighbouring regions.
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the Study
1.1. Introduction
In recent decades, the volume of theoretical and empirical studies on economic 
externality effects arising from the presence and operations of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in host economies has increased rapidly. The study presented in this 
thesis represents one of the latest additions to the growing body of empirical research 
in this field. Having said so, the study is not a mere continuation of recent empirical 
approaches, as it addresses several of the fundamental problems that have remained 
largely unaddressed in this research field. Also, in comparison to the majority of 
previous empirical research on externalities from FDI, the underlying theories that are 
used in the present study to justify the empirical analysis are richer. In particular, by 
using ideas related to the concept of agglomeration economies, the analysis of 
externality effects from FDI is placed in a new light, improving the resulting 
empirical estimations.
The present chapter serves as an introduction to the study presented in the 
main body of the thesis. Its purpose is not to provide a theoretical and empirical 
background to the study, as this is provided in following chapters. Instead, this 
introductory part merely serves to introduce the study in a general fashion, and to 
indicate the direction of the research questions that are developed and addressed in the 
main body of the thesis.
The remainder of this introduction consists of four sections. In section 1.2., I 
discuss the general context of the research topic, which aids in placing the study 
within the appropriate theoretical and empirical literature. In section 1.3., I indicate
15
the potential importance of the inclusion of geography in empirical estimations of 
FDI-extemalities. Section 1.4. presents the research questions that are addressed in the 
thesis. Finally, section 1.5. contains a brief description of the chapters of the main 
body of the thesis.
1.2. Context of the Study
In the present world economy, the importance of the operations of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and FDI is commonly accepted. One general indicator of this 
importance is the increasing volume of international investment occurring between 
developed countries, as well as towards selected developing countries (UNCTAD, 
2001; Dicken, 2003). Moreover, from the viewpoint of a host economy, the presence 
and operations of FDI can have far-reaching implications, in light of the various types 
of effects that FDI may create. These effects include the creation of new capital, 
increases in profit levels, the direct and indirect creation of employment and the 
stimulation, diversification and -  in case of developing countries -  often initiation of 
export flows (Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1993; also Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
In recent decades, a particular type of effect from FDI that has been receiving 
increasing interest and is argued to be one of the more important ones concerns
X /
externality effects (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 
2004; Caves, 1996). This type of effect refers to situations characterised by two 
conditions. First, the presence and operations of FDI affect productivity or efficiency
S
levels of domestic firms in a host economy. Second, this productivity effect is not
r  r
(fully) accounted for by market mechanisms. If both these conditions are met, the 
effect from the presence of FDI can be interpreted as an externality.
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Originally, empirical evidence on the existence of such externalities was rather 
scant, consisting mostly of anecdotal evidence from individual case studies and 
circumstantial evidence obtained from small-scale, one-off, surveys (see Dunning, 
1993). In the last couple of decades, however, this situation has changed drastically, 
due to the development of a branch of research engaged in the statistical identification 
and quantification of such externality effects.
Early empirical estimations from this type of research share the common 
feature that they have produced evidence of the existence of significant positive 
externalities from FDI. Both in a cross-country setting as well as in studies of 
individual host economies, empirical estimates of determinants of economic growth 
and productivity indicate significant positive effects of FDI (Blomstrom and Kokko, 
1998; 2003).
Following the initial contributions that suggest the existence of positive 
externalities from FDI, further empirical research has been extended and improved 
upon along two dimensions. One dimension is that the number of host economies for 
which FDI externality effects have been estimated has increased considerably. More 
importantly, the evidence from this more recent research is far less supportive for the 
belief that FDI creates positive externalities. Not only have several empirical studies 
produced estimated insignificant effects of FDI (Kumar, 1996), there is also important 
empirical evidence that suggests that the presence of FDI creates significant negative 
externalities (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Harrison, 1996; Haddad and Harrison, 
1993; see also Hanson, 2001).
The second dimension concerns the assessment of determinants of the 
occurrence of externalities from FDI. Partly as a response to empirical findings that 
suggest a lower frequency of positive externalities than thought previously, several
17
studies have attempted to identify factors that influence the occurrence and the level 
of externalities from FDI. Although several possible determinants have been 
speculated upon, the only commonly accepted determinant of externalities is related 
to the level of technological capacity or absorptive capacity of domestic firms 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). This concept refers to the idea that positive 
externalities from FDI are more likely to occur among those domestic firms or in 
those industries that possess a sufficient level of technological capacity to absorb 
knowledge and technology from foreign-owned firms.
Having said so, the use of the concept of absorptive capacity of domestic firms 
does not appear to be free from criticism. The general concept of absorptive capacity 
and its importance in externality transmitting processes are readily accepted. However, 
the specific interpretation of the concept and its subsequent use in empirical 
estimations of externalities from FDI appear to leave room for improvement. The 
level of technological differences between domestic and foreign-owned firms is 
usually adopted as an indirect indicator of the level of absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms. However, it appears that this indicator may be capturing alternative effects 
instead. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that either does not support the 
importance of this concept or appears to be in direct contrast with the underlying 
absorptive capacity hypothesis.
In sum, the present state of affairs is that two central issues in empirical 
research on externalities from FDI are debated upon. First, both the opinions that FDI 
creates positive externalities (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; see also Blomstrom et al,
2000) or negative externalities (Hanson, 2001; Aitken and Harrison, 1999) in host 
economies are continued to be defended, both supported by empirical evidence. 
Second, there is a need to identify alternative determinants of such externalities, as the
18
interpretation of the effect of the level of technological differences between FDI and 
domestic firms can be challenged, indicated by empirical evidence that is either not in 
support or in direct contrast to the underlying absorptive capacity hypothesis.
1.3. Geography and Externalities from FDI
Recent theories on endogenous growth stress the importance of externalities ih 
explaining sustained patterns of growth and productivity (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988,
2001) This increased attention for externalities has stimulated (renewed) interest in 
theories that relate the occurrence of such externalities to location patterns of 
economic activity. Although originating from largely different backgrounds, theories 
and empirical studies on urbanisation processes (Henderson, 1988), regional growth 
(Glaeser et al, 1992; Henderson et al, 1995; also Lucas, 2001; Porter, 1998), the so- 
called new economic geography (Krugman, 1991a, 1991b; Fujita et al, 1999) and 
studies on effects of geographical proximity on processes of knowledge spillovers 
(see especially Jaffe et al., 1993) all share the common feature that they link 
externalities to spatial processes.
The central concepts linking geography to external economies are the level of 
geographical concentration of activity and the level of geographical proximity 
between economic agents. These two concepts play central roles in explanations for 
the existence of spatially limited externalities, or agglomeration economies, as 
originally introduced by Marshall (1890). The scale of economic activity in a location 
or the level of geographical proximity between economic agents may create 
agglomeration economies, due to -the presence of a thick labour market, specialised 
local inputs and the occurrence of knowledge spillovers (see Eberts and McMillan,
19
1999; Hanson, 2000; also Duranton and Puga, 2003). The important aspect of this is 
that these agglomeration economies would not have occurred in the absence of 
geographical concentration or proximity, which indicates the unique contribution of 
these geographical concepts to the existence of such externalities.
Given the similarity between the two research fields regarding their central 
phenomenon under analysis, the initial relation between research on externalities from 
FDI and from geographical concentration or proximity seems easily made. Given the 
fact that both are analysing productivity effects that occur in an extra-market fashion, 
there may be important linkages between the two approaches. Having said so, these 
possible linkages have remained largely ignored in the existing literature thus far.
From the point of view of an empirical study set out to estimate externality 
effects from FDI, the consideration of geography can potentially make at least two 
important contributions. First, the majority of empirical models that are estimated to 
determine the presence of (positive or negative) externalities from FDI tend to omit 
variables that control for the level of geographical concentration of industries in a host 
economy. This may lead to biased estimates of the empirical model, as the level of 
geographical concentration may influence the level or growth rate of productivity of 
domestic firms in a host economy. As such, the first potential contribution of the 
consideration of the geographical concepts is an improvement of the general 
empirical model commonly specified to estimate externalities from FDI.
Second, the consideration of the geographical concepts may contribute to a 
better understanding regarding the occurrence of externalities from FDI, as 
geographical concentration and proximity may influence the occurrence of such 
externalities. Especially given the .afore-mentioned need to identify viable alternative 
determinants of these externalities, this second aspect of the consideration of these
20
geographical concepts may prove to make a very important contribution to existing 
empirical research on externalities from FDI.
1.4. Research Setting and Questions
The empirical sections of the present study are largely based on the analysis of 
unpublished and thus far unexplored data from the 1993 Mexican Economic Census. 
The principal reason for selecting the Republic of Mexico as host economy for the 
present study is that the body of previous empirical evidence indicating the existence 
of significant positive externalities from FDI consists for an important part of 
empirical research on FDI effects in Mexico (see Blomstrom et al., 2000). However, 
the data used in this previous research dates from the early 1970s, which may have 
lowered both the reliability and the relevance of the findings in contemporary 
discussions on externality effects from FDI.
The present study is set out to answer the following main research question:
What is the effect o f geographical concentration or proximity on the occurrence of 
externalities from FDI in Mexican manufacturing industries?
This main question can be divided into three research questions, which will be 
addressed in the main body of the thesis. First, is there empirical evidence for the 
overall existence of significant externalities from FDI in Mexican manufacturing 
industries? Given the existing evidence, this is a matter of empirical verification. On 
the one hand, previous empirical evidence for Mexico suggests that the presence of
21
FDI creates positive externalities. On the other hand, the fact that this previous 
evidence refers to a time frame of some decades ago, coupled with the existence of 
recent empirical evidence for other host economies suggesting the non-existence of 
positive externalities as well as the existence of negative externalities, makes it 
impossible to make a reliable prediction on the existence and type of externality 
effects of FDI in Mexico in more recent years.
Second, the question implicitly refers to the need to assess the effect of the 
concept of absorptive capacity. The importance that this concept has been given in 
previous empirical research implicates that it will need to be addressed in the present 
study as well. Given the available body of evidence, the predicted effect is that the 
level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms will either enhance the level of positive 
externalities, or at least allow positive externalities to materialise. Therefore, the 
inclusion of an assessment of the effect of the level of absorptive capacity of Mexican 
firms is necessary, as it may provide important qualifications to the findings regarding 
the first research question.
The third research question concerns the effect of geographical concentration 
and proximity on the occurrence of externalities from FDI. Similarly to the 
importance of including an assessment of the effect of absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms, the empirical analysis will include an assessment of the effect of geographical 
concentration or proximity on the occurrence of these externalities. The main focus in 
answering this question is to determine whether the concept of geographical 
concentration or proximity may serve as a viable alternative determinant of 
externalities from FDI.
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1.5. Structure of the Study
In order to theoretically and empirically address the research questions presented in 
the previous section, the main body of the thesis is divided into five main chapters, 
followed by a concluding chapter.
Chapter two contains an extensive review of both the main theories and 
empirical evidence of the occurrence of externalities from FDI. The first section of 
this chapter introduces the main theories on externalities, followed by an assessment 
of the use of this concept in empirical studies of FDI effects. The second section 
explains the underlying mechanisms that are responsible for the occurrence of these 
externalities. The third section presents and critically discusses the main empirical 
findings on the general occurrence of such externalities. In addition to a review of the 
general evidence from estimations of FDI-extemalities, this part of the chapter 
contains a separate section devoted specifically to research on the effect of 
technological differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms as indicator of 
the effect of the level of absorptive capacity.
Chapter three addresses relations between the concepts of agglomeration 
economies and externality effects from FDI. Using theories from different strands of 
literature, the first section introduces different interpretations of the concept of 
agglomeration economies. Section two elaborates on this, discussing the various 
underlying mechanisms that may cause spatially limited external economies to arise. 
Section three explores relations between the concepts of agglomeration economies 
and externalities from FDI. In section four, the limited amount of relevant empirical 
evidence from FDI-extemality studies is assessed. The final section of this chapter 
summarises the assessment of the importance of geographical concentration of
23
proximity in empirical studies on FDI-induced externalities and discusses the research 
questions of the present study.
Chapter four represents the first empirical part of the study. The first section 
contains a description of the database, as well as some preliminary statistics. The 
second section reviews previous empirical research on FDI and externalities in 
Mexico. In section three, the original empirical model is developed to estimate 
externalities for aggregate nation-wide Mexican manufacturing industries. Section 
four presents the empirical findings from this initial model, focusing on the 
identification of externalities that arise in the same industries in which FDI operates. 
Furthermore, the robustness of the empirical findings is tested by estimating a range 
of alternatively specified empirical models. Finally, section five contains an 
assessment of the effect of technological differences on the occurrence and level of 
externalities from FDI.
Chapter five contains a critical assessment of the original findings as presented 
in chapter four. This critical assessment consists of four parts. The first part addresses 
the validity of the main explanation for the type of externalities empirically identified 
in chapter four. The second part raises the issue of the functional specification of the 
empirical models from the previous chapter. Section three is devoted to an 
assessment of the existence of omitted variable bias. Finally, section four addresses 
the problem of endogeneity of the FDI variable that may have affected the estimated 
results as presented in chapter four.
Chapter six is exclusively devoted to an assessment of the effects of 
geographical concentration or proximity on the occurrence and level of externalities 
from FDI. Using the empirical model developed in the two previous chapters, the 
first section contains an assessment of the effect of geographical concentration on the
occurrence of intra-industry FDI-extemalities. Section two discusses a second type of 
externalities in the form of inter-industry externalities, which is argued to possibly be 
more relevant when considering the effect of geographical proximity on the 
occurrence of externalities. The third section adapts the national empirical model into 
a regional one. Using this new regional model, the fourth section addresses the 
question whether geographical proximity leads to the occurrence of FDI-extemalities 
within regions. In answering this question, both externalities within and between 
industries are considered. The fifth section uses the same regional model, changing 
the focus on the identification of the effect of geographical proximity on the 
occurrence of FDI-extemalities between regions. Again, both types of externalities 
from FDI are estimated.
Chapter seven contains a summary, main conclusions and recommendations 
for future research.
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Chapter 2 Foreign Direct Investment and Externalities: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence
2.1. Introduction
The operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) can have far-reaching effects on processes of economic development in host 
economies1. The term economic impact is normally used when referring to these 
effects. This economic impact of FDI or MNEs can take various forms (see Dunning, 
1993; Caves, 1996; also Dicken, 1998). For instance, FDI plays an important role in 
the creation of jobs in host economies. Also, they are often found to contribute 
positively to a host country’s trade balance, by stimulating and in some cases even 
initiating export flows. Another component of the economic impact is related to flows 
of technology, as MNEs transfer technologies to host economies through their 
affiliates. Such transfers are seen as important stimuli to processes of technological 
upgrading and economic development in host economies (Blomstrom et al., 1999; 
UNCTAD, 1999).
In the last 30 years, the effect of FDI on host economies in the form of FDI- 
induced technological spillovers or technological externalities has been recognised as 
an important factor in processes of economic development in host economies2. This 
recognition is reflected in a rapidly growing, rather heterogeneous, body of research, 
analysing various issues surrounding the occurrence and the magnitude of 
technological spillovers from FDI. This present chapter offers an extensive review of
1 The home economy is the country where the FDI originates from; the host economy is the country 
where the FDI is located.
2 See Caves (1996), Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), BlomstrOm et al. (1999), Lall (1993), UNCTAD 
(1999).
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this body of research, synthesising the available literature on spillovers that result 
from the entrance and operations of foreign-owned manufacturing firms in host 
economies3.
The first section of the present chapter defines the concept of technological 
spillovers, using concepts and ideas related to external economies and technology. 
Also, it contains an assessment of the use of this concept in studies of the effects of 
FDI. With the aid of the concepts clarified in the first section, the second section 
discusses the main ways in which technological externalities from FDI may occur, by 
reviewing empirical research on so-called channels of externalities. The third section 
of the chapter provides indications on the magnitude and significance of FDI-induced 
spillovers. This section contains an extensive review of contemporary empirical 
findings, focusing on cross-country studies that link the amount of FDI to national 
growth patterns and cross-industry studies that focus on the relation between 
productivity levels (or changes therein) of domestic firms and the magnitude of 
foreign investment within industries. Furthermore, this section contains a separate part 
that is devoted to the empirical identification of the main structural factor that is 
commonly assumed to affect the occurrence of technological externalities from FDI. 
The final part of the chapter summarises the main issues and concludes.
3 In this chapter, the terms FDI, foreign manufacturing firms and foreign-owned firms are used 
interchangeably. Although FDI can refer to foreign investment in both manufacturing and service 
activities, the large majority of the literature on foreign investment in general, and on spillovers 
resulting from the presence of foreign investment in particular, is confined to the effects of foreign- 
owned manufacturing firms. Therefore, unless stated otherwise, the terms FDI and foreign-owned firms 
refer to foreign-owned manufacturing firms. Similarly, the term domestic firms refers to domestically 
owned manufacturing firms in a host economy.
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2.2. Technological Spillovers and Foreign Direct Investment
2.2.1. Spillovers and External Economies
Spillovers are usually equated with externalities or external effects (Varian, 1992, p. 
432). As such, the concept of technological spillovers or technological externalities 
can be related to the concept of external economies of scale, originally introduced by 
Marshall (1890). Marshall tried to explain how an industry, under perfect competition, 
could be operating under a long term decreasing or forward falling supply curve. To 
explain this, he distinguished between internal and external economies of scale. 
Internal economies of scale are related to a decrease in production costs due to an 
increase in the scale of production of an individual firm in an industry; they are 
economies that ‘depend on the resources of the individual houses of business engaged 
in it, on their organisation and the efficiency of their management’ (Marshall, 1916, p. 
266). In contrast, external economies of scale are economies that depend on ‘the 
general development of a firm’s industry’ (Marshall, 1916, p. 266). They are ‘those 
which accrue to particular concerns as a result of the expansion of output by their 
industry as a whole, and which are independent on their own individual outputs’ 
(Viner, 1953, p. 217)4.
By distinguishing between internal and external economies of scale, Marshall 
could explain the possibility of a forward falling long-term supply curve in a market 
that is characterised by perfect competition (i.e. no internal scale economies). The
4 As Chipman (1970) argues, the label o f parametric external economies o f scale would have been a 
more appropriate one. Each firm in the industry contributes to the aggregate production o f the industry. 
Although a change in efficiency resulting from a change in aggregate production is perceived by all 
firms to be external to their individual production, each firm does contribute to the process (Chipman, 
1970). (This would also mean that, technically speaking, the part o f the overall change in aggregate 
production of the industry that can be ascribed to an individual firm should be classified as a gain 
caused by internal economies of scale; see Chipman, 1970, 349-350).
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increase of the scale of production of an industry entails external economies of scale, 
which causes the long run supply curve to be downward sloping, whilst the individual 
firms that comprise the industry have positively sloped marginal cost curves. The 
occurrence of external economies of scale can be pictured as the forward movement 
of upward sloping supply curves of individual firms, along a downward-sloped long 
run industry supply curve.
The original concept of external economies as introduced by Marshall (1890) 
and later refined by Pigou (1924; 1962) has received extensive criticism5. Some 
questioned the existence of external economies altogether (Clapham, 1922), whereas 
others focused their criticism on the question whether negatively and positively 
sloped long run supply curves call for government intervention. As Pigou (1962) 
argued, a downward falling long run supply curve leads to a situation of inefficiency, 
as individual firms will produce less than optimal levels of output from a society’s 
point of view. Government intervention, in the form of a subsidy, would increase the 
production of individual firms, which would lead to external economies for the 
aggregate industry and lead to an optimal resource allocation. In similar fashion, 
negative external economies (i.e. an increasing long run industry supply curve) 
represents a situation of over-production. Taxing the individual firms, which will 
lower their production volumes and erase the negative external economies, can solve 
this problem.
The core of the criticism towards the Marshall/Pigou argument of inefficiency 
(under- or over-production caused by either positive or negative external economies) 
was that not all inclined (i.e. positively or negatively sloped) long run industry supply 
curves are caused by the existence of external economies (Young, 1913; Knight,
5 See Papandreou (1994) and Mishan (1971) for complete discussions of the debate. See Stigler and 
Boulding (1951) for original contributions criticising the ideas presented by Marshall and Pigou.
1924). Pigou (1962) used the example of road congestion to indicate that there is a 
difference between social and net product. Road congestion is an example of the 
occurrence of negative externalities, arising from the fact that road users only regard 
their individual costs of road use, without considering the increase in costs for other 
users that is caused by an increase in the use of the road. Knight (1924) showed that 
the problem of road congestion could be interpreted in an alternative way; namely as 
one where there is a wasteful exploitation of a scarce natural resource (i.e. the road). 
If the congested road were to be privately owned, users would have to pay increasing 
prices with increasing use. This would lead to an increasing supply curve, similar to 
the one derived by Pigou. The importance of Knight’s contribution is that he showed 
that not all inclined long run supply curves are necessarily a cause for concern (i.e. do 
not reflect inefficiency in the Pigou sense), and hence do not call for intervention, as 
there are plausible cases where inclined supply curves do not reflect inefficiency (i.e. 
external economies) 6.
Technological and Pecuniary Externalities
An important outcome of the controversy surrounding the original concept of external 
economies was a scrutinising of the exact meaning of the concept. Viner (1953) 
clarified the heterogeneous nature of the original concept, noticing that the concept of 
external economies consists of two entirely different types of phenomena, in the form 
of technological and pecuniary effects (Viner, 1953, p. 213). Subsequently, the two 
types of effects have been labelled technological and pecuniary external economies 
(Scitovsky, 1954).
6 See Mishan (1971) for a complete discussion of this controversy.
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Technological (dis)economies are external (dis)economies ‘which arise when 
the output of a firm not only depends on the factors of production utilised by the firm, 
but also on the output and factor utilisation of another group of firms’ (Scitovsky, 
1954, p. 145). They are a source of inefficiency (i.e. overproduction or 
underproduction from the social optimum), ‘because the change of costs resulting 
from a firm’s entry into an industry is a change in the coefficients of production, and 
is not reflected in prices’ (Papandreou, 1994, p. 19).
Pecuniary external (dis)economies are external (dis)economies ‘that are 
invoked whenever the profits of one producer are affected by the actions of other 
producers’ (Scitovsky, 1954, p. 146). This type of externalities is mediated through 
the market, and is therefore not reflecting a case of inefficiency. As the effects of the 
behaviour of agents are transmitted through the market mechanism, pecuniary 
externalities are not a cause of inefficiency from a society’s point of view. As Mishan 
(1971) notes regarding negative pecuniary externalities:
‘ The term external pecuniary diseconomies was proposed to cover the case o f a 
rising supply price that is the result solely o f changes in relative factor prices as
output expands But in the complete absence o f external effects, rising supply price
is an implication o f any interdependent economic model....Seen from this perspective, 
there is nothing special about a rising supply curve, and no optimising correction of 
equilibrium outputs need be sought under conditions o f universal perfect competition ’ 
(Mishan, 1971, p. 6).
Following this line of thought, pecuniary externalities are often dismissed (Papan­
dreou, 1994), as they do not represent ‘external effects proper’ (Mishan, 1971, p. 6).
In models of perfect competition, it is easy to understand why pecuniary 
externalities can be dismissed or ignored. However, in the case of imperfect 
competition, where internal scale economies may arise, pecuniary externalities may 
take on a new raison d ’etre. For example, pecuniary externalities arise when an 
increase in the production in firm A leads to a decrease in production costs of this 
firm because of increasing returns, lowering the price of its product. When this 
product is used by firm B as an input, firm B’s profits rise as a result of the decrease 
in its input costs. Alternatively, if firm A lowers its production, firm B’s profits will 
be negatively affected as a result of this. Situations like these have been linked to the 
dynamics of processes of industrialisation (see Scitovsky, 1954; also Rosenstein- 
Rodan, 1943; Fleming, 1955). In a dynamic world - in which many conditions of the 
static, perfectly competitive, general-equilibrium models do not hold - pecuniary 
externalities (as well as technological externalities) may have a role to play, affecting 
efficiency (Papandreou, 1994, p. 30).
2.2.2. Technological Spillovers as Externalities
As mentioned earlier, technological spillovers are usually equated with external 
economies. The distinction between technological and pecuniary externalities has led 
to interpreting technological spillovers as technological externalities or external 
effects proper. The standard characterisation of an externality identifies the effect as 
being present ‘when the actions of one agent directly affect the environment of 
another agent, i.e. the effect is not transmitted through prices’ (Papandreou, 1994, p. 
5). In other words, externalities arise when there are ‘interdependencies, or “direct 
interaction” between utility and/or production functions’ (Bator, 1958). As such,
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externalities are related to market failures, creating situations where some benefits or 
costs remain external to decentralised cost revenue calculations in terms of prices (see 
Meade, 1973, 1952; Bator, 1958; also Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962).
Suppose for instance that there are two firms, both using a free resource that is 
limited in supply. This situation creates a negative producer externality, as the use of 
the resource by firm II affects the use of the resource by firm I. This can be thought of 
as the inclusion of firm II’s activities into the production function of firm I. An 
example of a positive producer externality is when firm I benefits from the existence 
of a labour market that exists because of the presence of firm II (see Scitovsky, 1954). 
The main point about such producer externalities is that, in addition to the factors that 
are included in a producer’s production function and which are under her control, the 
production function includes an additional term, which represents the activity of 
another producer (or group of producers). It is the inclusion of this activity into the 
production function which causes externalities to arise for the producer in question.7
Around 1960, the notion of externalities resulting from some form of 
interdependence that is not captured by the market mechanism had become commonly 
accepted. Subsequent contributions to the analysis of externalities can be classified 
into three distinct approaches (Papandreou, 1994, p. 44-45). One group is addressing 
externalities related to environmental issues, as these were thought to consist of a 
distinct category of phenomena (see Baumol and Oates, 1975). A second group, 
labelled the ‘general equilibrium approach’ (Papandreou, 1994, p. 45), interprets the 
existence of externalities as a case of missing markets. The fact that the price 
mechanism is not working is thought to be because there are missing markets. 
Introducing a market for an externality would eradicate the problem of externalities
7 See Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) for a similar discussion regarding utility functions and 
consumer externalities.
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(see Arrow, 1970; Heller and Starret, 1976). Finally, the third group focuses on the 
role of institutions in explaining the existence of externalities. For instance, a reason 
for the non-existence of markets for externalities could be related to ill-defined 
property rights (see Demsetz, 1967). Although the institutional interpretation is more 
heterogeneous, the common denominator of the approaches in this group is that they 
link the (non)formation of institutions with the notion of externalities.
For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to interpret externalities as some 
form of extra-market interdependence between agents, as this is the most commonly 
accepted explanation for the existence of externalities8. The failure of the market to 
fully reflect the range of costs or benefits of an agent’s actions leads to the occurrence 
of technological externalities. This creates a situation of inefficiency, as there is a 
difference between private and social cost-benefit calculations. The difference 
between private and social costs and benefits creates technological externalities or
spillovers, which can be identified as occurring ‘ when someone’s actions affect
anyone else in either a positive or negative way, and this effect is not (fully) paid for 
(in the case of a benefit) or fully compensated (in the case of a cost)’ (Bureau of 
Industry Economics, 1994, p. 7).
2.2.3. FDI and Technological Spillovers
Research on the effects of FDI on host economies in terms of technological spillovers 
appears to focus on technological external effects, as defined in the previous section. 
In broad terms, these technological spillovers comprise ‘all those phenomena tied to 
the presence of foreign firms on the national territory that may increase the productive
8 For discussions of the approaches towards studying externalities after the 1960’s, see Papandreou 
(1994) and Comes and Sandler (1986).
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efficiency of domestic firms or their innovative capacity’ (Perez, 1998, p. 22). The 
reason for interpreting these phenomena as technological externalities is that these 
effects of the presence of FDI on firms in the host economy are not intended, nor are 
foreign affiliates (fully) compensated for it. Therefore, from an economic point of 
view, these effects belong to the area of externalities (Perez, 1998).
Dunning (1993) offers a comprehensive definition of spillovers that may arise 
from the presence and operations of foreign manufacturing firms in host economies:
‘externalities or spillover effects are those effects that arise as a direct
consequence o f the linkages forged between foreign direct investors and other 
economic agents in the countries in which they operate. Linkages occur when, by 
design or not, any particular firm (in this case the MNE or its affiliate) affects the 
amount and/or conditions o f supply, or the demand for, other goods by another firm 
or by consumers ’ (Dunning, 1993, p. 446).
In general terms, the definition states that the presence of foreign firms in host 
economies may lead to external effects. These effects may be positive or negative, 
and affect either consumers or producers, depending on which type of economic agent 
is affected by the presence and operations of FDI9. The reference to the existence of a 
linkage between FDI and domestic firms refers to the requirement that in order for 
externalities to exist, there must be some form of direct interaction or interdependence 
between the two types of firms. The operations of FDI will lead to external effects, if 
the supply or demand conditions of domestic firms are influenced through some form 
of direct interaction between foreign and domestic firms. By limiting the effects of
9 In this discussion, I will focus on producer externalities only.
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FDI on domestic firms to those effects on host economy supply and demand 
conditions through direct linkage (i.e. non-market interaction), Dunning excludes 
pecuniary externalities; all those effects on supply and demand conditions of domestic 
firms which are transmitted through the market mechanism.
Somewhat alternative and more commonly adopted definitions are offered by 
Caves (1974) and, most recently, by Blomstrom and Kokko (1998). Caves (1974)
states that technological spillovers occur when ‘ [the] multinational corporation
cannot capture all quasi-rents due to its productive activities, or to the removal of 
distortions by the subsidiaries’ competitive pressure’ (Caves, 1974, p. 176). 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) say that spillovers occur ‘when the entry or presence of 
MNE affiliates leads to productivity or efficiency benefits in the host country’s local 
firms, and the MNEs are not able to internalise the full value of these benefits’ 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, p. 3)10.
These two definitions appear to come closer to the definition of technological 
externalities sec as discussed in the previous section. The definitions offered by both 
Caves (1974) and Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) imply that spillovers exist only when 
domestic firms are not (fully) compensating FDI for their increase in productivity or 
efficiency. This refers to the existence of some form of market failure; the effect of 
FDI on domestic firms is not (completely) transmitted through the market mechanism. 
This lack of presence of the market mechanism leads to the failure of (full) 
compensation to foreign affiliates to occur. Alternatively, in cases where foreign 
affiliates improve the efficiency of local firms but manage to capture all the gains of 
this efficiency improvement, no spillover is said to have occurred.
10 Blomstrom and Kokko’s definition refers to productivity or efficiency benefits. Similarly, instead of 
technological spillovers, the terms productivity or efficiency spillovers are used as alternative labels for 
the phenomenon, as they reflect the effect of technological spillovers: a change in the level of 
productivity or efficiency among domestic firms.
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Having said so, neither of the two definitions contains any specific reference 
to the requirement of the existence of direct interaction in the extra-market fashion 
between FDI and local firms as the reason for the change in efficiency or productivity. 
As a result, both definitions can be taken to include externality effects that are more of 
a pecuniary nature. For instance, in his discussion on technological spillovers, Caves 
(1974) refers to the effect that foreign-owned firms enhance the competitive pressure 
in a host economy. As a result of this increased competitive pressure, domestic firms 
need to enhance their productivity or efficiency to be able to compete with the foreign 
firms.
The efficiency increase among domestic firms is taken to be a technological 
externality, as the presence of FDI is responsible for this increase and foreign firms 
have not been compensated for this effect. However, this increase in efficiency on the 
part of domestic firms can alternatively be interpreted as a pecuniary externality, as 
the competitive pressure following the presence of FDI is likely to be ‘normally* 
transmitted through the market mechanism. The presence of FDI is likely to increase 
factor prices, which will have a negative effect on host economy profit levels. In order 
to protect their market share and retain their profit levels, domestic firms will have to 
change their conduct, having to become more efficient in light of the increased factor 
prices. Therefore, the resulting efficiency increase among domestic firms is in 
response to changing factor prices and profit levels, and should therefore be 
interpreted as a pecuniary externality (see Scitovsky, 1954).
Another example of a pecuniary externality that is compatible with the 
definitions of technological spillovers is the case where the presence of a foreign firm 
leads to an increase in the level of.production of domestic firms, through input-output 
relations between the two types of firms. The demand expressed by a foreign affiliate
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enhances the level of production of a domestic supplier, allowing her to produce more 
efficiently in the case where production costs are subject to internal economies of 
scale. If the domestic supplier only produces for the foreign firm, no externalities will 
flow to domestic firms, if all the efficiency gains of the domestic supplier flow back 
to the foreign firm in the form of lower prices of its input.
However, if there are other domestic firms that use the same input, pecuniary 
externalities may arise as a result of the increased efficiency of the domestic supplier. 
Domestic firms benefit from the decrease in their input costs due to scale economies 
achieved by the domestic supplier; scale economies that are made feasible by the 
increased demand for the domestic supplier’s product due to the presence of the 
foreign-owned firm. Again, the resulting externality is in the form of pecuniary 
externalities rather than technological externalities, but it is covered by the definitions 
of technological spillovers offered by Caves (1974) and Blomstrom and Kokko 
(1998).
Most studies of technological spillovers from FDI use definitions similar to 
the ones by Caves (1974) and Blomstrom and Kokko (1998). This means that the 
emphasis lies on positive producer externalities. However, it also means that the 
definitions do not always clearly distinguish between technological and pecuniary 
externalities. Therefore, in this thesis, to correct for the rather ambiguous use of the 
concept of technological spillovers, I propose a new term for externality effects 
arising from FDI. Instead of technological spillovers, I use the term of FDI-induced 
externalities, which refers to externalities that may be of a technological or pecuniary 
nature and may apply to both positive and negative externality effects.
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2.3. Channels of FDI-induced Externalities
The operations of MNEs and FDI may affect the level of technology in host 
economies in two ways: formal technology transfers and FDI-induced externalities 
(Dunning, 1993, Perez, 1998). Figure 2.1 depicts these two main sources of 
technology, as well as the variety o f ways in which technology can be transmitted 
from MNEs and FDI to domestic firms.
Figure 2.1. International investment as source of technology to host economy
Multinational enterprise
Host economy
internal technology transfer
Foreign affiliate
Channels of externalities
inter-firm linkages/ 
labour turnover
external techn. 
transfer
market structure 
(competition)
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One important source of technology to host economies that is related to MNEs and 
FDI is in the form of technology transfers11. Two types of technology transfer are 
usually distinguished: internal and external technology transfers (Dunning, 1993). 
Internal transfers of technology refer to intra-firm flows of technology from a mother 
company to its affiliate, hence remaining within the overall structure of the MNE 
(Chen, 1994). In the case of external technology transfers, technology is transmitted 
through the market, leading to a change in ownership (Chen, 1994; see also UNCTAD, 
1999)12.
Next to technology transfers, the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities
1 ' i
represents the second major source of technology for host economies . The literature 
reflects that four main channels o f externalities can be distinguished, which are 
depicted in figure 2.1.: market structure or competition, referring to changes in 
conduct by domestic firms in response to the competitive pressure from the presence 
of FDI; vertical inter-firm linkages between FDI and domestic firms; labour turnover 
(labour substituting a domestic employer for a foreign-owned firm) and demonstration 
effects, referring to situations where domestic firms learn from or copy technology 
from FDI. An important feature of figure 2.1. is that the various externality- 
transmitting mechanisms are depicted against a scale indicating the relative extent of 
the working of the market mechanism. Formal technology transfers are placed on the 
far left, as they represent flows of technology transmitted through the market. Moving 
to the right, the flows of technology to domestic firms take on more of an extra- 
market nature.
11 A third important source of technology to countries is openness to international trade (see Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 1997). This source is not included in figure 2.1., 
as it is not necessarily or specifically related to operations of FDI and MNEs.
12 For a description of the range of types o f external technology transfers, see Buckley (1985) and 
UNCTC (1987).
13 Some argue that, especially for developing countries, the second source is more important for 
stimulating processes of economic development (see Caves, 1996).
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Furthermore, the nature of externalities is likely to change with an increase in 
the extent of extra-market interaction. Externalities arising due to a change in market 
structure (i.e. an increase in competition) are placed on the left side of the scale, 
indicating that its effects on efficiency of domestic firms are transmitted through the 
market. As such, effects from this mechanism represent pecuniary externalities. On 
the far right of the scale are listed demonstration effects, which are flows of 
technology where markets play a small if not negligible role. This means that 
externalities related to demonstration effects occur in the form of technological 
externalities. Externalities related to inter-firm linkages and labour turnover are 
placed in the middle of the scale, as there are both market and non-market aspects 
attached to the externalities that may be caused by them. In these cases, the 
externalities are likely to be a mixture of technological and pecuniary externalities. In 
the following subsections, I review the main empirical findings for each of the four 
channels.
2.3.1. Market structure / Competition
The entrance of FDI into a host economy disturbs the existing market equilibrium, 
forcing domestic firms to change their conduct. They can do this either by improving 
their use of existing technologies, or by improving, enhancing and updating their 
technologies. In both cases, if the change of conduct leads to efficiency improvements 
among domestic firms, the effect can be interpreted as a positive pecuniary externality. 
Having said so, although the importance of the competition effect from the entrance 
of FDI is commonly accepted, there are only a few studies that specifically address 
this issue.
Mansfield and Romeo (1980) study flows of technology from US-based 
MNEs to affiliates located in other countries. For the UK, they find that over half of 
the domestic firms in their sample indicated that at least some of their new products or 
processes had been introduced more quickly as a result of the presence of foreign 
affiliates. Cantwell (1989) studies the effects of entry of US firms in Europe between 
1955 and 1975, and produces findings of a similar nature. Bertschek (1995) analyses 
determinants of innovative activity for a sample of domestic firms in Germany for the 
period 1984-1988. Controlling for variables that affect innovative behaviour (firm 
size, market size and technological competitiveness), the results indicate that inward 
FDI enhances the innovatory activity of the sample of firms. These findings offer 
evidence for the occurrence of positive pecuniary externalities, as an increase in 
competition leads to domestic firms improving their technologies and/or increasing 
their innovatory activities.
Two aspects of this suggested relation between competition and externalities 
are of key importance: (1) do domestic firms possess the capacity to become more 
efficient or productive by improving their technologies and (2) does the entrance of 
FDI always disturb the market equilibrium as is assumed?
Regarding the issue of capacity of domestic firms to change their conduct, 
Veugelers and van den Houte (1990) present findings for the host economy of 
Belgium, suggesting that the competitive pressure can prove to be too strong for 
domestic companies. Although their findings may have been affected by the small 
sample size and selection bias, they find a negative relation between the extent of 
industry-wide participation by FDI and innovatory activities by Belgian companies 
(see Veugelers and van den Houte, 1990). This negative association indicates that the 
entrance of FDI may be too much of a competitive pressure for domestic companies,
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in the sense that they are unable to improve their use of existing technologies or 
introduce new ones. A similar piece of empirical evidence is offered by Cantwell 
(1989), who reports that in those industries where domestic firms do not possess some 
traditional technological strength, the increased competitive pressure resulting from 
the entrance of FDI into Europe either pushed domestic firms into niche markets or 
forced them out of the market altogether (see Cantwell, 1989).
Second, the effect of FDI on the level of competition in the host economy 
market is less clear than usually thought. On the one hand, it can be assumed that the 
entrance of FDI increases the extent of competition, ‘because the MNE affiliates 
strategies typically stir up the established patterns of “gentlemen competition”’ 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, p. 50). Caves argues along similar lines, noting that 
‘whatever the market structure that results from the influence of direct investment, it 
can be argued that entry by a foreign subsidiary is likely to produce more active 
rivalrous behaviour and improvement in market performance than would a domestic 
entry at the same initial scale’ (Caves, 1971, p. 14).
On the other hand, however, it can also be argued that it is not the initial effect 
that foreign affiliates have on competitive pressure that is most important, but rather 
the effect on market structure in the medium and long run. As MNEs show a tendency 
to opt for non-price modes of rivalry, domestic firms may be forced out of the market 
after some time. Also, foreign affiliates may increase or strengthen industry entry- 
barriers, limiting the possibilities of entry by new domestic firms. Lall (1978) refers to 
this possible outcome, stating that ‘initially the entry of foreign competition may 
reduce the existing level of concentration, but in the long run the oligopolistic nature 
and large size of TNCs may well increase it’ (Lall, 1978, p. 227).
The available empirical evidence does not offer conclusive evidence on the
effect of FDI on market concentration. The evidence indicates a positive correlation 
between presence of FDI and market concentration, but the direction of causation is 
not clear. It may be that FDI is drawn towards more concentrated markets (Caves, 
1996). At the same time, the operations of FDI may have led to an increase in the 
level of market concentration. However, even if foreign affiliates do increase the level 
of market concentration, we should try to identify the independent effect of being part 
of a MNE on the level of market concentration (Lall, 1978). This means controlling 
for the positive effect on market concentration of variables such as firm size, 
marketing expenses and R&D activities. The majority of empirical studies have failed 
to do so, however (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998)14.
2.3.2. Vertical Inter-firm Linkages
Vertical inter-firm linkages are the most heavily empirically investigated channel of 
externalities15. The interest in relations between FDI and suppliers and customers -  
backward and forward linkages -  in host economies partly arises from the fact that 
such relations seem to provide ample scope for some form and level of externalities to 
occur. Having said so, research on linkage-creation by FDI is rather heterogeneous 
and qualitative of nature, consisting for the larger part of case studies and small-scale 
survey analysis, which seriously limits the consistency and comparability of 
methodology and findings.
The original interest in backward linkages and forward linkages originates 
from the introduction of the concept by Hirschman (1958). In his interpretation,
14 For empirical evidence of a positive association between foreign participation and industry 
concentration for selected developing countries, see Evans (1977), Willmore (1989), Lall (1979) and 
Blomstrom (1986).
15 See Lall (1978) and Dunning (1993) for surveys; see also UNCTAD (2001).
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relations between downstream and upstream industries could set in motion a mutually 
stimulating process of economic growth. This idea has produced a large interest in the 
study of the size and determinants of local integration by foreign affiliates (see Lall, 
1 9 7 8 )16 However, the concept of externalities in these empirical studies is usually 
loosely defined, with little reference to the underlying concept of linkages as 
stimulator of cumulative production processes (see Rodriguez-Claire, 1996).
As Ottaviano and Puga (1998) underline, relations between firms only give 
rise to backward and forward linkage effects in the case of increasing returns to scale:
‘For a downstream industry to bestow a backward linkage on an upstream industry, it 
is not enough that there is a buyer-supplier relationship between the two: it must be 
the case that an increase in the output o f the downstream industry, by enlarging the 
market for the intermediates it uses, induces the upstream industry to produce at a 
more efficient scale. Similarly, a downstream industry enjoys a forward linkage only 
insofar as an increase in the output o f an upstream sector allows downstream firms 
to produce more efficiently' (Ottaviano and Puga, 1998, p. 715).
The statement indicates that, in principle, there are two sources for pecuniary
externalities from FDI to domestic firms. A backward linkage refers to a situation
where the presence of FDI leads to lower production costs among its suppliers, arising
from the benefits of economies of scale. This efficiency effect is not only enjoyed by
the foreign firm (in the form of lower inputs costs), but also by all other domestic
firms that source from the domestic supplier. A forward linkage applies to the case
where domestic firms achieve pecuniary externalities by buying inputs from FDI,
16 For reviews on general determinants of the use of local suppliers, see Hagey and Malecki (1986) and 
Hoare (1985). For a recent typical empirical investigation into determinants of local sourcing by 
Japanese FDI, see Belderbos et al. (2001).
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which can operate under scale economies due to the scale of the host economy’s 
demand. However, such a specific interpretation of inter-firm linkages between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms is usually not adopted in applied empirical studies.
Next to pecuniary externalities, linkages between FDI and domestic firms can 
give rise to externalities of a technological nature17. Especially Lall (1978; 1980) 
offers insights into this aspect of linkages. The main reason to expect externalities to 
be an important feature of dealings between FDI and domestic suppliers is that, 
generally speaking, markets for intermediate inputs do not resemble perfect markets. 
Sources of market failures include the non-existence of perfect information, 
disparities in the use and availability of types of technology and a limited number of 
buyers and sellers, causing unequal distribution of market power. As a result, markets 
for intermediate products exhibit ‘gross imperfections which compel their buyers and 
sellers to resort to other means of achieving the required co-ordination’ (Lall, 1980, p. 
203). The efforts to solve these market imperfections create the scope for the 
occurrence of technological externalities from FDI to domestic suppliers.
A famous case study indicating the variety of possible technological 
externalities that may be transmitted through backward linkages is presented by Lall 
(1980), who analyses linkages that are established by two truck manufacturers in 
India, one foreign-owned and one domestically-owned. He identifies 10 different 
types of supportive relations between the two manufacturers and their Indian 
suppliers18; backward linkages differing in the extent of technological externalities 
that may be transmitted through them. For example, by receiving information about
17 Here I discuss only backward linkages. For some examples of forward linkages, see Reuber et al. 
(1973).
18 Assistance in establishment, locational assistance, supply of information, technical assistance, 
financial assistance, assistance in raw material procurement, managerial assistance, pricing assistance, 
other distributional assistance and assistance towards diversification of suppliers’ product line(s) (see 
Lall, 1980, p. 214-222).
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future production plans from the two truck manufacturers, local suppliers can adjust 
and improve their long-term investment plans. Assistance in raw material 
procurement can enhance the efficiency in the management of input flows. Also, 
technological assistance may aid local suppliers in their efforts to achieve higher 
levels of efficiency by adapting and improving their production processes19.
Supportive relations between FDI and domestic suppliers create a scope for 
the occurrence of technological externalities. However, in order for such externalities 
to occur, it is important to keep in mind that the gains in efficiency among domestic 
suppliers have to be higher than the benefits that the foreign affiliate receives from 
providing the assistance. For instance, by offering technological assistance, the 
foreign affiliate creates a benefit for itself, as it receives better inputs as a result of the 
assistance. Supportive relations are created by foreign firms to solve some form of 
market failure, and not merely to provide assistance to domestic suppliers (see Lim 
and Fond, 1982)20. Having said so, considering the pragmatic difficulties for a firm to 
exactly balance the amount of assistance with the benefits that it ultimately receives 
from this assistance, it seems plausible to assume that supportive relations lead to the 
occurrence of technological externalities to some extent21.
A final important issue to discuss in this context is related to efficiency 
improvements among domestic suppliers that are related to the type of demand by
19 For another study of such linkages, see Hallbach (1989), who presents an empirical investigation into 
the frequency and intensity of a variety o f types of support offered by a small sample o f foreign 
affiliates in a selection of Asian developing countries.
20 Although Lall’s study is often referred to as an example of the broad scope and intensity of 
technological spillovers from foreign firms, it is important to recognise the influence of the unique 
features surrounding his case study. At the time of his research, the Indian government was applying a 
stringent import substitution policy, virtually ruling out the possibility for the truck manufacturers to 
import any inputs. This situation undoubtedly both increased the need to establish linkages with Indian 
suppliers and the willingness to offer various types and a favourable intensity of assistance to these 
suppliers.
21 In addition, there may be technological and/or pecuniary externalities from FDI, if the assistance 
provided to domestic suppliers spills over to other domestic firms. For instance, if the assistance of FDI 
leads to lower production costs among domestic suppliers, and this cost reduction is transmitted 
through the market to other domestic firms who use these suppliers, an additional pecuniary externality 
has occurred.
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FDI (Dunning, 1993). Foreign affiliates tend to place a stronger demand on domestic 
suppliers in terms of speed of delivery, reliability, and quality of their products. For 
instance, Katz (1969) reports that FDI in Argentinean manufacturing industries 
required local suppliers to modernise, to the extent that they ‘forced their suppliers to 
adopt productive processes and techniques used by suppliers of their main firms in 
their country of origin’ (Katz, 1969, p. 154). This competitive pressure is usually 
interpreted as a technological externality. However, as such competitive pressures are 
normally transmitted through the market (i.e. if the supplier supplies at too high a cost, 
the foreign affiliate will not buy from her), the efficiency improvement among 
domestic suppliers that follows from demand pressures from foreign affiliates should 
be regarded as a positive pecuniary externality.
2.3.3. Labour Mobility
A potentially important channel of FDI-induced externalities is represented by flows 
of labour from FDI to domestic firms. The training efforts of foreign affiliates of their 
labour force create irreversible effects, in the sense that skills gained by workers while 
working for foreign affiliates can not be taken away from them when they decide to 
substitute a domestically-owned firm for a foreign-owned firm. However, it is 
important to recognise that the amount of empirical evidence of technological 
externality effects from labour mobility is scarce (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998).
A prerequisite for technological externalities from labour turnover to occur is 
that workers gain skills while working for foreign affiliates. As Blomstrom and 
Kokko (1998) argue, especially in-developing countries, the training of workers is an 
important source of new technology or improved use of existing technology.
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Gershenberg (1987) analyses training and development efforts of domestic managers 
by foreign affiliates in Kenya. He finds that foreign firms do commit considerable 
resources to these efforts. Chen (1983), analysing the operations of foreign firms in 
Singapore, also stresses the important contributions that foreign firms make in 
training their work force.
If foreign firms make significant efforts to train their work force, there is a 
scope for externalities to occur when workers substitute domestic employers for 
foreign affiliates. Domestic firms may benefit from skills and knowledge that are 
incorporated in workers that gained these skills and knowledge while working for FDI. 
The efficiency or productivity increase of domestic firms that follows from the free 
increase in skills and knowledge is a form of technological externalities, as domestic 
firms do not have to compensate foreign affiliates for this increase in efficiency.
However, an alternative way in which this efficiency effect may arise is 
through pecuniary externalities. Several studies indicate that workers in foreign 
affiliates earn higher wages compared to workers in their domestically-owned 
competitors (see Globerman, 1994; Caves, 1996; also Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004). 
Aitken et al. (1996) identify such differences between the two types of firms in 
Venezuela and Mexico. The source of this difference in wages is multiple, however. 
Firms may differ in productivity and profitability, and employees may possess 
different skill mixes. If, after having controlled for the effects of these factors on 
wages, there is still a wage difference between the two types of firms, the remaining 
difference can be interpreted as a wage premium (Fosfuri et al., 2001), designed to 
lower the willingness of workers to move from foreign-owned to domestically-owned 
firms. By paying a wage premium to their labour force, foreign affiliates transform a 
potential technological externality into a pecuniary externality. The extra skills
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incorporated into the workers of foreign affiliates are available to domestic firms at a 
price, represented by the wage premium22.
2.3.4. Demonstration Effects
FDI-induced extemahties arising through demonstration effects are relatively the 
most characterised by non-market aspects. As foreign affiliates may incorporate new 
technologies, their presence in a host economy may alert domestic firms of their 
existence (Blomstrbm, 1989), or convince domestic entrepreneurs, who are hesitating 
to adopt the new technology, of their use (Chen, 1983).
Because of the nature of demonstration effects, the empirical analysis of the 
occurrence and strength of this channel of externalities is problematic. As Blomstrom 
and Kokko (1998) note, demonstration effects ‘often take place unconsciously; it is 
seldom documented how and where a firm first learns about a new technology or 
product that is subsequently adopted’ (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, p. 15). This leads 
to indirect ways of detecting demonstration effects.
One way to determine the existence of demonstration effects is by analysing 
the diffusion process of technology in a country and assess whether FDI has a positive 
effect on this process. Globerman (1975) looks at the diffusion of specific 
technologies in the Canadian tool and die industry, but finds no evidence of an 
influence of FDI: there are no systematic differences between industries’ adoption
22 It seems unlikely that the transformation of technological externalities into pecuniary externalities 
will be complete. In pragmatic terms, it seems extremely difficult to exactly match the potential 
increase in efficiency among domestic firms by the wage premium -  especially when considering that 
workers previously employed by foreign firms not only may enhance efficiency directly, but also 
indirectly, when other workers learn from them. Therefore, the effect of the wage premium will be a 
lowering of technological extemahties from labour mobility, both by decreasing the tendency of labour 
to change jobs and by partially transforming the remaining technological externalities into pecuniary 
externalities.
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rates of new technologies in relation to the level of industry-wide foreign participation. 
Chen (1983) on the other hand concludes from more qualitative evidence that the 
presence of FDI did stimulate technology diffusion rates in Singapore.
Mansfield and Romeo (1980) apply a survey approach, looking at the 
importance of US outward FDI for technological innovation in host economies. For 
the UK, their findings suggest that -  depending on industry type -  domestic firms felt 
that the presence of US-owned affiliates had increased their technological capabilities. 
Also, this effect is positively related to the amount of foreign participation in an 
industry. In addition, Lake (1979), focusing his study on the semiconductor industry 
in the UK, offers some evidence that suggests that US-owned affiliates show a higher 
propensity to diffuse technology compared to their British competitors.
A different type of demonstration effect is what Aitken et al. (1997) refer to as 
market access spillovers (see also Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Improved 
knowledge of trade-related issues enhances the likelihood of successful penetration of
new markets. As Aitken et al. (1994) argue, ‘ MNEs are a natural conduit for
information about foreign markets, consumers and technology, and provide a natural 
channel through which domestic firms can distribute their goods. To the extent that 
MNEs directly or indirectly provide information and distribution services, their 
activities enhance the export prospects of local firms’ (Aitken et al., 1994, p. 2). In 
the case of market access spillovers from the presence of FDI, the idea is that they 
‘demonstrate’ to domestic firms what it involves to be successful on these markets, 
which constitutes a positive externality when the domestic firms do not (fully) 
compensate the foreign affiliates for this.
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2.3.5. Limitations of Empirical Findings on Channels of Externalities
Empirical findings on the channels of externalities have received serious criticism 
(see Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, also Caves, 1996). One of the main criticisms 
refers to the problem that only a limited number of case studies specifically address 
the occurrence of technological externalities. The majority of findings on 
technological externalities are taken from studies that have been set up to analyse 
other aspects of FDI, producing ‘circumstantial evidence’ on externalities in host 
economies. Second, due to the nature of the predominantly qualitative approaches 
undertaken to study the effects of FDI, problems arise when we want to compare 
findings from different studies. For instance, a common problem in the investigation 
of the extent of linkages between foreign firms and domestic suppliers is that there are 
considerably differences regarding definitions of these linkages, making 
generalisations of findings extremely problematic. Third, due to the nature of the 
studies, it is usually impossible to obtain indications of the extent of technological 
externalities. Measurement of externalities is not an easy task, and the reviewed 
empirical studies usually do not address the issue of measurement of such 
externalities.
In addition to these commonly accepted problems, the previous sections 
provide indications of two further problems that have been ignored in the literature 
thus far. One issue is that there seem to be many cases where it is difficult to identify 
the unique contribution of each of the individual channels. Also, not only may 
externalities arise due to the simultaneous existence of more than one channel, the 
identification is made more difficult due to the large likelihood that the channels are 
interdependent. Second, the concept of technological externalities is usually applied in
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a rather loose manner. Not only does this mean that some effects that are identified as 
technological extemahties should alternatively be labelled as pecuniary externalities, 
but it has also led to ignoring the possibility that negative externalities may arise from 
the presence of FDI.
Simultaneous Occurrence and Interdependence
Although the distinction between separate channels of externalities is very helpful in 
identifying the variety of ways in which externality effects of FDI can arise, the 
reality of the matter is that these channels often operate at the same time. Moreover, 
the implicit assumption that the channels are independent may not hold in a variety of 
situations.
Perhaps the best example of this interdependence is found in the case of 
demonstration effects. As noted earlier, pure demonstration effects are difficult to 
identify, because they usually leave no paper trail. In addition, the identification of a 
unique demonstration effect is problematic due to the fact that demonstration effects 
are ‘often intimately linked to competition’ (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, p. 261).
Not only do the demonstration effect and the competition effect occur 
simultaneously, it is likely that they affect each other. For instance, the presence of 
foreign affiliates may enhance the level of competition in the market. The increase in 
competition increases the need among domestic firms to improve their operations. As 
discussed earlier, Mansfield and Romeo (1980) analysed the influence of US affiliates 
on domestic firm operations in the UK. In addition to technology leaking out from US 
firms to domestic firms (a demonstration effect), they also found that over half of 
their sample of domestic firms indicated that at least some of their products or
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processes had been introduced more quickly as a result of the presence of foreign 
affiliates, thus representing a competition effect. In fact, the simultaneous occurrence 
of both types of effects, as well as the apparent interrelations between them, have led 
some to argue that the most important influences of MNEs on local firms operates 
through the interaction of demonstration and competition (see Blomstrom, 1986).
Although there is a serious lack of empirical evidence, it seems likely that such 
interactions are not confined to the channels of competition and demonstration effects. 
For instance, the increase in competitive pressure from the entrance of FDI may force 
a domestic firm to become more specialised in its production. This may lead the 
domestic firm to become specialised in the production of inputs for foreign firms in 
the host economy. In this case, the initial competition effect has lead to the creation of 
backward linkages. Furthermore, such inter-firm linkages may stimulate 
demonstration effects, as the domestic firm is likely to leam about technologies used 
in the foreign firm through their business relations (see Lall, 1978). Also, inter-firm 
linkages may stimulate workers to substitute a domestic firm for the foreign firm, or 
alternatively create their own independent firms as spin-offs from the foreign firm. If 
such processes are occurring, it becomes extremely difficult to attribute externality 
effects to any individual channel23.
23 An indication of this problem can be found in the earlier referred-to example of the relation between 
the competition and demonstration effect discussed by BlomstrOm and Kokko (1998). They argue that 
the most valuable information of the unique effect of competition can be determined by looking at the 
effect of the entrance of FDI in the short run, before imitation of technology takes place (see 
BlomstrOm and Kokko, 1998). In effect, this means that the competition effect is represented by a 
domestic firm enhancing efficiency keeping its technology constant, whereas the introduction of new 
technology would represent an imitation or demonstration effect. However, it may be that the improved 
use of existing technology is copied from or learned from the foreign firm, in which case the 
demonstration effect is already present. Also, the introduction o f new technology can be a response to 
the presence of foreign firms in the market, without any demonstration effect occurring. In this case, it 
would be a competition effect.
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Neglect of Negative Externalities
The second important shortcoming of empirical research on channels of FDI-induced 
externalities is related to the loose and confusing use of the concept of externalities. 
The loose interpretation of the concept may have created upwardly-biased indicators 
of technological externalities, as pecuniary externalities resulting from the presence of 
FDI are usually interpreted as technological ones. More importantly, the use of ill- 
defined concepts has led to a neglect of the analysis of the possible existence and 
relative importance of negative FDI-induced externalities.
The focus on positive externalities is understandable from the point of view of 
technological externalities. No examples have been provided of cases where negative 
technological externalities arise from the presence of FDI. However, when 
considering pecuniary externalities, negative effects from the presence and operations 
of foreign-owned firms are feasible.
Assuming that the entrance of FDI enhances the level of competition on the 
market, domestic firms may be negatively affected in their level of productivity, if 
they are unable to protect their market shares. In the case where domestic firms are 
initially operating in a market with oligopolistic characteristics, the entrance of 
foreign affiliates may lower the economic rent that domestic firms were previously 
enjoying. The decrease in economic rent lowers the value added of domestic firms, 
which negatively affects indicators of productivity of domestic firms. In this case, the 
entrance of FDI has led to a negative pecuniary externality, in the form of a decrease 
of economic rent following from a decrease in market power among domestic firms 
(see Caves, 1996). Only recently has this idea been followed up upon, most notably 
by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Harrison (1996). They present theoretical
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arguments and empirical evidence of the occurrence of negative FDI-induced 
externalities. Their approach is typified by the statistical identification of externalities 
from FDI; the approach that is reviewed below in section 2.4.
2.4. Statistical Evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced Externalities
The central problem surrounding qualitative studies of FDI-induced externalities is 
that it is extremely difficult to identify the relative importance of such externalities 
and obtain some form of quantification. In contrast, statistical studies are primarily 
concerned with this, estimating FDI-induced externalities arising from the entrance 
and operations of foreign-owned firms in host economies. Generally, such estimates 
do not provide strong indications as to which specific externality channel is 
responsible for the externality, offering indications of the significance and relative 
strength of such FDI-extemalities instead.
A first reading of the literature on statistical estimates of FDI-induced 
extemahties leaves a positive impression of the existence of significant positive 
externalities (see Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; also Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan, 
2000; Ewe-Ghee Lim, 2001). However, others disagree with the level of optimism 
reflected in these sources, and conclude that the empirical evidence of positive 
externalities from FDI is rather weak (see especially Hanson, 2001; also Kumar, 
1996). Furthermore, recent empirical evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities is indicating the existence of significant negative externalities arising 
from the presence and operations of FDI. These conflicting opinions and findings 
indicate the need for a re-evaluation of the available empirical evidence, which is 
presented in this section.
I survey key contributions to empirical research into the existence and 
magnitude of externalities arising from foreign affiliates. These empirical studies can 
be classified into two groups, which are discussed in sections 2.4.1. and 2.4.2. The 
first group consists of cross-country studies of processes of economic growth, in 
which FDI is assessed as a possible determinant of growth. The second group of 
studies addresses the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities by analysing cross- 
industry or plant level samples for host economies, relating levels or changes of 
domestic productivity to the level of industry-wide foreign participation. Following 
this, section 2.4.3. discusses research that is involved in the identification of 
determinants of technological externalities. Most notably, this section discusses the 
use of the concept of technological differences between FDI and domestic firms (as 
indirect indicator of absorptive capacity of domestic firms) as a structural factor that 
influences the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities.
2.4.1. FDI and Economic Growth
There are three main reasons why the presence of FDI may enhance the level of 
economic growth of a host economy (Caves, 1996). It is important to recognise that 
not all the reasons for this positive relation between FDI and economic growth 
represent the occurrence of positive externalities. In fact, two of three explanations for 
the positive effect of FDI originate from neo-classical models of growth. Only when 
interpreting the effect of FDI against the background of endogenous growth models 
does the externality effect of FDI play a role (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).
First, the entrance of FDI -into a host economy represents a form of capital 
accumulation. Equal to the effect of an increase in domestic capital, the influx of
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foreign capital into a host economy leads to an increase in the total volume of capital 
in the host economy, which may stimulate growth. Furthermore, if foreign capital 
attributes to the existing stock of capital in the sense that it improves the distribution 
of overall capital investment over the mixture of economic activity in the host 
economy, it may enhance overall productivity and growth, by eliminating structural 
bottlenecks in the host economy’s production structure (Caves, 1996).
Second, the capital that is incorporated in FDI is likely to have a further 
productivity-enhancing effect, due to ownership-specific advantages that are 
incorporated into foreign affiliates. Overall, the entrance of foreign affiliates 
represents the entrance of more efficient units of production in the host economy. This 
will lead to an increase in the overall level of efficiency in the host economy 
(Dunning, 1985). The resulting increase in efficiency is likely to have a positive effect 
on growth of the host economy.
Third, the presence of FDI may lead to productivity increases among domestic 
producers when FDI-induced extemahties occur. Interpreting FDI as a form of capital 
that incorporates a relative higher level of technology, the entrance of FDI creates the 
scope of externalities, as the new technology may be transmitted to domestic firms in 
the host economy (see Baldwin et al., 1999; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; 
Caves, 1996).
Regarding the question whether growth studies have produced evidence in 
support of the existence of FDI-induced externalities, two central issues need to be 
considered. First, is there a significant positive association between the countrywide 
level of FDI and economic growth? If so, the second issue is whether there is specific 
evidence for externalities. As indicated above, there are three reasons why we may 
expect FDI to have a positive effect on growth patterns, only one of which is related
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to the occurrence of such externalities. Therefore, a positive association between FDI 
and growth is insufficient evidence of the existence of FDI-induced externalities.
FDI-Growth Nexus
Empirical research on the relation between FDI and growth is hampered by a serious 
problem caused by the fact that there is no guidance to a priori establish 
unidirectional causality from FDI to growth (de Mello, 1999). An increase of 
countrywide FDI may create higher growth of the host economy, but likewise, a 
higher growth rate of a host economy may lead to a higher level of countrywide FDI. 
In line with these theoretical obscurities as to the exact relation between FDI and 
growth, empirical findings are mixed. For example, Shan et al. (1997) analyse 
determinants of growth for China, using quarterly time series data for 1988-1996. 
Their findings indicate a long run positive relation, running from FDI to economic 
growth. In contrast, Singh (1988) finds no support for a significant effect of FDI on 
growth for a sample of developing countries, a result similar to that reported by Hein 
(1992) for a sample of 41 developing countries.
Zhang (2001) offers particularly interesting empirical evidence that reflects 
the range of possible relations that may exist between FDI and country growth 
patterns. Investigating the existence of bi-directional causality between FDI and 
growth for a sample of 11 developing countries in Latin America and East Asia for a 
30-year period, Zhang finds a positive relation running from FDI to growth for five 
countries. For the other six countries, the evidence is less clear, as there are 
differences between short and long-term relations. Also, for some countries the 
relation runs from growth to FDI (see Zhang, 2001).
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Finally, de Mello (1999) analyses the effects of FDI in a sample of OECD- 
member and non-member countries between 1970 and 1990. Applying time series 
analysis, he finds no evidence for a long run relation between FDI and growth in 
OECD member countries. For the non-member countries, the relation only holds in 
some countries. Furthermore, for some other countries there is a negative long run 
relation between FDI and growth24.
In short, theory provides no clear answer as to the direction of the relation 
between FDI and growth. As for the empirical evidence, there is no conclusive 
evidence for a unique relation between FDI and growth either. In some countries, 
there is a positive relation from FDI to growth, whereas in other countries the relation 
runs the other way or fails to materialise. Finally, the findings that indicate a negative 
relation between FDI and growth further hinders a clear understanding of the relation 
between the two variables in question.
FDI and Externalities
As mentioned earlier, a positive relation between FDI and economic growth is not 
sufficient evidence for the existence of FDI-induced externalities. As there is no direct 
way to measure externalities, their existence has to be established in an indirect way. 
For instance, technological extemahties are assumed to exist when the level of 
productivity of host economies varies positively with the level of inward FDI, ceteris 
paribus.
De Mello (1999) is a good example of such an indirect approach. In order to 
see whether externalities exist in. the sample of OECD-member and non-member
24 For similar findings of such a negative relation, see Saltz (1992).
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countries referred to earlier, he relates the volume of countrywide FDI with total 
factor productivity indicators for these countries. For the OECD countries, there is a 
positive correlation between FDI and the measure of domestic productivity, which he 
interprets as evidence for the existence of externalities. Blomstrom et al. (1994) 
produce somewhat similar findings of a more indirect nature, as they regress the 
growth rate of real income per capita on FDI, finding a significant association 
between this dependent variable and the cross-country variation of FDI.
Baldwin et al. (1999) construct and empirically test a model that explicitly 
incorporates extemahties arising from MNEs. Their analysis covers a sample of 7 
manufacturing industries for nine OECD countries, for the period 1979-1991. The 
dependent variable is labour productivity growth. Important to note is that they test 
for the explanatory effect of two types of externalities. One type arises from what they 
refer to as ‘osmosis’ (Baldwin, 1999 et al., p. 7): inter-firm knowledge flows through 
channels such as face-to-face discussions, telecommunications and information 
disseminated through scientific papers. The second type of spillovers is captured by 
the level of participation of FDI in the industries in the sample. They try various 
alternative estimations, and find that both indicators of extemahties are significantly 
positively associated with labour productivity growth.
Borensztein et al. (1995) estimate the effect of FDI on economic growth, for a 
sample of 69 developing countries between 1970 and 1990. Their analysis is 
particularly interesting, in the sense that they distinguish between a FDI-induced 
increase in overall technical efficiency in the host economy and extemahties arising 
from the presence of FDI. One of their findings is that FDI contributes to economic 
growth to a larger extent than domestic investment. They interpret this as evidence of 
FDI’s positive effect on technical efficiency. Furthermore, their findings indicate that
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FDI tends to crowd-in domestic investment: a one-dollar increase in the new inflow of 
FDI is associated with an increase in total investment in the host economy of more 
than one dollar (Borensztein et al., 1995). This crowding-in effect is interpreted as 
evidence of the existence of FDI-induced externalities. Domestic firms are able to 
expand due to the presence of foreign affiliates; an expansion facilitated by 
technological externalities enhancing domestic productivity.
Estimation Issues
Empirical estimations of the effects of FDI on growth are hampered by several 
problems. As mentioned earlier, there is the issue that the direction of causation 
between the two variables may run both ways. Second, the high level of aggregation 
of variables makes that the magnitude of the estimated effects of the right hand side 
(RHS) variables has to be interpreted with caution; a problem with is further fuelled 
by the likely existence of the effect of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, with regard 
to the estimations of the existence of externalities, the indirect nature of the evidence 
creates room for alternative interpretations of the estimated effects. Finally, the 
possibility that empirical estimates of technological externalities may (partly) 
represent the existence of pecuniary externalities has not been recognised thus far.
The possibility of the existence of a bi-directional line of causation between 
FDI and growth means that empirical growth estimations face a possible simultaneity 
or endogeneity problem. FDI can affect growth, but at the same time, growth may 
also serve as an explanatory variable for inward investment into host economies. A 
possible solution to the problem-of simultaneity is to regress the growth rate of 
domestic productivity or growth rate of per capita income on FDI (see e.g. Blomstrom
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et al., 1994). A positive association between the level of productivity or the level of 
per capita income and FDI may be explained by foreign affiliates being attracted to 
high productivity or high-income countries (see Hanson, 2001). This problem of 
endogeneity may be solved when the dependent variable takes the form of growth 
rates. For example, even if it were true that FDI locates in high productivity countries, 
a positive relation between FDI in time period t and domestic productivity growth for 
time period t+1 would indicate the existence of an independent effect of the presence 
of FDI on productivity growth of firms in the host economy.
Having said so, the change in dependent variable appears to be only a partial 
solution to the problem. First, it assumes that there is no temporal correlation between 
FDI in time-periods 0 and 1. If there is such temporal autocorrelation, the endogeneity 
problem remains25. Second, it may be the case that FDI is attracted to countries with 
high growth rates of income or productivity. In such cases, the positive relation 
between FDI and growth of productivity or income is reflecting the tendency that FDI 
favours countries that grow relatively faster. In other words, the relation between 
productivity growth and FDI may be explained by a pro-cyclical nature, rather than 
the occurrence of technological externalities. Alternatively, the positive relation 
between productivity growth and FDI may reflect correct expectations on the part of 
FDI regarding future host economy growth rates (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).
A further consideration of the possible effect of endogeneity or simultaneity 
leads to a potentially very important interpretational problem. Relating the locational 
tendency of FDI to underlying processes of convergence of income or productivity
25 A possible explanation for this temporal autocorrelation is offered by Krugman (1997) and Barry and 
Bradley (1997). If MNEs are uncertain in which country to locate new FDI, they may follow location 
patterns of FDI in previous time periods, interpreting these previous location patterns as an indicator of 
the suitability of previously chosen host economies. In such cases, previous FDI and contemporary FDI 
are auto-correlated, due to the strategy of contemporary FDI to minimise uncertainty surrounding the 
choice of host economy.
between countries, the relation between FDI and growth rates of income or 
productivity could turn up as a negative one, if FDI gravitates towards countries with 
high income or productivity levels. As de Mello (1997) notes, ‘if FDI is growth 
enhancing in the long run.. .then this impact should be lower in technological leaders 
than in technological laggards’ (de Mello, 1997, p. 30). Therefore, if FDI tends to 
locate in host economies that can be classified as technological leaders -countries that 
start with higher initial values of income or productivity - the increase in productivity 
resulting from the presence of FDI would be lower compared to host economies that 
are classified as technological laggards. Assuming that foreign investment favours 
high productivity or high-income countries, the initial values of FDI would be higher 
in technologically leading countries, which subsequently show lower growth rates. 
This means that the relation between FDI and growth for the entire sample of 
countries would show up as a negative estimated association between FDI and 
country growth rates.
The second issue relates to problems originating from the use of RHS 
variables that are measured at a high level of aggregation. This high level of 
aggregation, together with likely measurement errors, makes that the variables at best 
only partly capture the effects or the magnitudes of the phenomena that they represent. 
The problems of FDI data are well known (see de Mello, 1997): as there are large 
differences in procedures between countries as to how FDI is measured, FDI 
measurements used in the empirical estimations can only be taken as crude proxies for 
the presence and impact of foreign technologies on host economy growth.
The problem of using aggregated variables is related to the problem of omitted 
variable bias. Usually, the dependent variable (in the form of income or productivity 
growth) is regressed on a limited number of variables, including a variable
representing the level of participation by foreign affiliates in host economies. The 
problem with this is that there is a large number of variables that have shown to have 
some significant explanatory power towards productivity, GDP or income growth (see 
for instance Levine and Renelt, 1992; also Sala-I-Martin, 1997). As individual studies 
only include a limited number of these variables, the variable representing the 
magnitude of FDI may be (partly) capturing the effect of one or more variables that 
have been excluded from the analysis. This becomes more likely when variables are 
aggregates or composites. If this is the case, the estimated effect of FDI will be biased, 
making the empirical results less reliable.
A further problem, somewhat related to the omitted variable issue, is that the 
identification of FDI-induced externalities is of an indirect nature, which creates room 
for disagreement when interpreting the empirical findings. The results of Borensztein 
et al. (1995) provide a good example of this. They argue that the crowding-in effect of 
FDI is evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities. A one-dollar increase 
in foreign investment in a host economy leads to an increase in domestic investment 
of more than one dollar26. They argue that this is evidence of the occurrence of 
externality effects from the presence of FDI. However, it may be that there other 
factors at work, which both explain the efficiency improvement of domestic firms and 
the presence of FDI. Also, as mentioned earlier, such evidence needs to be interpreted 
cautiously, as the presence of FDI may lead to productivity increases among domestic 
firms without the existence of FDI-induced externalities.
26 In contrast, Fry (1992), analysing a macroeconomic model for 16 developing countries for the period 
1966-1988, finds no evidence of any relation between domestic and foreign investment. Furthermore, 
he finds no evidence o f a difference in the effect on growth between foreign and domestic capital.
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2.4.2. FDI-induced Externalities and Industry Studies
The larger part of empirical research estimating FDI-induced externalities in host 
economies consists of industry or plant level studies for individual host countries. 
Especially in the last couple of years, a considerable amount of new empirical 
evidence has been produced in this field. The main focus of this empirical body of 
research rests on relating levels or changes in levels of productivity of domestic firms 
or domestically-owned shares of industries to the magnitude of foreign participation 
in these industries.
2.4.2.I. FDI and Cross-Industry Studies
The original contribution to this approach comes from Caves (1974), who tries to 
determine whether foreign investment in Australian manufacturing industries creates 
positive externalities among domestic firms. Using a sample of 22 domestic industries, 
he estimates the determinants of a partial labour productivity index in the form of 
value added per worker in the shares of industries owned by domestic firms. The 
hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, the level of productivity of domestic firms is 
positively influenced by the extent of participation of foreign affiliates per industry. 
His estimations produce such a positive relation, which leads him to conclude that 
there are positive externalities from foreign investment in Australian manufacturing 
industries27.
27 This interpretation is characteristic for the early contributions of this approach, as reflected in 
Persson and Blomstrom (1983): ‘the basic thought is as follows: if there is a positive relation between 
the productivity level in the domestically-owned plants in an industry and the shares o f foreign plants 
in the same industry (ceteris paribus), the foreign investment does raise the productivity in 
domestically-owned plants through spillover efficiency’ (Persson and Blomstrdm, 1983, p. 495).
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Globerman (1979) applies a similar approach as Caves (1974), using cross- 
section analysis on a sample of 4-digit Canadian manufacturing industries. Compared 
to Caves’ findings, his findings are less prone to estimation errors, as his sample 
contains a larger number of observations (ranging from 42 to 61, depending on the 
specification of the empirical model)28. Globerman’s findings are similar to Caves in 
the sense that he also finds a positive relation between the magnitude of industry-wide 
foreign investment and domestic productivity, be it that the results are sensitive to the 
specific measurement of industry-wide foreign participation, as well as the industry
* 70composition of the sample .
The basic approach introduced by Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979) has 
been adopted by various researchers estimating the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities. Persson and Blomstrom (1983) and Blomstrom (1989) estimate the 
effects of foreign investment in Mexico for a sample of 215 4-digit manufacturing 
industries for 1970, and find robust positive associations between FDI and domestic 
productivity. Kokko (1994, 1996) analyses the same database, trying out alternative 
specifications of both indicators of the magnitude of foreign investment as well as 
different control variables. His main findings confirm the positive relation between 
FDI and Mexican productivity. Also, Kokko et al. (1996) find a positive relation 
between the magnitude of industry-wide foreign investment and domestic 
productivity for a sample of 159 Uruguayan manufacturing plants for 1988. Finally, 
Sjoholm (1997, 1998, 1999) analyses the effects of FDI on measured productivity
28 Caves’ findings are particularly sensitive, as it was not possible to include all independent variables 
in the same empirical estimation (see Caves, 1974).
29 The three measures of foreign participation are the ratio of value added produced in foreign-owned 
plants over total industry value added, a binary variable indicating whether the foreign firms’ share in a 
given industry is higher than 50%, and value added of foreign plants divided by total number of 
employees in domestically owned plants. Of these three alternatives, the latter provides the strongest 
indication of the occurrence of positive externalities from FDI (see Globerman, 1979).
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levels of manufacturing firms in Indonesia, confirming the positive association 
between the two variables.
Estimation Issues
These initial empirical findings on the positive association between the magnitude of 
industry-wide foreign participation and the measured level of domestic productivity 
have generally been interpreted as evidence for the occurrence of positive FDI- 
induced externalities (see Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, 2003). However, it is 
important to recognise that these studies are subject to similar points of criticism as 
those expressed earlier towards cross-country growth studies.
First, the variables used in the estimations usually consist of proxies or 
aggregate average values of underlying phenomena. This potentially introduces all 
kinds of measurement errors into the analysis, which may affect the estimated effects. 
Furthermore, there are considerable differences in both measurement and type of 
control variables between the different studies, making comparisons and 
generalisations much more difficult.
Second, it is likely that the problem of omitted variables plays a role in these 
estimations. As Hanson (2001) notes, ‘though most empirical studies introduce 
additional controls in estimating the correlation between industry productivity and 
multinational presence, the included variables surely do not exhaust the set of factors 
which are likely to influence industry productivity and multinationality’ (Hanson, 
2001, p. 13). The variable that measures the magnitude of FDI may thus capture (part 
of) the effect of some variable that is not included as a control variable in the 
estimation of domestic labour productivity. Of course, the problem of omitted
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variable bias usually surrounds empirical estimates of this type. However, none of the 
empirical studies specifically addresses the question whether important variables have 
been left out, and what the possible effects of these omissions on their estimated 
results may have been.
Thirdly, there is the problem that the line of causation between foreign 
participation and the level of productivity may be bi-directional. A positive 
association between the two variables may indicate that foreign firms are attracted to 
industries with high productivity levels, as well as representing a situation where 
domestic productivity increases due to the presence of FDI (Hanson, 2001). This 
means that the positive relation between FDI and levels of productivity may not be 
sufficient evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities, due to the 
possibility that the foreign investment variable incorporates an endogenous element.
Finally, it is important to consider that the estimates of the existence of 
externalities only concern aggregate effects. Although an obvious point to make, it 
has been rather ignored in interpretations of the empirical findings. Assuming that the 
line of causation uni-directionally runs from the industry-wide magnitude of FDI 
participation to productivity, a positive association between the two variables can, 
technically speaking, only be taken to indicate that the overall externality effect is 
positive. Such a positive association does not necessarily mean that there are no 
negative (pecuniary) externalities, only that the positive externalities outweigh the 
negative ones. Especially for cross-industry studies, this means that there may be 
considerable variation in the benefits of FDI-induced externalities to individual 
domestic firms. It is perfectly feasible that, underlying the overall industry-wide 
positive association between foreign participation and measured domestic 
productivity, some domestic firms benefit from positive FDI - induced externalities,
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whereas other firms suffer from the presence of FDI.
2.4.2.2. Improved Estimations of FDI-induced Externalities
Overall, the early attempts to estimate FDI-induced extemahties have produced a 
positive association between the industry-wide level of foreign participation and the 
measured level of domestic productivity. Having said so, this finding is subject to 
serious points of criticism. After the initial attempts, alternative approaches towards 
the detection of externalities of FDI have been introduced. One change is that the 
number of host economies, for which FDI-induced externalities have been estimated, 
has increased considerably. Second, the estimated empirical models have undergone 
important changes, partly stimulated by improvements in the quality and availability 
of data.
One change in the estimation concerns the change of the dependent variable. 
Instead of using the productivity level of host economy firms or industries, several 
researchers have been able to estimate the effect of foreign investment on the change 
in productivity of domestic firms. An example of this is offered by the study 
presented in Blomstrom and Wolff (1994). Using a cross-sectional sample of 145 
Mexican industries, they estimate the effect of FDI on the rate of labour productivity 
growth of Mexican-owned shares of the industries and on the rate of convergence in 
labour productivity levels between local and foreign firms. Their results indicate that 
both these variables are positively related to the share of foreign participation per 
industry. Empirical findings corroborating this positive association between FDI and 
domestic industry productivity growth are reported by Barrios (2000) for Spain and 
Chuang and Mei Lin (1999) for Taiwain.
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Non Significance and Negative Externalities from FDI
Recent contributions have improved the estimation of externality effects of FDI by the 
use of multi-year plant level data. By looking at how the productivity of domestic 
plants (typically represented by some estimate of total factor productivity) changes 
over time in response to the presence of foreign investment, this improved 
specification of the empirical model allows to control for the presence of unobserved 
factors that may influence both domestic productivity and the behaviour of foreign 
affiliates, hence possibly or partially correcting for the potential endogenous element 
of FDI. Important is that findings of FDI-induced extemahties based on panel data 
estimations appear to have a tendency to produce insignificant or significant negative 
estimated coefficients of the FDI variables.
An example of this type of estimation is offered by Girma et al. (2001), who 
estimate externality effects from the presence of FDI, using a plant level data base of 
over 4000 firms in the UK for the period between 1991 and 1996. Their findings 
suggest that there are no general externality effects from FDI in UK manufacturing 
industries, as the estimated coefficient of the FDI variable fails to reach significance. 
Sgard (2001) is another example of an empirical study that suggest the relative 
unimportance of FDI presence, as he also fails to find a significant relation between 
the level of industry-wide foreign participation and aggregate TFP growth of domestic 
firms in Hungary between 1992 and 1998. Finally, Kinoshita (1999) reports an 
insignificant relation between FDI and TFP growth for a large sample of plants in the 
Czech Republic.
Two high profile empirical studies that present empirical estimates suggesting 
the existence of negative externalities are represented by Haddad and Harrison (1993)
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and Aitken and Harrison (1999). Haddad and Harrison (1993) calculate total factor 
productivity growth (TFP) for domestic plants in Morocco and find a significant 
negative association between domestic TFP growth and the magnitude of foreign 
participation in industries. This results holds for alternative measures of the extent of 
foreign participation and subgroups of the main sample30. Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
also present robust findings suggesting the occurrence of negative externalities from 
the presence of foreign affiliates. Applying panel data analysis to a sample of over 
4000 Venezuelan manufacturing plants, they find that the extent of foreign investment 
at the industry level is significantly negatively related to productivity growth of 
domestic manufacturing firms, indicating the existence of negative external effects 
from the presence of foreign affiliates .
In addition to these two studies, several others have presented findings that 
corroborate the existence of negative effects from the presence of FDI. Konings
(2000) applies panel data analysis on a large sample of plants for the period 1993- 
1997 for Bulgaria, Romania and Poland and finds significant negative associations 
between FDI and TFP growth for the first two countries. Djankov and Hoekman
(1999) analyse a sample of 513 firms from the Czech republic for the period 1992 - 
1996. Again, they find a significant negative relation between industry wide FDI and 
domestic TFP growth. One of the few examples of panel data estimates that suggest 
the presence of positive FDI-induced externalities can be found in Haskel et al. (2002), 
who present a sophisticated panel data analyses covering 1973-1992 for the UK, 
finding a significant positive association between domestic TFP growth and industry-
30 In addition, Haddad and Harrison estimate an equation similar to Globerman (1979), in which they 
find a significant and negative relationship between the level of industry-wide foreign participation and 
the measured level of domestic labour productivity (see Haddad and Harrison, 1993, p. 69-70).
31 Aitken and Harrison (1999) also report findings of a similar empirical estimation for a sample of 
Indonesian manufacturing plants for the period 1975-1989. The results from this estimation are in line 
with their findings for Venezuela (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999, p. 617).
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wide FDI.
The negative effect of FDI on TFP growth is usually explained by the 
existence of a negative competition or market stealing effect (see Aitken and Harrison, 
1999; also Harrison, 1996). When foreign-owned firms enter the host economy 
market, they take part of the market share of domestic firms. This loss in market share 
forces domestic firms to decrease their level of production. In the case where 
domestic firms have previously been benefiting from economies of scale, the decrease 
in production leads to a decrease in efficiency, which is reflected in a decrease in TFP 
growth (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
As discussed in the previous section, this effect should be interpreted as a 
negative pecuniary externality. The presence of foreign affiliates lowers the market 
share of domestic firms through competition. Domestic firms lower their scale of 
production, and see their efficiency decrease as a result. This efficiency decrease is 
the result of increased competition, transmitted through the market mechanism. 
Hence, the effect should be interpreted as a negative pecuniary externality, instead of 
a technological externality.
2.4.3. Endogenous occurrence of FDI-induced Externalities: the concept of 
Absorptive Capacity
The variability of findings on FDI-induced externalities can be interpreted as an 
indication that there may be important structural factors at work that affect the 
occurrence of such externalities (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). Various factors have 
been proposed, related to both the host economy and the foreign affiliates. Zhang
(2001) for instance argues that, in a cross-country setting, the impact of FDI may
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differ, depending on the trade strategy and the level of human capital of host 
economies. Blomstrom et al. (1999) list a considerable number of factors, including 
technological complementarities between foreign affiliates and domestic firms and the 
level of competition on host economy markets. Having said so, they also mention that 
many issues surrounding both the relative importance and the type of effect of such 
structural factors remain unclear (see Blomstrom et al., 1999).
Of the various potential candidates of factors that may affect the occurrence of 
FDI-induced externalities, the relative level of technological competence of host 
country firms -  the level o f absorptive capacity o f domestic firms - has received most
attention. As Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) state, ‘ the ability and motivation of
local firms to engage in investment and learning to absorb foreign knowledge and 
skills is an important determinant of whether or not the potential spillovers will be 
realized’ (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003, p. 16). The hypothesis that this factor may 
influence the occurrence of externalities is based on original ideas on absorptive 
capacity from Cohen and Levinthal (1990) . The idea is that a host economy can only 
benefit from positive FDI-induced externalities when it possesses a sufficient level of 
technological development (absorptive capacity) to learn from technologies that are 
incorporated into foreign affiliates. For instance, the demonstration effect from FDI 
can only occur if domestic firms have sufficient technological understanding to copy 
the technology. If this knowledge is lacking, domestic firms will not be able to copy 
the technology, and no positive externality will materialise.
The concept of absorptive capacity has been translated in empirical research of 
of FDI-induced externalities as the size of technological differences between domestic 
and foreign-owned firms. The idea behind the use of the level of technological
32 See also Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Keller (1996).
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differences, or technology gap, is that this level can be taken as an indirect indicator 
of the level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms. A large value of the technology 
gap can be taken as an indicator of an insufficient level of capacity among domestic 
firms to absorb new technologies, which will lead to the absence of positive FDI- 
induced externalities.
Having said so, without a significant difference between the technological 
levels of the two types of firms, externalities will fail to come into effect as well 
(Wang and Blomstrom, 1992). Externalities from the presence of foreign-owned firms 
arise due to the existence of a technology gap. If this gap is very small, the scope for 
positive externalities to arise will be limited.
This means that the difference in technology - the technology gap - assumes a 
dual role (Kokko, 1994). On the one hand, a large technology gap will prohibit the 
occurrence of FDI-induced externalities, reflecting an insufficient level of absorptive 
capacity among domestic firms. On the other hand, without a significant difference in 
technology, positive externalities of a considerable volume are unlikely to occur either, 
as there is insufficient scope for positive externalities to arise.
Absorptive Capacity or Competition?
In addition to the feature that the level of the technology gap may not have a one­
dimensional relationship with the level of positive FDI-induced externalities, there is 
a problem of another nature, as technological differences between foreign and 
domestic firms may also be related to the occurrence of negative pecuniary 
externalities. Important to note here is that, in line with the original focus in empirical 
research on the identification of positive FDI-induced externalities, the original
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introduction of the concept of the technology gap as indicator of the level of 
absorptive capacity of domestic firms aimed to explain the occurrence or 
maximisation of such positive externalities. As recent empirical findings indicate the 
significant existence of negative externalities, the possibility that technological 
differences between FDI and domestic firms may be connected to the occurrence of 
this type of externalities needs to be considered.
According to the original interpretation of the effect of absorptive capacity, an 
industry that is characterised by a limited level of technological differences between 
foreign and domestic firms is more likely to experience positive FDI-induced 
externalities (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). However, the limited level of 
technological differences between the two types of firms also indicates that it is more 
likely that these firms will be in direct competition with each other. As discussed 
earlier, the presence of such competition between FDI and domestic firms may lead to 
the occurrence of negative pecuniary externalities, if the decrease in production 
volume among domestic firms is accompanied by a loss in efficiency. If such a 
scenario occurs, industries that are characterised by small technology gaps may 
experience negative rather then positive externalities from the presence of foreign 
firms.
Therefore, if the size of the technology gap is taken as an indication of the 
presence or absence of direct competition between foreign-owned and domestic firms, 
the relation between the technology gap and externalities is opposite to the one given 
in empirical research that interprets the technology gap as an indicator of the level of 
absorptive capacity of domestic firms. Following the direct competition argument, a 
large technology gap would indicate that it is unlikely that domestic and foreign 
owned firms are in direct competition with each other. In such cases, negative
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externality effects are likely to be absent. Also, the scope for positive externalities 
will be relatively large. With a decrease in the magnitude of the technology gap, the 
likelihood of negative (pecuniary) externalities increases, as it becomes more likely 
that FDI and domestic firms are in direct competition with each other. Furthermore, 
the small level of the technology gap indicates that there is a limited scope for 
positive FDI-induced externalities to materialise.
In sum, the predicted effect of the level of technological differences between 
FDI and domestic firms differs markedly, depending on the effect that it is assumed to 
represent. If it is related to the level of absorptive capacity, the predicted effect will be 
that there is a negative relation between the size of technological differences and the 
occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities. In contrast, if the level of 
technological differences is taken to represent the presence or absence of direct 
competition between the two types of firms, the predicted effect of the size of the 
technology gap on the occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities is a positive 
one.
Empirical findings on the effect o f the Technology Gap
Cross-country growth studies provide indications of structural differences among 
countries that are related to the level of the technology gap and absorptive capacity. 
Blomstrom et al. (1994) discover that the positive relation between FDI and growth 
only holds for those developing countries in their sample that show relative high 
incomes, which they interpret to suggest ‘that a certain threshold of development is 
needed if the host economies are to absorb new technology from investment by 
foreign firms’ (Blomstrom et al., 1994, p. 254). Borensztein et al. (1995) report
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findings of a similar nature, as they find that the presence of FDI only resorts to 
higher productivity levels in those countries that have passed a minimum threshold 
stock of human capital. Finally, Bin Xu (2000) analyses the effects of US FDI on total 
factor productivity in a sample of host countries, finding that a significant positive 
relation only materialises in developed countries.
These findings suggest that the level of technological development in host 
economies plays an important role for externalities to materialise. The difference in 
the estimated effect of FDI between developed and developing countries indicates the 
importance of the presence of a sufficient level of absorptive capacity. In other words, 
there appears to be a negative relation between the size of the technology gap and the 
occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities.
However, these empirical findings need to be interpreted with caution, as they 
are not as clear-cut as it seems. Other empirical findings suggest a different type of 
relation. Especially de Mello (1999) is important in this respect. He identifies a 
difference in the type of effect of FDI on growth between OECD and non-OECD 
countries. However, the main difference is that the growth-enhancing effect of FDI is 
larger in the latter group of countries. This difference in estimated effect between the 
two sets of countries appears to indicate the need for a considerable technology gap to 
exist between foreign and domestic firms for positive externalities to arise. Adhering 
to the absorptive capacity assumption would have created an opposite prediction. 
From the assumption that non-OECD countries have a lower level of absorptive 
capacity compared to OECD member countries, the technological difference between 
FDI and domestic firms would be larger in the first type of countries, making 
positive FDI-induced externalities more likely to arise in the OECD member countries.
Further evidence about the possible effect of technological differences 
between FDI and domestic firms on the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities can 
be found in cross-industry studies. Kinoshita’s (1999) empirical analysis benefits 
from having information that allows him to construct a more direct measure of the 
level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms. As mentioned earlier, his general 
estimations indicate that industry-wide foreign participation is not significantly 
associated with measured productivity of domestic firms in the Czech Republic (see 
Kinoshita, 1999). However, when distinguishing between domestic firms based on the 
level of R&D investment they make, the estimations indicate a significant positive 
association for those domestic firms that have relatively high levels of spending on 
R&D. Taking the level of R&D spending as an indication of the level of absorptive 
capacity of domestic firms, this result indicates a positive effect of the level of 
absorptive capacity on the occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities (see 
Kinoshita, 1999).
The majority of empirical studies use technological differences as indirect 
indicator of the level of absorptive capacity. The empirical evidence from these 
studies is mixed. Findings presented by Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Kokko 
(1994, 1996) are good examples of this feature. Their empirical findings do suggest 
that the presence of FDI reduces the productivity gap between FDI and domestic 
firms, however only in those industries where the initial technology gap is not too 
large . This would suggest that domestic firms need a sufficient level of absorptive 
capacity to allow positive FDI-induced externalities to materialise. However, their 
estimations do not reveal any differences in estimated effects of FDI between low- 
tech and high-tech industries. The absorptive capacity assumption would predict
33 See Imbriani and Reganitti (1997) and Girma et al. (2001) for similar findings for Italy and the UK.
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differences in estimated effects of FDI for the two sets of industries, as it is likely that 
the level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms differs between the two types of 
industries.
Furthermore, some recent empirical evidence is available that suggests that the 
level of technological differences may alternatively reflect the presence or absence of 
direct competition between FDI and domestic firms. A good example of this can be 
found in Barrios (2000). Estimating FDI-induced externality effects for a large panel 
of Spanish manufacturing firms, he finds structural differences between high-tech and 
low-tech industries. However, whereas in high-tech industries there is no significant 
effect from the participation by foreign firms, in low-tech industries the estimated FDI 
effect is significant negative (see Barrios, 2000). The absorptive capacity hypothesis 
predicts a positive sign in these industries, as it is likely that the level of technological 
differences between domestic and foreign-owned firms is smaller in these industries. 
However, considering that it is likely that foreign and Spanish firms are in direct 
competition in low-tech industries (indicated by the relative small technology gap), 
the estimated negative externality effect can be interpreted as resulting from a 
negative competition effect in the form of negative pecuniary externalities.
A further piece of empirical evidence is presented by Zukowska-Gagelmann
(2000), who estimates externality effects from FDI for a large set of manufacturing 
plants in Poland for the period 1993-1997. Summarising the main empirical results, 
Zukowska-Gagelmann states that ‘FDI is found to have a negative impact on the 
performance of the most productive local firms in high competition industries. By 
contrast, the effect on the least productive state firms in low competition industries is 
positive’ (Zukowska-Gagelmann, 2000, p. 223). Again, the difference in the estimated 
externality effect of FDI between the two groups of firms is better explained by the
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presence or absence of negative externality effects from direct competition between 
FDI and domestic firms.
Finally, Castellani and Zanfei (2003) use a plant-level database of 
manufacturing firms in France, Italy and Spain for the period 1993-1997. Their 
empirical findings are in support of interpreting the technology gap as representing 
the presence or absence of direct competition. Their estimations indicate the 
significant presence of positive FDI-induced externalities, but only in those industries 
that are characterised by large technology gaps, suggesting the absence of negative 
(pecuniary) externalities that may arise when FDI and domestic firms are in direct 
competition for market shares.
In sum, the empirical evidence does suggest that there are structural 
differences regarding estimated externality effects of FDI. The level of absorptive 
capacity is a likely candidate to be responsible for the existence of such structural 
differences, as indicated by findings presented by Kinoshita (1999). However, the use 
of the indirect indicator of absorptive capacity in the form of the technology gap 
appears to be problematic, as its effect on the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities 
is open to two opposing interpretations. In essence, the available empirical evidence 
indicates that the level of technological differences between FDI and domestic firms 
may be related to the occurrence of both positive and negative externalities, 
depending on whether it represent the relative capacity of domestic firms to absorb 
technology, or alternatively indicates the presence or absence of direct competition 
between FDI and domestic firms.
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2.5. Summary of Main Findings
This chapter has offered an extensive review of research into the occurrence of FDI- 
induced externalities in host economies. In addition to providing an overview of the 
main approaches and empirical findings of this type of research, several important 
aspects and characteristics of this research have been discussed, which contribute to 
the existing literature on this topic. Also, they are important in light of the following 
chapters of this thesis.
First, the concept of externalities in research on externality effects is usually 
loosely defined. Although the terminology of research in this field usually refers to 
technological spillovers or externalities, pecuniary externality effects are also covered 
by the adopted definitions. Furthermore, the focus on technological externalities has 
led to the situation that, at least until recently, the sole emphasis of both theoretical 
ideas and empirical estimations has been put on the explanation and identification of 
positive FDI-induced externalities. To correct for these anomalies, I adopt the term of 
FDI-induced externalities in this thesis, to indicate externality effects from the 
presence and operations of FDI.
These externalities may be of a technological or pecuniary nature, and may 
lead to both positive and negative efficiency or productivity effects among domestic 
firms in a host economy. When FDI acts as a source of new technology for domestic 
firms, externality effects will be a mixture of technological and pecuniary externalities. 
In the case where the presence of FDI leads to a change of conduct of domestic firms, 
the externality effects will predominantly or exclusive be of a pecuniary nature. 
Furthermore, it is likely that both types of effects (FDI acting as source of new 
technology and as instigator of changed domestic firm behaviour) co-exist, making it
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more difficult to identify the unique contribution of each effect on the creation of 
FDI-induced externalities.
Second, a large part of the review chapter is devoted to an extensive review of 
both qualitative and quantitative empirical research into the occurrence of FDI- 
induced externalities. Research that is more qualitative of nature addresses the 
workings of channels of externalities. This set of channels consists of the competition 
effect, inter-firm linkages between FDI and domestic firms, processes of human 
capital accumulation and labour turnover and demonstration and learning effects. 
Externality effects arising from the competition effect are of a pecuniary nature, 
whereas demonstration and learning externalities can be envisaged as consisting of 
technological externalities. The remaining two channels of externalities are likely to 
transmit a mixture of both technological and pecuniary externalities.
The interpretation and generalisation of empirical findings from research on 
channels of externalities suffers from several problems. Empirical evidence is mixed, 
and comparisons between different findings are difficult due to the nature of the 
research, consisting mostly of case studies or small-scale surveys. Problems with 
definitions mean that pecuniary externalities are likely to have been interpreted as 
technological externalities. Importantly, this had led to a non-consideration of the 
possible existence of negative externalities. Furthermore, it appears extremely 
difficult to attribute unique contributions to separate channels, as they are likely to 
operate simultaneously and to be interrelated. Finally, due to the nature of this 
approach, no indications of the magnitude or generality of FDI-induced externalities 
are available.
Third, statistical estimates -of the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities are 
designed to identify the significance and magnitude of such externalities in host
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economies. Part of the empirical evidence is available from cross-country growth 
regressions that include the cross-country variation of FDI as one of the RHS 
variables. Furthermore, cross-industry or plant level estimates of determinants of 
domestic firm productivity incorporate industry-wide foreign participation as RHS 
variable. The review of the available empirical evidence identifies a considerable 
number of estimation problems and interpretational issues that need to be considered 
when estimating FDI-induced externalities.
The range of findings indicates that it is impossible to predict the effect of FDI 
a priori. In different settings, magnitudes of countrywide or industry-wide foreign 
participation have been found to be significantly positively or negatively associated 
with measured levels or growth rates of host economy productivity. Therefore, the 
only valid conclusion from the available empirical evidence is that both positive and 
negative externalities may occur from the presence and operations of FDI. Effectively, 
this means that the effect of FDI in any particular host economy setting has to be 
determined empirically.
Next, the estimated effects of FDI (positive or negative) have to be interpreted 
with caution, as there are several estimation problems that may produce bias in the 
estimated effects. A central problem originates from the fact that, in addition to the 
difficulty of predicting the type of effect of FDI on productivity a priori, it is 
impossible to predict the line of causation between the two variables of interest. For 
instance, a positive association between FDI and productivity may reflect a process 
where the presence of foreign firms enhances productivity levels of domestic firms in 
a host economy. However, it may just as easily indicate that countries or industries 
with higher productivity levels attract higher levels of foreign participation.
In addition to this fundamental specification problem , several estimation is­
sues hamper the practice of estimating FDI-induced externalities. Due to the high 
level of aggregation of variables, caution is required in the interpretation of the exact 
magnitude of estimated coefficients. Related to this, there is the problem of omitted 
variable bias. The high level of aggregation makes it possible that RHS variables are 
correlated with effects that are not included in the regression. Of course, due to the 
nature of these estimation techniques, there are bound to be effects that are not 
included in the estimation, but it is important to at least consider the possible bias that 
this introduces into the estimated FDI effect. Finally, the indirect nature of the 
evidence of the existence of FDI-induced externalities calls for caution in the 
interpretation.
Finally, structural differences between sub-samples of industries or countries 
in terms of the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities suggest that there are factors 
at work that influence the occurrence of these externalities. Thus far, the level of 
absorptive capacity of domestic firms is the only commonly accepted determinant of 
FDI-induced externalities. However, the use of this factor in empirical research 
appears to be open to criticism. Important to stress is that the criticism is not directed 
towards the relevance of the concept of absorptive capacity as such. The assumption 
that the level of externalities will be enhanced when domestic firms are more capable 
to learn from and absorb technologies operated by FDI seems to be a perfectly valid 
one.
The problem originates from the fact that the size of the technology gap, 
which is usually taken as an indirect measure of the level of absorptive capacity of 
domestic firms, may represent another effect instead. The review shows that this 
variable can alternatively be interpreted as an indicator of the presence or absence of 
direct competition between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms. This
alternative indicator may have an opposing effect on FDI-induced externalities as 
compared to the effect of absorptive capacity. Empirical evidence indicates that the 
support for the concept of absorptive capacity is not complete. Also, alternative 
empirical evidence appears to support the interpretation that the level of technological 
differences reflects the presence or absence of direct competition.
Therefore, findings from empirical studies of FDI-induced externalities that 
use the concept of the technology gap as indicator of absorptive capacity need to be 
interpreted with serious caution. Furthermore, the fact that the use of the only 
commonly accepted determinant of FDI-induced externalities is open to serious 
criticism strongly reflects the need to identify alternative determinants of such 
externalities.
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Chapter 3 Agglomeration economies and FDI
3.1. Introduction
In recent decades, an increasing amount of both theoretical and empirical evidence 
has been produced in support of the notion that productivity and efficiency levels of 
both industries and individual firms are positively affected by the type of distribution 
of economic activity over geographical space. This evidence suggests that, compared 
to firms located elsewhere, firms that are located in a geographic concentration of 
activity may enjoy additional benefits, commonly referred to as agglomeration 
economies. The striking feature of these benefits is that they are uniquely related to 
the existence of the locational aggregation of economic actors in geographical space.
The previous chapter has identified the main problems in empirical studies on 
FDI-induced externalities that interpret the level of technological differences between 
domestic and foreign-owned firms as a structural factor that influences the occurrence 
of these externalities. In addition to this problem that surrounds the commonly 
accepted determinant of FDI-induced externalities, there is also an important lack in 
the existing literature regarding the robust identification of new or alternative 
determinants of FDI-induced externalities. The purpose of the present chapter is to 
attempt to improve upon this situation, by assessing whether the level of geographical 
concentration of economic activity of industries within a country may be such a 
structural factor that affects the occurrence and the level of FDI-induced externalities.
The chapter is constructed as follows. Section 3.2. introduces the concept of 
agglomeration economies. Section 3.3. contains an overview of the main types of 
external economies that may arise from geographical concentration. Section 3.4.
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addresses the key aspects of the relations between FDI and agglomeration economies. 
Section 3.5. contains a summary of the limited amount of available empirical 
evidence on these relations. Finally, section 3.6. summarises the main points and 
assesses the importance of agglomeration for the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities.
3.2. Agglomeration Economies
3.2.1. Introduction
Economic activity has shown a persistent tendency to concentrate in space. This
geographical concentration, or agglomeration34, can be witnessed at several levels.
For instance, 50% of world GDP is produced by 15% of the world’s population and
54% of world GDP by countries occupying only 10% of the world’s land area
(Henderson et al., 2000). Similarly, such a tendency to concentrate applies to the
creation of certain metropolitan areas within individual countries (Henderson, 2000).
Moreover, urban hierarchies within countries have remained remarkably stable over
time (Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Also, within individual cities, agglomerations of
economic activity can be found, for instance in the form of large commercial districts
such as Soho in London and Montparnasse in Paris (Fujita and Thisse, 2002).
The phenomenon of geographical concentration is an important one. In fact,
when considering the variety of forms, the strength and the persistence of this
geographical concentration of activity, some even state that ‘the most striking fact
about the economic geography is the uneven distribution of activity’ (Henderson et al.,
34 In this chapter, the terms geographical concentration and agglomeration are used interchangeably. 
These terms are preferred over the general term of concentration, which is usually used to describe 
different economic phenomena (Huriot and Thisse, 2000).
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2000, p. 1). It is therefore no surprise that this special feature of firms’ location 
behaviour has occupied economists and regional scientists for more than a century 
now (see e.g. Marshall, 1890; Hoover, 1948; Dicken and Lloyd, 1990; Krugman, 
1991a, 1991b; Fujita et al., 1999). At the same time, it is important to acknowledge 
that no unique underlying model can explain the variety of forms of geographical 
concentrations that can be witnessed empirically. What is true at one spatial scale 
does not necessarily hold at a different one (Martin, 1999)35. Having said so, ‘a few 
general principles seem to govern the formation of distinct agglomerations, even 
though the content and intensity of the forces at work may vary with place and time’ 
(Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p. 3).
Traditional location theories based on the principle of the minimisation of 
production costs (including transportation costs) encounter serious problems when 
trying to explain the geographic concentration of economic activity (Chinitz, 1961). 
Such a concentration of economic activity would lead to an increase of the prices of 
inputs. This increase in input prices would subsequently lead to a dispersion of 
activity, as a result of firms trying to find lower input prices. As the empirical picture 
is one of persistence of geographical concentrations of economic activity, alternative 
theories that explain such concentrations have been developed. One of these 
alternative theories is that agglomerations of activities create some unique beneficial 
effects for firms located in these concentrations, compared to firms located elsewhere. 
These beneficial effects of concentration in geographical space are commonly referred 
to as agglomeration economies, or economies of agglomeration (Gordon and McCann, 
2000) 36.
35 Fujita and Thisse refer to this as “the ecological fallacy” (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p. 2).
36 The fact that transport costs and regional factor prices may not always provide satisfactory 
explanations for the existence of geographical concentrations o f economic activity does not mean that 
agglomeration economies are all prevalent in such agglomerations of activity. For instance, McCann
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3.2.2. The Concept of Agglomeration Economies37
The origins of the idea that an agglomeration of economic activity can create unique 
economic effects can be traced back to the writings of Marshall (1890), who studied 
the functioning of regional economies in the United Kingdom at the end of the 19th 
century38.
A striking feature of these regional economies, or industrial districts, is that 
they consisted of related industries. Marshall suggested that such a geographical 
concentration of related activities produces certain beneficial effects, economies of 
agglomeration, which put firms in these concentrations at an advantage over firms 
located elsewhere. Important to note is that these beneficial effects occur in the form 
of external economies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of external 
economies refers to the situation where the benefits are not internal to any given firm. 
Instead, they accrue to all firms alike. Applied to the occurrence of external 
economies in a geographical concentration of activity, interpreting agglomeration 
economies as external economies means that these economies cannot be internalised 
by any individual firm, but instead are enjoyed by all the firms in the geographical 
concentration of activity39.
(1995) identifies four different types of geographical concentrations of activity, of which only two are 
uniquely linked to agglomeration economies (see McCann, 1995, p. 573-574).
37 In this chapter, I discuss the general concept of agglomeration economies. This concept plays a 
crucial role in theories o f urbanisation. In fact, it has been noted that, in explaining cities other than 
company towns (Fujita, 1988), agglomeration economies are the prime reason for the existence of 
cities: ‘scale economies are the basis of urban agglomeration -  the reason we have cities' (Henderson, 
2001, p. 243; italics added). In this chapter, I borrow heavily from urbanisation literature, as the use of 
the concept of agglomeration economies in theories of urbanisation and location decisions shows many 
similarities. A recent example of this can be found in Fujita et al. (1999), who show that similar 
theoretical analysis may be applied to explain processes o f urbanisation and industry or firm location 
behaviour. However, I do not discuss specific theories o f urbanisation, as these are beyond the scope 
of my subject. For a discussion of such: theories, see Mills (1967), Henderson (1974, 1988), Fujita 
(1988) and Fujita et al. (1999).
38 For another early contribution on the UK, see Wensley and Florence (1940).
39 As such, this type o f external economies consists of an a-spatial and a spatial component (McCann, 
1995). Scale economies arise from an a-spatial process: the. decrease of average production costs as a
Starting from the premise that an agglomeration of economic activity may 
create external economies, the exact interpretations of this phenomenon are diverse. 
One interpretation of this type of external economies is based on cost savings that are 
related to the size of the agglomeration (see e.g. Sveikaukas, 1975). This leads to 
statements such as ‘agglomeration economies exist when resources are more 
productive in large cities than in small ones’ (Helsey and Strange, 1991, p. 96). 
Similar opinions are held by Dicken and Lloyd, who argue that ‘individual firms 
benefit from cost economies at second hand from scale factors operating outside 
themselves’ (Dicken and Lloyd, 1990, p. 208) and also by Parr (2002), who sees 
agglomeration economies as cost savings to the individual firm that depend on the 
scale of the industry to which the firm belongs (see Parr, 2002).
A related definition, one that originates more specifically from theories on 
urbanisation, is offered by Eberts and McMillen (1999):
‘agglomeration economies refer to situations where....the activities o f dissimilar 
businesses (and households) generate positive externalities that lower the production 
costs o f one establishment as the output o f  other businesses increases. The 
externalities result from businesses sharing non-excludable inputs, such as a common 
labour pool, technical expertise, communication and transportation networks ’ (Eberts 
and McMillen, 1999, p. 1457).
This definition hints at the importance of collective or public goods that are created as
a result of the existence of an agglomeration of activity: ‘economies of agglomeration
exist when an urban area provides .an input that lowers costs for all firms’ (Eberts and
result of an increase in production. The spatial component consists o f the fact that the decrease in 
average production costs arises from the increase in production of the overall geographical 
concentration of activity, rather than from any individual firm within the agglomeration.
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McMillen, p. 1470). For instance, the collection of firms in a city allows for the 
efficient use of a transportation network, which is not available to individual firms 
located outside a geographical concentration of activity.
An alternative and broader interpretation of agglomeration economies is 
expressed by Kaldor (1970). In considering the importance of the effects of the 
geographical distribution of economic activity for processes of regional development, 
he defines agglomeration economies as:
 nothing else but increasing returns to scale - using that term in the broadest
sense - in processing activities. These are not just economies o f large scale 
production, but the cumulative advantage arising from the growth o f industry itself - 
the development o f skill and know-how; the opportunities for easy communication o f 
ideas and experience; the opportunity o f ever-increasing differentiation o f processes 
and o f specialisation in human activities ’ (Kaldor, 1970, p. 340).
This definition indicates that Kaldor also interprets agglomeration economies as 
increasing returns to scale (in the form of positive externalities). However, large-scale 
economies are only one source for these geographically confined externalities. In 
addition to this source, Kaldor stresses the importance of an underlying dynamic 
growth process, which may explain the cumulative nature of the development of an 
agglomeration. For instance, within an agglomeration, it is easy for ideas to flow from 
one agent to another. The positive relation between geographical concentration and 
flows of knowledge means that firms have easy access to this knowledge, which takes 
on the characteristics of a regionally confined public good.
Furthermore, Kaldor underlines the dynamic aspects of specialisation and dif­
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ferentiation of production processes. If firms can be more specialised in their 
operations due to their presence in a geographical concentration, the enhancements in 
specialisation and differentiation in the agglomeration will lead to productivity 
increases. This will result in economic growth, and attract further economic activity to 
the agglomeration. This increase in activity may give rise to further increases in 
specialisation, and so on.
Finally, an interpretation of agglomeration economies that is related to a more 
general ease of transactions and communications within urban areas is offered by 
Mills (1992). Mills holds that clustering (geographic concentration) leads to lower 
transaction and time costs: ‘if large SMAs economise on time costs, this shows up in 
the SMA account as greater total factor productivity. I believe this to be the key 
explanation of agglomeration economies’ (Mills, 1992, p. 199)40. Placing the concept 
of agglomeration economies in the context of urban areas and processes of 
urbanisation, Mills ignores the possible effects of large scale production and 
increasing specialisation, emphasising instead the ease of transactions and 
communications that large cities enjoy in comparison to more remote and less dense 
areas. In essence, large cities offer better opportunities to engage in transactions of a 
more diversified nature, at lower transaction costs compared to firms located in 
smaller cities or rural areas (see also Jacobs, 1969)41.
40 SMA = statistical metropolitan area.
41 Important to note is that transaction costs represent more than narrowly defined costs of transport and 
communication, which have experienced dramatic declines over the last decades (Dicken, 1998). 
Transaction costs refer to a more encompassing concept, related to a set of factors relevant to the 
process of engaging in, finalising and monitoring transactions, be it that the exact definition remains 
unclear (see Williamson, 1975). See Scott (1988) for an application of the concept o f transaction costs 
in explaining the creation of regionally confined external economies.
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3.2.3. Mechanisms of Externalities
Although there is widespread recognition of the importance of agglomeration 
economies (Henderson, 2001), the previous section indicates that the exact 
interpretations of the concept of agglomeration economies differ considerably. An 
explanation for the existence of such different interpretations is that that there is a 
variety of underlying causes that lead to the occurrence of spatially confined external 
economies (Hanson, 2000). This is also recognised by Gordon and McCann (2000),
who state that ‘the actual sources are quite different, and the mechanisms by which
these are transmitted also differ substantially. It is solely the issue of geographical 
proximity which is the common element determining their being grouped under the 
general heading of “external economies” of industrial clustering’ (Gordon and 
McCann, 2000, p. 516). Marshall (1890), who introduced the concept of 
agglomeration economies, distinguished between three separate micro-foundations of 
spatially limited externalities: labour market pooling, intermediate inputs and 
information or technological spillovers.
3.2.3.1. Labour Market Pooling
The agglomeration of economic activity may lead to the existence of a thick labour 
market in the agglomeration, which offers some specific benefits. Firms can easily 
change their volumes of production, knowing that the required amount of labour is at 
hand (Hoover, 1948). In contrast, a firm in isolation lacks this flexibility, and will 
need to keep enough labour in employment for the peaks of production volume. In 
times of lower production volumes, part of the labour force will be idle. Angel (1989),
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in assessing the contribution of the local labour market of Silicon Valley to the 
success of this agglomeration of high tech production, finds that ‘within this 
specialised industrial complex, firms are able to adjust their employment base easily 
in response to changes in labour demand; workers are able to respond to new 
employment opportunities as they occur. The ability to reconstruct the work force 
swiftly and at low cost constitutes an important dimension of the new forms of 
manufacturing flexibility emerging in Silicon Valley’ (Angel, 1989, p. 100)42.
Furthermore, the flexibility aspect of the thick local labour market not only 
applies to the quantity of labour, but also to the quality of labour. The existence of the 
concentration of firms allows individual workers to become more specialised in their 
skills, knowing that the collection of firms ensures a sufficient aggregated demand for
more specialised skills. In contrast, ‘....the owner of an isolated factory is often put
to great shifts for want of some special skilled labour; and a skilled workman, when 
thrown out of employment in it, has no easy refuge (Marshall, 1920, p. 226)43. 
Similarly to the quantity argument, a firm in the agglomeration can hire specialised 
labour when it needs to, instead of permanently employing labour with special skills, 
which may not be needed at the intensity or frequency that would justify such full 
time employment. For example, whereas an isolated firm may have to hire specialised 
maintenance personnel on a full time basis, a firm in an agglomeration can hire such 
personnel only for the time period needed.
42 As Gordon and McCann (2000) state: ‘in terms o f modem thinking...the advantage o f a specialised 
local labour pool can be described in terms of a labour-market system which maximises the job 
matching opportunities between the individual worker and the individual firm...thus reducing the 
search costs for both parties’ (Gordon and McCann, 2000, p. 516). See also Duranton and Puga (2003),
Eberts and McMillen (1999) and Helsey and Strange (1991).
43 Shenfield and Florence (1944-1945),-analysing the functioning of the regional concentration of 
motor car related industries in Coventry around 1940, also stress the importance of the specific skills of 
local workers, as they ‘....helped to keep for the city’s industries the special quality o f keenness and up-
to-dateness for which they had long been famed ’, thus creating ‘....an external economy not
available in the same measure elsewhere’ (Shenfield and Florence, 1944-45, p. 80).
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3.2.3.2. Specialised Local Inputs
A geographical concentration of economic activity stimulates the creation of local 
(non-traded) intermediate goods (Henderson, 2001). Producers of such goods can 
come into existence exactly due to the volume of the aggregate demand of the 
collection of individual firms. Again, this effect has a quantity and a quality aspect to 
it. The quantity aspect is that firms can minimise on the time costs of stock keeping, 
knowing that the pool of suppliers guarantees ample supply of required inputs at short 
notice (Hoover, 1948). The quality aspect refers to the fact that the concentration 
allows for the increasing availability of specialised suppliers, which produce inputs 
that would be very costly to be produced by any individual firm.
A famous example of this effect is described by Vernon (1960), who, in a 
study of the functioning of the regional economy of New York, analysed the effects of 
the garment industry being agglomerated in this city. The level of geographical 
concentration of this industry allowed some firms to specialise in the production of 
the simple product of buttonholes. Before, each firm had to produce buttonholes for 
their own products. However, the aggregate demand created by the concentration of 
garment producers allowed some firms to specialise exclusively in the provision of 
this service. Due to a sufficient level of aggregate demand, these specialist suppliers 
were able to achieve economies of scale in their production. The resulting decrease in 
costs of the service enabled the other firms to subcontract the production of 
buttonholes to these regional specialist suppliers. Subsequently, they could become 
more specialised in their production process as well. Overall, the increase in 
specialisation enhanced the level of efficiency in the production in the garment 
industry in New York.
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A related positive externality that puts firms in the agglomeration at an 
advantage over firms located in isolation is caused by the provision of non-excludable 
inputs in the form of public services, such as transportation and communication 
networks and utilities (Fujita, 1988). Again, these services would be extremely costly 
for individual firms, but they become affordable in the agglomeration because the 
costs are spread over all the users in the agglomeration44.
Finally, the aggregation of firms leads to two additional beneficial effects 
compared to firms located elsewhere. One is that the agglomeration may benefit from 
price reductions arising through bulk transactions. The combined demand for inputs 
from the collection of firms may lead to lower prices for inputs, as discounts may be 
given due to large scale demand45. Also, firms may pay lower prices for inputs as a 
result of lower transport costs. Transport costs per unit of input are negatively related 
to the quantity of inputs transported (Hoover, 1948). The scale of demand from the 
collection of firms is likely to lower the price of inputs paid by the individual firms 
located in the agglomeration.
3.2.3.3. Information Spillovers
The third source for agglomeration economies is the occurrence of information 
spillovers. Marshall (1920) famously described the importance and workings of the 
exchange of information in industrial districts as follows: ‘...the mysteries of the trade
44 For instance, the city of London uses a specialist dedicated wide-band fibre-optic cable system, 
maximising the flow of information between the financial institutions in this district (McCann, 2001). 
Due to the high costs, it would have been impossible to construct this system for only a limited number 
of firms. However, the high extent of geographical concentration of financial firms in London has 
made the creation of this sophisticated communication system feasible, as the costs of the investment 
are spread over a large number of users.
45 Differently put, the aggregation of activity allows for the existence of distributors, which buy inputs 
in bulk for the agglomeration, at lower prices compared to the situation where firms have to buy these 
inputs individually.
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become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air....if one man starts a new idea, it is 
taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus becomes the 
source of further ideas’ (Marshall, 1920, p. 225).
Through means such as labour turnover, face-to-face contacts and informal 
meetings between agents in a geographic concentration of activity, knowledge is 
shared in the agglomeration and used by many agents free of charge. In addition to 
such a creation of local pools of knowledge, ideas are shared and improved upon, 
stimulating creativity in the agglomeration. The importance of the effects of the 
creation of local pools of knowledge and cross-fertilisation of ideas is stressed by e.g. 
Lucas (1988), who argues that ‘New York City’s garment district, financial district, 
diamond district, advertising district and many more are as much intellectual centres 
as are Columbia or New York University’ (Lucas, 1988, p. 38; see also Lucas, 2001; 
Jacobs, 1969).
3.2.4. Processes of Regionally Confined Externalities
Although there are various interpretations of the causes of agglomeration economies, 
three main factors have been identified in the previous section: labour market pooling, 
specialised local inputs and information spillovers. These factors may be related to 
several processes that underlie the occurrence of regionally confined externalities.
First, there is what can be called ‘search and match externalities’ (Henderson, 
2001; Gordon and McCann, 2000) in geographical concentrations of activity. This 
type of externality may apply to both labour market pooling and specialised local 
inputs. The concentration of agents in an agglomeration enhances the likelihood of 
finding suitable labour and suppliers in general, as well as in different quantities and
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time frames required.
Second, externalities related to specialisation may apply to both the local 
labour market and the local supplier base. The concentration of activity allows 
individual workers and suppliers of inputs to become increasingly specialised. The 
local labour force and supplier base become more efficient, which benefits the firms 
who hire their services and buy their inputs. Furthermore, an additional efficiency 
enhancing effect may arise if a firm substitutes external sourcing for the in-house 
production of an input. The freeing up of production time, machinery and labour may 
allow the firm to become more specialised in its remaining activities, thus further 
enhancing efficiency.
Third, externalities related to public services and infrastructure may apply to 
the existence of local suppliers. The agglomeration of activity makes it possible that 
either the local government or some private firm starts providing a service or 
infrastructure that cannot be afforded by any single firm. For instance, the local 
government can tax all firms, in exchange for which the local government provides 
the agglomeration with a good functioning road network. As the overall costs are 
shared by a large number of users, taxes per firm are much lower than would be the 
case if one or a limited number of firms would have to pay for the costs.
Finally, externalities are intricately linked with information spillovers. As 
mentioned previously, information and ideas may flow easily and informally in a 
geographical concentration of activity, thus enhancing the level of knowledge of all 
agents located in the agglomeration. In addition, technological externalities may also 
be indirectly linked to the externality generating process of specialisation. As Maskell 
and Malmberg (2002) argue, ‘very specialised firms often find solutions and notice 
peculiarities otherwise overlooked the perception of minor anomalities, previously
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unnoticed, leads in turn to new insights and ways of improvement and, as a result, to a 
general acceleration of the growth of knowledge’ (Maskell and Malmberg, 2002, p. 
440)46. When this knowledge spills over to other agents in an agglomeration, the level 
of knowledge in the agglomeration will have increased, indirectly due to the increased 
level of specialisation.
3.3. Types of Agglomeration Economies
It seems fair to state that, at a general level, the concept of agglomeration economies 
is commonly accepted. Also, rough observation of the functioning of cities and 
regional economies indicates that there are some special features connected to the 
existence of such concentrations of economic activity. Having said so, researchers 
have tried to classify the wide array of agglomeration economies that may occur47. 
Such distinctions are also important, as agglomeration economies may serve different 
purposes. As discussed earlier, the concept of agglomeration economies can be 
alternatively used to explain location behaviour of firms (at various geographical 
scales), the existence of general patterns of urbanisation and the stimulation of 
diffusion of technology at different geographical scales. For the purpose of the 
present chapter, two important distinctions between different types of agglomeration 
economies are related to the industrial scale at which these external economies are 
internalised, and the time frame in which the externalities materialise.
46 See also Young (1928).
47 See Richardson (1973a, 1973b) for a long list of possible empirical manifestations of agglomeration 
economies.
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3.3.1. Internal, Localisation and Urbanisation economies of Scale
A commonly used classification to distinguish between different types of 
agglomeration economies originates from Ohlin (1933) and Hoover (1937), focusing 
on the source of the agglomeration economies and the industrial scale at which these 
economies can be internalised. Using these criteria, three types of agglomeration 
economies can be distinguished: internal economies of scale, localisation economies, 
and urbanisation economies.
At the plant level, the concentration of production in a location can be a source 
of agglomeration economies, if the production in one locality leads to internal 
economies of scale. These scale economies are a form of agglomeration economies, as 
they arise from the geographical concentration of production. Therefore, internal 
economies of scale reflect a positive relation between scale of production and 
efficiency. However, the efficiency effects remain internalised by the individual 
producer firm.
Localisation economies are agglomeration economies that are related to the 
size of an industry: ‘Localisation economies occur when a firm’s unit costs are lower 
in an urban area that includes many firms in the same industry. The scale economy is
external to the firm but internal to the industry’ (Eberts and McMillen, 1999, p.
1461). In this case, there is a positive relation between the scale of production and the 
level of efficiency, be it that it concerns the scale of the aggregate production of an 
industry, rather than an individual firm. Subsequently, the scale economies are 
internalised within the industry, but remain external to any individual firm within that 
industry.
Finally, urbanisation economies are agglomeration economies that are related
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to the size of the aggregate economic activity in an entire agglomeration (Eberts and 
McMillen, 1999). In this case, the benefits from the positive relation between the 
scale of production and the level of efficiency of production relate to the general 
agglomeration of activity, rather than any individual industry -  let alone any 
individual firm.
Localisation-Urbanisation
Although there is a case to be made to distinguish between external economies of 
scale remaining internal to an industry or to an entire agglomeration instead, the 
distinction between to two is not at all clear (Isard, 1956). As Eberts and McMillen 
(1999) note:
‘Urbanisation economies occur when economies are external to both the firm and 
industry....This category is something o f a “residual”: i f  we cannot explain a firm ’s 
location in an urban area by other types o f agglomeration economies, then it must 
enjoy an urbanisation economy. In keeping with its status as a residual, little effort is 
given to explaining the existence o f an urbanisation economy, the typical statement 
being that urbanisation economies occur for the same reasons as agglomeration 
economies, but the benefits are not concentrated at the industry level’ (Eberts and 
McMillen, 1999, p.1463).
Others argue that this is exactly the case: the underlying processes creating external 
economies are similar; the only .difference between localisation and urbanisation 
economies is that the former are internalised within an industry, whereas the other can
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only be internalised within the entire agglomeration (Isard, 1956). Hoover (1971) also 
comes to this conclusion, when he describes the benefits of locating the production of 
ladies’ coats in an agglomeration of economic activity. After having pointed out the 
benefits of the availability of specialist suppliers, he notes that ‘a cluster in which 
availability of common inputs plays an important role is also more likely to be a 
complex of closely related activities than just a clump of units of one activity. Thus,
an essential part of a cluster is a variety of related activities’ (Hoover, 1971, p. 85-
86). He continues by asking: ‘But where does this stop? Some of the contributing 
activities may be so specialised that they help just one line of activity, but others are 
not so restricted’ (Hoover, 1971, p. 86). Hence, he concludes that ‘there is a 
continuous gradation, then, between external economies reflecting concentration of a 
single activity and external economies reflecting urban size (“urbanisation 
economies” )’ (Hoover, 1971, p. 86).
Negative Externalities
Thus far, all the externality effects arising from the geographic concentration of 
economic activity that have been discussed are of a positive nature. However, 
agglomeration may also lead to negative externalities, both for households and 
producer firms. One type of negative consumer externalities arises in the form of 
neighbourhood externalities (Fujita, 1988), resulting from the increase of the density 
of households that accompanies the growth of a city. Other consumption 
diseconomies connected to the clustering of people in urban areas include increasing 
commuting costs, and negative disamenities such as crime, pollution and social 
conflict (Henderson, 1988).
Likewise, producers start to suffer from certain negative externalities with 
growing city size. As Mills (1972; see also Mills 1967) argues, land and 
transportation are resources used in production processes. Considering that some land 
is more productive than other land, the first companies in an agglomeration will 
concentrate on the best land. The limited availability of this superior type of land 
means that the amount of land per product will increase when new firms occupy land 
of a lesser quality compared to the land occupied by the first movers. This means that 
as the size of the agglomeration increases, firms will have to use more and more of an 
inferior input to produce an equal amount of product. As far as transportation costs 
are concerned, the growing size of an agglomeration of activity leads to increasing 
transport costs for inputs (including labour) and outputs, as the increasing size of the 
agglomeration enhances required travel distances.
The important point about negative externalities is that their existence puts a 
limit to the size of cities or agglomerations. As an agglomeration grows in size, the 
diseconomies of concentration increase in a disproportionate fashion, eventually 
offsetting the positive externalities that are associated with geographical concentration 
(Henderson, 1988, 2001), thus putting upward boundaries to city and agglomeration 
size.
3.3.2. Static and Dynamic Agglomeration Economies
Recently, an important alternative distinction has been identified in the group of 
externalities that comprise agglomeration economies. From endogenous growth 
theory (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), the idea has come about that external economies 
play an important role in processes of growth. More particularly, external economies
104
that arise from knowledge spillovers among economic agents are interpreted as a 
potentially critical factor in enhancing the productivity level or the rate of economic 
growth of countries. However, as Lucas (1988) has pointed out, rather than analysing 
national economies, it is particularly cities that prove to be interesting, as they provide 
something of a natural laboratory to study externalities, facilitating communications 
among economic agents (see also Lucas, 2001)48.
In order to apply the idea that endogenous externalities affect the productivity 
or economic growth of firms in an agglomeration, we need to distinguish between 
static and dynamic externalities. Static externalities refer to the situation where some 
agglomerative factor affects firm output in the same time period (Henderson, 2001; 
McDonald, 1997). For instance, the size of the aggregate production of an industry in 
an agglomeration in time period t influences the production of a firm in that 
agglomeration in the same time period. Dynamic externalities refer to the case where 
the level of an agglomerative factor affects the production of a firm through time 
(Quigley, 1998). Simply put, the effect of aggregate output in an agglomeration in 
time period t has an effect on the production of a firm in that agglomeration in time 
period t+1 (or some other future time period). It is these dynamic externalities, in the 
form of information spillovers, that are the key in endogenous growth theory for 
explaining rates of growth (see Lucas, 1988; 2001)49.
48 Glaeser et al. (1992) argue among similar lines: ‘If geographical proximity facilitates transmission of 
ideas, then we should expect knowledge spilllovers to be particularly important in cities. After all, 
intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents’ 
(Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1127). See also Jacobs (1969) for similar ideas.
49 An alternative way to distinguish between static and dynamic externalities is to argue that static 
externalities are responsible for a one time decrease in costs or increase in productivity, whereas 
dynamic externalities represent underlying processes causing continuous decreases in costs or increases 
in productivity (McDonald, 1997). As Glaeser et al. (1992) put it: ‘These theories o f dynamic 
externalities are extremely appealing because they try to explain simultaneously how cities form and 
why they grow...they are different from the more standard location and urbanisation externality 
theories that address the formation and specialisation of cities...but not city growth’ (Glaeser et al., 
1992, p. 1228). The problem with this interpretation is that cities may also grow if the presence of static 
externalities in an agglomeration attracts more agents (see Hanson, 2000). Furthermore, the arrival of
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As mentioned earlier, Marshall (1920) pointed out the importance of 
informational spillovers. Flows of information and ideas within an agglomeration can 
lead to technological externalities, ‘whereby innovations and improvements occurring 
in one firm increase the productivity of the other firms without full compensation’ 
(Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1127)50. Information or knowledge flows can create dynamic 
externalities in agglomerations in two important ways (Henderson, 2001): through an 
increase of the level of interactions between agents and through the creation of a 
locally confined stock of knowledge.
The level of concentration of agents in an agglomeration is likely to be 
positively related to the amount of contacts between agents (see e.g. Glaeser, 1999). 
This concentration enhances the exchange of ideas, through means such as informal 
meetings, buyer-supplier contacts and regional labour turnover. These flows of 
knowledge and ideas are likely to create dynamic externality effects, as it takes time 
for knowledge to be transmitted (Henderson, 2001). Alternatively, if we envisage the 
effect of knowledge spillovers as individual workers engaging in a learning process 
(Glaeser, 1999)51, it is likely that there is a similar delay in the effect of this 
enhancement of knowledge, as it takes time for agents to absorb the new information 
and knowledge. In both cases, there are information spillovers as a result of the 
positive relation between the amount of interactions and geographical concentration 
of agents. The effects of these spillovers take the form of dynamic externalities, as it 
takes time for these spillovers to come into effect.
these agents enhances the scale of the agglomeration, which may subsequently lead to an increase in 
the level of static externalities. Therefore, it appears that both static and dynamic externalities may be 
linked to the growth process of cities and agglomerations.
50 In the recent literature, information spillovers are linked to dynamic externalities. However, 
information spillovers can also create static externalities, if  these spillovers affect the productivity of 
firms in the same time period as they occur.
51 Where learning is stimulated by the amount of contacts between agents.
Local stocks of knowledge are the second mechanism that may cause 
dynamic externalities to occur in agglomerations. In endogenous growth theory, the 
accumulation of knowledge can lead to externalities (Romer, 1986), as knowledge has 
the features of a public good. The innovation of one agent benefits other agents, as the 
knowledge is shared between these agents. However, the original interpretation of 
knowledge as a public good does not attach a geographical containment to its effects 
(Henderson, 2001). Jaffe et al. (1993) have provided evidence of the geographical 
containment of the creation of such a stock of knowledge. Evidenced by patents 
citations, they found strong evidence of a positive effect of geographical proximity on 
spillovers. Also, considering the possibility of lags in the effects of local stocks of 
knowledge, Henderson (2001) points out that in addition to the effect of how quickly 
information spreads across space, there is also information that is location-specific, 
built up over time52. Therefore, it is likely that the effects of a local stock of 
knowledge also take the form of dynamic externalities.
Dynamic Localisation and Urbanisation Economies
Similar to the case of static externalities, two different types of dynamic externalities 
may be distinguished (Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson et al., 1995; also Henderson, 
1997). One type of dynamic externalities is labelled Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) 
externalities. This type of dynamic externalities focuses on intra-industry externalities. 
The geographical concentration of an industry will facilitate the informal sharing of 
knowledge. Also, the extent of interaction between firms in an agglomerated industry 
is likely to be higher than would be the case when these firms are dispersed through
52 E.g. local information about how to deal with local regulators, where to find the best suppliers, etc., 
see Henderson (2001)
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geographical space. The second type of dynamic externalities is called Jacobs 
externalities (after the initial ideas expressed in Jacobs (1969)), and holds that 
knowledge spillovers are more likely to occur between industries than within 
industries. That is, ‘industrial variety rather than specialisation is conducive to growth, 
because in diversified cities there is more interchange of different ideas’ (Glaeser et 
al., 1992, p. 1132)53.
As the topic of dynamic externalities in the analysis of agglomeration 
economies has only recently been established, only a limited set of empirical findings 
regarding their overall existence and the relative importance of MAR and Jacobs 
externalities is available. Glaeser et al. (1992) estimate which factors contribute to 
employment growth of broad industries in a sample of 170 US cities. Among these 
factors are industrial specialisation and industrial variety in the base year period. 
Controlling for other factors such as national growth of industries and the extent of 
competition, their findings indicate that industrial variety in the base year has a 
positive influence on the rate of growth of the industries, suggesting the occurrence of 
dynamic Jacobs externalities. MAR externalities are not found to influence industry 
growth (see Glaeser et al., 1992).
In contrast, the findings from a similar study on US cities by Henderson et al. 
(1995) indicate the importance of intra-industry (MAR) dynamic externalities for 
mature industries, but not Jacobs externalities (for similar findings, see Henderson, 
1997). For new high technology industries, the empirical findings support the 
existence of both MAR and Jacobs externalities (see also Henderson and Kuncoro, 
1996).
53 In fact, Glaeser et al. (1992) identify- three types of dynamic externalities, as they add a second 
dimension in the form of local monopoly or competition. MAR externalities are then dynamic 
externalities of the intra-industry type, maximised under monopoly. Porter externalities are intra­
industry externalities, maximised under competition, and Jacobs externalities are inter-industry 
externalities, maximised under local competition.
Finally, two recent empirical contributions are Beardsell and Henderson 
(1999) and Henderson (2003). Both studies adopt panel data estimation techniques to 
control for location fixed/random effects. A criticism towards the earlier studies is 
that the estimated significant effects of local specialisation and diversity in the base 
year period capture such locational time-invariant effects, rather than capturing the 
presence of dynamic externalities. The findings presented by Beardsell and 
Henderson (1999) and Henderson (2003) share two important features. First, they 
both contain evidence of the significant existence of positive MAR externalities. 
Jacobs externalities are not identified in either of the studies. Second, these MAR 
externalities are most important for single-plant firms. In contrast, plants belonging to 
a multi-plant corporation appear not to be affected by MAR dynamic externalities.
As Henderson (2001) stresses, the empirical evidence on dynamic externalities 
is rather scant. Also, the findings from the few empirical studies indicate that different 
types of dynamic externalities may be responsible for growth of different industries. 
Furthermore, caution is required in interpreting the available empirical evidence, as 
productivity levels and growth rates of metropolitan areas are related to a number of 
externality-related factors. This refers to the possibility that effects that are allocated 
to dynamic regional features are more of a static nature instead (see Quigley, 1998). 
However, having said so, the belief is that dynamic externalities do constitute a very 
important aspect in the analysis of metropolitan and regional growth, and urgently 
require further theoretical and empirical investigation (Henderson, 2001; also 
McDonald, 1997; see also Glaeser, 2000).
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3.4. FDI and Agglomeration
Thus far, possible relations between FDI-induced externalities and agglomerations of 
economic activity have been largely ignored. An indication of the implicit recognition 
of the possible importance of geographical proximity between FDI and domestic 
firms can be found in Perez (1998). In discussing the concept of technological
externalities from FDI, he defines the concept as 4 the set of effects deriving from
the diffusion of the foreign firms’ technology to local firms due to physical proximity’ 
(Perez 1998. p. 4; emphasis added). However, in his survey of empirical research on 
FDI-induced externalities, and subsequently in his own analysis, proximity is not 
mentioned again, let alone assessed.
Despite the fact that possible relations between agglomerations and FDI- 
induced externalities have not been considered, the similarities between processes that 
explain the occurrence of externalities from the presence and operations of FDI and 
from geographical concentration of economic activity indicate that there may be 
important relations between the phenomena. In this section, I explore the possible 
relations between FDI and agglomeration economies in terms of two (related) aspects. 
One issue is whether the presence of foreign firms in an agglomeration affects the 
occurrence of agglomeration economies. The second issue is whether geographical 
proximity of FDI and domestic firms affects the working of the channels of FDI- 
induced externalities.
3.4.1. FDI and Agglomeration Economies
Considering the types of externality effects that may arise from the presence of FDI, it
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seems that the presence of FDI in an agglomeration may affect the level of 
externalities that are created by the agglomeration. One FDI-extemality effect that 
may enhance the level of agglomeration economies takes shape in the form of 
knowledge spillovers. As discussed earlier, knowledge flows are facilitated in 
agglomerations of activity (Lucas, 1988; Glaeser et al., 1992). Due to its 
characteristics, FDI may play an important role in the creation of such knowledge 
spillovers. It is well documented that MNEs play a central role in technology creation 
(see Dunning, 1993; UNCTAD, 1999). Furthermore, knowledge created by MNEs is 
internationally disseminated by the establishment of foreign affiliates in host 
economies. In fact, although the available empirical evidence is limited on this 
specific point, the importance of this international dissemination of knowledge 
through FDI is perceived to be such that foreign MNEs, through technology transfers 
to their affiliates, are often deemed to be the most important source of modem 
technology for many host economies (Dunning, 1993; Blomstrom et al., 1999).
The presence of FDI in agglomerations may create both static and dynamic 
externalities, depending on the time frame in which the externalities arise. If 
knowledge spillovers affect domestic firms’ productivity levels directly and quickly, 
the effect takes shape in the form of static externalities. If there is some time delay in 
the effect of knowledge spillovers from FDI, the externality can be interpreted as a 
dynamic one.
Besides externality effects that arise from knowledge spillovers from the 
presence of FDI, the other mechanisms that are commonly used to explain static 
agglomeration economies are all implicitly based on the requirement that firms are 
engaged with their business environment in the agglomeration. Regarding both labour 
market pooling and the operations of local specialised suppliers, firms in the
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agglomeration need to be involved in processes that create agglomeration economies 
in order for these externalities to materialise. If foreign-owned firms do not participate 
in these processes, or participate with their local business environment to a lower 
extent, the level of agglomeration economies will be lower than would have been the 
case where domestic firms would have operated in the place of these foreign firms.
Labour market pooling refers to externalities derived from flexibility effects 
regarding both the quantity and quality aspects of the local labour market. As 
discussed before, firms benefit from being located in an agglomeration of activity, as 
the agglomeration stimulates the creation and functioning of a thick labour market. 
However, foreign-owned firms and domestic firms might not participate in such local 
labour markets in a similar fashion. If foreign firms pay a wage premium to lower the 
rate of labour turnover of their employees (see e.g. Fosfuri, 2001; also Lipsey and 
Sjoholm, 2004), the willingness of employees to switch employers will decrease. Also, 
in more general terms, if workers have a general preference to work for foreign- 
owned firms, this preference will work against the functioning of a thick labour 
market.
The beneficial effects of the existence of a local pool of specialised suppliers 
of inputs equally require the participation of firms in the local economy. Here, the 
available empirical evidence is more voluminous, and indicative of the problem 
regarding the extent of local participation by FDI. Locally created agglomeration 
economies will be created when foreign firms establish inter-firm linkages with local 
suppliers. However, many cases have been reported where foreign firms do not 
integrate in the local economy, and prefer to use non-local suppliers instead (see 
Dunning, 1993; Lall. 1978). If this is the case, the presence of FDI will negatively 
affect the occurrence of agglomeration economies.
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Agglomeration Economies with a Twist
If foreign firms participate in the local economy to a lesser extent than domestic firms, 
agglomeration economies will be lower compared to the case where domestic firms 
would have taken the place of FDI. However, in cases where foreign firms do 
participate in the agglomeration, the level of external economies may be enhanced.
The relations between FDI and its local business environment that create 
agglomeration economies may lead to additional externalities flowing from foreign to 
domestic firms. One example is the case of labour turnover. In the case of the 
existence of a thick labour market, domestic firms will benefit from agglomeration 
economies. However, if workers substitute domestic for foreign firms, domestic firms 
not only benefit from enhanced flexibility effects, but also from the increase in skills 
and experience that is incorporated in these workers54.
A similar argument can be made with regard to externality effects arising from 
the existence of a pool of local suppliers. The existence of such a pool leads to 
positive agglomeration economies. In addition to this effect, foreign firms may 
transmit additional externalities to their local suppliers. Foreign firms may offer 
specific support to local suppliers, which enhances productivity levels of these firms. 
Again, the additional externality effect from the participation of FDI in an 
agglomeration may lead to a further increase in the level of agglomeration economies. 
Therefore, if foreign firms do participate in processes that create agglomeration 
economies, they are likely to cause additional increases to these external economies, 
resulting from the additional externalities that are transmitted through the channels of 
externalities.
54 See the discussion in chapter two.
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3.4.2. Agglomeration and the Channels of FDI-induced Externalities
An alternative way to address the relation between geographical concentration of 
economic activity and the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities is to look at the 
possible effects of geographical concentration on the existence and effectiveness of 
channels of FDI-induced externalities. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are 
various mechanisms or channels through which the entrance or operations of FDI may 
affect the level of efficiency or productivity or domestic firms. Intuitively, it seems 
that the level of geographical concentration of firms or industries will enhance the 
effectiveness of these channels. More precisely, geographical proximity between 
foreign and domestic firms that results from the agglomeration of firms may enhance 
the effectiveness of these channels.
This enhancing effect of geographical proximity is likely to apply to 
demonstration effects. This effect occurs when domestic firms learn from new 
technologies or copy new technologies, applied in foreign affiliates. This is more 
likely to happen when both types of firms are located in close proximity. An example 
of this proximity effect is provided by Aitken et al. (1997), who analyse the 
occurrence of externalities from foreign to domestic firms in Mexico in the form of 
demonstration effects regarding export activities. Using panel data for a sample of 
2,113 manufacturing firms for the period 1986-1990, they try to assess whether 
geographical proximity between foreign and domestic firms enhances export activities 
of the latter type of firms. Their findings suggest that demonstration effects are indeed 
enhanced by geographical proximity. Whereas a general higher geographical 
concentration of export activity does not enhance the probability of an individual 
domestic firm to engage in exporting activity, a higher geographical concentration of
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foreign affiliates’ exports significantly raises this probability. This indicates that 
locating in proximity to foreign affiliates facilitates demonstration effects.
Geographical proximity may affect the effectiveness of the other channels of 
externalities as well. For instance, the process of labour turnover between foreign and 
domestic firms seems likely to be enhanced when these firms are located in 
geographical proximity. Alternatively, if foreign firms and domestic firms are located 
in separate areas, the likelihood that workers who leave a foreign firm end up working 
in a domestic firm is lower. In addition to this general effect of proximity, if both 
types of firms are located in an agglomeration of activity with a thick labour market 
(characterised by a high labour turnover rates), workers will be substituting firms 
more frequently (see e.g. Angel, 1989), thus enhancing the occurrence of externalities.
The relation between geographical proximity and the establishment of inter­
firm linkages is a more commonly accepted one, as the common belief is that 
proximity between firms enhances inter-firm linkages (see for instance Scott, 1988). 
This means that, all else equal, domestic firms that produce products which could be 
used as inputs by foreign-owned firms are more likely to be used as suppliers when 
they are located in proximity to these foreign firms.
Furthermore, when foreign and domestic firms locate in proximity, they may 
be more inclined to establish inter-firm linkages. One of factors that have been found 
to hinder FDI’s use of local suppliers is that it takes time to find suitable suppliers and 
develop stable business relations (see Dunning, 1993). If potential local suppliers are 
located in the same agglomeration as foreign firms, the latter will find it easier to 
identify these domestic firms and develop such relations. Similarly, the presence of 
foreign firms may make it easier for domestic firms to identify them as potential 
clients and to adjust their products to make them suitable for successful incorporation
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into the FDI’s production process. In both cases, being located in the agglomeration 
represents a decrease in transaction costs for both foreign and domestic firms, which 
may have a positive effect on the creation of inter-firm linkages.
Also, as is the case with labour mobility, the type of agglomeration in which 
firms are located may independently enhance the establishment of linkages. An 
agglomeration of activity that functions through dense networks of inter-firm linkages 
will have a higher extent of interaction between foreign and domestic firms, thus 
enhancing the occurrence of externalities through these linkages.
Finally, the channel of competition or market structure is the only channel 
where the effect of geographical proximity on externalities does not appear to be as 
clear-cut. One consideration is that whether firms are located in proximity to each 
other or at some geographical distance, the level of market concentration in the 
industry in the country remains similar. In this sense, there appears to be no relation 
between geographical proximity and the effectiveness of the channel of market 
structure.
However, there may be a relation between geographical proximity and the 
competition effect when considering the effect of the presence of FDI on regional 
input markets. Assuming that, at least in the short run, labour and capital inputs are 
not perfectly mobile between regions in a host economy, the presence of FDI in an 
agglomeration will lead to increases in factor prices. Domestic firms in the 
agglomeration will have to pay higher prices for these regional inputs, which will 
negatively affect their profit levels. In this sense, the presence of FDI in an 
agglomeration of activity may create negative pecuniary externalities. However, 
following this initial negative productivity effect, if this increase in regional factor 
prices forces domestic firms to become more efficient, the final result of the increased
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regional competitive pressure for regional inputs may ultimately result in positive 
pecuniary externalities, if domestic firms are able to respond to the increased 
competitive pressure by enhancing their efficiency levels.
3.4.3. Agglomeration and FDI: Summarising the Relationships
The effects of foreign affiliates on domestic firms in terms of efficiency or 
productivity effects appear to be related to geographical concentration in several ways, 
as discussed in the previous section. Figure 3.1. shows the various relationships 
between the two phenomena of interest.
Figure 3.1. Agglomeration, FDI and External Economies
MNE
Host economy
FDI
Agglomeration economies Channels of externalities
1. non-participation by FDI 
lower external economies
demonstration effects (+) 
inter-firm linkages (+) 
labour mobility (+) 
market structure (+)2. participation by FDI 
increase in external economies
As figure 3.1. indicates, the relations between FDI-induced externalities and 
agglomerations can be interpreted from two different angles. One relation refers to the 
effect of the presence of FDI on the level of agglomeration economies in an 
agglomeration. One of the crucial factors behind this type of effect is the extent to 
which foreign firms are connected to their business environment in the agglomeration. 
If, compared to domestic firms, foreign firms participate less in the agglomeration, the 
level of agglomeration economies will be lower than would have been the case if 
domestic firms had taken the place of the foreign firms. In contrast, if foreign firms do 
participate in the agglomeration, the level of agglomeration economies is likely to 
increase. The explanation for this enhancing effect is that additional technological 
externalities may be transmitted to domestic firms through the mechanisms of labour 
turnover, buyer-supplier linkages and demonstration and learning effects.
The alternative angle from which to look at the relation between 
agglomeration and FDI-induced externalities is by considering the effect that 
geographical concentration may have on the existence and functioning of the channels 
of FDI-induced externalities. Here, agglomeration is interpreted as geographical 
proximity between FDI and domestic firms. The level of geographical proximity is 
likely to affect the functioning of the channels of externalities. As figure 3.1. indicates, 
all four channels are likely to function better when both types of firms are located in 
geographical proximity. However, as not all channels transmit only positive 
externalities, the resulting externality-enhancing effect from geographical 
concentration may apply to both positive and negative externalities. Demonstration 
effects, labour turnover and inter-firm linkages are channels that may transmit 
positive externalities to domestic- firms. Geographical proximity between FDI and 
domestic firms is likely to enhance these externalities. In contrast, the competition
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effect may create negative or positive pecuniary externalities. In relation to 
geographical concentration of firms, there may be an initial increase in the level of 
negative pecuniary externalities, resulting from the increased level of competition for 
regional production factors that follows from the presence of FDI. In the long run, this 
increased level of competitive pressure may result in a positive pecuniary externality, 
if domestic firms are capable of enhancing their efficiency levels.
3.5. Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence on possible relations between geographical concentration of 
activity and FDI-induced externalities is limited. Two types of evidence are available 
from the literature. One line of inquiry looks at factors that influence location 
decisions by foreign firms. The second type of evidence can be found in empirical 
studies that estimate FDI-induced externalities, as reviewed in chapter two. Some of 
these studies have included some form of assessment of the role of geography in 
externality creating processes.
3.5.1. FDI and Location Decisions
FDI may have both negative and positive effects on the occurrence of static 
agglomeration economies. Empirical evidence from location factor studies can be 
used to see whether foreign affiliates are attracted to regions with agglomeration 
advantages. If agglomeration economies attract foreign affiliates, it can be assumed 
that they will be participating in. processes creating agglomeration economies. For 
instance, if foreign firms are attracted to regions with an availability of local
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suppliers, ceteris paribus, it will be because they are interested in buying inputs from 
them.
Empirical analysis of location decisions of FDI interpret such decisions as the 
outcome of a profit maximisation strategy, where firms choose that location that is 
expected to provide the highest profit (see Head et al., 1995; 1999). Four groups of 
location factors are usually distinguished (Crozet et al., 2004): demand factors of 
locations that are related to the revenue of foreign affiliates, location-specific factor 
costs, public policies designed to attract foreign investment (as well as the provision 
of public infrastructure) and agglomeration economies, reflecting the additional 
advantage of locations with geographic concentrations of economic activity.
A typical example of such an empirical investigation of FDI location decisions 
is offered by Coughlin et al. (1991), who analyse the determinants of location 
decisions of foreign manufacturing firms in the US between 1981 and 1983. 
Variables that were found to have a positive influence on the location decision include 
the size of local demand, the rate of unemployment (indicating availability of labour), 
relative availability of infrastructure and the existence of promotion policies by state 
governments. Other studies of locational determinants for the US include Head et al. 
(1995; 1999) and Coughlin and Segev (2000), who provide similar types of analysis 
of determinants of location. Additional typical examples include Guimaraes et al. 
(2000) for Portugal and Crozet et al. (2004) for France.
These studies all include an assessment of the importance of agglomeration 
economies in FDI location decisions. This is done by including one or several 
variables into the empirical model that are believed to represent the presence of 
agglomeration economies. Coughlin et al. (1991) for instance include the level of 
manufacturing density at state level to control for agglomeration economies. Their
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estimations indicate that the probability of foreign firms choosing a specific state is 
positively influenced by this variable55. In a similar fashion, Coughlin and Segev 
(2 0 0 0 ) use the percentage of state workforce in overall manufacturing activity as 
indicator of agglomeration economies. Their findings similarly show a significant 
positive effect of this variable.
More detailed estimations of possible effects of agglomeration economies are 
offered by Head et al. (1995; 1999), Guimaraes et al. (2000) and Crozet et al. (2004). 
Head et al. (1995; 1999) analyse location determinants for a sample of about 750 
Japanese investments in the US in the 1980s, and distinguish between three different 
types of geographic concentration of activity at the state level. One type refers to 
geographic concentration of US firms at the state level, at the same 4-digit industry 
level in which the new Japanese firms are classified. Second, they calculate the 
concentration of existing Japanese firms in the US at the 4-digit industries of the new 
Japanese firms. Third, they include a variable that captures the level of concentration 
of Japanese firms that belong to the same keiretsu as the new Japanese firms. Their 
empirical findings indicate that, in addition to some variables from the other three 
groups of locational determinants, all three types of agglomeration have a positive 
influence on the probability that Japanese firms prefer one state over the other.
Guimaraes et al. (2000) include four different agglomeration variables in their 
estimations of location factors of 758 foreign affiliates in Portugal between 1985 and 
1992. One variable represents industry specific localisation economies, two variables 
capture more general urbanisation economies and one variable captures foreign firm- 
specific agglomeration economies. All variables except the foreign firm-specific 
agglomeration variable have a significant positive influence on the decision to locate
55 An alternative interpretation of the effect o f this variable is that it reflects state market demand, in the 
case where foreign firms produce inputs for manufacturing firms.
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in specific regions in Portugal. As for the relative importance of the three 
agglomeration variables, general urbanisation economies (in the form of business 
services) have the largest influence on FDI location decisions.
Finally, Crozet et al. (2004) present a comprehensive analysis of almost 4000 
location decisions by new foreign investors in France between 1985 and 1995. They 
follow Head et al. (1995; 1999) in measuring the effect of three agglomeration 
variables: geographic concentration of French firms, geographic concentration of 
foreign affiliates’ home country firms, and geographic concentration of other foreign 
firms. All three variables have significant positive effects, be it that the variable 
measuring the geographic concentration of French firms carries a much larger 
coefficient compared to the other two variables56.
Estimation Issues
The available empirical evidence suggests that FDI is attracted by agglomeration 
economies. Having said so, several issues need to be considered when relating these 
findings to the possible effect of the presence of FDI on the occurrence and level of 
agglomeration economies in a location.
One problem originates from the fact that the agglomeration economies 
variables may not represent agglomeration effects, but are proxies for omitted 
variables that influence location decisions instead (Hanson, 2000). Estimations of 
locational determinants include variables related to locational revenue, factor costs
56 An explanation for the difference in findings between Head et al. (1995, 1999) and Crozet et al. 
(2004) regarding the effect of geographical concentration of home country firms is that Head et al. 
(1995, 1999) analyse the location decisions of Japanese firms, whereas Crozet et al. (2004) consider 
foreign affiliates from all home countries. It has been found that spatial agglomeration of home country 
firms plays a more important role for Japanese firms than for firms from other home countries (see 
Friedman, Gerlowski and Silberman, 1992).
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and promotional activities by regional governments. Given that there are many 
variables that may affect location decisions and that the number of variables used in 
the empirical estimations is limited, variables indicating agglomeration effects may 
(partly) capture the effect of omitted variables. For instance, the agglomeration 
variables may be a substitute for factors related to investment uncertainty. As 
Krugman (1997) notes, foreign firms face uncertainties when they make location 
decisions. They may interpret previous investment patterns (by foreign and/or 
domestic firms) as a reliability indicator of a certain location. In this case, the positive 
relation between FDI location decisions and geographic concentration of economic 
activity is not reflecting any attractive effect of agglomeration economies, but the 
presence of an uncertainty minimising strategy on behalf of foreign-owned firms 
instead.
Second, these location studies are usually performed at a high level of 
aggregation, referring to all industries within regions57. This high level of aggregation 
means that the agglomeration variables ‘capture the effects from the clustering of all 
economic activity in a region, but they may not reflect the processes taking place 
within firms’ own industries and closely related industries’ (Nachum, 2000, p. 371)58. 
By using proxies for agglomeration effects, it remains largely unclear which type of 
agglomeration effect is attracting firms to a location (Hanson, 2000). Variables used 
in the empirical estimations include variables such as total employment in 
manufacturing, total number of firms in the sector of the foreign affiliate and 
manufacturing density. Such variables may capture part of the existence of
57 This applies even more so to empirical evidence of the importance of agglomeration economies 
obtained from estimations of FDI location factors using cross-country data. For examples of such 
evidence, see e.g. Wheeler and Moody (1992) and Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996).
58 A notable exception to this is Crozet et al. (2004), who are able to measure the determinants of 
location decisions for separate industries, due to the exceptionally large number of observations in their 
sample.
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agglomeration economies in regions, but the underlying sources and magnitudes of 
agglomeration effects remain unclear. As the estimations do not satisfactorily reveal 
the underlying processes that may create agglomeration economies - in fact, it is not 
clear from the empirical estimations whether and to what extent agglomeration 
economies exist - it remains unclear in which processes FDI could participate in.
The ramifications of this problem are that it is difficult to obtain any 
indications of the likely additional enhancing effects from FDI’s participation in 
processes of agglomeration economies. As Richardson (1973a, 1973b) indicates, 
there is a large variety of empirical manifestations of urbanisation and localisation 
economies, all of which may underlie the agglomeration economies variables used in 
the empirical estimations. As it is not clear from the empirical studies which 
processes underlie the regional agglomeration economies, a positive effect of 
agglomeration economies variables on the location choice of foreign firms does not 
provide indications of the likely effect that FDI may have on the level of 
agglomeration economies.
For instance, if the positive association reflects a situation where foreign 
affiliates are participating in processes that generate general urbanisation economies -  
e.g. the establishment of an efficient transport network or an electricity network -  the 
expected externality-enhancing effect from FDI’s participation as a result from 
additional technological externalities will be very limited. In contrast, if foreign firms 
are participating in inter-firm linkages that create more specialised localisation 
economies, the scope for technological externalities will be much larger, as 
technological externalities may be transmitted as a result of the participation of FDI in 
processes creating such localisation economies.
In sum, the available empirical evidence does suggest that foreign-owned
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firms are influenced in their location decisions by agglomeration variables. These 
studies do not provide evidence that agglomeration effects in the locations actually 
exist, however. Also, because of the indirect nature of the evidence, it is not clear 
what the effect of FDI on agglomeration economies of any type is likely to be. Having 
said so, the evidence does indicate that foreign firms tend to locate in agglomerations 
of economic activity. Therefore, the findings are in support of the second 
interpretation of the relation between agglomeration and FDI-induced externalities, 
which addresses the effects of agglomeration on the existence and functioning of 
channels of FDI-induced externalities in agglomerations of economic activity.
3.5.2. FDI and Productivity Studies
Some recent empirical studies on FDI-induced externalities address whether these 
externalities have some form of regional component. One approach to explore this 
geographical aspect of FDI-induced externalities is to analyse the occurrence of 
externalities at different geographical scales. The hypothesis is that FDI-induced 
externalities will be more prevalent at smaller geographical scales, as the channels of 
externalities may be more effective due to geographical proximity. The other 
approach is to include some measure of geographical concentration or participation of 
foreign firms at the regional level. In this case, in addition to estimating general intra­
industry externalities from FDI, the estimation adds a regional component, by looking 
at the effect of the presence of foreign firms in a given domestic firm’s region.
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3.5.2.I. Analysis at different Geographical Scales
Sjdholm (1998, 1999) is the sole example of this type of approach. His analysis is 
based on a large sample of firms from the Indonesian manufacturing sector for the 
years 1980 and 1991. He estimates two differently specified empirical models. One 
model is specified in the spirit of Glaeser et al. (1992). This involves regressing the 
growth of productivity of Indonesian firms on a number of variables, including 
industrial specialisation and diversity, the extent of participation of FDI at the 
industry level of each Indonesian plant and the extent of participation of FDI in other 
industries. The analysis is carried out at three different geographical scales: the 
national level, the province level, and the district level.
The findings of this empirical model are interesting. Whereas FDI-extemalities 
at the industry level are positive and significant at the national level, they become 
negative and significant at the province and district level. This would suggest that at 
the lower geographical scale, negative pecuniary externalities prevail. Foreign firms 
competing in regional input markets could force input prices to increase, which has a 
negative pecuniary effect on domestic firms in the region. Having said so, at the latter 
two geographical scales, the variable representing foreign participation in other 
industries carries a significant positive sign, suggesting the occurrence of positive 
externalities from other industries, at a geographical scale smaller than the national.
The second empirical model is specified following Caves (1974) and 
Blomstrom (1989), where the dependent variable is value added per employee for 
Indonesian firms. This variable is regressed on the same variables as in the 
productivity growth model. Again, the variable representing intra-industry foreign 
participation carries a significant positive sign at the national level. At the province
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level, the variable carries a significant negative coefficient, whereas at the district 
level the coefficient is either positive or negative, depending on the inclusion of 
industry dummies. Inter-industry externalities are significant and positive at both the 
province and district level.
Although the empirical evidence is interesting, the estimations suffer from 
several important problems59. It is not clear what the geographical scales of both 
provinces and districts are, which makes it difficult to form any opinion about the 
relevance of the use of these scales. Furthermore, no effort is made to assess whether, 
for a given domestic firm in a given region, foreign presence in adjacent provinces or 
districts is affecting productivity of this firm. It may be that the effects of FDI are 
transmitted over several districts. Alternatively, it may be that, within one province, 
only part of the area that constitutes the province contains a concentration of FDI, 
whose effect on Indonesian productivity peters out when the aggregate province 
indicators are used in the estimations.
The strongest point of criticism towards the empirical estimations is that they 
do not control for changes in the industrial structure or the scale of the geographical 
concentration of industries, neither at the province nor at the district level. This means 
that some factors are omitted from the estimations; factors which could partly explain 
the level and change in productivity of Indonesian firms in the time period under 
analysis. Furthermore, it may be that foreign investment is related to these variables. 
For instance, if foreign affiliates are attracted to certain regional characteristics that 
are also related to regional static or dynamic agglomeration economies, the variable 
representing the level of foreign investment in other industries may partly capture 
these industry scale and growth effects. In this case, the estimated effect of foreign
59 In addition to the problems surrounding the estimation o f FDI-induced externalities as discussed in 
chapter 2.
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participation may contain agglomeration economies as well as FDI-induced 
externalities. Therefore, the estimated effect of FDI may be biased, due to the 
omission of variables that control for the possible presence of static or dynamic 
agglomeration economies; a bias exacerbated by the possibility that these omitted 
variables are related to the variable foreign participation at the sub-national scale.
3.5.2.2. Extent of Regional Foreign Participation
The alternative way to assess whether there is a geographical component to the 
occurrence of FDI-induced externalities is to include a variable in the empirical model 
that captures the extent of regional foreign participation. An example of this 
interpretation is offered by Aitken and Harrison (1999). In order to capture regional 
externalities from FDI, they include a variable in their estimation of the determinants 
of total factor productivity for domestic firms in Venezuela in the form of the foreign 
firms’ share of employment in an industry in the region in which a domestic firm is 
located. The findings of Aitken and Harrison (1999) offer little evidence for the 
existence of a geographical component in the occurrence of externalities from FDI, 
however. The coefficient on regional foreign investment is positively (and marginally 
statistically) related with domestic productivity, if no control is made for regional 
productivity differences. When these controls are made, the coefficient of regional 
foreign investment decreases in size and becomes insignificant. This suggests that 
intra-industry FDI-induced externalities are not stimulated by geography.
The inclusion of a variable representing regional foreign participation has been 
adopted by several researchers, all. analysing the occurrence of externalities from FDI 
in the UK. The opinions about the importance of geographical proximity differ. Harris
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and Robinson (2002) and Haskel et al. (2002) conclude that, in general, regional 
externalities are not important. In contrast, Girina and Wakelin (2001, 2002) hold the 
opinion that regional externalities are an important feature of externalities from FDI.
Harris and Robinson (2002) analyse the impact of FDI on total factor 
productivity in the UK between 1974 and 1995, using a large plant level data set 
obtained from the Annual Respondents’ Database (ARD). The possible effect of FDI 
is tested by including three variables: the proportion of an industry’s capital stock 
owned by foreign plants, the proportion of a region’s capital stock owned by foreign 
firms, and the proportion of capital stock owned by foreign firms in other industries 
(where these industries are linked to the industry of a domestic plant by input-output 
tables). The findings indicate that in seven out of 20 industries the regional FDI 
variable has a significant effect. In three of these, the effect is positive, in the other 
four, the effect is negative.
Harris and Robinson (2002) interpret their findings as evidence for the non­
importance of regional foreign participation. However, their results can be interpreted 
differently. The fact that the estimated regional externality effect is only significant in 
about a third of the industries can be interpreted as an indication that these 
externalities are not important for all industries alike. Furthermore, the fact that they 
identify both positive and negative effects indicates that the negative pecuniary 
externality effect from competition by FDI in regional input markets is relevant for 
some industries, but not for others. The alternative interpretation of their results would 
be that in four industries this negative effect prevails, whereas in the other three 
industries positive externalities are larger then negative externalities, if present.
Haskel et al. (2002) cover roughly the same period, using the same plant level 
data source as Harris and Robinson (2002). They assess the effect of two FDI-related
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variables on domestic total factor productivity. One variable represents the extent of 
foreign participation at the industry, measured as the share of foreign firms’ 
employees in total industry employment. The second variable represents the 
participation of foreign investment in the region, measured as the FDI’s share in the 
total number of employees in the region. The results of their estimations show that 
foreign participation in the region does carry positive signs, but fails to reach 
acceptable significance levels. In fact, Haskel et al. (2002) carry out a battery of tests 
on the sample, but the non-significance of regional foreign participation remains 
throughout the analysis60.
Girina and Wakelin (2002) offer empirical evidence of a significant positive 
influence of regional foreign participation on domestic productivity in the UK. Using 
a different plant level data set than Haskel et al. (2002) and Harris and Robinson 
(2002), they cover the period 1988-199661. Girma and Wakelin (2002) include three 
FDI related variables in their analysis of determinants of TFP: a variable representing 
the share in total employment of FDI in each domestic firms’ industry and region, a 
variable representing the share in total employment of FDI in each domestic firm’s 
industry in other regions and a variable representing the share in each domestic firm’s 
region in related industrial sectors.
Their findings suggest that there is a geographical component to FDI-induced 
externalities. The variable measuring the magnitude of foreign investment in a 
domestic firm’s industry and region carries a significant and positive sign. Having 
said so, the effect is sensitive to the type of region. In non-assisted areas, the effect is 
significant and positive; in regions with an assisted area status, the externality effect
60 For similar findings of insignificance o f regional foreign participation in Russian manufacturing 
industries, see Yudaeva et al. (2000).
61 The data source is the Onesource database on private and public companies (see Girma and Wakelin, 
2002).
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from the regional presence of FDI disappears.
Finally, Girma and Wakelin (2001) present an analysis of FDI-induced 
externalities in the electronics industry in the UK, using plant level data from the 
ARD for the period 1980-1992. In this analysis, they use the same three FDI-related 
variables as in Girma and Wakelin (2002), distinguishing between FDI from different 
home countries. The findings are more supportive of the occurrence of externalities 
compared to Girma and Wakelin (2001). Both Japanese and European FDI in a 
domestic firm’s region and industry are positively related to the productivity of that 
firm. US investment has no significant estimated effect, however. In addition to this, 
the participation of FDI (irrespective of nationality) in a domestic firm’s region 
outside its own industry is positively related to the domestic firm’s productivity, 
pointing at the occurrence of externalities from sectors related to the sector in which 
the domestic firm operates.
In sum, assessing the empirical evidence in light of the potential effects of 
geography on the occurrence and level of intra-industry externalities, two important 
features of the empirical findings are particularly noteworthy. First, it appears that 
there may be a geographical or regional component to the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities. Several studies find a significant estimated externality effect of the 
regional presence of foreign-owned firms. Second, in order to capture all possible 
regional components of externalities from FDI, it seems important to extend the 
analysis to cover both intra- and inter-industry externalities. For a given domestic firm, 
regional participation of foreign-owned firms can take place in the domestic firm’s 
own industry, as well as in related but dissimilar industries. An empirical analysis that 
only considers regional externalities of the intra-industry type runs the serious risk of 
not identifying the second important regional source of productivity effects that
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originates from related but dissimilar industries.
Estimation Issues
The findings from the productivity studies offer some evidence of the importance of 
some form of geographical component to the occurrence of externalities from FDI. 
However, there are several shortcomings to the limited empirical evidence that is 
available, which means that the evidence needs to be interpreted with caution.
One issue is related to the choice of the scale of region. Equal to the analysis 
by Sjoholm (1999), the findings from the productivity studies may be sensitive to the 
choice of geographical scale. Girma and Wakelin (2001; 2002) for instance divide the 
UK (excluding Northern Ireland) into standard UK regions, 14 in total. Harris and 
Robinson (2002) use local authority areas, favouring this option as it more closely 
approximates local labour markets. Haskel et al. (2002) divide the UK into 11 
standard regions. The use of different geographical scales in the different studies 
makes the comparison between the findings of these alternative empirical studies 
more difficult.
Furthermore, none of the studies addresses the question whether the 
geographical scale of measurement of regional foreign participation influences the 
estimated effects of FDI62. For instance, it is not necessarily the case that proximity 
effects are most closely related to the lowest geographical scale (in this case the local 
authority area). It may be that externality effects from FDI are best captured at an 
alternative geographical scale. Sjoholm’s (1998, 1999) findings are indicative of this,
62 Of course, data considerations often prevent an analysis of the effects o f different geographical 
scales. However, as indicated by the different scales used in the UK studies, it seems to be possible to 
look into this aspect for this particular country.
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as his empirical analysis shows that estimates of FDI-induced externalities differ 
between different geographical scales of analysis.
A second issue, related to the scale of the region, is that it is not clear that the 
studies on the UK have sufficiently controlled for the possibility that there are 
regional differences in productivity that may have been caused by the presence of 
agglomeration economies (as in Aitken and Harrison, 1999). For instance, there is no 
control for the type of geographical distribution of economic activity within the UK. 
The issue of geographical concentration of activity is important, as it may affect the 
productivity of domestic firms directly, as well as affect the occurrence of 
externalities from FDI. Therefore, by omitting these variables from the empirical 
model, the estimated effect of foreign participation may be biased.
Finally, when attempting to estimate regional externalities from FDI, both 
within and between industries, it seems important to ensure that all the possible 
foreign participation variables are tested in the empirical model. In particular, for a 
given domestic firm in a given region, four possible types of foreign participation may 
lead to the occurrence of externalities: intra- and inter-industry foreign participation 
within the region, as well as intra- and inter-industry foreign participation in other 
regions. It appears that the majority of empirical studies that attempt to identify some 
form of geographical component to FDI-induced externalities have considered the 
effect of some of these different types of foreign participation. However, in order to 
ensure that the estimations of each of these foreign participation variables are 
unbiased, it appears that all four need to be considered in the same estimation.
3.6. Summary and Implications for Study
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The type of geographical distribution of economic activity may affect the productivity 
level of firms and industries. More particularly, in comparison to firms located 
elsewhere, firms located in an agglomeration of economic activity may benefit from 
productivity effects that are uniquely related to the existence of the agglomeration.
Three mechanisms for the enhancing effect of agglomeration on productivity 
can be identified: labour market pooling, specialised local inputs and information or 
knowledge spillovers. Each of these factors is linked to geographical concentrations 
of economic activity and may lead to productivity enhancing effects through various 
processes. These positive effects, agglomeration economies, may be confined to an 
industry, or apply to several industries in an agglomeration of activity. They may be 
of a static nature, in which case they show up as a one-off productivity increase 
among firms and industries. Alternatively, dynamic agglomeration economies affect 
future productivity levels of firms and industries and are linked to a continuous 
process of productivity increase.
The relations between agglomerations and FDI can be interpreted in two ways. 
One interpretation focuses on the effect of FDI on the creation and level of 
agglomeration economies. This relation crucially depends on the rate of participation 
of foreign firms with their business environment in the agglomeration. If foreign firms 
participate to a lesser extent, agglomeration economies will be lower, compared to the 
case where the agglomeration consists of only domestic firms. If foreign firms do 
participate, there may be an additional enhancing effect from this participation on 
externalities. This possibility arises from the fact that additional technological 
externalities may be transmitted from FDI through the mechanisms that create agglo­
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meration economies.
The alternative way to look at the relation between agglomeration and FDI is 
to assess the effect of geographical proximity between foreign and domestic firms on 
the existence and functioning of the channels of FDI-induced externalities. As 
geographical proximity is likely to enhance the functioning of these channels, there 
appears to be a positive relation between geographical proximity and FDI-induced 
externalities. Important to consider is that both positive and negative externalities may 
be enhanced by geographical concentration. Positive externalities may be enhanced, 
as proximity will improve the functioning of the channels in the form of labour 
turnover, inter-firm linkages and demonstration and learning effects. On the other 
hand, the presence of foreign firms in an agglomeration may also create negative 
pecuniary externalities. This effect can be explained by the increase in demand for 
regional inputs, which has a negative effect of profit levels of domestic firms. If 
domestic firms manage to change their conduct and become more efficient as a result, 
the ultimate effect of this increased competition for regional inputs may change into a 
positive pecuniary externality.
Empirical evidence of the effects of geographical concentration of economic 
activity on the occurrence and magnitude of FDI-induced externalities is limited in 
quantity and scope. Furthermore, methodological issues make it difficult to interpret 
and compare findings. Given this, one empirical finding that is important is the 
positive effect that agglomeration variables have in FDI location decisions. This 
finding indicates that foreign firms are attracted to locations that constitute 
agglomerations of economic activity. This tendency of foreign firms to locate in 
agglomerations is a piece of empirical evidence that suggests the importance of the 
analysis of the effect of geographical proximity between foreign and domestic firms
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on the occurrence and the level of FDI-induced externalities.
Empirical productivity studies that include variables representing foreign 
participation at the regional level offer further evidence. Several studies present 
estimated significant positive associations between region-wide foreign participation 
and domestic productivity, whereas others fail to find significant relations. Having 
said so, the majority of studies that identify significant effects from regional 
participation indicate that this association is positive of nature. Furthermore, the 
empirical findings are important in indicating that, when including some measure of 
regional foreign participation into the empirical estimation, it is important to consider 
both intra- and inter-industry externalities. The exclusive focus on intra-industry 
externalities creates the risk that an important part of regional externality effects from 
FDI, that arise between rather than within industries, remains unidentified.
Implications for Research
One of the main conclusions of chapter two is that there is an important gap in the 
empirical literature on FDI-induced externalities concerning the identification of 
determinants of these externalities. The goal of the present chapter is to assess 
whether the concept of geographical proximity may be such a determinant.
The discussion in the present chapter indicates that there appear to be 
important relations between the existence of agglomerations of economic activity and 
the occurrence and type of FDI-induced externalities. It seems that these relations can 
be investigated in an empirical setting in two alternative ways. One way would 
amount to the estimation of agglomeration economies in a regional setting, followed 
by an empirical identification of the association between foreign participation and
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these regionally confined externalities. The other way is to extend the approach 
initiated by some empirical studies on FDI-induced externalities, by analysing the 
effects of geographical proximity within the framework of such studies. In this thesis, 
I will take this latter approach. In estimating externalities from FDI, I will look into 
the effect(s) of geographical concentration on the level and type of these externalities. 
Following this interpretation, I have set up the following research question:
What is the effect o f geographical concentration or proximity on the occurrence o f 
externalities from FDI in Mexican manufacturing industries?
The underlying motivation of this research question is a straightforward one. 
Following the discussion presented in the present chapter, the hypothesis is that 
geographical concentration of industries affects the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities. The present chapter indicates that this relation between geographical 
proximity and the occurrence and type of FDI-induced externalities can take shape in 
at least three ways, all of which need to be assessed in order to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the research question stated above.
First, there is a relation between geographical proximity and FDI-induced 
externalities, in the sense that geographical proximity is likely to enhance the 
functioning of the channels of externalities. Whether geographical proximity enhances 
positive, negative, or both types of externalities is impossible to predict beforehand, 
as all channels of FDI-induced externalities seem to be stimulated by geographical 
proximity.
Second, the effect of geographical proximity on FDI-induced externalities 
can alternatively be approached from a regional point of view, by estimating the
externality impact of regional foreign participation. Important here is that the notion 
of regional participation refers to both intra- as well as inter-industry foreign 
participation, as proximity effects from the presence of foreign-owned firms may arise 
within and between industries. Therefore, the second question that needs to be 
addressed empirically is whether intra-regional foreign participation causes FDI- 
induced externalities.
Third, the effect of geographical proximity on FDI-induced externalities can 
also be looked at from an inter-regional point of view. In a similar fashion to intra- 
regional foreign participation, the presence of FDI may also cause intra- and inter­
industry externalities to arise between rather than within regions. The inclusion of the 
estimation of the presence of inter-regional intra- and inter-industry FDI-induced 
externalities ensures that all four types of regional foreign participation are assessed. 
Furthermore, the concept of geographical proximity regarding inter-regional 
externalities is more directly related to the concept of geographical distance, in the 
sense that these externalities from FDI are likely to be negatively related to inter­
regional distances within a host economy.
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Chapter 4 FDI and Intra-Industry Externalities in Mexico:
Initial empirical results
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I present the initial empirical findings on the occurrence of intra­
industry FDI-induced externalities in Mexico. Intra-industry externalities refer to 
externalities that occur between foreign and domestic firms that operate within the 
same industries. The other form of FDI-induced externalities are so-called inter­
industry externalities, referring to situations where the presence of foreign firms in a 
given industry create externality effects for domestic firms in other industries. 
Following the focus of the majority of empirical research on FDI-induced 
externalities, the present chapter presents findings for this type of externalities. 
Estimations of inter-industry externalities are presented in a later chapter.
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter is based on unpublished and 
thus far unexplored data from the 1988 and 1993 Mexican Economic Census, carried 
out by Inegi63. The prime reason for choosing Mexico as the country on which to 
focus the empirical analysis is bom out of the fact that an important share of empirical 
evidence of positive externality effects from FDI is based on previous research 
findings on Mexico. However, a potentially important drawback of that empirical 
evidence is that it relies heavily on the empirical analysis of 1970 data. Therefore, by 
analysing a more recent database for Mexico, not only will I be able to assess my 
findings against those earlier findings, but it also allows me to assess the relevance of 
those earlier empirical estimates in contemporary discussions of FDI-induced extema-
63 Institute) Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia y Informatica (National Institute of Statistics, Geography 
and Information).
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lities.
The chapter aims to answer the following two questions, set against the 
available evidence for Mexico from previous studies. First, is there empirical 
evidence of the general occurrence of intra-industry FDI-induced externalities in 
Mexico? Second, is there au effect of the commonly used determinant of externalities 
in the form of the technology gap?
The chapter consists of six sections. Section 4.2. describes the data and 
presents a rudimentary estimation of the existence of a certain scope for FDI-induced 
externalities to arise. Section 4.3. reviews the existing empirical evidence on FDI- 
induced externalities in Mexico. Section 4.4. introduces the main empirical model of 
the present chapter. Following this, section 4.5. presents the main empirical results for 
the initial empirical model. Furthermore, this section presents the results of several 
alternatively specified empirical models, in order to assess the robustness of the 
estimated association between measured Mexican productivity and foreign investment. 
Section 4.6. contains an assessment of the effect of the level of technological 
differences between foreign-owned and Mexican firms as determinant of FDI-induced 
externalities. Finally, section 4.7. summarises the key findings and concludes.
4.2. Productivity Differences between Domestic and Foreign firms
4.2.1. Introduction
One of the premises of research into FDI-induced externalities is that foreign firms 
possess a certain level of technological superiority over their domestic competitors in 
host economies. In fact, this technological advantage, representing some form of
140
ownership-specific advantage, allows a MNE to successfully locate and operate an 
affiliate in a foreign country (Dunning, 1993). Foreign firms are faced with 
disadvantages in host economies, arising from the fact that domestic firms know the 
culture, the language and are familiar with the local market with all its contacts, 
procedures, legal requirements, etc. To compensate for such disadvantages, FDI needs 
to possess ownership-specific advantages that allow it to successfully compete on 
foreign markets (Dunning, 1993, Caves, 1996).
The common way to determine whether foreign firms possess some advantage 
over domestic firms is to compare relative productivity or profitability levels of both 
types of firms. In his empirical review, Caves (1996, p. 186) indicates that ‘the 
general thrust has been to find that MNEs are more profitable or display higher 
productivity than selected single-nation rivals’ (Caves, 1996, p. 186). Such findings 
would suggest that foreign affiliates indeed possess some ownership advantage over 
domestic firms. However, the findings are not clear-cut. It is not surprising to find 
differences between foreign and domestic firms, as foreign firms must possess 
something that allows them to operate in foreign markets. More importantly, the 
difference between foreign and domestic firms may be explained by other factors 
rather than some ownership-specific advantage, such as capital intensity of production 
processes or intensity of use of skilled labour (Caves, 1996).
Some recent examples of the comparison of foreign and domestic firms in the 
UK can be found in Girma et al. (2001), Griffith (1999) and Griffith and Simpson 
(2002)64. Girma et al. (2001) compare labour productivity, total factor productivity 
and wages between foreign and domestic firms for a large plant level database for the 
UK for 1990-1996, and find that, controlling for differences in size and sector effects,
64 For an extensive review of this type of research, see Caves (1996).
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foreign firms systematically report higher values for the indicators mentioned. This 
difference is attributed to ownership effects (see Girma et al., 2001).
On the other hand, Griffith (1999) compares foreign and domestic firms in the 
UK car industry for the period 1980-1992, producing empirical findings that do not 
support the existence of such an ownership effect. Although measured labour 
productivity is higher in foreign firms in this industry, capital intensity and relative 
use of intermediate inputs appear to explain the differences in measured productivity 
between foreign and domestic firms. Finally, Griffith and Simpson (2002) compare 
manufacturing establishments in the UK between 1980 and 1996. Establishments 
under foreign control during this period show consistent higher measured productivity 
levels compared to British firms. However, when controlling for relative investment 
levels, most of the difference between the two types of firms can be accounted for.
The mixed findings on the UK underline the cautionary note expressed by 
Caves (1996), who warns for the problems that are attached to attributing differences 
in measured productivity levels between foreign and domestic firms uniquely to some 
form of ownership-specific advantage. Having said so, a comparison of productivity 
levels between the two types of firms provides some indication of the existence of 
differences in productivity due to ownership-specific advantages, indicating the 
existence of a certain scope of FDI-induced externalities to materialise. Therefore, the 
analysis of whether there are differences in productivity still can serve as an 
introductory analysis to the subsequent analysis of externalities arising from FDI.
Domestic and Foreign-owned Companies in Mexico
Two important sources of information on the question whether there are differences
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between foreign and domestic manufacturing companies in Mexico are Fajinzylber 
and Martinez (1976) and Blomstrom (1989). Both studies present evidence indicating 
that there are important differences between the two types of firms. Foreign firms 
show higher levels of labour productivity, capital intensity and wages. On the other 
hand, the wage share in value added is lower for foreign than domestic firms (see 
Fajinzylber and Martinez, 1976; Blomstrom, 1989)65. Having said so, the differences 
between the two types of companies are much smaller in Blomstrom (1989) than in 
Fajinzylber and Martinez (1976). Furthermore, Blomstrom (1989) finds that the 
differences between foreign and Mexican firms are insignificant; the hypothesis that 
both firms have equal values for the mentioned indicators cannot be rejected (see 
Blomstrom, 1989).
4.2.2. Characteristics of Data
The data that is used for the empirical analysis in the present and following chapters 
consists to a large extent of two unpublished, and thus far unexplored, databases from 
the 1988 and 1993 Mexican Economic Census of manufacturing establishments. The 
data is unpublished, and was provided directly to me by Inegi, Mexico’s main 
government office for statistics.
The data is in the form of aggregate 6 -digit manufacturing industry data for 
the years 1988 and 199366. The data is registered according to two types of
65 The one difference between the two studies is that whereas Blomstrom (1989) finds that foreign 
firms have lower profits per unit of capital, Fajnzylber and Martinez (1976) find that foreign firms have 
higher profits.
66 Classification used is the Clasificacion Mexicana de Actividades y Productos (CMAP), see Inegi 
(1994) for description.
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f%1 ASownership: private foreign-owned and private Mexican-owned ’ . The total number 
of industries amounts to 302, of which 262 contain some level of foreign 
participation69. The databases contain the following variables: value added, number of 
employees, total assets at book value, number of establishments, number of white 
collar workers, number of blue collar workers and total gross production70. In addition 
to these variables, I have enlarged the data-sets by adding the size distribution of 
establishments per industry based on various size indicators, such as relative size of 
total gross production, total number of employees, etc. These size distributions do 
only distinguish between the two types of ownership at the four-digit level for 1993, 
however71.
4.2.3. Empirical Findings on Productivity Differences
As mentioned in footnote 70, the biggest shortcoming of the database is that, in many
77cases, the number of firms is withheld, due to publication restrictions . This means
67 State owned companies were deleted from the original database, for similar reasons as expressed by 
BlomstrSm and Persson (1983, p. 495): state owned companies can be expected to show different 
behaviour from privately owned firms (Mexican or foreign-owned), because they have different 
operational goals (e.g. creation of employment). More specifically, the pursuit of such goals by state 
owned companies might have a negative effect on the level of productivity of such firms. Alternatively, 
state owned firms might be engaged in specific power relations with foreign owned companies, which 
may increase their productivity. As there are no variables in the database that could control for such 
issues, state owned firms have been excluded.
68 All companies of which any percentage is owned by a foreign company (or companies) are 
considered as foreign-owned. In reality however, there are no foreign-owned companies in the database 
with less than 10% of total assets in foreign hands. Effectively therefore, the industry aggregates of 
observations from foreign-owned firms can be taken to reflect those manufacturing companies in 
Mexico of which at least 10% of total assets is owned by foreign companies.
69 The actual number of industries used in the empirical analysis is lower, due to problems of missing 
variables and outliers.
70 The variable that poses most problems is the variable number of establishments. For any given 
industry, federal law prevents Inegi to publish the number of firms when this number is equal to or less 
than three, in order to prevent the identification of individual companies from aggregate industry 
statistics (Inegi, 1994). This also explains why the analysis in this study is conducted with industry 
aggregates rather than with individual plant level data.
71 For 1988, this information is not available.
72 In these cases, only the total number o f firms in an industry is given; both the cells of the number of 
foreign firms and the number of domestic firms are empty.
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that it is not possible to construct a reliable measure of labour productivity per foreign 
firm, as this number is not known in these cases. In the cases where the number of 
foreign firms is known, the problem arises that it is not clear how large each of these 
firms are individually. This makes it impossible to compare foreign and domestic 
firms, as average firm level productivity levels cannot be calculated accurately.
An alternative way to see if there are differences between foreign and Mexican 
firms is presented by Blomstrom (1989). In order to detect differences between 
foreign and domestic firms, he regresses a proxy for labour productivity on a number 
of independent variables, for both foreign and domestic firms separately. Using these 
findings, he determines whether there are significant differences in the estimated 
coefficients between the two estimations. As the database for 1993 allows such an 
analysis, I have replicated the analysis as presented by Blomstrom (1989), to see if 
there are labour productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms.
The Empirical Model
The empirical model that is estimated for both types of ownership as well as for the 
aggregate sample is taken from Blomstrom (1989) and can be stated as follows73:
Equation 4.1. PROD = Bo + Bi INV + B2 LQ + B3 SCALE + B4  C4 + 8
The idea of the analysis is to estimate the labour productivity equation for Mexican- 
owned and foreign-owned shares of industries separately. After this, the two datasets 
are merged, and the equation is estimated again for the aggregate set.
73 For a full explanation and justification of the empirical model, see section 4.4.
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Prod = labour productivity; (total value added) / (total number of employees)
INV = capital intensity; (total assets at book value) / (total number of employees)
LQ = labour quality; (total number of white collar employees) / (total number of blue
collar employees)
SCALE = scale economies; (average gross production industry) / (average gross
production largest plants in industry)
C4 = industrial concentration; (total gross production 4 largest plants in industry) /
(total production of industry)
Using the results of the three estimations, a Chow test can be conducted to test 
whether the estimated coefficients of the estimations for foreign- and domestically- 
owned shares of industries are similar, in the sense that the two sets of observations 
can be taken to come from the same underlying regression model. The results for the 
three estimations are shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Labour productivity; Mexican and foreign firms; 1993
Mexican firms Foreign firms All firms
Constant 14.26
(5.931)***
23.645
(5.134)***
20.405
(7.824)***
INV 0.569
(13.087)***
0.508
(11.261)***
0.52
(16.82)***
LQ 0.357 0.344 0.353
(8.771)*** (8.193)*** (11.95)***
SCALE 0.116
(2.574)**
0.260
(5.695)***
0.219
(6.978)***
C4 -0.043 -0.041 -0.045
(1.017) (0.95) (1.51)
R2  ad.j 0.610 0.641 0.621
F 98.148 (0.000) 99.472 (0.000) 194.02 (0.000)
N 251 222 473
RSS 59046.25 241355.14 333507.33
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance; Beta coefficients are standardised
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The empirical model appears to function satisfactory. The adjusted R2
indicates that over 60 % of the variation in the independent variables is explained by
the four right hand side (RHS) variables. Three of these RHS variables have estimated
significant effects. To test the hypothesis that both sets of firms belong to the same
regression model, I conduct a Chow-test, using the residual sums of squares from the
estimations (see Gujarati, 1995, p. 263-264).
The F value amounts to
_ (RSSallfirms -  RSSmexfirms — Rssforfirms) / k 
{RSSmexfirms +RSSforfirms) !{n\ +n2 -  2k)
k = the number of estimated parameters
n l, n2  = number of observations for mexfirms and forfirms (251 and 2 2 2 ).
This leads to
(333507.33-59046.25-241355.14)/5
F (5 4 6 3 1 —   — 1 U .2 U S
1 ; (59046.25 +241355.14)/(251 +222 -10)
F (5, 463) = 10.205 is higher than the critical F value (F = 1.29), which leads to a 
rejection of the hypothesis that domestic and foreign firms belong to the same 
regression model. Therefore, based on the results of the Chow-test, foreign and 
domestic firms are indeed different, as their labour productivity regression lines 
cannot be captured by the same general regression line.
In order to see whether this difference is possibly related to any ownership- 
specific advantage of foreign-owned firms, an exploration of the plot of the residuals 
of the estimation for all firms may be helpful. This plot is shown in figure 4.1.
The plot of the residuals of the estimated regression for all firms reveals that 
there is a difference between the residuals of Mexican and foreign firms. The 
aggregate regression line appears to perform satisfactory for the domestically-owned 
shares of industries, as indicated by the random pattern of positive and negative
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Figure 1. Residuals of estimation for all firms
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values of the residuals. In contrast, the residuals of the foreign-owned industry shares 
have a tendency to be larger and positive at a higher frequency. This indicates that the 
aggregate regression line tends to underestimate labour productivity levels of foreign- 
owned firms. A possible explanation for this is the presence of some form of 
ownership-specific advantage that is present among FDI, which is not captured by the 
underlying regression model for the entire set of observations.
In sum, this section has provided a rough indication of the existence of 
productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms. Using a simple 
empirical model to compare determinants of measured labour productivity for 
Mexican-owned and foreign-owned shares of industries, the hypothesis that both 
regressions can be taken to come from the same empirical model is firmly rejected. 
This dissimilarity, together with the revealed patterns of residuals of both sets of 
observations, points at the existence o f some level of productivity advantage of FDI. 
Keeping in mind that these findings only provide a rough indicator of the presence of
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some form of ownership-specific advantage among FDI, they do provide important 
background information for the study of FDI-induced externalities in Mexico, as they 
reflect the presence of a scope for such externalities to occur.
4.3. FDI-induced Externalities in Mexico: some Previous Research
Several studies are available that provide general overviews of the relative importance 
of foreign investment in the overall Mexican economy and in individual 
manufacturing industries, most importantly Faynzylber and Martinez (1976), Matthies 
(1977) and Robinson and Smith (1976). Furthermore, an analysis of the importance of 
foreign investment towards the development of specific key industries can be found in 
Perez (1990). Also, a recent important study focuses exclusively on the overall 
importance of foreign investment in the form of so-called Maquiladora firms (see 
Cepal, 1996).
Furthermore, several empirical studies focus on topics that are linked to the 
question whether the presence of foreign-owned firms has created FDI-induced 
externalities accruing to Mexican manufacturing firms. Empirical evidence from these 
studies is mixed: some findings suggest that positive FDI-induced externalities arise 
from the presence of FDI, whereas other findings appear to indicate the occurrence of 
negative externalities. Having said so, on balance the evidence appears to be in favour 
of the existence of positive FDI-induced externalities, be it that this conclusion is 
mainly based on the analysis of 1970 census data.
Ramirez (2000) provides a longitudinal study of short and long term effects of 
FDI on measured labour productivity for the overall Mexican economy between 1960 
and 1995. The findings indicate that changes in both the domestic and (lagged)
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foreign capital stock are positively related to changes in measured labour productivity. 
Ramirez (2000) interprets this positive association between changes in overall labour 
productivity and foreign capital stock as evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities in the Mexican economy.
However, as discussed in chapter two, this positive relation does not 
necessarily represent externalities. The influx of foreign capital represents capital 
accumulation, which has a positive effect on labour productivity. In fact, the positive 
relation between labour productivity and the change in domestic capital reflects this. 
In addition, the increase in capital stock resulting from FDI could have served to solve 
certain bottlenecks in the Mexican economy. This would lead to an improvement in 
overall allocative efficiency, which would show up as an overall increase in labour 
productivity.
Furthermore, the positive estimated effect of FDI could represent an overall 
improvement of efficiency in the Mexican economy, following from the increasing 
share of foreign firms in overall manufacturing activity. It is important to recall that 
the entry of foreign-owned firms represents an overall improvement in the level of 
technology in the economy (see Dunning, 1985). The dependent variable in Ramirez 
(2 0 0 0 ) concerns aggregate labour productivity for all manufacturing activity 
(domestic-and foreign-owned). This means that (at least part of) the positive estimated 
effect of FDI on measured productivity could be caused by improved overall 
efficiency, due to the increased level of foreign participation in the economy. 
Therefore, the estimated positive association found by Ramirez (2000) could reflect 
the occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities, but it is unclear whether this is 
the case and to what extent.
As discussed in chapter three, Aitken et al. (1997) offer evidence of the occur­
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rence of positive FDI-induced externalities in the form of market access spillovers; a 
form of externalities more closely representing pure technological externalities. 
Mexican firms that are located in close proximity to foreign exporting firms are found 
to be more likely to be engaged in exporting activities themselves. Such a positive 
relation does not exist when replacing the geographical concentration of foreign- 
owned exporting activity by overall exporting activity, suggesting a unique 
contribution from FDI to exporting activities by Mexican firms.
Using the same database as in Aitken et al. (1997), Aitken et al. (1996) assess 
whether another type of externality occurs in Mexico resulting from labour turnover 
between foreign and domestic firms. Their findings suggest that this is not the case. 
Estimating determinants of overall wage levels in industries in Mexico, the findings 
indicate that the extent of industry-wide foreign participation has a positive effect on 
the industry wage level. However, these wage levels are for foreign and domestic 
firms combined. When the determinants of wage levels of only Mexican firms are 
assessed, the positive effect of the extent of industry-wide foreign participation 
disappears (Aitken et al, 1996)74.
An alternative approach can be found in an empirical study carried out by 
Bannister and Stolp (1995), who analyse determinants of efficiency levels for 2-digit 
manufacturing industries for 1985 at the state level. Using distance-fimction 
production methodology, they calculate indicators for overall, technical, allocative 
and scale efficiency for the 32 states (see Bannister and Stolp, 1995, p. 674-677). 
Subsequently, these efficiency indicators are regressed on a number of RHS variables,
74 In the case of externalities, the findings would indicate a positive significant association between 
industry-wide FDI and domestic wage levels. Estimating similarly specified empirical models, Aitken 
et al. (1996) replicate the analysis for Venezuela and the US. For Venezuela, the findings are similar to 
Mexico. For the US however, the presence of foreign firms seems to be creating positive externalities, 
as there is a positive relation between domestic wage level and the magnitude of foreign investment 
(see Aitken et al., 1996).
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including internal scale economies, the extent of geographical concentration of 
industries and foreign participation in state-wide overall manufacturing activity. Their 
findings indicate positive effects of internal scale economies and urbanisation 
economies on both overall and technical efficiency indicators. However, foreign 
participation is found to have a negative effect on the overall level of state efficiency, 
suggesting the occurrence of negative externalities.
Bannister and Stolp (1995) argue that the negative association between foreign 
participation and efficiency results from a miss-specification problem, rather than 
from the existence of negative externalities: ‘foreign firms locate in regions where 
labour is less expensive and hence where productivity may be lower. Thus in the 
aggregate, the positive effects of foreign investment may be difficult to distinguish 
from the effects of other regional characteristics that bring efficiency down’ (Stolp 
and Bannister, 1995, p.685). However, this issue is not further explored75.
A further indication of the possible existence of negative externalities from the 
presence of FDI can be found in Grether (1999). He analyses the process of 
technology diffusion in the Mexican economy, using a panel of Mexican and foreign- 
owned firms for the period 1984-199076. As discussed in chapter two, such an 
analysis of determinants of technology diffusion can be used to detect the occurrence 
of externalities from FDI. If the magnitude of industry-wide foreign participation is 
positively related to some indicator representing the rate of industry-wide technology 
diffusion, ceteris paribus, the relation can be interpreted as an indication of the 
occurrence of positive externalities. However, Grether’s findings suggest that the 
presence of foreign firms creates negative externalities, as the estimated association
75 For instance, they could have tested the effect of regional dummies, which may partly control for this 
problem.
6 This sample o f plants is similar to the one used by Aitken et al (1996; 1997), although Grether 
appears to have deleted a considerable number of plant observations from his sample (see Grether, 
1999).
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between the two variables carries a significant negative coefficient (see Grether, 
1999).
Having said so, it is not entirely clear how to interpret the estimated negative 
effect of foreign investment on technology diffusion. It could be that a high level of 
foreign investment creates a situation where foreign firms try to prevent the 
occurrence of technology diffusion, whereas in industries with less foreign 
participation, FDI is less able to do so. In this case, the negative estimated effect 
should not be interpreted as a negative externality effect,, but rather as an indication 
that FDI is preventing the occurrence of positive externalities to materialise. If the 
estimated effect is reflecting externalities, the only feasible explanation is related to 
the existence of some form of negative (pecuniary) competition effect, where the 
presence of FDI puts too high a pressure on domestic firms, preventing these firms 
from making productivity enhancing investments77.
Positive FDI-induced externalities: the 1970 sample
An important set of papers relies on the analysis of a database containing industry­
wide data for 1970, as first presented by Persson and Blomstrom (1983)78. The main 
database consists of 1970 data for 215 manufacturing industries, for which relevant 
variables such as value added and number of employees are distinguishable between 
foreign and domestic ownership.
77 An alternative explanation for the estimated negative association could be that the estimation is 
affected by endogeneity. The dependent variable is defined as the technological difference between a 
Mexican firm and the most efficient firm in its industry. A large difference is taken to indicate low 
technology diffusion. It could be that foreign firms prefer industries with large technological 
differences with Mexican firms, where* they are likely to face less competition in comparison to 
industries where firms are more technologically similar. If this were the case, the estimation would 
indeed produce a negative association between technology diffusion and foreign participation, 
reflecting the tendency of foreign firms to gravitate towards low technology diffusion industries.
78 See also Blomstrdm (1989) for more details of this database.
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The first important empirical result from the analysis of this database is that 
FDI in Mexico appears to be creating positive externalities. Several empirical 
estimations indicate that, controlling for various factors that affect productivity of 
domestically-owned shares of the industries, the extent of industry-wide foreign 
participation is significantly positively related to domestic industry-wide measured 
labour productivity (see Blomstrom and Persson, 1983; Blomstrom, 1989; Kokko, 
1994,1996; Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan, 2000).
Second, the positive association between foreign investment and domestic 
productivity appears robust to changes in the specification of the underlying empirical 
models. For instance, Blomstrom (1986) finds a significant positive relation between 
the share of industry-wide foreign participation and the overall efficiency level of 
industries, defined as the difference in efficiency between the best practice firm and 
the average firm79. Alternatively, the dependent variable can be defined as the rate of 
growth of labour productivity or the rate of convergence of measured industry-wide 
labour productivity between Mexican and foreign-owned manufacturing firms. 
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) calculate these alternative dependent variables for the 
period 1970-1975, finding that both are significantly positively related to the industry­
wide share of foreign investment in 1970 (see Blomstrom and Wolff, 1994).
Third, the analysis of the 1970 database has produced indications of the 
importance of structural factors influencing the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities, as discussed in chapter two. For instance, in his estimation of the overall 
efficiency effect of FDI, Blomstrom’s (1989) findings indicate that this effect differs 
between large and small Mexican firms. Blomstrom (1989) explains this difference in
79 An important caveat of this analysis is that the indicator of overall efficiency does not distinguish 
between best practice of foreign and domestic firms. Therefore, the positive relation may alternatively 
reflect that industries with large foreign presence contain foreign firms with small technological 
differences between them.
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estimated effect by interpreting firm size as an indicator of the level of absorptive 
capacity of domestic firms80. Large Mexican firms are likely to use modem 
technologies, which makes them more suitable to absorb technologies used by foreign 
firms. In contrast, small firms use relatively traditional technologies and are likely to 
remain unaffected by the presence of FDI. Similarly, from a study attempting to find 
factors that affect the extent to which foreign affiliates import new technologies into 
Mexico, Blomstrom et al. (1994) find that that there are structural differences between 
traditional and modem industries in terms of import intensity of technology.
Furthermore, Kokko (1994; 1996) relates industry characteristics as indicators 
of the level of absorptive capacity of Mexican firms to the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities. His findings suggest that the simultaneous existence of large technology 
gaps between foreign and domestic companies and a relatively large industry-wide 
participation of foreign investment hinders the occurrence of externalities. Kokko 
(1994) interprets this finding as evidence of the existence of so-called ‘ “enclaves”, i.e. 
isolated segments of the market where technologies, products and plant sizes are very 
different from those used by local firms’ (Kokko, 1994, p. 291). In a related research 
on the effect of competition on labour productivity of both foreign and domestic firms, 
Kokko (1996) finds indications confirming his separation of industries with enclave 
characteristics, as his hypotheses are only confirmed for those industries that do not fit 
these characteristics (see Kokko, 1996).
Summarising, the results based on the 1970 database offer empirical evidence 
of the existence of positive FDI-induced externalities, indicated by an estimated 
significant positive association between industry-wide foreign participation and 
measured Mexican labour productivity. Furthermore, this positive association appears
80 See Aitken and Harrison (1999) for similar argument.
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robust to different specifications of the underlying empirical model. Also, the 
estimations are in support of the hypothesis that the domestic level of absorptive 
capacity is positively influencing the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities.
4.4. Specification of the Empirical Model
The initial empirical model that I estimate in this chapter largely follows the 
specifications as used in the analysis of the 1970 sample, facilitating a comparison 
between the findings from the new database and the old one. The empirical model can 
be stated as:
Equation 4.2. (Prodm) = Bo + 6 i INVm + 6 2  LQm + 8 3  SCALEm + B4  HERFI
B5  GINI + Bg FOR + £ J
The dependent variable, PRODm, is an industry-wide labour productivity index, 
measured as the ratio of value added over total number of employees of the Mexican- 
owned shares of manufacturing industries.
The capital-labour ratio INVm is measured as the ratio of the book value of 
total assets to the total number of employees in Mexican-owned shares of industries, 
to control for the effect of cross-industry variation of capital-intensity of production 
technologies.
LQm measures the cross-industry variation of the level of human capital. An 
industry with a relatively high level of human capital is likely to show a higher level 
of productivity compared to an industry with a lower level of labour quality, all else 
equal (Persson and Blomstrom, 1983).
The standard measure of labour quality is average wages. The information for
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this variable is available in the database, but the use of it is problematic due to 
potential simultaneity problems, as the dependent variable contains value added in the 
numerator. Moreover, the line of causation between labour productivity and wage 
level is not clear-cut, as it may run both ways. Therefore, in line with earlier studies, 
an alternative variable indicating the relative level of labour quality is used, in the 
form of the ratio of white to blue-collar labour in Mexican-owned shares of 
industries81.
The level of market concentration in an industry is hypothesised to be related 
to the level of measured productivity. It is represented in equation 4.2 as HERFI. 
Two identical industries with different levels of market concentration may show 
different levels of value added per employee (Blomstrom and Persson, 1983; 
Blomstrom, 1989). However, the effect of market concentration on domestic 
productivity is not clear-cut. One the one hand, competition may spur companies to be 
more efficient in their production, which would lead to a negative relation between 
productivity and market concentration. On the other hand, firms in more concentrated 
industries are likely to be better able to engage in some level of monopoly pricing, 
which will result to higher measured levels of productivity, as monopoly pricing 
raises measured value added. In this scenario, market concentration would show a 
positive association with measured domestic productivity (Kokko, 1994).
The influence of the level of market concentration per industry can be 
captured by the Herfindahl or Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index. The HH index may 
be regarded as the preferred variable representing the underlying factors that are 
important in the analysis of market concentration, as it captures the combined effects
81 Previous studies on Mexico using the 1970 database rely on a proxy for this variable, as the variables 
of blue-and white-collar labour separated for domestic and foreign-owned firms are unavailable for that 
year (see Blomstrdm and Persson, 1983). The present analysis does not rely on a proxy, as the new 
database does distinguish between the two types of ownership for this variable.
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of the influences of number of firms per industry, market shares and coalition 
potential (see van Lommel et al., 1977; also Blomstrom, 1989)82. For the present 
estimation, the variable is calculated as the aggregation of squared shares of 
individual firms in total industry production (see van Lommel et al., 1977).
The level of scale economies among Mexican firms is represented by 
SCALEm. The inclusion of this variable is common practice in productivity 
estimations, as it can be assumed that industries that are subject to internal scale 
economies will show higher levels of measured labour productivity, compared to 
industries that do not benefit from internal scale economies (see Haddad and Harrison, 
1993; Chuang and Chi-Mei Lin, 1999; Blomstrom, 1989).
In absence of engineering data, an indirect measure of scale economies has to 
be constructed. This can be done by using the concept of ‘minimum optimum scale’ 
(Corry, 1981, p. 96) or minimum efficient scale (MES) (Blomstrom, 1989). The main 
idea of these concepts is that they capture to what extent average production in an 
industry approaches the level of MES production volume in that industry. For the 
present estimation, a proxy for this MES in an industry can be calculated as the gross 
production of the largest plant in an industry. Subsequently, the variable SCALEm is 
the industry-wide ratio of the volume of average gross production of Mexican firms 
over gross production of the largest plant in that industry (see Blomstrom, 1989, p. 
43-44).
The inclusion of the variable GINI represents an important departure from 
previous estimations of FDI-induced externalities in Mexico. As discussed previously 
in chapter three, geographical concentration of industries may have a unique 
enhancing effect on productivity, through the occurrence of spatially confined
82 For reviews of the characteristics o f a variety of indices of market concentration, see van Lommel et 
al. (1977) and Curry and George (1983).
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agglomeration economies. Of course, one type of such agglomeration economies may 
occur in the form of internal scale economies. This is controlled for by the inclusion 
of SCALEm in equation 4.2.
In order to control for agglomeration economies of either the localisation or 
urbanisation type, I have calculated Gini-coefficients for the industries in the sample. 
Although usually applied to indicate the level and type of inequality of income 
distributions (see Owell, 1977), the Gini coefficient can also be applied to obtain an 
indicator that describes the type of distribution of industries over the 32 states in 
Mexico. The value of GINI ranges between the extreme values of 0 and 1, where 0 
represents the case where all states have equal shares in an industry and 1 indicates 
the situation where one state contains an entire industry.
Finally, the variable FOR represents the extent of industry-wide foreign 
investment in equation 4.2. Following previous research, it is calculated as the ratio of 
the number of employees in foreign firms over the total number of employees per 
industry. The function of this variable is to assess whether the presence of FDI creates 
externalities.
As for the expected estimated effects of the RHS variables, it is important to 
note that, contrary to the previous empirical analysis on Mexico using the 1970 
database, the present hypothesised effect of FOR is undetermined, as the previous 
section shows that both types of effect of FDI on domestic productivity in Mexico 
have been reported in empirical estimations. As for the expected estimated effect of 
the remaining variables, the variable HERFI may have a positive or negative effect, as 
mentioned earlier. The remaining RHS variables are all expected to have positive 
effects, in line with previous research findings.
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4.5. Statistical Results
4.5.1. Baseline Estimation Results
To recapitulate, the initial empirical model is
Equation 4.2. Prodm = Bo + Bi INVm + B2  LQm + 6 3  SCALEm + B4  HERFI
fisGINI +B6FOR + 8
The coefficients of equation 4.2 have been estimated applying ordinary least squares 
(OLS). All variables are in standardised levels, to allow direct comparison of the 
estimated coefficients. The results are shown in table 4.2.
The first estimated specification is shown in column (1). The independent 
variables explain about 45% of the total variance of the dependent variable, which 
seems to be in line with previous empirical results on Mexico using the 1970 
database83. Furthermore, setting aside the two variables of GINI and FOR, the 
remaining four independent variables all carry positive signs.
The coefficient representing capital intensity, INVm, carries a significant and 
positive coefficient. This is very much in line with the 1970 findings, which all found 
capital intensity to be the most important independent variable explaining measured 
Mexican labour productivity (see Blomstrom et al., 2000). Second, the variable 
representing market concentration, HERFI, also carries a significant positive sign, 
suggesting that concentrated industries have higher levels of labour productivity. This
83 The adjusted R2 in the present analysis is lower than reported in studies on Mexico based on the 1970 
data. However, the present results are corrected for heteroscedasticity, which has lowered the R2. It is 
likely that the R2 from the 1970 studies is somewhat inflated, as there appears to be no correction for 
heteroscedasticity in those studies.
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Table 4.2. Determinants of Mexican productivity; 1993
Dependent variable labour productivity Mexican-owned shares o f industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.0716
(3.71)***
-0.7286
(3.87)***
-0.073
(3.86)***
-0.072
(3.68)***
-0.064
(3.25)***
INVm 0.2371
(6.33)***
0.222
(6.12)***
0.2241
(6.16)***
0.2363
(6.12)***
0.2867
(7.39)***
LQm 0.052
0.13)
0.064
(1.35)
0.0632
(1.32)
0.052
(1.12)
0.053
(1.15)
Herfi 0.1002
(2.54)***
0.111
(2.82)***
0.109
(2.81)***
0.103
(2.51)***
0.0837
(2.06)**
Scale 0.0032
(0.60)
0.006
(1.54)
0.005
(1.21)
0.0009
(0.17)
0.0024
(0.49)
For -0.009
(0.38)
— -- 0.001
(0.05)
0.0016
(0.07)
For 2 — -0.067
(2.93)***
— — --
For 3 — -- -0.058
(2.52)***
— —
Gini 0.0593
(2.93)***
0.083
(4.15)***
0.079
(3.98)***
— —
Gini 2 -- -- -- 0.0431
(1.96)**
—
Gini 3 — — — — 0.0389
(1.93)**
R2adj 0.4567 0.4783 0.4721 0.448 0.4580
F 15.31 (0.00) 16.33 (0.00) 15.84 (0.00) 13.57 (0.00) 17.64 (0.00)
N 240 240 240 240 240
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.
All variables have been standardised. The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances 
corrections based on the Huber/White/Sandwich method.
can be interpreted as a presence of monopoly pricing activities, which inflates value 
added. Third, the variable SCALEm, representing internal scale economies, carries a 
positive sign, be it that it fails to reach acceptable significance levels84. Finally, the 
variable representing industry-wide human capital carries the correct sign, but does 
not reach significance.
The estimated coefficients of the variables FOR and GINI provide the first 
clues as to the effects of these variables. As for the estimated effect of FOR, the 
results from estimation (1) are disappointing: FOR carries an insignificant negatively
84 Blomstrom (1989) finds a similar insignificance of this variable.
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signed coefficient. This finding contrast strongly with all the previous findings on 
Mexico for 1970, which all report significant positive coefficients (Blomstrom and 
Persson, 1983; Blomstrom, 1989; Kokko, 1994,1996; Blomstrom et al., 2000).
To test the robustness of this result, I have re-estimated equation (1), using 
alternative indicators of the extent of industry-wide foreign participation. One 
alternative way in which to capture the variation of industry-wide foreign 
participation is to take the ratio of foreign firms’ value added over total industry-wide 
value added. Also, the foreign firms’ share in industry-wide total gross production 
provides such an alternative indicator. The results from using the alternative 
indicators of industry-wide foreign participation are presented in columns (2) and (3). 
The findings indicate that foreign firms appear to be creating negative externalities: 
the coefficients carry negative signs, and are significant at acceptable significance 
levels85.
The findings regarding the existence of some effect on productivity of the type 
of distribution of economic activity over geographical space in Mexico are in line 
with the expected effect. The coefficient of GINI carries the expected positive sign 
and reaches the 1% significance level in estimations (1) through (3). This indicates 
that there is a positive relation between the extent of inequality of the distribution of 
an industry over the 32 states in Mexico and the measured level of labour productivity. 
In other words, the level of geographical concentration of industries (high inequality 
in the distribution) is positively related to the measured productivity levels.
85 An alternative way to capture the extent o f foreign participation is to construct a binary variable, that 
assumes the value of 1 if the industry-wide share of foreign firms in total number of industry-wide 
employees amounts to 50% or more and the value 0 otherwise (see e.g. Globerman, 1979; Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999). Capturing the effect of the presence of FDI in such a manner means a rejection of the 
assumption that the effect of the presence of FDI varies continuously with the relative magnitude of 
FDI, but instead comes into play after a certain threshold value of industry-wide foreign participation 
has been reached (see Globerman, 1979). I have run estimations with such a binary variable (results not 
reported), trying threshold values of 30, 50 and 75%. The estimated coefficients of these binary 
variables are negatively signed, but not significant.
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A possible important caveat that needs to be addresses concerning the results 
of GINI is that this variable is only based on the share of each state in the total 
number of employees of an industry. This means that this variable does not control for 
the relative size of a state-wide regional economy. Differences in relative sizes of 
regional economies will have effects on the distribution of individual industries. This 
means that the un-weighed Gini coefficient may overestimate the level of 
geographical concentration of industries.
To correct for this possible caveat, I have calculated locational Gini 
coefficients, in the spirit of the coefficient discussed in Krugman (1991), who uses 
such a coefficient to show the geographical distribution of industries at the state level 
in the US. A locational Gini coefficient measures the extent of inequality of 
geographical distribution of industries over some regional unit of analysis (in this case 
Mexican states), controlling for the effect of the size of each regional unit’s economy. 
The procedure is shown in box 4.1.
Box 4.1. Locational Gini coefficient
GINI2 or GINI3
x2 n2 1=1 j=l 
where xi = [EijV ^  j  Eij] / [ X  * Eij/ Z z Y j J EiJ]5
Eij = industry employment i (6 -digit)in region j;
J ]  i Eij = total manufacturing employment (4-digit for GINI2, 2-digit 
for GINI3) in state j ;
Eij = total industry employment i (6 -digit) in republic of Mexico;
'Yji J ]  7  Eij = total manufacturing employment (4-digit for GINI2, 2-digit 
for GINI3) in of Mexico; 
n = population size (the number of states; 32);
x = arithmetic mean
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As the size of state economies can be measured at different levels, I have calculated 
two different Gini location coefficients. GINI2 controls for the size of each state’s 
economy at the 4-digit manufacturing industry level and GINI3 controls for the size 
of each state’s economy at the 2 -digit manufacturing industry level.
Important to mention is that both coefficients are confined to capturing the 
effects of the inter-state distribution of only manufacturing industries. This means that 
the resulting estimated coefficients could be interpreted as representing only 
localisation economies arising from the concentration of manufacturing industries. 
Having said so, the 4-digit and particularly the 2-digit manufacturing industries are 
much broader than the 6 -digit industries under analysis, which means that also 
urbanisation economies may be captured by the variables. Both variables represent 
externalities arising from agglomeration, with the possible difference being that the 
location coefficient using 2 -digit industries will capture more of a mixture of 
localisation and urbanisation economies compared to the location coefficient using 4- 
digit manufacturing industries.
Equations (4) and (5) in table 4.2. are the results from estimating the effect of 
geographical concentration of industries on measured labour productivity, using the 
alternative coefficients GINI2 and GINI3. The effect of geographical concentration 
appears robust to the change in the definition of the variable. Comparing the findings 
from estimations (4) and (5) with the findings from (1), (2) and (3), the coefficients of 
GINI2 and GINI3 are somewhat smaller, and the level of significance has decreased 
somewhat. However, the coefficients remain positively signed and the significance 
levels remain acceptable, indicating that, even when controlling for the distribution of 
overall manufacturing over the states in Mexico, the geographical concentration of 
individual 6 -digit manufacturing industries is positively related to the measured level
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of Mexican labour productivity.
4.5.2. Persistence of the Negative Effect of Industry-wide Foreign Participation?
The results from the analysis of the 1993 sample indicate that the level of industry­
wide foreign participation is negatively associated with the level of measured 
Mexican productivity, suggesting the existence of negative externalities arising from 
the presence of FDI. As this finding is in strong contrast with the findings from the 
1970 database, it is important to explore whether the estimated negative effect of the 
variable FOR is robust. In order to test this, I have estimated several modified 
empirical models, in line with the alternatively specified empirical models discussed 
in chapter two. In total, I estimate the effect of FOR in a further five empirical 
specifications. One empirical model analyses Mexican productivity at a different 
industrial scale. Second, I estimate the original model for a different base year, 1988. 
Third, I assess whether a different dependent variable in the form of the relative 
change in domestic productivity between 1988 and 1993 changes the estimated effect. 
Fourth, another alternative dependent variable can be constructed in the form of the 
extent of convergence of productivity between foreign and domestic firms. Finally, I 
assess whether the factor of absorptive capacity in the form of technological 
differences between foreign-owned and Mexican firms influences the empirical 
results.
4.5.2.1. Four-digit Estimation
One possible explanation for the finding of a negative estimated effect of FDI is that
165
the level of industry-aggregation influences the estimation. It may be that at the 6 - 
digit level, positive FDI-induced externalities remain undetected, as these externalities 
arise in related, but dissimilar industries. In order to test this, I have recalculated all 
the variables for the 4-digit (rama) level, resulting in a final sample of 50 
manufacturing industries. The results of the estimation of equation 4.2. at the 4-digit 
industry level are shown in table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Determinants of Mexican productivity; 1993; 4-digit level
Dependent variable labour productivity Mexican-owned manufacturing firms
Consta
nt
INVm LQm Herfi Scale FOR GINI2 R2 F N
-0.005
(0 .0 1 )
-0.09.2
(0.94)
0.1704
(2.91)***
-0.092
(0.64)
0.948
(4.72)***
-0.171
(2.49)***
0.1868
(2.28)**
0.8582 11.93
(0 .0 0 0 )
50
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level o f significance.
All variables have been standardised. The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances 
corrections based on the Huber/White/Sandwich method.
The estimated effects of the RHS variables from the estimation at the 4-digit level are 
somewhat different in comparison to the findings at the 6 -digit level. The most 
important difference appears to be that INVm fails to reach significance. The 
insignificance of the estimated effect of INVm is likely due to an aggregation bias, 
caused by the use of 4-digit data. The aggregation from 6 -digit to 4-digit industries 
groups together industries with a variety of production technologies, which are likely 
to differ markedly in capital intensity. This may have prevented the variable INVm 
from correctly capturing the effect of capital intensity on measured productivity for 
the 4-digit industries. In addition to this, the variable representing internal scale 
economies now carries a significant positive coefficient, possibly partly capturing the 
effect of the cross-industry variation of capital-intensity.
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The estimated effect of the variable of interest, FOR (measured as the share of 
foreign firms in total employment in a 4-digit industry), is negative with a 
significance level of 1%86. This finding indicates that it is unlikely that the choice of 
industrial aggregation affects the estimated effect of FDI: the estimated association 
between industry-wide foreign participation and the measured level of Mexican 
productivity levels is negative at both the 4- and 6 -digit industry level.
4.5.2.2. Results for 1988
In order to check whether the findings for 1993 are not a “one-off’ outcome, due to 
e.g. a temporary change in cross-industry participation by foreign affiliates, I have 
replicated the estimation of equation 4.2. using data for the year 1988. The results of 
this estimation are shown in table 4.4.
As is the case in 1993, the variable representing capital intensity is the most 
important explanatory variable throughout the estimations. Labour quality appears to 
be more important in explaining measured Mexican labour productivity in comparison 
to 1993. The results for 1988 indicate that LQm carries a significant positive 
coefficient, reaching significance levels between 5% and 10%. The variable HERFI 
performs poorly, but the positive coefficient of the variable SCALE reaches the 1% 
significance level throughout the estimations87.
The effect of foreign investment is less clear, as the effect in the regressions 
using FORI and FOR3 is insignificant. Having said so, in two of the three estimations,
86 I have also run the estimations using FOR2 and FOR3 (results not reported in table 2), which 
produce similar significant negative associations.
The variables GINI or GINI2 and GINI3 are not included in the estimation, as the information for 
that year is not published in electronic format by Inegi, which means that the values for 32 states and 
232 industries would have to be imputed by hand (I have run estimations using 1993 values for GINI, 
GINI2 and GINI3, but this variable performed unsatisfactory).
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Table 4.4. Determinants of Mexican productivity; 1988
Dependent variable labour productivity Mexican- owned manufacturing firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0616
(1.58)
-0.02232
(0.69)
-0.0292
(0.98)
-0.0658
(1.03)
INVm 0.4226
(5.39)***
0.601
(6.95)***
0.5934
(9.55)***
0.597
(9.45)***
LQm 0.066
(2.30)**
0.0603
(1.83)*
0.0608
(1.92)*
0.066
(2.03)**
Herfi -0.033
(1.13)
0.0232
(0.50)
0.0237
(0.56)
0.0391
(0.79)
Scale 0.0951
(2.86)***
0.1033
(3.01)***
0.0922
(2.76)***
For 0.5846
(1.32)
0.1281
(0.36)
—
For 2 — -0.0285
(4.75)***
—
For 3 — — — -0.6958
(0.66)
R2 0.4714 0.6297 0.6330 0.6315
R2 adj - - -- -
F 11.12(0.00) 54.65 (0.00) 94.05 (0.00) 54.41 (0.00)
N 232 149 149 149
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.
All variables have been standardised. The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances 
corrections based on the Huber/White/Sandwich method.
the coefficient carries a negative sign. In the specification using FOR2, the estimated 
negative effect of industry-wide foreign participation reaches significance. Therefore, 
comparing the results from 1988 and 1993, the estimations of he latter year appear 
more robust, as the estimated effect carries a similar negative sign in all three cases. 
Having said so, the estimated effect of FDI for the year 1988 produces no evidence 
that suggests that the results for 1993 are a one-off result.
4.S.2.3.1988-1993
An important possible reason why'the estimations produce negative externality effects 
is that the estimations are performed on one-year samples. As discussed in chapter
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two, an important drawback of this form of cross-sectional analysis is that if foreign 
firms have a tendency to prefer some industries over others, the estimated effect of 
FDI will be biased, as it will capture this tendency. In this particular case, the 
negative association between industry-wide foreign participation and measured 
domestic productivity could reflect a tendency of foreign firms to gravitate towards 
low value added or low productivity industries.
One way to test whether the estimations of the relation between FDI and 
domestic productivity are hampered by this tendency of foreign firms to locate in 
certain industries is to regress the change of labour productivity of Mexican 
manufacturing firms on the independent variables for the base year. Even in the case 
where FDI would prefer to locate in low value added or low productivity industries, 
their presence would lead to an increase in the growth rate of Mexican productivity 
when positive externalities occur88. In order to do so, I have run a set of alternative 
empirical models that take the form of productivity growth regressions, as listed 
below.
Equation 4.3.
(lnPRODm93-lnProdm88) = Bo + Bi lnINV8 8  + B2  LQm8 8  + B3 FOR8 8  +
+ B4  HERFI8 8  + B5 SCALE8 8  + 8
Equation 4.4.
(lnPRODm93-lnProdm88) = Bo + Bi lnINV8 8  + B2  LQm8 8  + B3 FOR288 +
+ B4  HERFT8 8  + B5  SCALE8 8  + 8
88 As discussed in chapter 2, this is only a partial solution to the bias when FDI gravitates towards 
specific industries.
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Equation 4.5.
(lnPRODm93-lnProdm88) = B0  + Bi lnINV8 8  + B2 LQm8 8  + B3FOR388 +
+ 6 4  HERFI8 8  + B5  SCALE8 8  + s
Estimations 4.3., 4.4. and 4.5. regress the change in the dependent variable in the 
period 1988-1993 on the independent variables with base year values (1988), where 
the change of Mexican labour productivity is measured as the difference in natural 
logs. The results of the three estimations are shown in table 4.5.
Table 4.5. Determinants of Mexican productivity; 1988-1993
Dependent variable change in labour productivity Mexican- 
owned manufacturing firms
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 1.168
(5.30)***
1.031
(4.92)***
1.0853
(5.10)***
INVm -0.255
(5.61)***
-0.2257
(5.21)***
-0.232
(5.27)***
LQm 0.113
(1.73)*
0.1154
(1.87)*
0.127
(2.02)**
Herfi 0.1554
(2.36)**
0.1388
(2.30)**
0.1465
(2.45)**
Scale 0.0171
(0.33)
0.0131
(0.26)
-0.0072
(0.14)
For -0.0942
(2.50)**
— --
For 2 — -0.1102
(3.21)***
—
For 3 — ~  - -0.121
(3.41)***
R2 adj 0.2859 0.3477 0.3358
F 9.52 (0.00) 9.44 (0.00) 10.71 (0.00)
N 135 135 135
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.
The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the 
models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances corrections based on the 
Huber/White/Sandwich method.
The variables of INVm and HERFI show to have significant estimated effects 
on the change in labour productivity in Mexican-owned shares of industries. However, 
both variables carry significant negative signs. These negative signs indicate that
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industries that are capital intensive and are operating under relative high levels of 
market concentration have relatively lower increases in their measured level of labour 
productivity. This suggests that these industries are already operating at relative high 
levels of measured labour productivity in the base year 1988.
Looking at the variable of interest, the findings are similar for all three 
measures of industry-wide foreign participation. In all three estimations, the 
coefficient of the variable representing industry-wide foreign participation carries a 
significant negative coefficient. This suggests that the presence of FDI hurts the 
development of productivity of Mexican firms. Therefore, this result supports the 
previous conclusion that foreign investment creates negative externalities among 
Mexican manufacturing industries. The strong interpretation of this finding would be 
that, even after controlling for a tendency of foreign firms to locate in certain types of 
industries, negative FDI-induced externalities prevail. Important to keep in mind is 
that the correction for endogeneity is only partial. However, the evidence supports the 
findings from the previous empirical models, by revealing estimated significant 
negative associations between industry-wide foreign participation and measured 
Mexican productivity.
4.5.2.4. Productivity convergence
An alternative way to measure whether the relative presence of FDI is related to 
productivity changes of Mexican manufacturing firms is to estimate the effect of 
industry-wide foreign participation on the rate of productivity convergence between 
foreign and domestic firms, as presented for Mexico for the period 1970-1975 by 
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994). Their empirical results contain evidence of a process of
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productivity convergence in that time frame . Furthermore, their estimations produce 
a significant association between the extent of industry-wide foreign participation and 
the rate of productivity convergence between the two types of firms, which they 
interpret as evidence of the occurrence of positive externalities (see Blomstrom and 
Wolff, 1994).
In order to assess whether such a positive association between FDI and 
productivity convergence between foreign and Mexican firms exists in the period 
1988 - 1993,1 have estimated the following empirical model:
Equation 4 .6. (Productivity difference) = Bo + 13i GAP + B2  INVm+ B3 HERFI +
B4SCALE + 6 5  FOR + e
f (VA)Mx >
(POP)Mx 93  
(VA)Fr
j ■ • I  (POP)Fr jProductivity Difference = -p----------- (— ;
[ (VA)Mx |
(POP)Mx 8g
the ratio of the labour productivity GAP between domestic and foreign-owned firms 
for 1993 and 1988.
(VA)M x  ; g
GAP = —  is the labour productivity gap in 198890
(VAjFr pp
(POP)Fr
INVm, Herfi, SCALE and FOR are all for 1988.
The results are shown in table 4.6.
I  
 
,  (P P)Fr j  
'  > 
(IVA)Fr 
, (POP)Fr j
89 For a similar type of estimation for Central and Eastern European countries, see (UN/ECE, 2000).
90 BlomstrOm and Wang (1992) adopt similar definition.
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Table 4.6. Determinants of productivity catch-up
Dependent variable: ratio o f productivity gaps 1993 and 1988
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.444
(12.74)***
1.724 
(9 47)***
1.731
(9.45)
1.693
(10.65)***
1.605
(7.98)***
GAP88 -0.0188
(2.77)***
-0.3072
(2.80)***
-0.3041
(2.73)***
-0.302
(2.78)***
-0.275
(2.42)***
INVm -0.00141
(1.93)**
-0.0022
(1.66)*
-0.00214
(1.53)
-0.002
(1.46)
-0.002
(1.41)
HERFI -0.000164
(1.87)*
— -0.0000314
(0-26)
-0.00008
(0.66)
-0.00015
(1.22)
FOR -0.193
(0.73)
-0.282
(0.96)
-0.251
(0.84)
— --
FOR2 -- -0.00044
(0.46)
—
FOR3 -- 0.344
(0.96)
SCALE 0.0484
(0.09)
0.0454
(0.09)
0.022
(0.04)
0.0086
(0.02)
R2 0.0704 0.2126 0.2128 0.2098 0.2155
F 6.39 (0.00) 3.12(0.02) 2.62 (0.02) 3.79 (0.00) 4.37 (0.00)
N 198 136 136 136 136
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.
The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the 
models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances corrections based on the 
Huber/White/Sandwich method.
The variable GAP8 8  has a similar effect as found by Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) in 
their analysis for the 1970-1975 period: the significant negative coefficient is 
persistent in all five estimations presented in table 4.5. This negative relation between 
GAP8 8  and productivity convergence indicates that industries with large initial 
productivity gaps in the base year have a higher rate of productivity convergence - a 
decrease in the level of productivity differences between foreign-owned and Mexican 
firms - in the period 1988-1993. Also, similar to Blomstrom and Wolffs findings, the 
variable representing capital intensity INVm carries a negative coefficient, be it that 
the significance level is only acceptable in the first two estimations. This negative
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coefficient indicates that in industries with relative high levels of capital intensity in 
the base year, the subsequent productivity convergence occurs faster than in less 
capital-intensive industries.
Turning to the variable of interest FOR, the empirical results offer no evidence 
for the existence of positive externalities arising from FDI. The coefficient of FOR 
carries a negative sign in four of the five estimations. Such a negative relation 
between the industry-wide foreign participation and the size of the technology gap 
would be interpreted as an indication of the occurrence of positive externalities. In 
industries with a large foreign participation in the base year, the technology gap 
decreases more than in those industries with a lower initial foreign presence. However, 
in contrast to Blomstrom and Wolff’s (1994) findings, the estimated coefficient of 
FOR does not reach significance in any of the present estimations, indicating that the 
presence of foreign-owned firms does not affect the productivity convergence process.
Summary
Before turning to an assessment of the possible effects of technological differences on 
the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities, it seems useful to recap the empirical 
findings presented thus far. Overall, the most important finding from the set of 
estimations from the differently specified empirical models is that the findings 
contrast strongly with previous findings for Mexico that are based on the 1970 (and 
1970-1975) database. Table 4.7. contains a summary of the findings from the 1988 
and 1993 findings presented in the present chapter.
One aspect that becomes clear from the summary of the findings in table 4.6. 
is that the evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities is mixed, as the
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Table 4.7. Summary of empirical findings
Variable 1993 4-digit 1988 1988-1993 
In difference
Convergence
FOR (-) not sign (-) sign (+) not sign (-) sign (-) not sign
FOR2 (-) sign (-) sign (-) sign (-) sign (-) not sign
FOR3 (-) sign (-) sign (-) not sign (-) sign (+) not sign
coefficients of FOR carry both positive and negative signs, depending on the 
measurement of industry-wide level of foreign participation and the specification of 
the empirical model. Furthermore, in various occasions, the relation between FOR and 
domestic productivity or changes in domestic productivity fails to reach acceptable 
levels of significance.
Having said so, the second impression is that there is more support for the 
hypothesis that FDI is creating negative externalities than for the opposite 
hypothesised effect. Important to recall is that an overall negative association between 
FDI and domestic productivity can only be taken to represent the situation where, on 
aggregate, negative externalities outweigh positive externalities. It is therefore 
possible that firms are subject to both positive and negative externalities, be it that the 
latter effect prevails. Also, it is possible that, although the aggregate effect is negative, 
individual firms benefit from positive externalities. Having said so, the fact remains 
that, overall, Mexican manufacturing industries seem to be negatively affected in their 
measured productivity levels by the presence of foreign firms, as indicated by the 
higher frequency of estimated significant negative associations between industry-wide 
foreign participation and measured Mexican productivity levels.
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4.6. The Influence of Technological Differences
A possible explanation for the failure in the previous sections to identify positive FDI- 
induced externalities is that the estimations have been performed on the full sample of 
industries. By doing this, the analysis ignores the possibility that there may be 
endogenous elements in the sample -  structural factors that affect the occurrence of 
FDI-induced externalities -  that influence the overall estimated externality effect from 
foreign participation.
As discussed in chapter two, the factor of technology gap or technological 
differences as indicator of the level of absorptive capacity is commonly recognised as 
the important factor that may determine whether positive FDI-induced externalities 
arise (see e.g. Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998, 2003). Previous empirical research 
indicates that the level of technological differences can be measured in two different 
ways. One approach is to differentiate in the analysis between different types of firms 
(see e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999; also Barrios, 2000). The idea is that, compared to 
small firms, large firms are more likely to possess sufficient technological capacities 
to absorb externalities from FDI. Therefore, if there are differences in terms of the 
estimated effect of industry-wide foreign participation, we can expect a positive 
coefficient on the FOR variable in labour productivity estimations for large Mexican 
firms in the sample.
The second approach towards assessing the effect of technology is to see if the 
relative technological complexity of industries is related to the occurrence of FDI- 
induced externalities (see especially Haddad and Harrison, 1993; also Kokko, 1994; 
1996). Externalities from FDI are assumed to be more likely to occur when the 
difference in technologies used by domestic and foreign firms is not too large
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(Haddad and Harrison, 1993). In contrast, industries that are characterised by large 
technological differences are less likely to experience positive externalities, as the size 
of the technology gap prevents domestic firms to benefit from them (see Kokko, 
1994).
4.6.1. Firm Size as Indicator of Absorptive Capacity.
Empirical findings from previous research on Mexico would suggest that there might 
be differences between the effects of FDI on small versus large firms. As mentioned 
earlier, Blomstrom (1986) estimates the effects of the presence of FDI on structural 
efficiency among Mexican firms, finding indications that FDI only affects modem 
segments of the Mexican economy. In this estimation, Blomstrom (1986) takes large 
firms to be representative of modem segments, which can be expected to have a 
relative high level of absorptive capacity. In contrast, small firms, operating in 
traditional segments of the economy, remain largely unaffected by the presence and 
operations of FDI, due to their relative low level of absorptive capacity (see 
Blomstrom, 1986; also Blomstrom, 1989).
The size distribution for the 1993 database containing 6 -digit manufacturing 
industries does not distinguish between foreign and domestic ownership91. However, 
at the 4-digit industry level, it is possible to approximate such a distinction, using the 
firm size classification of 50 employees as critical point dividing Mexican firms into 
small and large firms (Aitken and Harrison (1999) adopt similar value of cut-off 
point) The expectation behind this exercise is that positive FDI-induced
91 This is due to the earlier mentioned disclosure problems.
92 The values for the overall database can be split into small and large Mexican firms due to the fact 
that foreign-owned firms are virtually absent from the size classes representing less than 50 employees. 
The division of the database has been done as follows. For each industry, the variables value added,
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externalities are more likely to accrue to large firms than to small firms, due to the 
difference in absorptive capacity. The results of the separate estimations for the 
industry-shares of small and large Mexican firms are shown in table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Determinants of Mexican productivity, 1993; 4-digit level
Dependent variable labour productivity Mexican-owned manufacturing firms
4-digit sample Large Small
Constant -0.00005 0.0005 -0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
INVm -0.0932 -0.156 0.35
(0.94) (1.50) (1.90)*
LQm 0.1704 0.21 0.05
(2.91)*** (2.91)*** (0.56)
Herfi -0.092 -0.05 0.84
(0.64) (0.30) (1.52)
Scale 0.948 0.95 -0.59
(4.72)*** (4.40)*** (1 ..67)*
For -0.171 -0.19 0.13
(2.49)*** (2.40)** (1.18)
Gini2 0.1868 0.08 -0.12
(2.28)99 (.0.96) (0.72)
R2 adj 0.8582 0.84 0.45
F 11.93 (0.000) 10.66 2.48
(0.000) (0.02)
N 50 50 50
Absolute values ofT  statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.
All variables have been standardised. The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances 
corrections based on the Huber/White/Sandwich method.
The findings from the estimations for small and large Mexican firms do not 
offer support for the hypothesis that large Mexican firms are more likely to benefit 
from positive externalities compared to Mexican firms. Whereas the measured labour 
productivity of small Mexican firms is not significantly related to FOR, the 
productivity of large Mexican firms is significantly effected by the presence of
gross fixed investment and number of employees are available for several size classes. For the size 
groups representing small firms (<50 employees), I have aggregated the variables per industry. 
Subsequently, the rest of the sample exists o f all firms that have at least 50 employees. Subtracting the 
aggregate values for foreign firms from this sub-sample of the database leaves the shares in the 
database o f Mexican firms with 50 or more employees.
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foreign firms in a negative fashion. Therefore, although there seems to be a difference 
in the effect of foreign firms when it comes to small versus large Mexican firms, the 
difference in effect is opposite to the hypothesised one. As such, these findings do not 
offer support for the absorptive capacity hypothesis.
As argued earlier in chapter two, an alternative explanation for the difference 
in estimated effect between the two types of firms is that the level of technological 
differences may indicate the presence or absence of direct competition between 
foreign-owned and domestic firms. In relation to the difference of the estimated effect 
of FOR between large and small firms as presented in table 4.8., this explanation may 
be valid when considering the feature that the Mexican economy is characterised by a 
strong sense of duality (see Blomstrom, 1989).
This duality means that modem and traditional segments co-exist within 
manufacturing industries, with only few business and market relations between the 
two segments. Foreign firms are likely to operate in the modem segments, which 
means that they also only compete with Mexican firms operating in these modem 
segments. In this case, the difference between the estimated effect of FDI on small 
and large Mexican firms suggests the existence of a negative competition effect 
among large Mexican firms only. Foreign firms, operating in modem segments, out- 
compete Mexican firms in these segments of the economy. Overall, this competition 
effect leads to the occurrence of negative pecuniary externalities, as indicated by the 
negative association between measured productivity of large Mexican firms and 
industry-wide foreign participation. In contrast, small Mexican firms, who are 
unlikely to be engaged in direct competition with foreign-owned firms, do not suffer 
from this negative competition effect. As a result, the negative estimated externality 
effect of FDI is absent among these small Mexican firms.
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4.6.2. Technological Complexity
The alternative approach to assess the effect of technological differences on the 
occurrence of FDI-induced externalities is to split the overall sample into sub-samples, 
using the relative value of some indicator of industry-wide technological complexity 
as splitting variable. In the present analysis, I have tried out three indicators. Two 
indicators represent industry-wide levels of technological complexity, whereas the 
third one captures the industry-wide technology gap between foreign and Mexican 
firms.
The first indicator of technological complexity is the industry-wide level of 
assets at book value per employee in foreign-owned firms (INVfor). The underlying 
assumption of this indicator is that total investment per employee in foreign firms is a 
proxy for the level of technological complexity of an industry (see Kokko, 1994). In 
a similar fashion, the industry-wide ratio of the number of white-collar over blue- 
collar employees in foreign-owned firms can be used as a proxy for technological 
complexity, assuming that a high ratio of white over blue collar employees reflects 
relative complex technologies. The relation between these two variables and the 
underlying concept of absorptive capacity is that technologically complex industries 
are likely to show higher levels of technological differences between FDI and domes­
tic firms, suggesting a relative low level of absorptive capacity.
Third, the variable representing the technology gap between foreign and 
domestic firms follows Blomstrom and Wang (1992) in interpreting the industry-wide 
ratio of value added per employee in foreign firms over value added per employee in 
Mexican-owned firms as a proxy for this technological difference. This variable is a 
more direct indicator of the level of technological differences between foreign-owned
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and Mexican firms. Having said so, it remains an indirect indicator of the underlying 
level of absorptive capacity of Mexican firms.
For each of the three indicators of the level of technological differences, the 
original sample is divided into two sub-samples, after which the original labour 
productivity equation (equation 4.2.) is estimated for each of the sub-samples. 
Following the idea of the effect of absorptive capacity, the expected difference 
between the sub-samples is that industries with either low values of technological 
complexity or a small technology gap benefit from positive FDI-induced externalities. 
The results of the estimations are shown in table 4.9.
The results in table 4.9. provide some evidence for the existence of an effect 
caused by technological complexity, be it that the effect is different than hypothesised, 
as was the case earlier in section 4.6.1. Estimations (1) through (4) are the estimations 
where the sample has been divided based on relative scores of either INVfor or LQfor. 
Looking at the findings from using INVfor as splitting variable, there is no difference 
in the effect of FOR, as the estimated effect of foreign participation is insignificant in 
both sets of industries. The findings from using LQfor as splitting variable are similar, 
as they indicate that the estimated effect of FOR remains insignificant in both sub­
samples of industries.
The results from using the technology gap between foreign and domestic firms 
as variable to distinguish between industries are shown in columns (5) and (6 ). The 
estimated coefficient of FOR carries a negative sign in both sets of industries. 
However, in those industries where the productivity gap is relatively low (column (5)), 
the negative relation between FDI and Mexican firms’ productivity reaches an 
acceptable significance level. In a similar fashion of the findings of section 4.6.1., this 
indicates that in industries where Mexican and foreign firms are most similar, foreign
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Table 4.9. Technological differences and externalities from FDI; 1993
Dependent variable labour productivity Mexican-owned manufacturing firms
INVfor
low
(1 )
INVfor
high
(2 )
LQfor
low
(3)
LQfor
high
(4)
Gap
low
(5)
Gap
high
(6 )
Constant 0 . 0 2(0.16)
0.84
(0.77)
0.57
(0.53)
0.17
(0.78)
0 . 1 2
(0.31)
0 . 2 0
(0.19)
INVm
0.60
(3.94)**
*
0.31
(3.98)***
0.48
(446)***
0.33
(4.95)***
0.14
(2.67)***
0.53
(7.26)***
LQ 0.04(0.48)
0.16
(2.06)**
0 . 0 2
(0.24)
0.15
(2 .0 2 )**
0.41
(7.29)***
0.09
(1.06)
HERFI
0.27
(3.40)**
*
0.14
(1 .2 0 )
0.44
(5.43)***
0 . 1 2
(1.03)
0.76
(8 .6 6 )***
0.18
(1.83)*
SCALE 0 . 0 0 1(0.57)
0.23
(1.48)
0 . 0 2
(1 .6 6 )*
0.25
(1.63)*
-0 . 1 1
(1.41)
0 . 0 2
(0.92)
FOR 0 . 0 2(0.42)
-0.03
(0.35)
0.03
(0.48)
-0.06
(0.80)
-0.19
(2.34)**
-0.05
(0 .1 0 )
GINK 0 . 1 1(2.34)**
0 . 1 2
(1.51)
0.07
(1 .0 0 )
0.17
(2.25)**
0.38
(3.15)***
0 . 1 0
(2 .1 0 )**
R2 0.60 0.38 0.67 0.41 0.82 0.48
F 52.58(0 .0 0 0 )
9.31
(0 .0 0 0 )
35.52
(0 .0 0 0 )
8 . 6 8
(0 .0 0 0 )
45.90
(0 .0 0 0 )
13.11
(0 .0 0 0 )
N 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 35 205
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance.
All variables have been standardised. The initial estimations revealed that the sample is suffering from 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the models have been re-estimated with standard errors and variances 
corrections based on the Huber/White/Sandwich method.
For each selection criterion, several splitting points have been tried, after which Chow tests indicated 
whether there is structural instability in the sample (see Gujarati, 1995). The Chow tests for the 
equations shown in the table indicate that, for each of the three selection variables, the hypothesis of 
structural stability can be rejected.
firms have a negative effect on the measured level of domestic productivity. Again, 
this suggests the existence of a negative competition effect from the presence of 
foreign-owned firms.
This finding is in line with the interpretation that technological differences 
represent the presence or absence .of a direct competition effect, rather than being an 
indirect indicator of the level of absorptive capacity of Mexican firms. Industries with
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a relative low technology gap between foreign-owned and Mexican firms are likely to 
experience direct competition, which leads to the occurrence of negative externality 
effects. As such, the present findings of the effect of the technology gap are in line 
with Barrios (2000), Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000) and Castellani and Zanfei (2003)93.
4.7. Summary and Conclusions
The chapter introduces a new and thus far unexplored data set for the Mexican 
economy for 1988 and 1993.1 use this dataset to estimate whether the presence and 
operations of foreign-owned firms create intra-industry externalities among Mexican 
manufacturing industries.
As a prelude to the analysis of FDI-induced externalities, the introductory part 
of the chapter contains a comparison of determinants of productivity levels of foreign 
and Mexican manufacturing firms. Although the results need to be interpreted with 
the necessary caution, they do suggest that there is a scope for the occurrence of 
externalities.
Regarding the empirical estimations of intra-industry externality effects of 
FDI, this chapter offers important empirical findings. One important issue is that the 
inclusion of a variable representing the level of geographical concentration of 
industries is successful, as it has a positive association with the measured level of 
productivity of industries. Both the uncorrected and the corrected Gini coefficients 
carry significant positive coefficients in the 1993 analysis, suggesting the occurrence 
of some form of positive agglomeration economies that benefit Mexican 
manufacturing industries.
93 See chapter two.
Second, the findings show a negative association between the extent of 
industry-wide foreign participation and the measured level of Mexican manufacturing 
productivity. The chapter presents various alternative estimations, in an attempt to test 
the robustness of the finding of a negative externality effect from the presence of FDI. 
Although the empirical findings are of a somewhat diverse nature, the overall 
impression is that the negative relation is prevalent. Findings that are especially 
important in this light are those that indicate that the industry-wide presence of FDI is 
negatively related to productivity growth of Mexican firms. These findings suggest 
that, even when rudimentary controlling for a possible bias of FDI to concentrate in 
certain industries, the level of industry-wide foreign participation is negatively 
associated with the growth rate of domestic labour productivity.
The empirical finding that FDI creates negative externality effects is much in 
line with contemporary findings for other host economies, as presented most notably 
by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993). Furthermore, the 
empirical findings from the thus far unexplored 1988 and 1993 data sets are in strong 
contrast to previous empirical findings for Mexico, which are based on the analysis of 
the 1970 database. The implications of the difference between the present findings 
and the earlier ones may be rather large, as these earlier findings from Mexico are 
heavily relied upon in contemporary debates addressing the central question whether 
foreign participation creates positive or negative externalities in host economies.
Finally, the chapter presents empirical findings that address the effect of the 
level of technological differences between FDI and Mexican firms on FDI-induced 
externalities. The estimations do indicate that technology seems to affect the 
occurrence of FDI-induced externalities. However, the effect of the level of 
technological differences between FDI and Mexican firms is opposite to the effect
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that is predicted by the absorptive capacity hypothesis. In the present analysis, 
technological differences, approximated indirectly by firm size or more directly by the 
size of the technology gap, appear to stimulate the occurrence of negative externalities 
from FDI. The estimations for those Mexican firms or Mexican-owned shares of 
industries with a relative low level of technological differences with foreign-owned 
firms produce significant negative coefficients of the foreign participation variable.
This particular finding is in support of the hypothesis that the level of 
technological differences reflects the presence or absence of direct competition 
between foreign-owned and domestic firms. In those industries, or among those 
Mexican firms, where the level of technological differences with FDI is relatively low, 
the estimated association with industry-wide foreign participation is significantly 
negative, indicating the presence of negative pecuniary externalities. In industries that 
are characterised by relative high levels of technological differences, the two types of 
firms are likely not to be in direct competition, creating a situation where negative 
competition externalities from foreign participation are absent.
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Chapter 5 FDI and Negative Intra-Industry Externalities:
Further Tests of the Empirical Model
5.1. Introduction
The empirical findings presented in the previous chapter provide substantial support 
for the conclusion that the presence of foreign manufacturing firms creates negative 
externalities among Mexican firms in 1993. The estimated negative association 
between the cross-sectional variation of industry-wide foreign participation and 
measured levels of domestic labour productivity indicates that, ceteris paribus, 
domestic firms are negatively affected by the presence and operations of FDI.
Although this finding is in line with other recent empirical estimations of FDI- 
induced externalities in different host economies, it has to be interpreted with the 
necessary caution. One important reason to be cautious is that these empirical findings 
are in strong contrast to previous empirical findings for the host economy of Mexico. 
Second, the estimated effect of foreign participation may be biased, for several 
reasons related to the estimated empirical model and employed estimation techniques. 
Given the importance of the empirical findings presented in the previous chapter and 
the possible disturbing influence of the reasons mentioned above, it seems important 
to assess whether, instead of reflecting the occurrence of negative FDI-induced 
externalities, there are alternative explanations for the estimated negative association 
between FDI and measured Mexican labour productivity. The aim of this chapter is 
to ensure that the empirical finding of negative FDI-induced externalities can be 
accepted without important qualifications.
The present chapter consists of five main sections. Section 5.2. addresses the
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validity of the main explanation for the occurrence of negative externalities from the 
presence of FDI. The existence of negative FDI-induced externalities has mainly been 
established empirically, with theoretical explanations for this phenomenon being 
rather scant. The main explanation offered for this empirical finding refers to the 
possible effect that follows from foreign firms challenging domestic firms for market 
shares in the host economy. Although commonly accepted in the literature, this 
explanation has not received serious scrutiny thus far. Also, other possible 
explanations for the occurrence of negative FDI-induced externalities have remained 
largely unexplored.
Section 5.3. addresses the specification of the estimated main empirical model 
in the previous chapter. In line with previous empirical research on FDI-induced 
externalities in Mexico, the estimated empirical models are stated in standardised 
levels, to allow comparability of the estimated B-coefficients. However, as the set of 
empirical models seems to reflect an underlying production function in a 
multiplicative form, log linear specifications may be more appropriate. Therefore, in 
order to appraise whether such considerations are relevant for the finding of negative 
FDI-induced externalities, I derive the empirical model from a standard Cobb- 
Douglas function, estimate the empirical models following log linear specifications 
and compare the estimated effects from the two types of functional specification.
Section 5.4. addresses the important question whether the findings from the 
empirical models are affected by omitted variable bias. In essence, the problem of 
omitted variable bias refers to the possibility that the erroneous exclusion of a right 
hand side (RHS) variable from the empirical model may bias the estimated effects, as 
the resulting coefficients and significance levels of the included RHS variables are 
estimated less accurately. In the specific case of empirical estimations using Mexican
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manufacturing data, two important variables that have not been included in the 
empirical model in the previous chapter are the cross-industry variation of the share 
of maquiladora industry activity in total industry production and the effect of 
industry-wide trade intensity or trade openness. The omission of these two variables 
needs to be addressed, in order to ensure that the coefficients and significance levels 
of the originally included RHS variables are estimated without bias.
Section 5.5. is devoted to the core criticism of cross-sectional estimations of 
FDI-induced externalities. This criticism refers to the possible miss-specification of 
the empirical model when the cross-industry variation of industry-wide foreign 
participation is endogenous to the estimation. The underlying assumption when 
estimating the empirical models is that the line of causation runs from industry-wide 
foreign participation to measured Mexican labour productivity. However, if there is 
also a line of causation running from industry productivity to foreign participation 
shares, a failure to control for this additional line of causation will produce incorrect 
estimates of the effect of FDI on measured labour productivity. In section 5.5., I 
discuss this problem in more detail, assess whether it has affected the previous 
estimations and present estimations that control for any endogenous component of the 
variation of the foreign participation variable.
Finally, section 5.6. of this chapter summarises the key results and presents the 
conclusions of this chapter.
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5.2. Explanations for the Negative Association between FDI and Host Economy 
Productivity
5.2.1. Negative Externalities from FDI
Although some empirical studies have optimistically concluded in favour of the 
prevalence of positive FDI-induced externalities (see Blomstrom and Kokko, 1988; 
also Blomstrom et al, 2000; Ewe-Ghee Lim, 2001), others dispute this conclusion and 
point out that the empirical evidence of such positive externalities is rather weak (see 
especially Hanson, 2001; also Kumar, 1996). Furthermore, recent high profile studies, 
most notably Aitken and Harrison (1999), Harrison (1996) and Haddad and Harrison 
(1993) report significant negative associations between industry-wide foreign 
participation and measured productivity of domestically-owned manufacturing firms. 
In addition to the findings presented in these studies, several other recent empirical 
studies provide evidence in support of this negative association between FDI and 
domestic productivity, including Konings (2000) for Bulgaria, Romania and Poland 
and both Kinoshita (2000) and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic.
Such empirical findings of a significant negative association between FDI and 
measured domestic productivity have not been interpreted in a homogenous way. 
Some interpret this finding as merely indicating the non-occurrence of positive 
externalities. Kinoshita (2000) for instance interprets his finding of a negative 
association between industry-wide foreign participation and domestic productivity for 
a sample of Czechian firms as an indication that positive externalities are not as 
prevalent as thought previously (see Kinoshita, 2000). Others, including Caves (1999), 
argue that the negative association indicates the need to construct and test alternative
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hypotheses for the existence of an apparent insufficient level of absorptive capacity on 
the part of host economy firms that does not allow them to let positive externalities 
materialise. Although such interpretations do at least acknowledge the possibility that 
positive FDI-induced externalities may be less prevalent than argued by others, they 
fall short of actually providing a satisfactory explanation for the existence of negative 
externalities.
5.2.2. Market Stealing
Aitken and Harrison (1999) do offer an explanation for the existence of negative FDI- 
induced externalities. Referring to it as the market stealing effect (see Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999), they argue that domestic firms may be hurt in their measured 
productivity levels when foreign firms steal part of the market from them. In such a 
case, the entrance and operations of FDI leads to a decrease in the scale of production 
among domestic firms, with negative efficiency effects. As they argue, ‘FDI reduces 
domestic plant productivity in the short run by forcing domestic firms to contract, 
thereby increasing their average costs’ (Aitken and Harrison, 1999, p. 611)94.
In addition to this market stealing effect, Caves (1996) points out that such a 
market stealing effect may also arise from the entrance of FDI into the host economy 
in a slightly different guise. This may happen when domestic firms, prior to the arrival 
of FDI, are enjoying some level of economic rent. As Caves (1996) argues, foreign 
affiliates tend to locate in oligopolistic industries; industries that are likely to have 
allowed domestic firms to create such economic rent, due to the relative lack of 
competitive pressure. The effect of the entrance of FDI in such industries is then
94 See also Harrison (1996) for similar argument
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‘ purely to inject additional competition in the market, destroying rents that
otherwise count in domestic firms’ productivity levels’ (Caves, 1996, p. 182).
Problems with the Market Stealing Argument
Although the explanation of negative FDI-induced externalities arising from some 
form of market stealing effect certainly possesses merit, it does contain some 
elements that warrant further scrutiny, especially given the growing reliance on the 
concept of market stealing in explaining recent empirical findings.
An important point of criticism is that the market stealing effect runs counter 
to the commonly-referred-to effect that the entrance of FDI leads to an increase in 
competitive pressure, which forces domestic firms to become more competitive, thus 
resulting in an increase in their level of measured productivity (Blomstrom and Kokko, 
1998). In fact, Haddad and Harrison (1993) refer to this positive competition effect 
when they explain their empirical findings in the form of a positive association 
between the extent of industry-wide foreign participation and the smallness of 
deviation from industry-wide productivity among domestic manufacturing plants in
Morocco: ‘ one reason [for this positive association] may be that foreign firms
induce greater competition causing firms that cannot approach the best-practice 
frontier to exit the industry’ (Haddad and Harrison, 1993, p. 63). The exit of the least 
competitive domestic firms will show up as a positive relation between industry-wide 
foreign investment and measured domestic productivity, as the remaining population 
of domestic plants in the sample will have a higher average productivity level 
compared to the initial full sample.
The confusion about the nature of the competition effect is further underlined
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when, later on in the discussion of their empirical findings, Haddad and Harrison 
(1993) try to explain findings from a differently specified empirical model, which 
indicate a significant negative association between the two variables of interest. This
estimated association, they argue, should be interpreted as 4  suggesting that any
positive spillover from foreign to domestically-owned firms may be offset by the 
negative impact of greater competition’ (Haddad and Harrison, 1993, p. 70). This 
statement indicates that they now interpret the competition effect in a manner opposite 
to earlier on in their discussion. Instead of arguing for a positive externality effect 
from competition, they now argue that increased competitive pressure has led to a 
decrease in measured productivity among domestic plants.
The second point of criticism is that the market stealing argument implicitly 
rests on the assumption that the entrance of FDI automatically leads to a sustained 
increase in the level of competition. As discussed previously in chapter two, the final 
competition effect of the entrance of FDI into a host economy is not at all clear. If 
foreign firms, who are inclined to locate in oligopolistic markets (Caves, 1996), resort 
to the construction of non-entry barriers, the final effect of the entry of FDI may well 
be a decrease in the level of competition, instead of an increase (see Lall, 1978; Caves, 
1996).
A further complicating factor is that it is not entirely clear how such a decrease 
in competitive pressure would show up in empirical estimations. On the one hand, the 
decrease in the level of competition may lead to a decrease in the level of productivity 
of domestic plants. This would show up as a negative association between the 
presence of FDI and measured host economy productivity. On the other hand, the 
decrease in competitive pressure might allow domestic firms to create some level of 
economic rent, which would enhance their measured level of productivity (Caves,
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1996). Therefore, not only is it possible that the long run effect of the entrance of 
foreign affiliates lowers the level of competitive pressure in the host economy, it is 
also unclear whether this will show up in empirical estimates as a positive or negative 
association between industry-wide foreign participation and measured domestic 
productivity.
5.2.3. Negative Externalities through other Channels of FDI-induced 
Externalities?
Thus far, the only explicit explanation for negative FDI-induced externalities offered 
in the literature is the market stealing effect. Whether the other channels of 
externalities from FDI could be transmitting such negative externalities has not been 
considered thus far.
Arguably the least likely candidate for transmitting negative FDI-induced 
externalities in a host economy seems to be the channel representing demonstration or 
imitation effects. Domestic firms may learn new technologies through the presence of 
FDI that employs these technologies. This increase in technological knowledge is free 
of charge; if domestic firms are successful in adopting and implementing these 
technologies in their production processes, their productivity will improve. The only 
way in which this channel can cause a decrease in productivity is when domestic 
firms are unsuccessful in the implementation of the new technology into their 
production process. Also, in the case of developing countries, an additional argument 
could be that foreign affiliates use technologies that are inappropriate for a developing 
host economy (Weill and Basu, 1998; also Lall and Streeten, 1977). The adoption of 
such inappropriate technologies by domestic firms may lower the measured level of
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labour productivity.
It seems unlikely that these scenarios offer important explanations for the 
existence of negative FDI-induced externalities. One simple counter argument relates 
to the motivation that underlies the copying of new technologies. Surely, domestic 
firm s will only be aiming to benefit from the new technologies if they are able to copy 
and incorporate these technologies into their production process. If they are unable to 
do so, their production process will remain unaltered, and productivity levels should 
remain similar.
Second, on a technical note, even if a domestic firm manages to copy 
technologies and subsequently applies them unsuccessfully resulting in a decrease in 
productivity, this decrease should not be interpreted as a case of negative externalities. 
Instead, as it is the failure to successfully implement the technologies that is the 
underlying cause of the reduction in productivity, this effect should be interpreted as a 
case of bad business practice or ill-management. Therefore, the possible decrease in 
productivity, unlikely as it is, does not represent a case of negative FDI-induced 
externalities caused by demonstration effects.
Processes of human capital accumulation and labour turnover constitute the 
second channel of FDI-induced externalities. Employees who work for FDI and later 
substitute domestic firms for foreign-owned firms may incorporate additional 
knowledge, skills and experience that are obtained while working for FDI. This is a 
form of externalities, as domestic firms do not have to compensate foreign-owned 
firms for this95. As is the case with demonstration effects, it seems unlikely that this 
channel causes negative FDI-induced externalities to arise. If a domestic firm loses 
productivity as a result of new employees using skills that they gained while working
95 As discussed in chapter two, this is a simplified account, as the actual externalities arising to 
domestic firms are more likely to consist of a mixture of technological and pecuniary externalities.
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for foreign-owned firms, the simple response would be for the domestic firm not to 
allow its employees to use these skills. This would control for the part of externalities 
that is technological of nature.
This leaves the part of externalities that is pecuniary of nature, captured in the 
wage premium paid to those employees. This may show up as a negative externality, 
if employees are paid for their extra skills, but are not producing at any higher level of 
productivity compared to other employees who lack these additional skills. Having 
said so, again this is not a form of negative externalities as such, but more related to 
an error of judgement on behalf of the domestic firms, who are paying too high wages 
to these employees.
Finally, the channel representing inter-firm linkages between foreign and 
domestic firms may cause negative externalities to arise among domestic firms. As 
discussed in chapter two, inter-firm linkages may lead to positive externalities if FDI 
establishes special supportive relations with their suppliers in the host economy. 
However, in return, local suppliers must produce inputs at lower costs and/or higher 
quality. It may be that these concessions on the part of domestic suppliers are so 
strong, that foreign-owned firms ultimately receive benefits from this that outweigh 
the original support provided by them. In such a case, the ultimate externality effect is 
a negative one.
Having said so, the vast majority of empirical research into externality effects 
of FDI, including the empirical research presented in the previous chapter, concerns 
intra-industry externalities. That is, externalities from a given foreign-owned firm 
affecting the measured level of productivity of domestic firms operating in the same 
industry as the foreign firm. Depending on the level of industrial aggregation of the 
analysis, it is unlikely that domestic firms that supply to the given foreign firm are
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located in the same industry. Instead, it is far more likely that domestic firms that are 
located in the same industry are in direct competition with the foreign firm instead. 
Domestic firms that operate as suppliers are more likely to be classified in related, but 
different, industries. This means that, although it is possible for negative externalities 
to arise through inter-firm linkages, it is unlikely that the aforementioned empirical 
studies capture externality effects from such linkages, as the focus predominantly lies 
on the identification of intra-industry externalities.
5.2.4. Explanations of Negative Externalities: a Summary
Recent important empirical studies show a negative association between FDI and 
productivity in host economies, thus challenging earlier findings that indicate a 
positive association between the two variables of interest. This empirically established 
negative relation between foreign investment and host economy productivity has been 
interpreted as important evidence of the occurrence of negative FDI-induced 
externalities.
The main explanation for the occurrence of such negative externalities is the 
market stealing effect, where domestic firms are hurt in their productivity by the 
presence of foreign firms, either through a forced decrease in their production scale 
leading to inefficiencies (Aitken and Harrison, 1999), or through a lowering of 
economic rent that domestic firms enjoyed prior to the entrance of foreign firms 
(Caves, 1996).
The market stealing argument contains two main flaws. First, it runs counter to 
the often-voiced opinion that foreign firms enhance the level of competitive pressure, 
thus forcing domestic firms to become more productive in their production processes.
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The argument that the presence of FDI leads to productivity decreases seems only 
applicable in the short run. In the long run, the competition effect will lead to higher 
levels of domestic productivity, as it will force the least productive domestic firms 
out of the market. This effect will show up as a positive association between foreign 
investment and domestic productivity, as the remaining host economy firms will be 
the most efficient ones.
Second, the market stealing argument assumes that the sustained effect of the 
entrance of FDI will be an increase in competitive pressure. This can be disputed as 
well, as foreign firms may also erect entry-barriers, effectively lowering the level of 
competition. In this case, the presence of foreign firms may lead to positive 
externalities if domestic firms are able to create some level of economic rent. On the 
other hand, the decrease in competitive pressure may also allow domestic firms to 
become less efficient, thus lowering their productivity.
A brief assessment of the other channels of FDI-induced externalities shows 
that they constitute unlikely explanations for the negative intra-industry association 
between FDI and productivity in host economies. In the cases of both demonstration 
effects and labour turnover, the occurrence of negative externalities is unlikely, and 
not related to the channels as such. In the case of inter-firm linkages, there is scope 
for the occurrence of negative externalities. However, it is unlikely that this channel 
leads to negative intra-industry externalities, as this channel of externalities 
predominantly applies to FDI-induced externalities that flow between a given foreign 
firm’s industry and its domestic suppliers located in related but dissimilar industries.
The discussion of theoretical explanations of negative externalities has shown 
that the main explanation for the finding of a negative association between FDI and 
domestic productivity is not without flaws. In relation to the empirical findings
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presented in the previous chapter, the only viable explanation for the estimated 
negative association between industry-wide foreign participation and measured 
Mexican labour productivity would be that there is a short run effect which lowers the 
efficiency level of Mexican firms, due to a decrease of scale of production. Negative 
externalities through other channels of externalities are unlikely, as is the existence of 
a long run negative externality effect.
Therefore, the findings from the previous chapter are to be interpreted with the 
necessary caution. The criticism that warns against a too readily acceptance of 
findings of positive FDI-induced externalities should also be applied to findings 
indicating negative associations between the two variables of interest. Given this, 
there is ample scope for a further scrutiny of the results as presented in the previous 
chapter, in order to ensure that, instead of indicating the existence of negative FDI- 
induced externalities, there are no important estimation issues that may explain the 
estimated negative association between industry-wide foreign participation and 
measured Mexican labour productivity instead. The remainder of this chapter 
addresses the most important estimation issues that may have caused such estimation 
errors or biases.
5.3. Functional Form of the Empirical Model
5.3.1. Deriving the Empirical Model
In the previous chapter, the functional form of the set of estimated empirical models is 
specified following the earlier group of empirical papers estimating externalities from 
FDI in Mexico, originating with Persson and Blomstrom (1983) and Blomstrom
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(1989)96. The empirical models that were estimated by this group are all specified as
It may be that the results of the earlier estimations on FDI-induced 
externalities in Mexico, as well as the empirical analysis presented in the previous 
chapter, are affected by the measurement of the variables in (standardised) levels. In 
fact, the majority of the more recent empirical studies on growth and productivity 
effects of FDI assume some type of production function to underlie the empirical 
models that are estimated (see e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999; also Haddad and 
Harrison, 1993; Sjoholm 1999). In these cases, the empirical models take on different 
forms. Instead of an additive specification, the underlying production functions take 
on multiplicative forms.
To see the origins of the change in specification of the estimated empirical 
model, I start by deriving the structural equation that will be estimated. Starting from 
a standard Cobb-Douglas production function98:
where Q, K and L are production, capital and labour respectively; A is the efficiency 
parameter.
Production can be stated as a function of the capital-labour ratio k :
07linear equations, where the variables are measured in levels, in standardised values .
(1) Q = A K ° L
dividing both sides by L gives the physical product of labour:
96 See chapter four for full list of references of this set of studies.
97 In order to allow a direct comparison o f the coefficients of RHS variables that are measured in 
different units.
98 For a full discussion of the theory and empirical applications of estimating production functions, see 
e.g. Grilliches and Ringstad (1971).
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finally, stating (3) in log linear form produces the equation to be estimated:
(4) In j  = In A + a In k
Following this, the empirical model that is estimated can be stated as
Prodm = Bo + Bi INVm + B2  LQm + B3 SCALEm + B4  HERFI 
B5 GINI + 6 6  FOR + e ;
where
ls Prod111* k* is INVm and A is (LQm, SCALEm, HERFI, GINI, FOR).
This derivation implies that the production function can be directly estimated with the 
type of data that is available for the present study, by restating the empirical model in 
a log linear form. Important to note here is that the change in measurement of the 
variables has repercussions for the interpretation of the B-coefficients. The B- 
coefficients of an empirical model in which the variables are measured in levels 
indicate the change in the dependent variable of a one-unit change in the independent 
variables. In log linear models, the B-coefficients represent elasticities; the percentage 
change in the dependent variable for a given (small) percentage change in 
independent variables (see Gujarati, 1995, p. 166; also Chiang, 1984).
5.3.2. A comparison of Different Empirical Specifications
To see whether the specific functional form of the empirical model adopted in the 
previous chapter may have affected the results of the estimation of FDI-induced
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externalities, I have re-estimated the set of empirical models of chapter four, this time 
specifying the empirical models in log linear fashion. The two sets of estimations of 
the main labour productivity equation are shown in table 5.1.
Comparing the overall goodness-of-fit statistic of the two alternative empirical 
models, the adjusted R of the log linear functional form is considerably higher than 
the standardised levels model. This would suggest that the log linear specification 
performs better compared to the levels model. However, it is important to consider 
that the two adjusted R -values of the alternative models are not directly comparable. 
The transformation of the dependent variable from level to log linear means that the 
two alternative models effectively have different dependent variables (Gujarati, 1995), 
which means that the adjusted R2  values of the two models indicate the overall 
goodness-of-fit of two different empirical models.
Second, I have conducted a Box-Cox transformation test, the results of which 
can be seen as an informal test for the best functional specification. Developed by 
Box and Cox (1964), the transformation of the variables makes the residuals more 
closely normal and decreases heteroscedasticity (see also Cook and Weisberg, 1982). 
There are several possible transformations possible, most notably linear 
transformation, multiplicative inverse transformation and natural log transformation. 
Furthermore, tests can be conducted to determine whether both the left hand side and 
the right hand side need to be transformed, or one of either two sides. For the present 
study, I have focused on the test whether a log linear specification is to be preferred 
over a linearly specified equation as used in the previous chapter. The relevant 
findings from this particular Box-Cox transformation test are shown in Box 5.1.
The transformation into the Theta model represents the most general model. 
Both the dependent and the independent variables are transformed, but the transfer-
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Table 5.1. Comparison between standardised level and log linear estimations;
6 -digit (clase) industries; 1993
Standardised levels Log linear
Control
variables
Fori For2 For3 Fori For2 For3
Constant -0.072
(3.71)
***
-0.073
(3.87)
* * *
-0.073 
(3.86) ***
3.30 
(17.78) ***
3.35
(18.09)
***
3.34
(18.01)
***
INVm 0.237
(6.33)
***
0 . 2 2 2
(6 .1 2 )
***
0.224 
(6.16) ***
0.23 
(6.69) ***
0 . 2 1  
(6 .1 1 ) ***
0 . 2 1  
(6 .2 2 ) ***
LQm 0.052
(1.13)
0.064
(1.35)
0.063
(1.32)
0.27 
(4.69) ***
0.30 
(4.96) ***
0.30 
(4.92) ***
HERFI 0 . 1 0
(2.54)
0.111
(2.82)
♦♦♦
0 . 1 1  
(2.81) ***
0.086 
(6.38) ***
0.09 
(6.93) ***
0.09 
(6.98) ***
SCALE 0.003
(0.60)
0.006
(1.54)
0.005
(1 .2 1 )
0 . 1 1  
(3.97) ***
0 . 1 0  
(3.86) ***
0 . 1 1  
(3.99) ***
Gini 0.06
(2.93)
***
0.083
(4.15)
***
0.079 
(3.98) ***
0 . 2 1
( 1 .2 0 )
0.44 
(2.51) **
0.43 
(2.37) **
FORI -0.009
(0.38)
— 0.023 
(1.70) *
— —
FOR2 -0.067
(2.93)
***
-0.014
(0.74)
FOR3 — — -0.06 
(2.52) ***
— — -0.013
(0 .6 8 )
R2 0.457 0.478 0.472 0.72 0.72 0.72
F 15.31
(0 . 0 0 0
0 )
16.33
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
15.84
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
101.98
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
99.77
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
96.67
(0 .0 0 0 0 )
N 240 240 240 240 240 240
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Standard errors and variances heteroscedasticicity robust based on 
Hubert/White/Sandwhich method.
mation parameters of the left hand side and the right hand side do not have to be equal. 
The Z statistic of both the Lamda (right hand side) and Theta (left hand side) exceed 
their critical values. This suggests that the transformation of both sides of the equation 
is applicable.
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Box 5.1. Box-Cox test of functional form specification
Coefficient Standard error Z P> I z l
Theta model Lamda -0.29 0.087 -3.32 0 . 0 0 1
Theta -0 . 1 1 0.57 -2 . 0 0 0.045
Lamda Test Ho Restricted log LR statistic P-value
Model likelihood Chi 2 Prob > Chi 2
Lamda = -1 -1172.2139 328.46 0.000
Lamda = 0 -1009.6894 3.41 0.065 ,
Lamda = 1 -1179.381 342.79 0.000
The test statistics for the Lamda model concern the type of transformation 
where the same transformation parameter is used for both the LHS and RHS variables. 
The statistics shown in box two for this model consist of likelihood-ratio tests on the 
linear (Lamda = -1), multiplicative inverse (Lamda = 1 ) and natural log functional 
forms ( Lamda = 0). Both the linear and the multiplicative inverse specifications are 
rejected. The log linear transformation can only be rejected at the 10% level. At the 
5% or 1% significance level, the log linear transformation is significant, indicating 
that the residuals of the equation behave better when the equation is transformed on 
both sides into natural logs.
An further piece of information that can be looked at to evaluate the relative 
performance of the two alternatively specified models in table 5.1. is obtained from 
the signs and significance levels of the RHS variables. Again, the log linear 
specification seems to perform better. The estimated effects from the log linear 
specification indicate that, besides the variable FOR, all the control variables carry 
expected signs, and are significant at either the 1% or 5% acceptance level". Based
99 The only exception being the variable GINI for the log linear empirical model using FORI.
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on these results, the log linear specification seems superior, as it behaves more in line 
with the hypothesised effects of the control variables.
Turning to the estimated effect of FDI on measured Mexican productivity, it 
appears that this variable is the variable where the results of the two sets of 
estimations differ most markedly. As discussed in the previous chapter, the levels 
models indicate that the effect of foreign participation on domestic productivity 
ranges between significant negative to insignificant positive, depending on the 
measurement of industry-wide foreign participation. The results from the log linear 
empirical models give a rather different impression. According to these results, the 
effect of foreign participation ranges between significant positive to insignificant 
negative. This suggests that increases in foreign participation either enhance Mexican 
productivity, or do not have significant externality effects. Or, to put the results more 
in line with the concept of FDI-induced externalities being a composite of both 
positive and negative externalities, the results indicate that the positive externalities 
from foreign participation either outweigh its negative effects, or that the positive and 
negative effects balance each other out.
In order to further assess whether there are strong differences between the 
(standardised) levels and the log linear specifications, I have re-estimated all the 
empirical models presented in chapter four. In table 5.2., the most important features 
of the set of empirical results are shown, together with a comparison between the 
levels and the log linear estimates.
One aspect of the comparison between the two types of functional forms 
concerns the overall goodness-of-fit of the estimations of the empirical models. 
Although the adjusted R -values of the two different sets of estimation are not 
directly comparable, they can serve as a first indicator. The information in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2. Main results of log linear estimations and comparison with
Standardised levels estimates
empirical model functional form Adj. R2 n significant RHS variables Effect of FOR
50 4-digit 
industries (rama);
stand, levels 0 . 8 6 LQ, Scale, Gini Sign, negative coefficient
log linear 0.83 INVm, LQ, Herfi, Scale Insign, negative coefficient
1998 6 -digit 
industries (clase)
stand, levels 0.63 INVm, SCALE, LQ Insign positive to insign, negative
log linear 0.60 INVm, LQ, Herfi, Scale Insign positive to insign negative
jroductivity change 
1988-1993
stand, levels 0.33 INVm, LQ, Herfi Insign negative and sign negative
log linear 0.47 INVm, Herfi, Scale Sign, positive and insign. 
positive
Productivity
convergence
1988-1993
stand, levels 0 . 2 1 GAP8 8 Insign. positive and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.48 GAP8 8 , INVm, Herfi Insign. negative and insign. 
positive
Productivity large 
Mexican firms
stand, levels 0.83 LQ, Scale Sign, negative and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.73 LQ, Herfi, Scale Sign, negative and insign. 
negative
Productivity small 
Mexican firms
stand, levels 0.46 INVm, Scale Insign. Positive
---- log linear 0.48 INVm, LQ, Herfi, Gini Sign. Positive
Low INVfor stand, levels 0.60 INVm, Gini, Herfi Insign. negative and insign. 
positive
log linear 0.76 INVm, LQ, Gini, Herfi, Scale Sign, positive and insign. positive
High INVfor stand, levels 0.40 INVm, LQ, Gini Sign, negative and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.63 INVm, LQ, Herfi, Scale Sign, positive, insign negative and 
sign. Negative
low LQfor stand, levels 0.69 INVm, Herfi, Gini, Scale Insign. positive and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.72 LQ, Gini, Herfi, Scale Insign. positive and insign. 
negative
high LQfor stand, levels 0.44 INVm, LQ, Gini Sign, negative and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.65 INVm, LQ, Gini, Herfi, Scale Sign, negative and insign. positive
low productivity 
gap
stand, levels 0.82 INVm, LQ, Gini, Herfi Sign, negative and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.71 LQ, Gini, Herfi Sign, negative and insign. positive
high productivity
gap
stand, levels 0.48 INVm, Gini, Herfi Sign, negative and insign. 
negative
log linear 0.72 INVm, LQ, Herfi, Scale Sign, positive and insign. negative
(*) Average for estimations for FORI, FOR2, FOR3.
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reveals that the log linear estimations show either similar or higher goodness-of-fit 
statistics100. Even if we do not compare the two sets of estimations and look only at 
the goodness-of-fit statistic of the log linear empirical models, they all seem to reach 
satisfactory levels.
Turning to the performance of the models in terms of correct signs and 
significance levels of the RHS variables besides the variable FOR, the results indicate 
that a log linear functional form seems to be preferred over the levels specification. In 
total, table 5.1. and 5.2. contain the results of 13 separate empirical equations, 
estimated for both types of functional specification. For nine of these empirical 
equations, the number of RHS variables that carries hypothesised signs and reaches 
acceptable significance levels is higher for the log linear results compared to the 
levels estimates. Three empirical estimations produce similar results regarding RHS 
variables for both functional specifications, and only one estimation produces more 
significant RHS variables in the levels specification.
As is the case with the results presented in table 5.1., the results presented in 
table 5.2. indicate that the estimated effect of foreign participation represents the most 
marked difference between the two functional form specifications. The main 
impression that arises from the comparison of the estimated effect of foreign 
investment between the levels estimations and the log linear estimations is that the 
latter estimations indicate either a moderately to weakly significant positive effect of 
foreign investment or the absence of a significant negative effect. A good example of 
the feature that log linear estimates attribute a far more positive effect to the presence 
of foreign investment compared to the levels estimates is offered by the estimation 
results of determinants of productivity growth for Mexican firms in the period 1988-
100 The only exception to this is the estimation for the sub-sample of industries characterised by a 
relative small productivity gap between foreign and domestic firms
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1993. Whereas the levels estimates attribute a significant or insignificant negative 
effect to the presence of industry-wide foreign participation on the development of 
measured Mexican productivity, the log linear estimates suggest a significant positive 
to an insignificant positive effect. Having said so, important to note is that the results 
captured in table 5.2. also reveal that in many cases, irrespective of the functional 
form, the presence of foreign investment does not appear to create significant 
externality effects.
Implications o f the choice for log linear specification
In sum, it appears that the log linear functional specification of the empirical models 
is to be preferred over the levels specification. First, the log linear specification is 
more in line with the theoretical model of an underlying Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Second, the Box-Cox test statistics indicate that a log-linear specification is 
to be preferred over the levels specification. Third, the adjusted R -values of the log 
linear estimations all seem satisfactory, indicating that the log linear specification 
does behave satisfactory. Furthermore, the control RHS variables carry hypothesised 
signs at a higher frequency in the log linear models, as well as reaching acceptable 
significance levels more often.
The preference for the log linear specification carries important implications 
for the interpretation of the effect of foreign investment on measured Mexican 
domestic productivity. The empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter 
suggests the occurrence of negative externalities from the presence of foreign 
manufacturing firms. The results from the log linear models offer far less convincing 
support for such a conclusion. In fact, the results from some of the improved
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estimations even offer support for the conclusion that the presence of FDI creates 
positive externalities. A more cautious conclusion, based on the overall set of findings, 
is that the presence of foreign investment does not appear to lead to significant 
externality effects, positive or negative. This could also be interpreted as evidence for 
a situation where positive and negative externalities, if present, seem to outweigh each 
other. However, the most important result of this section is that the log linear 
specification of the empirical model is to be preferred over the (standardised) levels 
one. Therefore, in the remainder of this thesis, I will be using log linearly specified 
empirical models.
5.4. Omitted Variable Bias
A potentially important problem of cross-sectional econometric analysis is that the 
results may be biased due to the effect of omitted variables. This effect arises when 
during the specification of an empirical model, one or more important RHS variables 
have been left out101. The danger of introducing such a bias into the specification of 
an empirical model is inherent to the nature of econometric estimations, as it involves 
a trade-off between including a limited number of RHS variables and minimising the 
risk that no important control variables are left out. The effect of the erroneous 
omission of a right hand side variable is multi-fold (see Gujarati, 1995). One 
important manifestation of the effect of omitted variable bias arises when the omitted 
variable is related to one or more of the RHS variables that are included in the
101 The problem of omitted variable bias is a common one in empirical research. An example of this is 
offered by Sala-I-Martin (1997), who reviews empirical research of determinants of economic growth, 
finding that about 60 RHS variables have been found to have a significant association with growth in at 
least one empirical specification. This indicates that, when assessing the robustness o f findings from a 
particular empirical specification, it is important to consider whether the estimated effects of the 
included RHS variables are influenced by omitted variable bias.
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empirical model. In this case, the estimated coefficients of the RHS variables in the 
model will be both biased and inconsistent. In other words, the coefficients do not 
assume their true values, even in the case where the sample of observations is very 
large. Second, even in the case where the omitted variable is not correlated with any 
of the included RHS variables, the variances of the entire empirical model as well as 
the individual 13-coefficients are estimated incorrectly, which creates the problem that 
decisions concerning hypothesis testing of the significance of the estimated 
coefficients are based on less accurate estimations.
The empirical model used to estimate FDI-induced externalities in the 
previous chapter is specified in accordance with previous research on both Mexico 
and other host economies. In addition to the variable representing industry-wide 
foreign investment, the RHS variables that have been included represent important 
RHS variables in other empirical research. Also, especially in the case of the log 
linear estimations, the model seems to be performing well, as indicated by the 
acceptable overall goodness-of-fit statistics of the model and the frequency of the 
significance of the RHS variables.
Having said so, for the reasons outlined above, it is important to consider the 
possibility that certain important variables have erroneously been left out. In the 
specific case of Mexico, one factor that may have important effects on Mexican 
productivity is the existence of maquiladora-style production in certain industries. 
Maquiladora manufacturing activity, or in-bond assembly activities, consists mainly 
of low value added, labour-intensive manufacturing activities (see Sklair, 1993 for a 
good review; also Cepal, 1996; see also Ramirez, 2004). Therefore, the relative share 
of maquiladora type activities in. an industry may influence the measured level of 
industry-wide Mexican labour productivity. Furthermore, as the maquiladora
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industries are characterised by a large participation of foreign-owned firms, the 
variable FOR in the empirical model may be correlated with the industry-wide 
intensity of maquiladora activities. The effect on the estimated results of the omission 
of the maquiladora effect may have been an imprecise estimation of the variation of 
the entire model and the individual b-coefficients.
The second factor that may be a source of omitted variable bias in the case of 
Mexico is the industry-wide level of trade intensity. Trade may affect the level of 
productivity of industries in various ways. For instance, industries that are engaged in 
international trade are relatively more susceptible to forces of international 
competition, which may act as a further pressure raising productivity levels (Haddad 
and Harrison, 1993, Caves, 1974; Chuang and Chi-Mei Lin, 1999). Again, the omitted 
variable bias may originate from two sources. One source concerns the possible 
relation between measured productivity and industry-wide trade intensity. The second 
source is that foreign firms may show a tendency to concentrate in trade-oriented 
industries, in which case the industry-wide trade intensity is related to the variable 
FOR. In both cases, the omission of the trade variable may lead to biased estimates of 
the original empirical model.
5.4.1. Biased Estimation from Omitting the Maquiladora Effect?
In order to capture the possible effect of maquiladora-style production on measured 
labour productivity, I have calculated the industry-wide share of total number of 
employees that work in maquiladora firms. However, the data on the operations of 
maquiladora firms is published under a different industrial classification system than 
the census system. The two systems are so dissimilar that a direct comparison with
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the classification system of the Mexican economic census is not possible. Therefore, I 
have had to resort to calculating an approximation of the industry-wide share of 
maquiladora employees under the economic census system, comparing statistics on 
maquiladora employees from the national accounts with the industry statistics from 
the economic census. The exact procedure for this is explained in the appendix to this 
chapter.
In order to test whether the cross-sectional variation of industry-wide 
importance of maquiladora production has an effect on measured labour productivity, 
I have estimated the main empirical model as specified in the previous chapter, adding 
the variable MAQUI, which represents the percentage share of maquiladora workers 
per industry. This leads to the following empirical model to be estimated:
Prodm = Bo + Bi INVm + B2  LQm + 6 3  SCALE + B4  HERFI+ B5 GINI 
+ 6 6  FOR + B7  Maqui + 6
The results of the estimations are shown in table 5.3.
Columns FORI (a) through FOR3(a) contain the findings from the original estimations, 
whereas the columns FORl(b) through FOR3(b) contain the results from the 
empirical models with the additional variable MAQUI. Comparing the two sets of 
findings, there appear to be no real differences between the signs and significance 
levels of the RHS control variables. Also, the estimated effect of the variable 
representing industry-wide foreign investment remains largely unaltered. As for the 
estimated effect of MAQUI, the results indicate that this variable is unimportant in the 
current empirical estimation. Although the coefficient carries the hypothesised 
negative sign in two of three estimations, the coefficient is very small, and does not
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Table 5.3. Mexican productivity and the importance of maquiladora-
production style; 1993; log linear functional form
Fori (a) For2(a) For3(a) Forl(b) For2(b) For3(b)
Constant 3.30 
(17.78) ***
3.35 
(18.09) ***
3.34
(18.01)***
3.30
(17.80) ***
3.35
(18.05) ***
3.34
(17.96) ***
INVm 0.23 
(6.69) ***
0.21
(6.11)***
0.21 
(6.22) ***
0.23
(6.54) ***
0.21
(6.01) ***
0.22
(6.13) ***
LQm 0.27 
(4.69) ***
0.30 
(4.96) ***
0.30 
(4.92) ***
0.26
(4.62) ***
0.30
(4.93) ***
0.30
(4.92) ***
HERFI 0.086 
(6.38) ***
0.09 
(6.93) ***
0.09 
(6.98) ***
0.09
(6.42) ***
0.09
(6.92) ***
0.09
(6.96) ***
SCALE 0.11 
(3 97) ***
0.10 
(3.86) ***
0.11 
(3.99) ***
0.11
(3.94) ***
0.10
(3.84) ***
0.11
(3.98) ***
GINI 0.21
(1.20)
0.44
(2.51)**
0.43 
(2.37) **
0.21
(1.21)
0.44
(2.47) **
0.42
(2.34) **
FORI 0.023
(1.70)*
— — 0.03
(1.97) **
— —
FOR2 — -0.014
(0.74)
— — -0.01
(0.74)
—
FOR3 — — -0.013
(0.68)
— — -0.01
(0.71)
MAQUI -0.006
(0.58)
-0.0005
(0.05)
0.0006
(0.06)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
F 101.98
(0.0000)
99.77
(0.0000)
96.67
(0.0000)
89.68
(0.000)
87.36
(0.000)
84.26
(0.000)
N 240 240 240 240 240 240
Absolute values o f T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Hubert/White/Sandwhich method.
reach significance levels in any of the three estimations.
A possible reason for the results as presented in table 5.3. is that the variable 
MAQUI does not sufficiently capture the industry-wide importance of the 
maquiladora production style. As explained in the appendix to this chapter, the 
variable MAQUI represents only an approximation of the cross-industry variation of 
the share of maquiladora activities. Therefore, it may be that an alternative way of 
measurement produces different results. An indication that this may be the case can be 
found in the information presented in table 5.4., which shows the main economic
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activities from the national accounts in terms of their share in total maquiladora 
employment.
Table 5.4. Core maquiladora activities; average 1992-1994
Type of industrial activity (a) Share in total maquiladora- 
employment 
(1992-1994 average)
Electrical machinery and equipment 
(Equipos y aparatos electronicos)
22.8%
Car bodywork, engines, parts and accessories 
for the automobile industry 
(Carrocerias, motores, partes y acceosorios 
para vehiculos automotores)
21.5%
Other manufacturing industries 
(Otras industrias manufactureras)
10%
Dressing garments 
(Prendas de vestir)
9.8%
Electric systems and instruments 
(Equipos y aparatos electricos)
6.8%
Other products made from textiles 
(Otras industrias textiles)
5.3%
Electric machinery and equipment 
(Maquinaria y aparatos electricos)
4.8%
Other products made of wood and cork 
(Otros productos de Madera y corcho)
3.7%
Accumulative share 84.9%
Remainder of activities (including services) 10.9%
(a) original Mexican description in parentheses 
source: own calculations, based on data taken from Inegi (1999)a
As table 5.4. indicates, the major share of total maquiladora employment is 
represented by only a small number of industrial activities. In fact, the eight selected 
industrial activities have an aggregate share of about 85% of total maquiladora 
employment. Based on this feature of the relative importance of these activities in 
total maquiladora employment, an alternative way to estimate the cross-industry 
variation of industry-intensity of maquiladora production is to include a dummy 
variable in the original empirical model, labelled MAQDUMMY. This dummy
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variable takes the value of 1  for those 6 -digit clase industries that belong to the eight 
industrial activities listed in table 5.4. and the value 0 for the remaining industries. 
This results in the following empirical model:
Prodm = Bo + Bi INVm + &2 LQm + B3 SCALE + B4  HERFI+ B5 GINI 
+ B6  FOR + B7  MAQDUMMY + 8
The set of findings of the estimation of this empirical model are presented in table 5.5.
The results from the estimations including the dummy variable indicate that there 
appear to be no differences with the original model concerning the effect and 
significance of the RHS control variables. Also, the effect of the industry-wide 
presence of foreign firms remains similar. As for the results of the dummy variable, 
they are somewhat more in line with the hypothesised effect. MAQDUMMY carries a 
negatively signed coefficient in all three estimations, in line with the expected effect. 
However, the variable does not reach acceptable levels of significance, supporting the 
findings from the estimations with the variable MAQUI that the cross-industry 
variation of maquiladora style production does not have a significant effect on 
measured Mexican productivity levels.
In sum, the extent of industry-wide maquiladora production can be assumed to 
have a negative effect on the measured level of Mexican productivity. As such, the 
omission of this variable may have created a bias in the estimations; moreover so due 
to the fact that the variable may be correlated with the variable FOR. The empirical 
results from the estimations using two alternative indicators of the cross-industry 
variation of industry-wide intensity of maquiladora style production partly confirm 
this negative effect, as the maquiladora variables carry negatively signed
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Table 5.5. Testing the Maquiladora-effect by means of maquiladora dummy;
1993; log linear functional form
Fori (a) For2(a) For3(a) For 1(b) For2(b) For3(b)
Constant 3.30 
(17.78) ***
3.35 
(18.09) ***
3.34
(18.01)***
3.34
(16.93)**
♦
3.38
(17.0)***
3.38
(17.0)***
INVm 0.23 
(6.69) ***
0.21
(6.11)***
0.21 
(6.22) ***
0.22
(5.92)***
0.20
(5.37)***
0.21
(5.44)***
LQm 0.27 
(4.69) ***
0.30 
(4.96) ***
0.30 
(4.92) ***
0.27
(4.58)***
0.30
(4.90)***
0.29
(4.84)***
HERFI 0.086 
(6.38) ***
0.09 
(6.93) ***
0.09 
(6.98) ***
0.09 
(6.83)***
0.09
(6.83)***
0.10
(6.88)***
SCALE 0.11 
(3.97) ***
0.10 
(3.86) ***
0.11 
(3.99) ***
0.11
(4.07)***
0.11
(3.90)***
0.11
(4.06)***
GINI 0.21
(1.20)
0.44 
(2.51) **
0.43 
(2.37) **
0.21
(1.20)
0.44
(2.52)**
0.43
(2.38)**
FORI 0.023
(1.70)*
— — 0.03
(1.72)*
— —
FOR2 — -0.014
(0.74)
— — -0.01
(0.73)
—
FOR3 — — -0.013
(0.68)
— — -0.01
(0.67)
MAQDUMM
Y
-0.04
(0.70)
-0.02
(0.45)
-0.03
(0.57)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
F 101.98
(0.0000)
99.77
(0.0000)
96.67
(0.0000)
87.48
(0.000)
85.39
(0.000)
82.72
(0.000)
N - 240 240 240 240 240 240
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level o f significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Hubert/White/Sandwhich method.
coefficients. Having said so, the effect of maquiladora production does not have a 
significant effect on Mexican productivity. More importantly, the findings from the 
original model are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of this additional variable, 
supporting the decision that the maquiladora effect does not need to be included into 
the empirical model102.
1021 have also estimated the effects of both maquiladora variables in levels estimations. The results are 
similar to the log linear specifications: negative and positive coefficients for MAQUI, and all negative
5.4.2. Biased Estimations from Omitting Trade?
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The second variable that may have caused a bias in the estimated effect of the 
presence of FDI in Mexican manufacturing industries is related to the cross-sectional 
variation of exports, trade intensity or trade openness of these industries. The analysis 
of effects of international trade forms an important part of empirical research into 
determinants of income, production and productivity (see Lewer and Berg, 2003; 
Edwards, 1993 andRodrik, 1993 for main reviews).
Exports or trade are hypothesised to have a positive effect on these dependent 
variables for several reasons. First, exports concentrate investment in the most 
efficient sectors in an economy. Stronger specialisation in exports subsequently leads 
to increased productivity (Kunst and Marin, 1989). Second, industries that are 
engaged in international trade are more susceptible to international forces of 
competition, forcing them to become more efficient in their production. Third, it can 
be argued that being engaged in international trade involves an aspect of learning by 
doing, which sees firms becoming more efficient due to the fact that they are engaged 
in international competition (Clerides et al., 1998). Fourth, following ideas from 
endogenous growth theory, international trade can enhance domestic productivity as 
trade flows facilitate international transfers of knowledge and ideas across country 
borders (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Feeney, 1999).
This latter explanation for the existence of a positive relation between trade
and productivity may apply to a country like Mexico particularly, as this explanation
is often used with reference to trade relations between a developed and a less
developed country. Given that the US is Mexico’s major trade partner, international
coefficients for MAQDUMMY. Again, none of the maquiladora variables reach significance levels, 
and the estimated effects of the other RHS variables are insensitive towards the inclusion or exclusion 
of the maquiladora variables.
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transfers of knowledge and ideas may be important in the analysis of productivity of 
Mexican industries103.
Following any of these four different explanations for a relation between trade 
and productivity or growth, the omission of the trade variable may lead to biased 
results, as it may influence measured productivity of a host economy. Also, as the 
cross-industry variation of foreign participation in a host economy may be related to 
the level of trade intensity, the omission of the trade variable may have affected the 
estimation of the empirical model. Again, both sources for possible estimation bias 
are present.
The attempt to include the cross-industry variation of trade intensity or 
openness in the empirical model faces a similar type of problem as the incorporation 
of the maquiladora effect. Mexico’s international trade flows are classified and 
published under the Harmonised Tariff System (HTS), which is different from the 
classification system used in the economic census. Therefore, I have had to match the 
two classification systems, based primarily on the descriptions of the activities that 
are used in each of the two alternative systems. The appendix to this chapter describes 
the main procedure and the full results of the matching process. The main result of the 
matching process is that I have been able to allocate export and import flows for the 
period 1990-2000 to the 4-digit (rama) classification of the Mexican census. In order 
to exclude the possibility that scores of particular years have affected the results, the 
export and import values that are allocated to the Mexican census industries are 
average values for the period 1991-1995104.
103 As an indication of this dependence of Mexico in its international trade relations on the US, between 
1993 and 2000, the average share of the US in Mexico’s total trade values amounted to 81% (based on 
trade statistics downloaded from Mexico’s ministry of economics at http://www.economia.gob.mx.)
104 An alternative way to assess the effect of trade or openness is by using nominal or effective rates of 
protection, as presented for Mexico by ten Kate (1987). This option is less feasible for the present 
analysis, however, for several reasons. First, many changes have been made to the census classification
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There are several ways in which to measure trade, trade intensity or 
openness105. However, the vast majority of empirical investigations into the relation 
between trade openness and productivity use samples of countries, instead of a set of 
industries for a particular country. 1 0 6  In this chapter, I present the findings of the 
variable capturing trade openness or trade intensity per industry, which is measured as 
the average value of total trade (exports + imports) for the period 1991-1995, divided 
by the value of total production of each industry in 1993107. A similar specification of 
trade intensity for the estimation of the relation between trade and productivity has 
been used in a cross-country setting by e.g. Frankel et al. (1996) and Frankel and 
Romer (1996). The inclusion of this variable leads to the following empirical model:
Prodm = fio + fii INVm + B2  LQm + B3 SCALE + 6 4  HERFI+ B5 GINI 
+ Bg FOR + B7  TRADE + s
The results of the estimation of this model are presented in table 5.6.
Column (l)a through (3)a contain the results of the estimations of the original 
empirical model. Columns (l)b through (3)b contain the estimations of the empirical 
model including the trade variable. Comparing the two sets of results, the overall
system of Inegi since 1980 (the year for which ten Kate calculated the rates o f protection). 
Furthermore, the fact that the rates are for 1980 lowers the relevance of these protection rates for the 
present analysis. Finally, previous estimations that have include protection rates found that the effect is 
insignificant: BlomstrOm (1989) uses the cross-industry variation of the rates of protection per industry 
for 1970, obtained from ten Kate and Wallace (1976), finding insignificant estimated effects of these 
protection rates.
105 See Edwards (1993) for a discussion of commonly used measures o f trade openness.
106 For an exception to this, see Bernard and Hensen (1999)
107 I have experimented with alternative variables related to trade, such as (exports/trade), 
(imports/trade), and (exports-imports)/trade. Also, I have tried similar trade indicators using total 
production per industry in 1993 as base. The empirical results from using these alternatives are either 
similar or weaker in comparison to the results presented in this section.
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Table 5.6. Assessment of the importance of trade intensity
(l)a (2)a (3)a (Db (2)b (3)b
Constant 3.30
(17.78) ***
3.35 
(18.1) ***
3.34
(18.01) ***
3.31
(17.5) ***
3.36
(17.8) ***
3.35
(17.8) ***
INVm 0.23
(6.69) ***
0.21
(6.11)***
0.21
(6.22) ***
0.23
(6.36) ***
0.20
(5.76) ***
0.21
(5.85) ***
LQm 0.27
(4.69) ***
0.30
(4.96)***
0.30
(4.92) ***
0.25
(4.18) ***
0.29
(4.64) ***
0.28
(4.59) ***
Herfi 0.086 
(6.38) ***
0.09
(6.93) ***
0.09
(6.98) ***
0.08 
(6.16) ***
0.09
(6.78) ***
0.09
(6.85) ***
Scale 0.11
(3.97) ***
0.10
(3.86) ***
0.11
(3.99) ***
0.11
(3.99) ***
0.11
(3.87) ***
0.11
(4.00) ***
Gini 0.21
(1.20)
0.44
(2.51)**
0.43
(2.37) **
0.23
(1.30)
0.46
(2.62) ***
0.45
(2.50) **
For 0.023
(1.70)*
— — 0.04
(1.96) **
— —
For 2 — -0.014
(0.74)
— — -0.01
(0.74)
—
For 3 - - -0.013
(0.68)
— — -0.01
(0.72)
Trade — — — 0.04
(1.84)*
0.02
(1.08)
0.03
(1.15)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
F 101.98
(0.000)
99.77
(0.000)
96.67
(0.000)
84.40
(0.000)
83.15
(0.000)
81.16
(0.000)
N 240 240 240 236 236 236
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method
goodness-of-fit is similar, as are the signs and significance levels of the RHS control 
variables. Furthermore, the coefficient of the variable representing foreign investment 
shows a similar switch from positive to negative. In both sets of estimations, the 
positive coefficient is significant, whereas the negative coefficients are not.
The results for the trade variable are mixed. As hypothesised, the sign of the 
trade variable is positive, indicating that industries that are open to trade, or trade 
more intensively, show higher measured productivity levels. Moreover, in the 
estimation containing foreign firms’ share in total industry-wide employment as
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measure of foreign participation (column (l)b), the coefficient of TRADE carries a 
significant positive sign. On the other hand, the coefficient of TRADE is small in all 
three estimations, suggesting only a limited impact of this variable. Furthermore, in 
two of the three estimations, the association between Mexican productivity and 
TRADE does not reach acceptable significance levels108.
The findings related to the inclusion of TRADE into the empirical model do 
not offer conclusive support for such an inclusion. Furthermore, the inclusion of the 
trade variable may create an additional problem. This problem originates from the 
possibility that the relation between productivity and trade may run from the former to 
the latter (Rodrik, 1993; Frankel and Romer, 1996). Both time series and cross- 
sectional estimations have shown that this may be the case, which seriously 
complicates any precise interpretation of the effect of trade on productivity109. 
Therefore, based on the lack of conclusive evidence of the presence of omitted 
variable bias and the possible endogeneity aspect of trade intensity, I maintain the 
original empirical model that omits the trade related RHS variable.
108 The estimations for the standardized levels specification indicate a stronger impact of TRADE. In 
all of the three estimations, the variable TRADE carries a positive sign, significant at the 5% level.
109 This problem is caused by the existence of simultaneity between trade and productivity (Frankel et 
al., 1996) or endogeneity of trade to the empirical model (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Not only does 
the inclusion of a potentially endogenous RHS variable pose problems to the interpretation of the 
estimations as such; moreover, section 5.5. shows that the variable FDI may also be endogenous to the 
estimation. Therefore, the possibility that foreign investment is endogenous is an additional reason to 
exclude trade from the empirical model, in order to avoid problems that arise from estimating an 
empirical model containing two potentially endogenous RHS variables.
220
5.5. Endogenous FDI110
5.5.1. The Expected Relation between FDI and Domestic Productivity
Empirical research into the relation between FDI and growth is hampered by the fact 
that the line of causation between the two variables of interest is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict a priori. The prediction that FDI affects growth may easily be 
replaced with the alternative prediction that growth affects inward FDI (see Caves, 
1996; also de Mello, 1999). Furthermore, the line of causation may also be bi­
directional (Balasubramayan et al., 1996; Zhang, 2001). As discussed in the review 
chapter, FDI and growth have been found to be related in some countries, but not in 
others. Also, the direction of causation differs, and may apply only to short run 
relations or to long run development processes as well (see especially Zhang, 2001).
As discussed in chapter 2, the empirical findings on the relation between FDI 
and host economy productivity have also produced both positive and negative 
associations. As such, a similarity exists between the a priori unpredictability of the 
type of estimated effect of FDI on growth and productivity of host economies. 
However, the possibility that the line of causation between FDI and host economy
110 This section treats the issue of endogenous FDI. A related estimation problem concerns the issue of 
selection bias, as first discussed by Heckman (1979). This problem is a common one in empirical 
research, and applies to those cases where the sample under analysis constitutes a sub-sample derived 
from a larger one. If there is a relation between belonging to the sub-sample and the estimated effect on 
the dependent variable, and this association cannot be explained by observable characteristics in the 
sample, the estimated coefficients will be biased (see Heckman, 1979; also Vella, 1998). Such a 
selection bias may apply to the analysis of the effects o f FDI in a host economy, as these firms 
represent a sub-sample of all the firms that have considered investing in the host economy. If the 
decision to invest is related to the effects of FDI through some unobservable characteristics of foreign 
affiliates, the resulting findings from the analysis of the effects of FDI will be flawed due to the 
selection bias. However, the data requirements for the analysis o f whether selection bias is present are 
quite specific, as the analysis requires the construction of the full sample, in this case containing both 
firms that have decided to invest in Mexico as well as firms who have decided against it. To the best of 
my knowledge, no empirical investigation of the possible effect of selection bias on the analysis of the 
effects of FDI in Mexico or in any other host economy has been conducted thus far.
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productivity may run from the latter to the former has remained largely ignored.
Kholdy (1995) attempts to address this issue specifically. He notes that the 
positive relation between FDI and domestic productivity, as found in early cross- 
sectional industry studies, may be the result of FDI locating in those industries that 
report higher labour productivity and capital formation, rather than labour 
productivity being enhanced by the presence of FDI. Hence, the question is ‘whether 
foreign investment happens prior to higher labour productivity and capital formation 
and therefore causes it or is caused by it’ (Kholdy, 1995, p. 746). The finding of a 
positive association between the extent of inward FDI and domestic productivity in a 
host economy does not solve this problem, ‘as a statistical association does not verify 
or reject a causal relationship’ (Kholdy, 1995, p. 746)111.
Aitken and Harrison (1999) also refer to the problem of causation. The core of 
their criticism that they express towards the early cross-sectional estimates of FDI- 
induced externalities is that:
‘by using data aggregated at the sectoral level, these studies were unable to control 
for differences in productivity across sectors which might be correlated with, but not 
caused by, foreign presence. I f  foreign investors gravitate towards more productive 
industries, then a misspecification which fails to control for differences across 
industries is likely to find a positive association between the share o f industry wide 
FDI and the productivity o f domestic plants, even i f  no spillovers take place ’ (Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999, p. 611).
111 Kholdy’s empirical findings are inconclusive, however. He performs Granger causality tests on the 
relation between FDI and technical efficiency for Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Singapore and Zambia. His 
findings indicate that the two variables are causally independent variables, which does not clarify the 
significant association between FDI and productivity reported in other studies (see Kholdy, 1995).
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Aitken and Harrison (1999) apply a panel data analysis, controlling for industry- 
specific productivity differences* which would eliminate from the estimation the part 
of the association between FDI and productivity that is caused by FDI’s attraction to 
high productivity industries. The estimation of their empirical model that controls for 
these industry differences produces an estimated negative association between FDI 
and measured domestic productivity. In contrast, a similarly specified model that 
omits the industry controls produces a significant positive association between FDI 
and productivity. They interpret this marked difference in estimated effect as evidence 
for the existence of a relation running from productivity to FDI:
‘ ...the very different message suggested by the results provides an excellent
example o f the problems associated with cross-section estimation. I f  we fail to control 
for the fact that foreign investment is allocated to more productive sectors, we 
conclude that spillovers from foreign ownership are positive; once we introduce 
controls for industry-specific differences, however, we find evidence o f negative 
spillovers on domestic productivity’ (Aitken and Harrison, 1999, p. 611).
The main criticism aimed at cross-sectional estimates of externalities from FDI is that 
the findings are flawed when there exists a line of causation from productivity to FDI 
(see Hanson, 2001). However, the implications of this criticism seem not to have been 
followed through sufficiently. This becomes apparent from the discussion of 
empirical findings by Haddad and Harrison (1993; see also Harrison, 1996). They 
replicate an empirical model similar to the one estimated by Globerman (1979), a 
typical example of an early cross-sectional model. The criticism towards this type of 
model is that its estimated effect of FDI is possibly influenced by a line of causation
223
running from productivity to FDI. Their results indicate a statistically significant 
negative association between industry-wide foreign investment and measured 
domestic productivity (see Haddad and Harrison, 1993). They interpret this as 
evidence of the occurrence of negative externalities from FDI. However, such a 
conclusion implicitly rests on the assumption that the possible relation from 
productivity to FDI is always positive. Had the estimation produced a significant 
positive association between FDI and measured productivity, the criticism would have 
been that this positive relation is likely to have been caused by FDI being attracted to 
high productivity industries. However, a negative association is accepted as sufficient 
evidence for the conclusion that there are negative externalities. The possibility that 
FDI gravitates towards industries that are characterised by relatively low levels of 
productivity remains unexplored112.
5.5.2. The Problem of Endogenous FDI
As indicated in the previous section, there may be a problem concerning the 
estimation of the effect of industry-wide foreign participation on domestic 
productivity levels when these productivity levels also affect the cross-industry 
variation of foreign participation. Solving this empirical estimation problem is not an 
easy task. In order to understand the exact nature of the problem and the requirements 
of a successful solution, it is helpful to consider the problem in more detail. To 
recapture, the basic empirical model can be stated as:
Prodm = Po + Pi-i X + Pi FOR + s;
112 This seems to be an example of the attitude criticised by Caves (1996), that empirical findings on 
externality effects of FDI bear strong imprints of a researcher’s prior beliefs concerning the type of 
relationship.
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where the vector X contains INVm, LQm, HERFI, SCALE and GINI.
The assumption when estimating this equation is that the line of causation runs from 
FOR to Prodm. The findings of this estimation may be flawed when there is also a 
line of causation running from Prodm to FOR. In this case, FOR should be considered 
as endogenous to the equation, in which case OLS estimations of the association 
between FOR and Prodm will produce inconsistent and inefficient 13-coefficients 
(Wooldridge, 2002).
In fact, three related reasons for endogeneity of a RHS variable like FOR are 
usually recognised (Wooldridge, 2002; Hausman, 2001): omitted variables, 
measurement error and simultaneity of the RHS variable. The problem of omitted 
variable bias has been addressed in the previous section. As for measurement error, 
the capturing of the cross-industry variation of industry-wide foreign participation by 
the industry-wide share in total employment, production or value added seems 
acceptable and is widely used in other empirical studies on FDI-induced externalities 
(see Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Here, the endogeneity problem surrounding FOR 
is most likely to be caused by this RHS variable being simultaneously determined 
with Prodm. Having said so, in reality precise distinctions between the three causes 
may be difficult to make (Wooldridge, 2002). More important than identifying the 
exact underlying cause of the endogeneity problem is its effect on OLS estimations. 
Due to the correlation with the error term, estimation of the (3-coefficients will be 
inefficient and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 1995). Therefore, applying 
standards OLS estimation to the empirical model will produce biased estimates of 
FOR and the other RHS variables, if FOR is endogenous.
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5.5.3. Characteristics of a Good Instrument
In order to estimate the empirical model without bias, we must find an observable 
variable, not part of the original vector X. This additional variable must meet two 
central conditions (Wooldridge, 2002). First, the variable must be uncorrelated with 
the error term s (i.e. it has to be an exogenous RHS variable). Second, the variable 
must be correlated with the endogenous variable FOR. If the additional variable meets 
both criteria, it can be seen as an instrumental variable or instrument for the variable
FOR. To put is slightly different, ‘ a good instrument is correlated with the
endogenous regressor for reasons the researcher can verify and explain, but 
uncorrelated with the outcome variable for reasons beyond its effect on the 
endogenous regressor’ (Angrist and Krueger, 1999, p. 8). In reality, to find variables 
that meet both these criteria has proved difficult (Wooldridge, 2002; Bound, Jaeger 
and Baker, 1995).
An often-referred-to example of a good instrument for an endogenous RHS 
variable is presented in Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1999). In their empirical analysis 
of determinants of future wage earnings, they face the problem that the RHS variable
i n
of educational attainment is endogenous to their empirical model . Their solution 
entails a regression of the education variable on an institutional constraint in the form 
of state laws that say that a child has to start school in the calendar year that it turns
six and stay in school until their 16th birthday. This creates ‘ a natural experiment
in which children are compelled to attend school for different lengths of time 
depending on birthdays’ (Angrist and Krueger, 1999, p. 9). This means that quarter of 
birth can be used as an instrument for education. Quarter of birth is correlated with
113 This endogeneity could be caused by omitted variables (ability, quality of education, family 
background), measurement error (how do you correctly measure education) or simultaneity bias.
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education (through the length of time of staying in school), while at the same time it is 
unlikely that it has any additional effects on the dependent variable other than through 
its effect on education114. If there is a problem with this instrument, it will originate 
from the small correlation with education, in which case the IV results will be 
affected by finite sample bias (Wooldridge, 2002; Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; 
also Staiger and Stock, 1999).
Another recent example of the use of IV estimation in a cross-sectional setting 
comes from the empirical analysis of the effect of trade on income or productivity 
(see Frankel and Romer, 1996; Frankel et al., 1996; also Edwards, 1997). The 
empirical estimation of the effect of trade on income may be biased due to the fact 
that trade may be endogenous to the empirical model. On the one hand, trade will 
have a positive effect on the income level of countries. On the other hand, it is also 
plausible that countries with higher income levels will be more engaged in 
international trade, in comparison to countries with lower income levels. This line of 
causation running from income to trade makes the latter variable endogenous.
In order to estimate the unbiased effect of trade on income, the use of an 
instrument is required. Frankel and Romer (1996) propose an instrument derived from 
the gravity model of trade. They argue that the distance between two countries is 
correlated with the trade level between these countries (see Frankel and Romer, 1996; 
also Frankel et al., 1996). In essence, the level of trade between two countries will be 
negatively correlated with the distance between these countries, ceteris paribus. Also, 
Frankel and Romer (1996) argue that the component of trade that is correlated with
distance is unlikely to affect income other than through its effect on trade: ‘ there
is no likely channel through which proximity or isolation affects income other than
114 Not all agree though, see especially Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995).
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increased or decreased interactions with other countries’ (Frankel and Romer, 1996, p. 
30-31). Hence, both criteria of a good instrument appear to have been met by the 
distance-based instrument for trade.
5.5.4. Finding a Good Instrument for Industry-wide Foreign Participation
It does not appear too problematic to find potential instruments that meet the criterion 
of having to be correlated with the potentially endogenous variable FOR. Several 
determinants of FDI in the form of industry characteristics have been identified in 
empirical research (for reviews, see Ewe-Ghee Lim, 2001; Dunning, 1993; Caves, 
1996). Some of these determinants are readily available from the 1994 census from 
Inegi. One such variable is industry-wide gross fixed capital accumulation. Foreign 
participation has been found to be correlated with industry-wide new fixed domestic 
capital accumulation, representing present or future industry growth (Kholdy, 1995). 
Another possible determinant of foreign participation is the level of industry-wide 
profitability, where foreign firms are attracted to those countries or industries within 
host economies where the highest profit margins can be made (Dunning, 1993).
However, the problem with such variables is that they are likely to suffer from 
the problem that they do not meet the second criterion of being a valid instrument, as 
it is likely that they are correlated with the dependent variable through other channels 
besides the association with the variable industry-wide foreign participation. For 
instance, gross fixed capital investment is likely to have an impact on the level of 
measured productivity in a host economy, besides the impact it has through the 
variable of industry-wide foreign participation. The variable of industry-wide 
profitability is facing a similar problem.
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An alternative to this type of instrument is the use of lagged values of either 
the dependent variable or the endogenous RHS variable (Gujarati, 1995)115. The use 
of lagged values as instrument may be valid, as it may prevent a correlation between 
the instrument and the error term of the empirical model in the same time period. 
Even in the case where the variable FOR t-i is endogenous to the empirical model at t- 
1, it may serve as an instrument in the regression model at time period t, if FORt-i is 
correlated with FOR t and not correlated with the error term of the model in time 
period t. In a similar fashion, Prodm t-i and FOR t may be correlated, if for instance 
foreign firms select industries based on past productivity performance. If Prodmt-i is 
not correlated with the error term of the empirical model in time period t, it may serve 
as a valid instrument. The problem with this type of instrument is that, in a cross- 
sectional setting, it seems unlikely that the lagged values of the dependent and the 
endogenous RHS variable are not correlated with the error term of the empirical 
model in time period t. This strong assumption of no serial auto-correlation is unlikely 
to hold, in which case the inefficiency in the estimated effects will remain.
Given the problems with these potential instruments for the variable FOR, I 
propose to use a new instrument. A striking feature of FDI in general is that industries 
seem to differ markedly in terms of their level of foreign participation. An indication 
of this cross-industry variation of foreign participation can be found in 
UNCTAD(2001, table 3.6.; see also Dicken, 2004), where a transnationality index is 
calculated for broad economic sectors in which the largest 100 multinational 
enterprises operated in 1999116. The media sector shows the highest transnationality 
index with a score of 87. Food, beverages and tobacco industries come second with
115 For a recent application of lagged values in empirical estimates of the effect of FDI on growth, see 
Benson Dunham (2004).
116 This transnationality index is calculated as the average of three ratios: foreign-owned assets over 
total assets, foreign sales over total sales and foreign employment over total employment.
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79. In contrast, motor vehicles and parts have a transnationality index o f 48 and 
retailing industries produce an index value of just 37.
Another important indication of the variation of foreign participation over 
different economic activities, available at a less aggregate level and focusing 
particularly on manufacturing industries, can be found in OECD (2002). Figure 5.1. 
shows the cross-industry variation of foreign participation, measured as the 
percentage share of FDI in total employment of manufacturing industries, for a 
selection of OECD countries.
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Figure 5.1. Foreign firms' shares in total employment in selected 
manufacturing industries in the OECD; 1990s
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source: Table VI.5. Percentage share of employment in foreign affiliates in selected industries, OECD 
average, 1990s, in Chapter 6 “Trends in Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries”;
OECD Economic Outlook no. 73, 2002, OECD, Paris.
Simple averages. The data covers 19 OECD countries; available years differ across countries.
230
The figure reveals that there is marked variation in the level of foreign participation 
over manufacturing industries. For instance, electrical machinery, chemical products 
and petrochemical industries represent industries where more then 35% of the total 
number of employees work for foreign-owned firms. In contrast, industries with 
relative low levels of foreign participation include fabricated metal products (about 
10%) and wood and paper products (11-12%).
The different values of foreign participation in manufacturing industries in 
OECD countries indicate that this type of variation may be used as an instrument for 
the cross-industry variation of FDI participation in a given host economy. The 
variation suggests, that, irrespective of the particular host economy, it is likely to find 
that the industry of e.g. radio, t.v. and communication equipment will have a higher 
share of foreign participation compared to the industry of metal products, ceteris 
paribus. This suggests that the cross-industry variation of foreign participation in a 
host economy will be correlated with the OECD-wide average FDI-intensity of 
manufacturing industries, as indicated in figure 5.1. This means that the variable 
presented in figure 5.1. is likely to meet the first criterion of a valid instrument.
Having said so, the industry-wide foreign participation of manufacturing 
industries in OECD countries may suffer from two important weaknesses when 
considering the application to the estimation of FDI-induced externality effects in 
Mexico. First, due to the high level of aggregation, the variable is only available in 16 
observations. This may negatively affect the strength of the correlation with the 
endogenous variable, in which case the estimation will be imprecise (see Bound, 
Jaeger and Baker, 1995; also Staiger and Stock, 1999). Second, a problem may exist 
due to the fact that a large majority of FDI in Mexico is U.S.-owned.
The US is a major player in the field of international investment. As an indica­
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tion of this, in the period 1990-1995, about 25% of worldwide outward direct 
investment stock was under US control (see Dicken, 2003). The relative large share of 
US FDI worldwide means that it is likely that US-owned firms are playing an 
important role in causing the distribution of foreign participation shares over 
manufacturing industries as shown in figure 5.1. If the productivity levels of these 
industries affect the distribution of US-owned FDI over these industries, the variable 
from figure 5.1. may be ill suited to be an instrument. The large majority of inward 
FDI investment in Mexico is U.S.-owned. Therefore, using the instrument presented 
in figure 5.1. would effectively lead to replacing the endogenous aspect of FOR in 
Mexico with the potential endogenous characteristic of US-owned FDI in OECD 
manufacturing industries.
Given these two problems of potential weak correlation between FOR and the 
variable presented in figure 5.1. and the possible continuation of endogeneity of FDI, 
I propose to use an alternative proxy for general FDI-intensity of manufacturing 
industries, in the form of the cross-industry variation of foreign participation in US 
manufacturing industries117. One advantage of this alternative indicator is that this 
variable is available at a less aggregate level, totalling to 52 observations. Therefore, 
the correlation between this alternative variable and the foreign participation level in 
Mexican industries is likely to be better in comparison to the correlation between the 
OECD variable and FOR.
Furthermore, the use of the alternative variable seriously limits the possibility 
that this instrument will be endogenous to the empirical model for Mexico, provided 
that this host economy does not have an important share in total inward US FDI118.
117 See the appendix to this chapter for description of data and sources.
118 The use of this variable could be problematic when we want to use it as an instrument in the 
estimation o f FDI-induced externalities in a host economy that has a considerable share in US inward 
FDI. Suppose that we want to estimate the empirical model for the UK. In 1998, the UK had the largest
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Therefore, it appears that this proxy for the general FDI-intensity of manufacturing 
industries also meets the second criteria of a good instrument. Besides its effect on the 
foreign participation variable in Mexican industries, there is no plausible explanation 
that the cross-industry variation of foreign participation in US industries would affect 
measured levels of Mexican productivity.
5.5.5. Testing for Endogenous FDI
The first step in correcting for the problem of endogeneity is to actually test whether 
the suspected variable is endogenous to the empirical model. Although the criticism 
of biased estimates from OLS estimates due to endogenous FDI towards OLS is often 
made (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Hanson, 2001), no empirical evidence for the 
existence of endogeneity of the FDI variable in a cross-sectional setting is available.
In order to determine whether FOR is endogenous to the empirical model, I 
can apply a Hausman specification test, as described in e.g. Gujarati (1995), 
Wooldridge (2002) and of course Hausman (1978). In order to apply this test, I 
assume the following two equation empirical model:
(1 ) Prodm = po + Pi-i X m + pi FOR + Si
where X m is INVm, LQm, SCALE, HERFI, GINI
(2) FOR = 5i + 52 Z + e2
share (17.5%) in US inward FDI (calculated at historical cost basis; data from www.bea.gov.) If the 
FDI flows between the UK and the US consist of intra-industry reciprocal flows, the endogenous 
aspect of the distribution of US FDI over manufacturing industries in the UK may be transferred to the 
cross-industry distribution of UK-owned firms in US manufacturing industries. This problem is 
circumvented when the host economy has only a small share in total inward FDI in the US. In the case 
of Mexico, this condition is met, as Mexico’s share in total inward FDI in the US amounts to 0.26% 
(for 1998, based on data taken from www.bea.gov).
where Z is the vector (Xi, Xm , Zi)
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Zi additional exogenous variable
The idea is to regress FOR on all exogenous variables of the original equation in the 
first stage regression, including at least one additional variable that is exogenous to 
equation (1). From this first stage regression, the residuals can be calculated (e2), 
which are subsequently included into equation (1 ), which is estimated in the second 
stage of the regression. Therefore, equation (1) becomes
(1) 2nd stage Prodm = po + pi.! X m + Pi FOR + 8 1  + 6 2
If the residuals 6 2  from the first stage regression have a significant estimated effect on 
Prodm in the second stage regression, the variable FOR can be considered as 
endogenous to the empirical model (see Wooldridge, 2002).
I have estimated the first stage regression for several possible instrumental 
variables that were discussed in the previous section. These Zi variables are 
CAPRATIO, which is the ratio of new fixed capital investment over gross industry 
production119, industry-wide profitability (measured as the ratio of total input costs 
over total sales)120, lagged values of Mexican productivity and FOR (both 1988 
values) and the variable measuring foreign participation in US industries, labelled US. 
This variable is calculated as the ratio of employees working in foreign-owned firms 
over the total number of employees per manufacturing industry. For each of these 
alternative Zi variables, I have run the first stage regression, which produces the 6 2 .
119 Taken from Inegi (1994).
120 Calculated with data taken from Inegi (1994).
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This term is added to the original equation (1), after which the equation is estimated. 
The relevant results from the 2nd stage estimations are shown in table 5.7.
Table 5.7. Hausman test; selected ZI variables
CAPratio Profitability
(A)
Prod8 8 FOR8 8 US
e2 -0 . 0 2
(0 .1 2 )
0.70
(4.67) ***
-0.60
(0.79)
-0.08
(1.40)
-0.63
(2.47) , 
***
R2 0.72 0.75 0.72 0 . 6 8 0.71
F 89.05
(0 .0 0 0 )
93.17
(0 .0 0 0 )
89.57
(0 .0 0 0 )
60.58
(0 .0 0 0 )
78.07
(0 .0 0 0 )
N 238 238 238 205 226
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. As Wooldridge (2002) stresses, it is necessary to correct for heteroscedasticity in 
both stages of the regressions. Therefore, both the estimations of the first stage and the results of the 
second stage shown in table 5.7. are heteroscedasticity robust using the Huber/White/Sandwich method. 
The difference in number of observations for the different ZI variables is due to differences in 
frequency of missing values.
(A) Profitability is measured as (costs total inputs/total sales). I have also tried (costs total inputs/total 
production). The use of this alternative profitability variable produces some differences in the t 
statistics of the exogenous variables, but the e2 variable is similarly significant, with a similar t statistic.
The summary of the 2nd stage regression results in table 5.7. offers support for 
the assumption that the variable FOR is endogenous to the original empirical model. 
The Hausman test, using either industry-wide profitability or the foreign investment 
intensity of US industries, shows that the estimated residuals from the first stage
i<^i
regression carry significant coefficients in the second stage regressions . This means 
that the variable FOR should be regarded as endogenous, which has implications for 
the interpretation of the findings from the original model. Due to the endogeneity of 
FOR, the estimated effect of this variable is likely to (partly) reflect some form of 
relationship between Mexican productivity and industry-wide foreign participation
121 The level estimations show similar results in terms of significance o f the estimated residuals using 
profitability and US. In addition, the levels Hausman test also indicates a significant coefficient for the 
estimated residuals using FOR88.
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running from the former to the latter, rather than from foreign investment to 
productivity. To correct for this and to produce unbiased estimates of FDI-induced 
externalities, the method of instrumental variables is required.
5.5.6. OLS and IV compared
The empirical findings from the previous section confirm the endogeneity of the 
variable FOR. In this section, I present the empirical findings using the instrument 
and compare these with the original OLS findings. The set of empirical estimates is 
presented in table 5.8.
The results in column IV_1 are obtained from using the OECD variable from 
figure 5.1. as instrument. As mentioned earlier, this variable may be ill suited to serve 
as a valid instrument for the reasons discussed earlier. Using the OECD variable as Zi 
variable does not produce a significant effect of e2  in the second stage regression. 
Regarding the estimated effect of FOR, the results in column IV_1 do not differ from 
the original OLS estimates, be it that the estimated effect of FOR using the OECD 
instrument is less precise and no longer significant. These results, together with the 
problematic characteristics of the OECD instrument, indicate that this variable is not 
up to the task.
Column IV_2 contains the results from the IV estimation using foreign 
participation in US industries as instrument. As previously reported in table 5.7., the 
use of this variable as Zi variable produces a significant effect of &2 in the second 
stage regression. In comparison to the OLS results, the IV estimate indicates a much 
larger estimated positive effect of FOR on measured Mexican labour productivity. 
Also, the estimated effect of FOR is accepted at the preferred significance level of 1%.
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Table 5.8. FDI-externalities in Mexico: comparing OLS and IV results
OLS IV 1 IV 2 IV 3
INVm 0.23
(6 .2 2 )***
0 . 2 1
(6.24)***
0 . 2 2
(5.82)***
0 . 2 1
(5.86)***
LQm 0.26
(4.23)***
0.27
(4.65)***
0.23
(3.62)***
0.27
(4.62)***
Herfi 0.09
(6.26)***
0.09
(6.69)***
0.09
(6.41)***
0.09
(6.36)***
Scale 0 . 1 1
(3.66)***
0 . 1 1
(4.02)***
0 . 1 1
(3.75)***
0 . 1 2
(4.20)***
Gini 0 . 2 1
( 1 .2 1 )
0.28
(1.83)*
0.37
(2.58)***
0.28
(1.87)*
For 0.03
(1.75)*
0.04
(1.08)
0.16
(2.55)***
0.09
(2 .2 1 )**
Constant 3.28
(16.53)***
3.43
(16.62)***
3.70
(15.86)***
3.47
(17.49)***
(e2 ) — -0.03
(0.52)
-0.63
(2.47)***
-0 . 2 0
(1.95)**
Adj-R2 1st stage — 0.46 0.42 0.44
Adj-R2  2nd stage 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72
Sargan test for 
over identification
— — “ X 2 (1) = 1.246 
(p-value 0.264)
F 90.64
(0 .0 0 0 )
96.91
(0 .0 0 0 )
86.27
(0 .0 0 0 )
94.79
(0 .0 0 0 )
N 228 228 228 228
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
acceptance levels. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust based on Hubert/White/Sandwhich method 
The use of IV creates 14 missing observations; therefore, I have re-estimated the original model with 
OLS for the same 226 observations. The results do not differ with the results in table 1, suggesting that 
the missing observations caused by the use of the US variable are randomly distributed.
IV_1 = OECD used as instrument 
IV_2 = US used as instrument 
IV_3 = US and US_VA as instruments
(e2) = test statistic for significance o f estimated residuals in 2nd stage regression obtained from 1st stage 
regression of FOR on all exogenous RHS variables including Z variable(s) (i.e. reduced form 
regression)
These differences between the OLS and IV estimates suggest two important things. 
First, the fact that there is a difference indicates that standard OLS estimates do 
produce biased estimates of FDI-induced externalities. Controlling for the apparent 
tendency of foreign firms to locate in industries with particular productivity levels
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does produce different estimates. Second, in contrast to the standard criticism towards 
cross-sectional estimates of FDI-induced externalities that foreign firms always 
gravitate towards high productivity industries, the difference between the OLS and IV 
estimates indicates that, in the present study, the estimations are affected by foreign- 
owned firms having a different type of preference. Instead of preferring high 
productivity industries, FDI gravitates towards manufacturing industries with low 
measured levels of Mexican productivity.
Having said so, a possible problem with the results from the IV_2 regression is 
that the instrument US may incorporate an endogenous element somewhat similar to 
the OECD instrument discussed earlier. If foreign investment is, in general, attracted 
to industries with particular productivity levels, the use of the US instrument may 
have substituted this general endogeneity for the endogeneity of the variable FOR in 
the estimation of FDI-induced externalities in Mexico122. In order to control for the 
bias that would result from this possible endogeneity issue, I can add the cross- 
sectional variation of value added over US manufacturing industries as an additional 
instrument. This additional variable would control for any possible endogenous 
relation that may exist between the variable US and the cross-sectional variation of 
US industry productivity levels.
The results of including this additional instrument into the IV estimation are 
shown in the column IV_3. The estimated e2 carries a significant coefficient in the 
second stage Hausman regression, indicating that FOR remains endogenous to the 
empirical model. Comparing IV_3 with IV_2 indicates that the inclusion of the 
additional instrument lowers the coefficient of FOR somewhat, suggesting that IV_2
122 It is not clear though what the nature o f this general endogeneity aspect of FDI in relation to 
productivity levels of industries is, as foreign investment may be attracted to high or low productivity 
levels, depending on the underlying motivations of the investments.
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may have over-estimated the positive FDI-induced externality effect123. This would 
presumably have been caused by the apparent tendency of foreign firms to gravitate 
towards high productivity US manufacturing industries124. Having said so, even when 
controlling for this tendency, the resulting estimated effect of FOR still indicates a 
larger and more significant coefficient compared to the OLS results125.
Therefore, the results suggest that foreign firms in Mexico gravitate towards 
low productivity manufacturing industries. As this is the first empirical evidence that 
such a relation between industry-wide foreign participation and domestic productivity 
levels exist, explanations for this relation are speculative. One possible explanation 
for this established relation is that market-seeking foreign firms locate in low 
productivity industries if they are trying to safeguard their ownership-specific 
advantages. Following the idea that FDI is based on the existence of ownership- 
specific advantages (see Dunning, 1993), foreign-owned firms may want to locate in 
those industries where Mexican firms are relatively less productive, in order to 
facilitate the capturing of market share and profits . Second, efficiency seeking FDI 
in Mexico is likely to focus on low productivity industries, as such industries are 
characterised by labour intensive production technologies. In fact, Love and Lage- 
Hidalgo (1999, 2000) have identified relative labour costs as an important location 
factor of US FDI in Mexico. FDI that locates in Mexico to exploit low labour costs 
will tend to gravitate towards low productivity industries, creating the negative line of
123 IV_3 produces a smaller P-coefficient o f FOR compared to IV_2. However, this difference is not 
significant at the 10% significance level; at this significance level, equality of the P-coefficients of the 
two IV estimations can not be rejected - F(l, 227) = 2.87, prob. F = 0.09.
124 Also, the Sargan test statistic indicates that the inclusion of the second instrument into the first stage 
is accepted.
125 The hypothesis of equality between the p-coefficients o f the OLS and IV_3 estimations is rejected at 
the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels (F(l,227) = 2.19, prob. F = 0.14)
126 As argued in chapter four, this could be an explanation for the empirically established negative 
association between technology diffusion and industry-wide foreign participation, found by Grether, 
1999). FDI may tend to locate in industries with large technological differences, if they are trying to 
safeguard their competitive advantage from (potential) Mexican competitors.
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causation running from measured productivity levels to industry-wide foreign 
participation.
5.6. Summary and Conclusions
This aim of this chapter is to further address the empirically established negative 
association between industry-wide foreign participation and measured Mexican labour 
productivity, presented in the previous chapter. In line with recent empirical findings 
for other host economies, these empirical results suggest the occurrence of negative 
FDI-induced externalities from foreign firms. However, there appear to be various 
potential problems surrounding the findings of negative associations between FDI 
and measured domestic productivity, which have not been fully considered in the 
majority of previous empirical research. These issues are addressed in the present 
chapter.
The main theoretical explanation for the occurrence of negative FDI-induced 
externalities is the market stealing effect, which follows from foreign-owned firms 
successfully challenging domestic firms for part of the host economy market. The 
decrease in market share leads to a decrease in host economy productivity levels, 
either through inefficiency from the lowering of production volume or the decrease in 
previously established economic rents.
As argued in the first section of this chapter, the market stealing argument 
suffers from two weaknesses. First, the decrease in productivity is likely to be only a 
short-term effect. In the long run, the increased competitive pressure from the 
presence of foreign firms will, either force domestic firms to enhance their 
productivity, or force the least competitive firms out of the market. In both cases, the
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long-term effect of the entrance of FDI will lead to an increase in host economy 
productivity. Second, the argument relies on the assumption that the entrance of FDI 
will lead to a sustained increase in competitive pressure; an assumption which can 
also be challenged. In sum, although the market stealing effect may explain the 
negative association between foreign investment and host economy productivity in 
some cases, the explanation is not without flaws. This suggests that empirical findings 
of a negative association between FDI and productivity in a host economy should be 
treated with caution. Also, it warrants further tests on the empirical model presented 
in the previous chapter, to ensure that the empirically established negative association 
between industry-wide foreign participation and measured Mexican labour 
productivity is not caused by estimation errors or biases instead.
The first potential estimation problem concerns the functional form of the 
empirical models. Following previous empirical estimations on FDI-induced 
externality effects in Mexico, the functional form of the estimated models in the 
previous chapter is in (standardised) levels. However, when assuming an underlying 
Cobb-Douglas production function, the empirical model should be re-specified in log 
linear form. The comparison of the estimated results between the two alternative 
specifications is in favour of the log linear specification. Box Cox tests indicate a 
preference for the log linear specification. Also, although not directly comparable, the 
R values of the log linear models are higher than those obtained from levels models. 
Furthermore, the frequency at which the RHS variables show significant effects with 
expected signs is higher in the case of the log linear models.
The preference for the log linear specification has important ramifications for 
the estimated externality effect from foreign participation. The levels estimates 
suggest the existence of negative FDI-induced externalities, indicated by the negative
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association between FOR and measured Mexican labour productivity. In contrast, the 
findings from the log linear models offer far weaker evidence for the existence of 
negative externalities. Using this specification, the findings tend to indicate that the 
association between industry-wide foreign participation and measured Mexican labour 
productivity is either weakly significant positive or insignificant.
The second estimation issue that is dealt with concerns the possibility that the 
estimations are affected by omitted variable bias. Given the nature of OLS estimation 
techniques of cross-sectional data, problems of omitted variable bias should always be 
considered. In this chapter, I assess the possible effect of the omission of two 
potentially important variables in empirical estimates of determinants of Mexican 
labour productivity. These two variables are (1) the industry-wide participation of 
maquiladora style production, which can be assumed to have a negative effect on 
measured labour productivity and (2 ) the trade intensity or trade openness of 
industries, which is usually assumed to have a positive effect on measured labour 
productivity. Comparing the results of the empirical models that include or omit 
constructed proxies for the cross-industry variation of each of these two variables, the 
findings indicate that these results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these two 
additional RHS variables. This robustness suggests that both variables do not have to 
be added to the empirical model. Furthermore, it suggests that the estimated effects of 
the original RHS variables do not suffer from omitted variable bias related to these 
two potentially important additional control variables.
Finally, an important part of the chapter addresses the core criticism of cross- 
sectional estimates of FDI-induced externalities that states that the estimated effect is 
likely to be biased due to a tendency of foreign-owned firms to locate in high 
productivity industries. The solution to this problem is the use of instrumental
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variable estimation. In this chapter, I introduce an instrument for the variable FOR in 
the form of the general FDI-intensity of manufacturing industries. The proxy for this 
variable is the cross-industry variation of FDI in US manufacturing industries. This 
instrument meets both criteria of a valid instrument. First, it is associated with the 
variable measuring industry-wide foreign participation in Mexican manufacturing 
industries. Second, there is no plausible explanation for the FDI-intensity of 
manufacturing industries in the US and the measured levels of Mexican labour 
productivity to be related, besides its effect through the variable FOR in the original 
empirical model. The main provision for this appears to be that the outward FDI flows 
from the host economy under analysis do not influence the cross-industry distribution 
of FDI in US manufacturing industries. Given the relative low share of Mexican 
outward FDI in US inward FDI in manufacturing industries, this condition is met.
Hausman specification tests indicate that the criticism towards OLS 
estimations in this empirical setting is correct in the sense that the variable measuring 
the cross-industry variation of foreign participation is endogenous to the empirical 
model. This warrants the use of IV estimation. However, the comparison between 
OLS and IV estimates of externality effects from FDI indicates that, in contrast to the 
usually expressed criticism, foreign firms do not gravitate towards Mexican 
manufacturing industries with high measured levels of labour productivity. Instead, 
they concentrate in low productivity, labour intensive industries. Controlling for this 
tendency, the IV estimations indicate that the presence of foreign firms is significantly 
positively associated with Mexican measured labour productivity to a much larger 
extent in comparison to the OLS estimates.
The implications of these findings are two-fold. First, the findings presented in 
the previous chapter are biased due to the fact that the variable FOR is endogenous to
the empirical model. The findings in the present chapter show that, in contrast to the 
previous chapter, unbiased estimates of the externality effect of FDI produce a 
significant positive association between FOR and Prodm. This indicates that the 
presence of FDI is creating positive externalities in Mexican manufacturing industries. 
Second, the findings form an important piece of empirical counter-evidence against 
the commonly voiced criticism towards findings from OLS estimates of FDI-induced 
externalities. In contrast to this criticism, the present findings indicate that it is 
possible that foreign firms are attracted to low productivity industries. Subsequently, 
it is not always the case that OLS estimates will overestimate the presence of positive 
FDI-induced externalities. When foreign firms gravitate towards low productivity 
industries, OLS estimates may actually underestimate the occurrence of positive FDI- 
induced externalities, as appears to be the case in Mexico.
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Chapter 6 FDI-induced Externalities and the Effects of Geographical 
Proximity of Manufacturing Activity
6.1. Introduction
Compared to previous empirical research, the main empirical model that has been 
developed in this thesis thus far has been successfully augmented by adding a RHS 
variable that controls for the occurrence of external economies within industries. The 
inclusion of this variable has proved to be important in its own right, as its estimated 
effect on measured levels of Mexican labour productivity is significant in the majority 
of cases. Having said so, other than ensuring that the estimated effect of the cross­
industry variation of foreign participation is unbiased -  by controlling for 
agglomeration economies - the inclusion of the variable GINI does not help to 
clarify the possible effects of geography on FDI-induced externalities.
The aim of the present chapter is to correct for this, by empirically 
investigating whether the type of geographical distribution of manufacturing 
industries within Mexico influences the type and level of externalities arising from 
industry-wide participation by foreign-owned firms. The main conclusion from the 
discussion presented in chapter three is that there are three important ways in which 
the effects of FDI may be influenced by geographical proximity between firms. All 
three of these possible effects of geography on FDI-induced externalities are 
empirically assessed in the present chapter.
First, there are important similarities between theoretical explanations of 
agglomeration economies and FDI-induced externalities. Agglomeration economies 
arise in geographical concentrations of economic activity due to processes involving
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the creation and functioning of inter-firm linkages, human capital accumulation and 
labour turnover and the regional build up and dissemination of knowledge spillovers. 
These mechanisms have also been identified as channels that transmit externalities 
from FDI. This large extent of similarity between the explanations of the two 
externality-related phenomena produces the hypothesis that FDI-induced intra­
industry externalities may be affected by the type of geographical distribution of 
industries. More in particular, following the ideas of theories on agglomeration 
economies, the hypothesis can readily be stated that FDI-induced externalities are 
enhanced when foreign and domestic firms are located in a geographical 
concentration of economic activity.
The second relation between geographical proximity and FDI-induced 
externalities is related to the existence of inter-firm linkages in agglomerations of 
activity. As discussed earlier, intra-industry externalities are unlikely to be caused by 
buyer-supplier linkages between foreign and domestic firms. However, recent 
theoretical arguments are in support of the idea that (positive) inter-industry 
externalities are at least as important as intra-industry externalities. Given the relation 
between the existence of an agglomeration of economic activity and the possible 
creation of agglomeration economies through inter-firm linkages, the second question 
that this chapter needs to address is whether the presence of FDI in Mexican 
manufacturing industries gives rise to inter-industry externalities.
Third, geographical proximity between Mexican and foreign-owned 
manufacturing firms may also be important when considering the possibility that FDI- 
induced externalities may be transmitted at the inter-regional level. In this case, the 
concept of geographical proximity or geographical agglomeration is interpreted 
somewhat differently, in the sense that the presence of FDI in a given region may
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affect the measured productivity levels of Mexican firms in regions other than where 
a foreign-owned firm is operating. This interpretation directly links the occurrence of 
FDI-induced externalities to the geographical concept of distance, where distance is 
expected to be negatively related to the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities.
In this chapter, the effects of these three aspects or manifestations of 
geographical proximity on both the occurrence and the type of FDI-induced 
externalities are empirically assessed. The chapter consists of six sections. Section 6.2. 
estimates the effect of geographical proximity on FDI-induced intra-industry 
externalities, using the empirical model that has been developed in the previous 
chapters. In Section 6.3., I discuss recent ideas and empirical findings that relate 
regional inter-industry FDI participation to FDI-induced externalities. Section 6.4. 
introduces and develops a regional empirical model, constructed from regional 2 - 
digit manufacturing industry observations. In section 6.5., I use the regional model to 
empirically addresses the question whether the presence of foreign-owned firms leads 
to the existence of intra- and inter-industry intra-regional externalities. Section 6 .6 . 
presents estimations that answer the question whether there are intra- and inter­
industry FDI-induced externalities between regions. Finally, section 6.7. summarises 
and concludes.
6.2. The Effect of Geographical Proximity: Findings from the National Sample
6.2.1. The Effect of Geographical Concentration of Manufacturing Industries
The discussion of the main theories on effects of geographical concentration of 
economic activity as presented in chapter three reveals that there is considerable
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similarity between the mechanisms that underlie agglomeration economies and the 
channels of FDI-induced externalities. If geographical concentration creates 
regionally confined externalities in the form of agglomeration economies, it seems 
plausible to transfer this positive effect of geographical proximity to the occurrence of 
externalities from FDI.
Splitting the national aggregate manufacturing industry observations into 
lowly and highly geographically concentrated industry groups can empirically test the 
hypothesis that geographical concentration enhances the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities. The indicator of geographical concentration that I use to split the 
industries is the variable GINI. The expected difference between the estimated results 
of the two sub-samples is that the coefficient of FOR in the sub-sample containing 
geographically concentrated industries is significantly larger than the coefficient of 
FOR in the industry-group containing industries that are geographically concentrated 
to a low extent. The results of the empirical estimations of the main empirical model 
for both groups of industries are presented in table 6 .1 .
The empirical findings are not in support of the hypothesised effect of 
geographical concentration on FDI-induced externalities. In fact, the difference in 
findings between the two sub-samples appears to indicate the existence of an effect 
opposite from hypothesised. The estimation for industries that are relatively less 
geographically concentrated shows a positively signed coefficient of FOR, reaching a 
1% significance level when using FORI. In contrast, Mexican firms that operate in 
highly geographically concentrated industries appear to be suffering from the 
presence of foreign-owned firms. For these industries, the estimated association 
between FOR and measured Mexican productivity is negative in the cases of FOR2 
and FOR3, with the estimated effect of FOR2 being significant at the 10% acceptance
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Table 6.1. The importance of geographical concentration: OLS estimations
low concentration his h concentration
FORI FOR2 FOR3 FORI FOR2 FOR3
constant 3.23
(12.28)***
3.24
(12.48) ***
3.25
(12.38) ***
3.55
(15.15) ***
3.63
(15.71)***
3.60
(15 64)***
INVm 0 . 2 2
(4.75) ***
0 . 2 1
(4 4 5 ) ***
0 . 2 1
(4.47) ***
0 . 2 2
(4.62) ***
0.17
(3.64) ***
0.18
(3.89) ***
LQm 0.25
(3.85) ***
0.24
(3.65) ***
0.25
(3.75) ***
0.34
(3.93) ***
0.38
(4 41) ***
0.36
(4.22) ***
HERFI 0.08
(5.71) ***
0.09
(6 .2 0 ) ***
0.08
(5.93) ***
0 . 1 0
(4.87) ***
0 . 1 1
(5.61) ***
0 . 1 2
(5.65) ***
SCALEm 0.07
(2.25) **
0.06
(2.15) **
0.07 
(2.28) **
0.17
(4.61) ***
0.17
(4 7i) ***
0.17
(4 71)***
GINI 0.19
( 1 .0 0 )
0.37
(1.85)*
0.31
(1.58)
0 . 6 6
(0.62)
0.61
(0.65)
0.84
(0 .8 6 )
FORI 0.05
(2.69) ***
— — 0 . 0 2
(0.48)
— —
FOR2 — 0.023
(1.41)
— — -0.07
( 1 .8 8 )*
—
FOR3 — — 0 . 0 2 2
(1.28)
— — -0.06
(1.50)
Adj. R2 0.79 0.78 0.78 0 . 6 6 0.67 0.67
F 85.32
(0 .0 0 0 )
80.17
(0 .0 0 0 )
78,77
(0 .0 0 0 )
34.96
(0 .0 0 0 )
35.16
(0 .0 0 0 )
34.29
(0 .0 0 0 )
N 126 126 126 114 114 114
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Hubert/White/Sandwhicb method.
LHS variable: ratio value added over labour Mexican-owned share of industry;
RHS variables: INVm (capital/labour ratio Mexican-owned share of industry); LQm (labour quality 
ratio Mexican-owned share of industry); Herfi (level of market concentration); Scalem (level of 
attainment scale economies among Mexican firms); Gini (level o f geographical concentration 
industry); FORI (share of foreign-owned firms in industry-employment); FOR2 (share of foreign- 
owned firms in industry value added); FOR3 (share of foreign-owned firms in industry-gross 
production)
level. Of course, the results need to be interpreted with the necessary caution, in light 
of the prevalence of insignificant estimated effects of foreign participation in both 
sub-samples of industries. Having said so, if anything, the results seem to indicate a 
difference in effect from the presence of foreign-owned firms that is opposite to the 
hypothesised difference between the two sets of industries.
One possible explanation for both the weak empirical results and the unexpec-
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ted type of difference between the two sub-samples might be that the estimations are 
not corrected for the variable FOR being endogenous to the empirical model, as 
discovered in chapter five. To assess whether this is the case, I have re-estimated the 
empirical model for both sets of industries, using the IV-procedure as discussed in the 
previous chapter. The results of the IV estimates are shown in table 6.2127.
The first important feature of the empirical results is that, in line with the 
empirical findings presented in the previous chapter, the IV estimations indicate a 
more positive association between industry-wide foreign participation and measured 
Mexican labour productivity. In all six estimations, the variable FOR carries a 
positively signed coefficient. Given that the IV estimations are to be preferred over 
the OLS estimations, the occurrence of negative externalities from the presence of 
FDI can therefore be rejected.
Having said so, the difference in estimated effect of FOR between the two 
sub-samples of industries does not offer support for the hypothesis that geographical 
concentration enhances the occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities. The IV 
estimates indicate that Mexican firms operating in lowly geographically concentrated 
industries benefit from significant positive externalities arising from the presence of 
FDI. Compared to the OLS estimates, the coefficients are much larger and the 
estimated effect is significant at the 1% level for all three indicators of FOR. 
Industries that are geographically concentrated also show positively signed 
coefficients of the FOR variables. However, these coefficients are smaller in size and 
the estimated effects of FOR do not reach acceptable significance levels in this sub­
sample of industries. Therefore, based on these findings, the hypothesis that 
geographical concentration stimulates the occurrence of positive externalities from
127 The results for the IV-estimation presented in table 6.2. are based on using the instruments US and 
US_VA.
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Table 6.2. The importance of geographical concentration; IV estimations
Low concentration high concentration
FORI FOR2 FOR3 FORI FOR2 FOR3
Constant 3.52
(12.80)***
3.52
(12.80) ***
3.52
(12.80) ***
3.58
(15.69) ***
3.58
(15.69) ***
3.58
(15.69) ***
INVm 0.17
(3.54)***
0.17
(3.54) ***
0.17
(3.54) ***
0 . 2 2
(4.28) ***
0 . 2 2
(4.28) ***
0 . 2 2
(4.28) ***
LQm 0 . 2 1
(3.53) ***
0 . 2 1
(3.53) ***
0 . 2 1
(3.53) ***
0.29
(3.01) ***
0.29
(3.01) ***
0.29
(3.01) ***
HERFI 0.09
(6.81) ***
0.09
(6.81) ***
0.09
(6.81) ***
0 . 1 0
(4.16) ***
0 . 1 0
(4.16)*** >
0 . 1 0
(4.16) ***
SCALE 0.06 
(2 .0 1 ) **
0.06 
(2 .0 1 ) **
0.06 
(2 .0 1 ) **
0.18
( 4  4 7 ) ***
0.18
(4.47) ***
0.18
(4.47) ***
GINI 0.47
(2.75) ***
0.47
(2.75) ***
0.47
(2.75) ***
0.87
(0.80)
0.87
(0.80)
0.87
(0.80)
FORI 0.30
(2.75) ***
— — 0.09
(0.64)
— —
FOR2 — 0.33
(2.75) ***
— — 0 . 1 0
(0.64)
—
FOR3 — — 0.31
(2.75) ***
— — 0.095
(0.64)
R2 0.79 0.79 0.79 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 6
F 77.13
(0 .0 0 0 )
77.13
(0 .0 0 0 )
77.13
(0 .0 0 0 )
31.19
(0 .0 0 0 )
31.19
(0 .0 0 0 )
31.19
N 126 126 126 114 114 114
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Hubert/White/Sandwhich method.
FDI cannot be accepted, as it is Mexican firms in lowly geographically concentrated 
industries that are benefiting from the industrial presence and participation of FDI.
6.2.2. Geographical Concentration, Competition and FDI-induced Externalities
The unexpected findings presented in the previous section require further 
investigation, due to the non-confirmation of the tested hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
impression that an effect opposite to the hypothesised one is occurring requires further
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testing.
One possible explanation for the unexpected empirical findings is that the 
empirical results as presented in tables 6 .1 . and 6 .2 . are affected by the omission of 
additional structural factors that influence the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities. 
If this is the case, it will be difficult to identify the unique effect of geographical 
concentration. The possibility that there are simultaneous effects of several structural 
determinants on the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities could make it very 
difficult to attribute the revealed differences between industries solely to the factor of 
geographical concentration of industries.
Chapter four contains an empirical analysis of the effect of the structural 
determinant that is most commonly recognised in empirical studies of FDI-induced 
externalities in the form of the level of technological differences between foreign- 
owned and Mexican firms. The findings in chapter four indicate that the level of the 
technology gap is negatively related to the occurrence of negative externalities. If this 
structural factor, together with the effect from geographical concentration, affects the 
level and type of FDI-induced externalities simultaneously, both factors should be 
included in the same empirical model to determine both their independent effects and 
possible interactions between them.
In order to determine whether these concerns are relevant for the estimation of 
the present empirical model and the resulting estimated externality effect of FOR, I 
have set up the following empirical model:
Bo + fli INVm + B2 LQm + B3 SCALEm + B4 HERFI 
+ B5GINI + fi6FOR + B7FOR * TECH+ B8FOR*GAP
+ B9 FOR*GINI + B1 0 FOR*GINI*GAP + BnFOR*TECH *GAP
+ Bi2 FOR*TECH*GINI + £
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The variable TECH indicates the level of industry-wide technological complexity, 
whereas GAP indicates the industry-wide level of technological differences between
1 0ftforeign-owned and Mexican firms . Initial empirical estimations of the full model 
indicate that none of the interaction terms containing the structural factor TECH carry 
significant coefficients129. Therefore, I have re-estimated the empirical model 
omitting all the interaction terms containing TECH. The results are presented in Table 
6.3. 1 3 0
The empirical findings reveal some interesting relations between structural 
factors and the occurrence and type of externalities from FDI. First, it is important to 
note that the estimated effect of FOR in the augmented empirical model has to be 
interpreted slightly different from previous empirical models. Here, due to the 
additional interaction terms, the estimated effects of FORI and FOR3 represent the 
externality effect from industry-wide foreign participation cleared from any possible 
influences of the structural factors.
Having said so, the estimated effect of FOR is similar to previous findings: 
OLS estimations indicate a negative association between FOR and measured Mexican 
productivity, reaching a 1% significance level when using FOR3131. Again, the IV 
estimations suggest a more positive effect, represented by the positively signed 
coefficient of both FORI and FOR3.
The interaction term GINI*FOR identifies those industries with relative high 
foreign participation and a high level of geographical concentration. Support for the 
hypothesis that geographical concentration promotes the occurrence of positive FDI-
128 See chapter four for definitions of these variables.
1291 have tried both the variables industry-wide level of assets at book value per employee in foreign- 
owned firms (INVfor) and industry-wide ratio of the number of white-collar over blue-collar 
employees in foreign owned firms (LQfor).
130 It proved impossible to estimate the effects of the interaction terms in the sample of 4-digit 
industries, due to the occurrence of prohibitive levels of multicollinearity.
131 The results from using FOR2 (not reported in table 6.3. ) are similar to those of FQR3.
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Table 6.3. FDI-induced externalities: net effect and interactions; OLS and IV
FOR1-OLS FORl-IV(l) FORl-IV(2) FOR3-OLS FOR3-IV(l) FOR3-IV(2)
Constant 3.26
(18.36) ***
3.60
(14.34) ***
3.57
(17.88) ***
3.26
(18.94) ***
3.55
(15.16) ***
3.52
(18.14) ***
INVm 0.24
(7.30) ***
0.23
(6.63) ***
0.23
(6.67) ***
0.23
(7.04) ***
0.23
(6.64) ***
0.23 
(6.68) ***
LQM 0.28
(4.65) ***
0.25
(3.72) ***
0.25
(3.74) ***
0.28
(4.79) ***
0.25
(3.73) ***
0.25
(3.75) ***
HERFI 0.09
(7.15)***
0.09
(7.18) ***
0.09
(7.28) ***
0.09
(7.65) ***
0.09
(7.20) ***
0.09
(7.29) ***
SCALE 0.09
(3.58) ***
0.08
(3.00) ***
0.08
(3.01)***
0.10
(3.85) ***
0.08
(3.00) ***
0.08
(3.02) ***
GINI 0.31
(1.29)
0.81
(1.56)
0.65
(3.40) ***
0.29
(1.20)
0.75
(1.69)*
0,66
(3.42) ***
FOR -0.02
(0.65)
0.15
(1.58)
0.13 
(2.26) **
-0.08 
(2.81) ***
0.13
(1.45)
0.12
(2.14) **
GINI*FOR -0.06
(1.25)
0.08
(0.33)
— -0.12 
(2.46) ***
0.06
(0.24)
—
GAP*FOR 0.03
(3.21) ***
0.03
(3.30) ***
0.03
(3.29) ***
0.05
(2.96) ***
0.03
(3.39) ***
0.03
(3.39) ***
GINI*GAP*FO
R
0.04
(2.64) ***
0.06
(1.73)*
0.06
(1.71)*
0.07
(2.51) ***
0.07 
(1.76) *
0.07 
(1.75) *
R2 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.74
F 75.51
(0.000)
69.97
(0.000)
71.81
(0.000)
80.91
(0.000)
70.04
(0.000)
72.03
(0.000)
N 237 226 226 237 226 226
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Hubert/White/Sandwhich method.
The inclusion of interaction terms may pose a problem if it leads to the introduction of multicollinearity 
among the RHS variables. To determine whether this is the case, I have conducted VIF (variation 
inflation factors) tests. The results of these tests indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in the 
present case: both the largest VIF scores do not exceed the value of 10, and the mean VIF values are 
not considerably larger than 1 (2.02 on average). For a full discussion of the tests, see Chatteqee, Hadi 
and Price (2000).
induced externalities would come in the form of a significant positive coefficient of 
this interaction term. However, the OLS results show a negatively signed coefficient, 
reaching the significance level of 1% in the case of FOR3. The IV results show 
positively signed coefficients, but the estimated effects of FOR do not reach 
acceptable significance levels.
Therefore, it appears that geographical concentration does not enhance 
positive externalities. In fact, according to OLS estimates, it may enhance the
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occurrence of negative externalities. An explanation for this effect could be that the 
presence of foreign-owned firms in agglomerations of activity puts upward pressure 
on the prices of regionally confined production inputs. If so, this may have a 
detrimental effect on profit levels of Mexican firms. All else equal, such a scenario of 
increasing regional factor prices creates negative pecuniary externalities among 
Mexican firms.
However, the OLS estimates are not corrected for the tendency of foreign- 
owned firms to concentrate in low-wage industries. IV estimates that do control for 
this tendency indicate that there is no interaction effect between foreign participation 
and the level of geographical concentration of industries, as the estimated effect of the 
interaction term is insignificant. Therefore, the conclusion must be that geographical 
concentration does not enhance the occurrence of negative externalities.
The interaction term FOR*GAP carries a positive coefficient and is significant 
at the 1% acceptance level in all six empirical estimations. This suggests that 
industries with simultaneous relative high scores of foreign participation and 
technological differences between foreign and Mexican firms are particularly suited to 
experience positive FDI-induced externalities. This type of effect runs counter to the 
often-voiced opinion that there is a negative relation between the extent of 
technological differences and the occurrence of positive externalities, as technological 
differences are assumed to reflect the level of absorptive capacity (see Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 2003)132. However, as argued in chapter four, the level of technological 
differences can alternatively be interpreted as indicating the presence or absence of 
direct competition between domestic and foreign-owned firms. The positive 
coefficient of the interaction term FOR*GAP would indicate that in those industries
132 See the discussion in chapter four.
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where negative externalities from the competition effect are absent, the presence of
1 ^FDI leads to positive externalities .
Finally, the alternative interpretation of the effect of the technology gap also 
clarifies the interpretation of the estimated effect of the interaction term 
GINI*FOR*GAP. This interaction term carries a significant positive coefficient in 
both OLS and IV estimations. This finding indicates the existence of a positive 
contribution of geographical concentration to the creation of positive externalities.
Following the earlier expectation that geographical concentration may 
stimulate positive externalities, the significant positive coefficient of this interaction 
term suggests this is the case, when an additional condition is met. Among industries 
that are characterised by a large scope for positive externalities and the absence of 
direct competition between foreign and Mexican firms, those industries that are 
geographically concentrated experience additional positive externalities from FDI.
Therefore, the relation between geographical concentration of industries and 
the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities is different than the results in table 6.2. 
suggest. The results in table 6.2. indicate that industries that are not geographically 
concentrated are experiencing positive externalities. The results in table 6.3. provide a 
qualification to this conclusion, as they indicate that geographical concentration may 
enhance the occurrence of positive externalities, but only in those industries that are 
characterised by large technological differences between foreign and Mexican firms. 
When both these conditions are met, Mexican-owned firms enjoy additional positive 
externalities from foreign investment.
Finally, it is important to note that the findings on the estimated effects of 
FOR and the interaction terms. GINI*FOR and GINI*FOR*GAP indicate that
133 See Castellani and Zanfei (2003) for similar finding of the effect of this interaction term..
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geographical concentration is a contributing, but not necessary, factor for the 
occurrence of externalities from FDI. The inclusion of these interaction terms has not 
led to insignificant estimated effects of the variable FOR that is cleared from any 
effect from the two structural factors. Therefore, the results indicate that the presence 
of FDI creates positive externalities among Mexican manufacturing firms. In addition 
to this, the structural factor of geographical concentration - as well as the level of 
technological differences -stimulates additional positive externalities arising from 
foreign participation.
6.3. Inter-Industry FDI-induced Externalities
One of the findings from the review sections in chapters two and three is that 
estimations of FDI-induced externalities are usually confined to the identification of 
intra-industry externalities. However, the majority of studies that do include an 
estimation of the effect of foreign participation of an inter-industry nature find that 
this type of foreign participation leads to positive externalities. Furthermore, these 
studies usually interpret inter-industry foreign participation in a geographical sense, 
using regional inter-industry foreign participation as additional RHS variable.
In this section 6.3., I discuss two issues. First, I present recent ideas that argue 
that it could be more likely that (positive) FDI-induced externalities arise between 
rather than within industries. Second, I review some recent studies, paying special 
attention to attempts to identify and distinguish between FDI-induced externalities 
within and between regions. In section 6.4., I develop a regional model that I can 
estimate to identify FDI-induced.externalities in Mexican manufacturing industries 
within and between regions. The results of the estimations of intra-regional and inter­
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regional FDI-induced externalities are subsequently presented in sections 6.5. and 6 .6 .
6.3.1. Inter-Industry Externalities
The large majority of empirical estimates of FDI-induced externalities focus on the 
identification of intra-industry externalities. However, as discussed in chapter three, 
some recent empirical studies have included RHS variables that relate to externalities 
from foreign-owned firms that are transmitted to host economy firms operating in 
upstream and downstream industries. Externalities that are transmitted between FDI 
and domestic firms through inter-firm linkages are more likely to be of an inter­
industry rather than intra-industry nature, as they are usually located in different 
industries134.
The strongest proponent of the importance of FDI-induced externalities 
through inter-industry linkages is Kugler (2000a, 2000b). He refers to various theories 
of international investment, all implying that externalities between foreign-owned 
firms and domestic firms in similar industries are likely to be limited. In particular, he 
uses the ownership-location-intemalisation (OLI) theory pioneered by Dunning (1985, 
1993) to show the rationale that underlies this prediction. Firms that decide to engage 
in the creation of FDI do so, intending to exploit their ownership advantage in a 
chosen location. Furthermore, the decision to internalise its ownership-specific 
advantage over other firms (rather than exporting to the host economy) implies that 
the firm has an interest in maintaining its technological edge over (potential) 
competitors in the host economy. In other words, ‘the preference by MNCs to profit 
from their intangible assets via direct use rather than licensing reflects the strategic
134 Of course, this depends on the level of aggregation of the industries.
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benefits of maintaining secrecy of proprietary information’ (Kugler, 2000a, p. 9). 
Therefore, FDI will commit itself to minimise positive within-industry externalities 
accruing to domestic firms in a host economy.
In contrast, inter-industry externalities from FDI are more likely to arise. 
Technological knowledge incorporated in FDI that provides it with a comparative 
advantage over (potential) competitors in its industry in the host economy is likely to 
be industry-specific. Technology that is more generic of nature will be less crucial to 
the foreign firm’s ownership-specific advantage and hence less strictly protected 
(Kugler, 2000a, 2000b). Therefore, this type of technology is more likely to spill over 
and affect productivity of domestic firms; due to its nature, these effects will arise in 
the form of inter-industry externalities135.
An additional argument in support of the higher likelihood of positive 
externalities in the form of inter-industry externalities is more directly related to the 
interest of FDI in establishing buyer-supplier linkages in a host economy. In contrast 
to the interest of FDI in protecting its ownership advantage from its within-industry 
competitors, foreign-owned firms may have an interest in promoting technological 
improvements among local supplying industries (Blalock and Gertler, 2002; see also 
Dunning, 1993; Lall, 1980). Improvements among local suppliers will benefit foreign- 
owned firms in the form of better and cheaper inputs136. In chapter two, the features of 
FDI-induced externalities through buyer-supplier linkages were discussed. Foreign- 
owned firms that perceive that they will benefit from the establishment of a 
productive supplier base of local firms may actively promote technology transfers to
135 Furthermore, due to the likely absence of competition effects in situations of inter-industry 
externalities, these externalities are likely to be exclusively positive.
136 These improvements among local suppliers that culminate in better and cheaper inputs for foreign- 
owned firms can take shape in many forms (see especially Lall, 1980, Dunning, 1993): improved 
product quality management, better delivery times, reliable deliveries, co-development of inputs, 
financial stability, etc.
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these firms. If so, these actions may materialise in positive FDI-induced externalities 
accruing to these local suppliers.
In sum, there are two main arguments in support of the expectation that it is 
more likely that FDI-induced externalities from the presence and operations of FDI 
materialise in the form of inter-, rather then intra-, industry externalities. First, 
foreign-owned firms have a specific interest in safeguarding their industry-specific 
technological advantages. This minimises externalities in their own industry, thus 
limiting intra-industry externalities. In contrast, generic technological knowledge 
incorporated in FDI can be assumed to be. less strategic to its survival in the host 
economy market. Hence, this type of technology is more likely to spill over to 
domestic firms operating in other industries, creating inter-industry externalities. 
Second, FDI may actively stimulate technology transfers to domestic firms in 
supplying industries, when it has an interest in improving the efficiency and 
productivity levels of host economy suppliers. Such support from foreign-owned 
firms is likely to lead to positive externalities among their suppliers. As these 
suppliers are usually located in other industries than the foreign firm, this effect takes 
shape in the form of inter-industry externalities.
6.3.2. Inter-industry FDI-induced externalities & the Role of Geography
Kugler (2000a, 2000b) offers empirical evidence of the occurrence of FDI-induced 
inter-industry externalities in 2-digit Colombian manufacturing industries. Applying 
panel data estimation to a panel of 10 industries for the period 1974-1998, his findings 
indicate a significant long run association between domestic sectoral TFP growth and 
inter-industry FDI participation. In contrast, significant intra - industry externalities
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cannot be identified (see Kugler, 2000a, table 4).
A further interesting aspect of his findings is that they associate FDI 
participation in a given industry with productivity effects in several other Colombian- 
owned shares in industries, reflecting the possible occurrence of externality effects 
from both forward and backward linkages137. To what extent the externalities can be 
separately attributed to forward and backward linkages remains unclear however, as 
no specific identification of upstream and downstream industries is made. The 
findings indicate whether a given Colombian industry benefits from foreign 
participation in other industries, but we do not know whether these other industries 
are supplying to or buying from the Colombian industry. An important drawback of 
the empirical findings in light of the topic of the present chapter is that the possible 
role of geographical proximity is not analysed, as the analysis is performed on data 
for national aggregate 2-digit manufacturing industries138.
In addition to Kugler (2000a, 2000b), some previous empirical studies have 
recognised the potential importance of inter-industry externalities. Driffield (1999), 
using aggregate panel data observations for a set of UK manufacturing industries, 
finds both intra- and inter-industry FDI-induced externalities to have significant and 
opposite effects: intra-industry foreign presence has a significant negative effect, 
whereas inter-industry FDI-induced externalities are positive. Harris and Robinson 
(2002) apply panel data estimation to a large sample of manufacturing plants from the 
UK ARD, finding similar results to Driffield (1999). Furthermore, their findings
137 For instance, FDI participation in paper and wood industries is positively associated with 
Colombian TFP growth in the industries of food, beverages and tobacco, textiles, chemicals and rubber 
& plastics.
138 As indicated in chapter three, for a given domestic firm in a given region, there are four possible 
effects from FDI participation: intra-regional within-industry externalities, representing externalities 
from FDI operating in the firm’s region and industry; within-region inter-industry externalities, 
representing inter-industry externalities from FDI in the domestic firm’s region; between-region 
within-industry externalities, representing intra-industry externalities from FDI located in other regions 
than the domestic firm; inter-regional inter-industry externalities, referring to externalities from 
foreign firms located in other regions and other industries. .
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suggest that inter-industry externalities are generally more prevalent than intra­
industry externalities (see Harris and Robinson, 2002).
Blalock and Gertler (2002) estimate externality effects from FDI for a large 
sample of Indonesian manufacturing plants for the period 1988-1996, focusing on the 
regional aspect of these externalities. In their estimations, they distinguish between 
intra-and inter-industry externalities and assess the role of geography. For a given 
Indonesian manufacturing firm, intra-industry foreign participation is measured as the 
aggregate foreign firms’ regional participation in the domestic firms’ industry. 
Furthermore, using input-output tables, regional downstream industries are identified, 
for which regional foreign participation is then calculated. Their findings suggest the 
occurrence of positive buyer-supplier externalities, indicated by significant positive 
associations between regional foreign participation in related industries and 
Indonesian plant level productivity. In contrast, the estimated effect of intra-industry 
regional foreign participation carries opposite signs in alternatively specified 
empirical models, but reaches significance in none of the estimations (see Blalock and 
Gertler, 2002).
An important shortcoming of the study by Blalock and Gertler (2002) and 
similar studies reviewed in chapter three is that they do not address the question 
whether regional foreign participation leads to the occurrence of externalities that spill 
over between regions. A qualitative indication of the extent to which positive impacts 
from the presence of FDI may reach is provided by Potter et al. (2002). Survey results, 
based on responses from a random sample of 30 large foreign manufacturing firms in 
the UK, as well as from a sample of their suppliers and customers, indicate that these 
positive impacts are not confined to the region in which a foreign-owned firm is 
located. Potter et al. (2002) conclude that the impact from FDI in the form of
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knowledge transfers and learning processes do ‘...not just occur at the level of the 
locality or region but also at a larger national scale’ (Potter et al, 2002, p. 304).
The statistical estimation and quantification of spatial externalities requires the 
use of some form of distance decay parameter (Anselin, 1988). The studies 
presented in Girina and Wakelin (2002) and Girina and Wakelin (2001) provide a 
good indication of the effect of the incorporation of some form of distance-related 
decay effect on the estimated effect of spatial FDI-induced externalities. As discussed 
earlier in chapter three, Girma and Wakelin (2002) include a variable capturing the 
inter-regional intra-industry variation of foreign participation in their estimates of 
determinants of plant level productivity in the UK. This variable is significantly 
related to the dependent variable, suggesting the existence of inter-regional intra­
industry externalities. However, this variable does not control for distance between 
regions. Girma and Wakelin (2001) perform the same empirical study for the 
electronics industry in the UK, this time weighing the inter-regional intra-industry 
foreign participation variable with the distance between regions. In this estimation, 
the variable fails to reach significance (see Girma and Wakelin, 2001).
Having said so, it appears that their finding of a non-significant intra-industry 
inter-regional foreign participation effect needs to be interpreted with the necessary 
caution as well. First, Girma and Wakelin (2001) only use one interpretation of the 
distance decay effect. Their interpretation of the distance-decay effect is that it is 
inversely related to distance between regions in the UK. It may be that distance has an 
alternative distance decay-effect on FDI-induced externalities, which remains 
undetected due to their specific interpretation. For instance, an alternative assumption 
could be that externalities may only occur between neighbouring regions (see Anselin, 
1988). Second, the empirical analysis falls short in determining all the effects of
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foreign investment, due to their failure to include the effect from FDI through inter­
regional inter-industry foreign participation. Their empirical findings do suggest 
that positive intra-regional inter-industry externalities are significant. It may be that 
this positive externality effect from inter-industry foreign participation also affects 
productivity of domestic firms in other regions.
An example of the identification of this type of inter-regional externality effect 
from foreign participation is provided by Smarzynska (2002), who estimates 
productivity externalities from FDI using a large plant-level database from Lithuania 
for the period 1996-2000. The findings indicate that there may be spatially related 
externalities from inter-industry foreign participation arising from backward linkages. 
Intra-industry externalities are not significant, neither for intra-regional nor for inter­
regional foreign participation. In contrast, the estimated externality effect of foreign 
participation in downstream industries is significant and positive, both for intra- and 
inter-regional foreign participation (see Smarzynska, 2002). This suggests that 
externalities from backward linkages between foreign and Lithuanian firms are not 
confined to the region of a given Lithuanian firm, but may originate from other 
regions as well.
However, important to note is that no controls are made for inter-regional 
distances in Lithuania in the construction of the variable capturing inter-regional 
foreign participation in downstream industries. Again, the omission of an assessment 
of any form of distance-related decay effect may have influenced the estimated exter­
nality effect of inter-regional foreign participation139.
In sum, the available empirical evidence on inter-industry externalities and the
139 The author’s defence for omitting an assessment of any form of distance-related decay effect is that 
Lithuania is a small country (see Smarzynska, 2002). Whether this facilitates inter-regional FDI- 
induced externalities within the country to the extent that inter-regional distances can be ignored 
altogether should be a matter of empirical verification, however.
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role of geography can be characterised as having three important features. First, inter­
industry externalities appear to be an important externality effect from the presence of 
FDI, as indicated by the frequency of significant positive associations between 
industry-wide foreign participation and measured host economy firms’ productivity in 
related industries. Therefore, inter-industry FDI-induced externalities represent an 
important component of the range of externality effects that may arise from the 
presence of FDI.
Second, these inter-industry externalities can be linked to regional estimations, 
by defining inter-industry foreign participation using regional units of observations 
within the host economy. Third, the concept of FDI-induced externalities can further 
be related to geographical concentration or geographical proximity, by estimating 
whether foreign participation in other regions affects productivity levels of domestic 
firms in a given region. In such an estimation, it appears to be important to construct 
and assess whether some form of distance-related decay effect is related to the 
occurrence of inter-regional FDI-induced externalities. This ensures that the
estimated effects do pick up the possible effect of geographical distance on these 
externalities, preventing possible misspecification problems.
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6.4. Developing a Regional Model to estimate Intra- and Inter-Regional 
Externalities from FDI
6.4.1. Introduction of Regional Empirical Model and Initial Results
In order to answer the question whether the presence of foreign-owned firms creates 
externalities within and between regions, I need to transform the empirical model of 
determinants of Mexican labour productivity for national aggregate industries into a 
regional model. In this section 6.4., I introduce and develop an empirical model that 
can be used to estimate FDI-induced externalities, using an alternative unpublished 
database that was provided directly to me by Inegi.
This database contains 2-digit manufacturing observations for the states of 
Mexico140. The republic of Mexico consists of 31 states and a Federal District 
(Mexico City). I take these 32 regions as the units of observation for the 2-digit 
industries. For these regions, I start with estimating the main empirical model 
developed in the previous chapters. With one alteration, this empirical model can be 
replicated for state-level observations. The empirical model becomes:
ij = 13o + Bi INVniij + B2 LQmij + B3 SCALEnijj + B4 HERFIy
+ B5 LOCij + BeFORij + 8
where
industries i = 1......... 9
states j = 1 ,2 ,........... 32
140 The industries are (1) Food, Drinks and Tobacco, (2) Textiles, Clothing and Leather, (3) Wood and 
Wood Products, (4) Paper, Paper Products and Printing, (5) Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products, 
(6) non-Metallic Minerals, (7) Basic Metals, (8) Metal Products and Machinery & Equipment and (9) 
Other Manufacturing.
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The variables are defined in a similar fashion as in chapter four, be it that they are 
calculated from 2-digit manufacturing industry observations for the 32 regions. Again, 
the observations are divided into foreign-owned and Mexican-owned shares of 
industries. The main difference with the previous empirical models is that the variable 
LOC is substituted for GINI. The variable GINI captures the relative level of 
geographical concentration of industries over the 32 regions in Mexico. Due to the use 
of 2-digit industries for regions as units of observation, the variable capturing the 
cross-sectional variation of geographical concentration of manufacturing industries 
has to be calculated differently. Here, the variable is defined as the share of a 2-digit 
manufacturing industry in total state manufacturing employment, divided by the share 
of the 2-digit manufacturing industry in national manufacturing employment.
The maximum number of observations of this regional database amounts to 
288 observations. However, several industries are extremely small, which leads to the 
occurrence of missing values for most variables. After deleting these industries from 
the database and running some preliminary tests detecting outliers141, the final number 
of observations in the database is 166. The initial results of estimating the adapted 
regional model are shown in table 6.4., under column heading (1).
The regression statistics suggest that the model is well specified. The overall 
goodness-of-fit is slightly higher compared to the empirical estimations of the 
aggregate database. Except for the variables LOC and FOR, the estimated effects of 
the RHS variables carry expected signs and are significant at acceptable significance 
levels. The only variable that carries a negative coefficient is the variable FOR.
1411 have chosen outliers to be those cases where the residuals deviate more then 3 standard deviations 
from the mean.
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Table 6.4. Initial results of the 2-digit empirical model; 1993; OLS estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 2.33 1.11 0.91 0.09 -0.50
(8.41) *** (3.43) *** (3.72) *** (0.24) (0.83)
INVm 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.51
(12.93) *** (13.89) *** (14.64) *** (14.29) *** (13.75) ***
LQm 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.18
(2.94) *** (3.15) *** (3.72) *** (2.55) ** (2.66) ***
SCALEm 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.07
(2.44) ** (4.49) *** (4.74) *** (2.18) ** (2.18) **
HERFI 0.08
(2.09) **
0.02
(0.61)
— — —
FOR -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.003
(0.57) (1.63)* (1.92) ** (0.99) (0.14)
LOC 0.06 — 0.09 0.10 0.09
(1.22) (2.27) ** (2.11) ** (2.05) **
U R B 1 -- 0.15
(6.26)***
0.16
(8.19) ***
— —
U R B 2 — — — 0.16
(6.55) ***
—
U R B 3 — — — — 0.17
(4.69) ***
R2 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.74
F 57.15 89.67 92.87 74.23 64.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 166 166 166 166 166
Absolute values of T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
Industry employment (URB_1) and total manufacturing employment (URB_2) are in total number of 
workers, taken from the economic census (Inegi, 1994). The variable of state population (URB_3) is 
total number of inhabitants per state in 1993, taken from Anuario Estadistico, Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos (Inegi, 1999b).
Controlling for Agglomeration Economies
The next step in the specification of the empirical model is to fully control for the 
possible presence of agglomeration economies. Agglomeration economies may be due 
to either urbanisation economies or localisation economies. As discussed in chapter 
three, the majority of research assessing some form of regional component of FDI- 
induced externalities fails to control for the presence of such regionally confined 
external economies, creating the possibility of omitted variable bias.
In order to assess whether agglomeration economies are influencing measured 
levels of Mexican productivity, I include a RHS variable representing the scale of 
manufacturing activity at the state level. The general approach in applied research on 
agglomeration economies to capture the presence of localisation economies is to add a 
variable measuring the total size of an industry in a region. Urbanisation economies 
can be captured by a variable measuring the size of total regional manufacturing or 
regional population (see Moomaw, 1988; Henderson, 1988; also Ebert and McMillen, 
1999). However, in the present case, the variables of total industry employment, total 
state manufacturing employment and total state population are considerably 
correlated142. Also, the empirical model already includes the variable LOC, which, as 
a measure of geographical concentration of industries, serves to capture localisation 
economies. Therefore, I consider all three alternative variables: URB_1: number of 
employees in 2-digit industry in region; URB_2: total state manufacturing 
employment and URB_3: total state population. The results of the inclusion of these 
RHS variables are shown in columns (2) though (5).
Columns (2) and (3) contain the results of the empirical estimation containing 
the RHS variable of total 2-digit manufacturing employment per region. In both 
regressions, this variable carries a positive coefficient, significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting the existence of positive agglomeration economies. In regression (2), the 
estimated effect of the variable HERFI does not reach significance. In regression (3), 
LOC is substituted for HERFI. The results of regression (3) show a positive 
coefficient for LOC, significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that both the 
level of geographical concentration of an industry and the size of the industry are
142 Pearson correlation coefficients are: state-wide 2-digit industry employment and total state 
manufacturing employment 0.65; industry employment and state population 0.56; total manufacturing 
employment and state population 0.83,
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positively associated with measured Mexican productivity levels, suggesting that both 
localisation and urbanisation economies are present143.
Further assessing this empirical finding, regressions (4) and (5) replicate 
regression (3), using total state manufacturing employment and state population as 
proxies for urbanisation economies. Both variables carry positive coefficients, 
significant at the 1% level. Also, LOC carries a stable coefficient, significant at the 
5% level. Therefore, based on this empirical evidence, the most acceptable conclusion 
is that the measured level of Mexican-owned 2-digit statewide manufacturing 
productivity is positively influenced by general agglomeration economies. These 
agglomeration economies appear to consist of both an urbanisation and a localisation 
component, as indicated by the significant positive estimated effects of LOC and the 
various urbanisation variables144.
6.4.2. Competition versus Dual Economy?
In the previous section, the variable HERFI fails to carry a significant coefficient, 
when agglomeration economies are controlled for. It may be that HERFI, originally 
designed to indicate market concentration in national aggregate industries, does not 
correctly capture the effect of competitive pressure when applied to a regional 
setting145. An alternative indicator for the cross-regional variation of intra-regional 
competition is offered by Glaeser et al. (1992), who capture the extent of intra- 
regional competition as the ratio of the number of firms over the total number of 
manufacturing employees per region divided by the ratio of the number of firms over
143 Concerns that the size variable of total industry employment per state captures internal scale 
economies appear to be invalid due to the inclusion of the RHS variable SCALEm.
144 In the following sections, I use URB_1, as it has the highest variation of the three urbanisation 
variables.
145 Especially given the high level of aggregation of the 2-digit industries.
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the total number of manufacturing employees for the entire country. I label this 
variable COMP_l. COMP_ 2 is calculated as the ratio of the number of firms over 
number of manufacturing employees for a 2-digit manufacturing industry per region. 
COMP_3 is COMP_2 divided by the ratio of the number of firms over total number 
of manufacturing employees for a 2-digit manufacturing industry in the country. The 
estimated effect of the competition variables is shown in table 6.5.
Table 6.5.Testing alternative competition indicators
COMP 1 COMP 2 COMP 3
Constant -0.16
(0.26)
-0.24
(0.42)
0.17
(0.30)
INVm 0.51
(14.34)***
0.45 
(11.76) ***
0.49 
(14.87) ***
LQm 0.17
(2.66)***
0.23 
(3.65) ***
0.24
(3.66)***
SCALEm 0.07
(2.08)**
-0.02
(0.47)
0.06
(1.96)**
FOR -0.02
(1.13)
-0.04 
(1.75) *
-0.02
(1.28)
LOC 0.09
(2.10)**
0.09 
(2.22) **
0.10 
(2.46) **
URB 0.14
(3.72)***
0.12 
(3.12) ***
0.13 
(3.52) ***
COMP -0.17 
(3.60) ***
-0.19 
(4.59) ***
-0.19
(5.20)***
R2 0.76 0.77 0.77
F 67.89
(0.000)
67.09
(0.000)
70.31
(0.000)
N 166 166 166
Absolute values ofT-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method.
The results indicate that the intensity of competitive pressure of intra-regional 
competition is negatively associated with the measured level of Mexican productivity. 
All three competition variables carry negatively signed coefficients and are highly 
significant. Following the ideas presented by Glaeser et al. (1992) and Henderson et al.
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(1995), this negative association indicates that a monopolistic market structure at the 
regional level favours the level of productivity.
Having said so, it is important to consider that findings on the effect of 
regional competition in empirical studies such as Glaeser et al. (1992) and Henderson 
et al. (1995) concern the effect on dynamic externalities, rather than static 
productivity effects. The favourable effect of a regional monopolistic structure on 
regional productivity growth is explained by arguing that firms in such regions are 
more inclined to be engaged in research and development activities, as the 
monopolistic structure guarantees a sufficient capacity to internalise gained 
knowledge (see Glaeser et al., 1992). In contrast, a high level of regional competition 
would limit R&D activities, as firms are concerned that regional competitors will 
benefit from their knowledge. However, such explanations may not be suitable when 
considering effects on productivity levels.146.
Instead of capturing the effect of intra-regional competitive pressure, the 
COMP variables may alternatively represent the cross-state variation of another 
regional feature that may affect Mexican productivity levels. The ratio of the number 
of manufacturing firms over number of manufacturing employees (absolute or relative 
to the national average) may capture the cross-state variation of the share of small 
firms in regional economies. As mentioned before, the Mexican economy is 
characterised by a structural dual nature (see Blomstrom, 1989). In such an economy, 
traditional segments, predominantly consisting of small and micro-sized enterprises, 
use traditional technologies and operate at relative low productivity levels. In contrast,
146 The second main determinant o f dynamic externalities is argued to be the level of diversity in the 
regional composition of economic activity (see e.g. Henderson et al., 1995; also Henderson, 1997). I 
have estimated several indicators o f the cross-industry and cross-regional variation of this diversity 
variable (see Duranton and Puga, 2000, for definitions and discussion). However, the diversity 
variables are not significantly associated with the dependent variable in the present estimations and are 
therefore not reported in the table or further discussed.
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modem segments are likely to disproportionately consist of large firms that produce 
with modem technologies at relative high productivity levels.
The estimated negative association between the competition variables and 
measured Mexican productivity may reflect the inter-regional distribution of these 
traditional and modem segments. A high value of COMP for a particular 2-digit 
industry may indicate a relative over-concentration of small and micro-sized firms in 
a region. This relative over-concentration of low productivity activity may produce a 
negative effect on measured productivity for the entire industry in the state, as it 
represents an over-concentration of traditional, low productivity, production 
technologies within the industry147.
Therefore, given the difference between the present empirical model that 
focuses on explaining productivity levels and the empirical models represented by 
Glaeser et al. (1992) and Henderson et al. (1995) that deal with dynamic externalities, 
as well as the plausibility of the alternative interpretation of the variable COMP that it 
represents the effect of the inter-regional distribution of traditional segments of the 
Mexican economy, I accept the variable COMP into the empirical model, interpreting 
it as representing the negative effect of the relative over-concentration of traditional, 
low productivity, segments of the Mexican economy on measured productivity 
levels148. In the remainder of the chapter, I refer to this variable as DUAL149.
147 To test this, I have estimated an alternative empirical model, replacing the COMP variables with a 
variable representing the share of aggregate employment of firms employing 1-10 employees in total 
employment of a 2-digit industry per region. This alternative variable carries a coefficient of -0.14, 
significant at the 1% acceptance level.
148 An alternative interpretation of the competition variable that links regional competitive pressure and 
the presence of low productivity activity is that an over-concentration of low productivity activity may 
lead to a lack of sufficient competitive pressure on the modem segment o f the industry in the region. 
Following this interpretation, the variable would represent the lack o f competitive pressure at the 
regional level, which would suggest that competition is positively related to measured industry-wide 
productivity levels.
149 In the empirical estimations in the following sections, I use COMP_3 as the variable of DUAL, as it 
provides the highest variation of the three COMP variables. .
6.4.3. The Regional Model: Testing Industry and State Dummies
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The previous sections have introduced and developed a regional model of 
determinants of measured Mexican productivity. This model may serve to further 
investigate the effect of FDI on Mexican productivity. To recapture and summarise, 
the specification of the empirical model that appears to function satisfactorily is :
=  Bo +  Bi INVmij +  B2 LQniij +  B 3SC A L E m ij +  B4 URBjj 
+  B5 LOCij +  BgDUALij +  B7FORjj +  £
Before proceeding with this empirical model, some tests on the model are required 
due to its specific nature. Thus far, the equations have been estimated while omitting 
any controls for possible regional or industry fixed effects. Observations have been 
pooled together over both the industry and the state dimension. This pooling may 
affect both the estimated magnitudes and significance levels of the B-coefficients, if 
there are structural industry and regional effects within the sample150. In order to test 
whether this is the case, I have re-estimated the empirical model, including dummies 
for industries and states. The results are shown in table 6.6.
The results from regression (1) are from the empirical estimation that does not 
include any regional or industry effects. Starting from this regression, there are two 
dimensions related to the pooled data that need to be tested: a regional and an 
industrial one. Regression (2) represents regression (1) with added industry dummies. 
If the data can be pooled across industries without problems, the coefficients of these 
dummies will not carry significant coefficients.
150 See Gujarati (1995) for discussion on dummies and pooling of data
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Table 6.6. Inclusion of industry and state fixed effects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.10
(0.18)
0.55
(0.85)
-1.52
(2.54)**
-1.15
(1.59)
EtSTVm 0.49
(14.75)***
0.38
(8.18)***
0.52
(13.39)***
0.42
(9.50)***
LQm 0.24
(3.70)***
0.21
(2.12)**
0.18
(2.76)***
0.11
(1.01)
SCALEm 0.07
(2.23)**
0.09
(1.91)**
0.06
(1.75)*
0.10
(1.84)*
FOR -0.02
(1.29)
-0.04
(2.62)***
-0.02
(0.95)
-0.03
(1.59)
URB 0.13
(3.60)***
0.14
(4.35)***
0.21
(5.74)***
0.22
(6.19)***
DUAL -0.18
(4.45)***
-0.25
(5.76)***
-0.13
(2.09)**
-0.18
(3.04)***
LOC 0.10
(2.54)**
0.08
(2.27)**
0.11
(2.36)**
0.08
(2.05)**
Industry-effects No Yes No Yes
n F= 4.32 
(0.0001)
F = 8.44 
(0.000)
State effects No No Yes Yes
(A) F = 4.98 
(0.0000)
F = 3.91 
(0.000)
R^ 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.86
F 64.93
(0.000)
43.77
(0.000)
48.48
(0.000)
98.77
(0.000)
N 166 166 166 166
Absolute values of T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
(A)F values are from F-tests whether the industry-dummies, state-dummies and the combined industry- 
and state-dummies jointly have coefficients different from 0.
However, an F-test indicates that the hypothesis of joint equality of the 
estimated dummy coefficients has to be rejected. This means that the coefficients 
estimated in regression (1) may have been estimated imprecisely, as they may partly 
incorporate fixed industry effects. Comparing the results in columns (1) and (2), the 
main difference appears to be that the negative estimated effect from intra-industry 
foreign participation reaches significance in the model specification containing indus­
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try fixed effects.
Regression (3) contains state fixed effects. Again, an F-test on the significance 
of the dummies indicates that the hypothesis of joint equality to 0 of the dummy 
coefficients is rejected, suggesting that the data cannot be pooled across states without 
controlling for state effects. Having said so, a comparison of the estimated effects in 
regression (1) and (3) does not reveal any important differences. The coefficients 
differ somewhat in value, but none of the coefficients has a change in sign or a large 
drop in significance.
Finally, regression (4) contains both industry and state fixed effects. The F-test 
for this regression indicates that the hypothesis of joint equality to 0 of the industry 
and state dummies is rejected. A comparison of the results from regression (4) to 
regression (1) indicates one main difference in the form of the non-significance of the 
estimated effect of human capital (LQm). This indicates that, when controlling for 
structural differences between industries and states, the effect of the cross-industry 
and cross-regional variation of the human capital variable does not significantly affect 
measured Mexican productivity151.
6.5. Intra- and Inter-Industry Intra-regional FDI-induced Externalities
6.5.1. Intra-Industry FDI-induced Externalities within Regions
The results presented in tables 6.4. through 6.6. suggest that the presence of FDI
appears to lead to negative effects, as indicated by the negatively signed coefficients.
In some cases, this estimated negative effect reaches acceptable significance levels.
151 Of course, this finding does not suggest that human capital is not important for productivity levels in 
the regional model. Given the high level of aggregation of the industry data, it is more likely that the 
industry and state dummies capture the effect of human capital.
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In a similar fashion to the empirical analysis presented in chapter five, the 
concern regarding the estimated effect of foreign participation is that the variable 
FOR may be endogenous to the empirical model. To see whether the estimated effect 
of industry-wide foreign investment changes when controlling for its endogeneity in 
the new regional empirical model, I have re-estimated the empirical model, using IV 
estimation.
Although the general IV approach is similar to the one discussed in the 
previous chapter, for the present empirical model it requires some additional steps. 
For each state, I run the first stage regression discussed in chapter five152. Using this 
regression, I can calculate FO R es^'8^  for each state. This constructed variable 
represents the estimated foreign participation shares in 4-digit manufacturing 
industries for each state. Using these foreign participation shares, I calculate the total 
number of employees working in foreign-owned shares of 4-digit industries per state. 
I then aggregate these values to 2-digit manufacturing industries, with which I 
calculate FORes(2_dlgit). These values are used in the IV regression. The results of the 
regressions using all three measurements of FOR are shown in table 6.7.153.
The results indicate that, as is the case with the estimations using national 6- 
digit manufacturing industries, the variable FOR carries a negative sign in OLS 
regressions and a positive sign when using IV estimation. Furthermore, in two of the 
three specifications of FOR, the estimated effect reaches the 10% significance level. 
This difference in estimated effect between OLS and IV estimations indicates that, 
when controlled for its endogenous component, industry-wide foreign participation is
1521 use both US and US_VA as instruments.
153 The reason for regressing FOR on the instruments for each state separately is that regressing FOR 
on the instruments for pooled data at the 4-digit level is likely to require state and industry dummies, as 
indicated by the results at the 2-digit level. However, fixed effects at the 2-digit level may have a 
different impact from fixed effects at the 4-digit level. By running separate regressions for each state at 
the 4-digit level, the problem of altering fixed effects is circumvented.
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Table 6.7. Intra-industry spillovers at 2-digit level: OLS versus IV
Variables OLS IV
FORI FOR2 FOR3 FORI FOR2 FOR3
Constant -0.98
(1.32)
-1.28
(2.21)**
-0.86
(1.18)
-1.36
(2.34)**
-1.56
(2.62)***
-1.68
(2.71)***
INVm 0.41
(8.53)***
0.40
(8.31)***
0.40
(8.19)***
0.41
(8.33)***
0.42
(8.49)***
0.43
(8.36)***
LQm 0.11
(1.03)
0.12
(1.21)
0.12
(1.18)
0.09
(0.83)
0.07
(0.67)
0.06
(0.58)
SCALE 0.10
(1.80)*
0.10
(2.00)**
0.10
(1.94)**
0.09
(1.81)*
0.09
(1.81)*
0.09
(1.85)*
FOR -0.03
(1.74)*
-0.04
(2.53)***
-0.03
(2.02)**
0.06
(1.68)*
0.07
(1.43)
0.07
(1.74)*
URB 0.22
(6.32)***
0.22
(6.65)***
0.22
(6.61)***
0.23
(6.86)***
0.24
(7.09)***
0.24
(7.06)***
DUAL -0.19
(3.12)***
-0.19
(3.51)***
-0.19
(3.48)***
-0.18
(3.26)***
-0.17
(3.01)***
-0.17
(3.09)***
LOC 0.08
(2.05)**
0.08
(2.01)**
0.08
(2.03)**
0.08
(1.90)**
0.08
(1.91)**
0.08
(1.92)**
Industry and 
state dummies
F = 13.09 
(0.000)
F = 5.91 
(0.000)
F = 5.99 
(0.000)
F = 9.10 
(0.000)
F = 14.06 
(0.000)
F = 16.48 
(0.000)
F 149.09
(0.000)
177.05
(0.000)
1853.24
(0.000)
439.88
(0.000)
332.61
(0.000)
375.76
(0.000)
R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
N 166 166 166 166 166 166
Absolute values of T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
The F-value for industry and state dummies is for F-test whether industry and state dummies have 
coefficients equal to 0.
positively associated with measured Mexican productivity levels, indicating the 
occurrence of positive intra-industry intra-regional FDI-induced externalities. This 
finding is in line with the empirical results presented in chapter five154.
154 The estimated positive externality effect from the presence of foreign firms appears less robust 
compared to the empirical results from IV estimations as presented in chapter five. One possible 
explanation of this difference is that the present empirical model uses 2-digit manufacturing industries, 
as opposed to 6-digit industries, which may have introduced an aggregation bias. Also, the calculation 
of the instrument of FOR in the present analysis involves an aggregation from the 4-digit to the 2-digit 
level, which may similarly have produced an aggregation bias into the estimated effect.
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6.5.2. Inter-Industry Intra-regional Externalities from FDI155
As discussed earlier, the idea has recently been introduced that inter-industry FDI- 
induced externalities may be an important component of the externality effects arising 
from the presence and operations of FDI. In order to determine whether foreign firms 
operating in a given industry in a given region affect Mexican productivity levels 
operating in other manufacturing industries in the region, an additional RHS variable 
needs to be added to the empirical model. For a given industry, this variable needs to 
reflect the extent of foreign participation in other industries in a given region.
For a given industry in a given region, I have defined this variable as the share 
of foreign participation in aggregate statewide manufacturing, excluding the particular 
industry. The advantage of this definition is that it captures the possible presence of 
inter-industry externalities originating from both forward and backward linkages 
between FDI and domestic firms156.
For instance, this variable for region 1 and industry 1 amounts to:
(numberofemployeesforeignfirms)
FIRi i :
J'X1numberofemployeesworkinginindustiy) 
V 2
155 A replication of the type of analysis of the effect of geographical proximity as presented in section 
6.2.2. for the national database proved too difficult to replicate for the regional model. Estimated 
effects using groups of industries representing low and high technology gaps or low and high 
localisation levels are difficult to interpret, due to multicollinearity problems (indicated by insignificant 
fi-coefficients and high adj. R2 levels). A similar problem affects the empirical estimation of models 
including interaction terms. Again, most variables show insignificant effects, while the R2 is high. 
Also, VTF tests indicate that the interaction terms affect the estimations so strongly that interpretation 
of the estimated effects becomes problematic. Therefore, these results are not presented.
156 Of course, the disadvantage is that it is not possible to identify the unique contribution o f each of the 
two types of linkages to the existence o f inter-industry externalities.
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In a similar fashion to the variable FOR, the additional variable FIR is calculated for 
the three alternative measures of foreign participation using shares in employment, 
value added and total gross production. The results of the inclusion of this variable are
1 ^ 7shown in table 6.8 .
Table 6.8. Intra- and inter industry externalities: OLS estimations
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) , (6)
Constant -0.40
(0.68)
-0.76
(1.07)
-0.45
(0.73)
-1.25
(1.25)
-0.38
(0.62)
-1.14
(1.51)
INVm 0.54
(17.60)***
0.42
(9.51)***
0.54
(17.47)***
0.42
(9.42)***
0.54
(17.53)***
0.42
(9.32)***
SCALE 0.05
(1.67)*
0.11
(2.06)**
0.05
(1.60)
0.13
(2.32)**
0.05
(1.52)
0.11
(2.17)**
FOR -0.008
(0.41)
-0.03
(1.88)*
-0.005
(0.26)
-0.05
(2.74)***
0.002
(0.09)
-0.04
(2.20)**
FIR 0.005
(0.18)
-0.07
(1.44)
-0.004
(0.17)
-0.09
(1.62)
0.004
(0.18)
-0.07
(1.48)
URB 0.14
(3.49)***
0.16
(3.48)***
0.14
(3 43)***
0.22
(3.64)***
0.14
(3.39)***
0.19
(3.75)***
DUAL -0.16
(3.46)***
-0.17
(3.14)***
-0.16
(3.62)***
-0.17
(3.14)***
-0.15 
(3 49)***
-0.17
(3.15)***
LOC 0.10
(2.20)**
0.08
(2.00)**
0.10
(2.17)**
0.08
(2.01)**
0.10
(2.17)**
0.08
(2.02)**
Industry and 
state effects
No Yes
F = 7.97 
(0.000)
No Yes
F = 6.41 
(0.000)
No Yes
F = 6.95 
(0.000)
R* 0.75 0.86 0.75 0.86 0.75 0.86
F 74.16
(0.000)
87.98
(0.000)
70.49
(0.000)
92.47
(0.000)
72.36
(0.000)
81.26
(0.000)
N 166 166 166 166 166 166
Absolute values of T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
F-value for industry and state dummies is for F-test whether industry and state dummies have 
coefficients equal to 0.
(1), (2) FOR1&FIR1; (3), (4) FOR2 & FIR2; (5), (6) FOR3 & FIR3.
1571 have tried to distinguish between upstream and downstream industries, in order to identify those 
inter-industry linkages that have the strongest input-output linkages. These efforts were unsuccessful. 
One possible reason for this is that the latest freely available input-output matrix for the Mexican 
economy is from 1985 (see Inegi, 1999a). Second, the high level o f aggregation of the 1993 regional 
database may have created an aggregation bias. Third, the available input-output matrix contains input- 
output linkages between aggregate national industries, which do not capture regional differences in 
inter-industry relations.
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By and large, the results do not differ greatly between the three different 
measurements of FOR and FIR. In a majority of cases, both the variables representing 
intra- and inter-industry FDI-induced externalities carry negative coefficients. To 
ensure that the presence of both state and industry fixed effects are required, I have 
estimated the empirical model both with and without fixed effects. The F-test 
statistics indicate that their presence is significant.
The main difference between the estimated effects of the two empirical 
models is the significance of the negative effect of intra-industry foreign participation. 
Whereas the empirical models without fixed effects do not indicate significant 
negative effects from FOR, the empirical models that include fixed effects indicate 
that this negative effect is significant, with an acceptance level ranging between 1% 
and 10%, depending on the specific measurement of FOR. As such, these results are 
in line with the OLS findings presented in table 6.7. The variable FIR carries negative 
signs, but does not reach significance in any of the estimated models.
We know from the findings presented in table 6.7. that the estimated effect of 
the intra-industry presence of foreign investment is different when controlled for its 
endogenous component. To see whether the estimated effects of both FOR and FIR 
change when controlling for the endogenous component of industry-wide foreign 
participation, I have used IV estimation for the empirical model that is augmented 
with FIR. In this specification, the instrument as described in section 6.5.1. 
approximates the variable FOR. As for the variable FIR, it may pose somewhat of a 
problem of a similar nature, as it contains an endogenous element as well.
For instance, for industry 8 (machinery and equipment), the variable FIR is 
calculated as the share of foreign investment in the other 8 industries in a particular 
region. Due to its endogenous nature, the productivity levels of these industries will
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affect the level of foreign participation in these 8 industries. If this is the only 
endogenous component incorporated into the levels of foreign participation, the effect 
from FIR can be estimated using actual observations, as there is no endogenous 
component between the level of foreign participation in other industries and the 
productivity level of industry 8. In this case, the value of FIR is exogenous to the 
equation of the labour productivity level of industry 8.
However, productivity levels of industries within a region may be related 
through inter-firm linkages and other relations. In that case, the endogenous relation 
between FIR and the industry productivity level of the other industries may be 
indirectly translated into an endogenous relation between the productivity level of 
industry 8 and FIR. It is also possible that the level of foreign participation in other 
industries is directly related to the productivity level of industry 8. For instance, 
suppose that a foreign firm operating in industry 4 is investing in a region partly 
because they are intending to buy inputs from or subcontract assembly activities to 
regional companies that are located in industry 8. In this case, the level of foreign 
participation in industry 4 may be influenced by the productivity level in industry 38, 
making the variable FIR endogenous to the labour productivity equation of industry 
8158.
To assess the influence of endogeneity on the estimated effects of FOR and 
FIR, I estimate the effects of FOR and FIR for two scenarios. In one scenario, I 
assume that FIR can be calculated from actual observations as described earlier. In the 
second scenario, I use the IV calculation procedure as earlier explained for the 
calculation of FORes(4Kilglt). Using this procedure, I have calculated instruments
158 It could be that state dummies capture the endogenous component of FIR with respect to the 
productivity level of an industry. This might be the case if foreign investment is attracted to the 
productivity level of the entire manufacturing base of a region, rather than to productivity levels o f  
individual 2-digit manufacturing industries. However, if this is the case, the state dummies should 
capture this effect, allowing the use of FIR as defined in the OLS estimations.
282
representing foreign participation shares of 4-digit industries for all states. These 
instruments are used to calculate, for a given industry and region, the foreign 
participation in other industries in that region for 2-digit industries. The results of the 
estimations for both scenarios are shown in table 6.9.
Table 6.9.Intra-regional intra- and inter industry externalities: IV estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables FIR1 FIRIIV FIR2 FIR2IV FIR3 FIR3IV
Constant 0.32
(0.37)
1.44
(1.58)
0.21
(0.23)
0.66
(0.90)
0.35
(0.39)
0.50
(0.71)
INVm 0.43
(9.31)***
0.42
(8.89)***
0.44
(9 71)***
0.44
(9.79)***
0.44
(9.64)***
0.44
(9.70)***
SCALE 0.10
(1.88)*
0.08
(1.30)
0.10
(1.83)*
0.07
(1.42)
0.10
(1.84)*
0.08
(1.49)
FOR 0.06
(1.80)*
0.12
(2.38)**
0.08
(1.63)*
0.12
(2.50)***
0.08
(2.04)**
0.12
(2.73)***
FIR -0.02
(0.37)
0.16
(2.28)**
-0.006
(0.14)
0.15
(2.02)**
0.008
(0.20)
0.13
(2.08)**
URB 0.14
(2.69)***
0.09
(1.93)**
0.14
(2.47)***
0.10
(2.14)**
0.13
(2.41)***
0.11
(2.42)***
DUAL -0.16
(3.03)***
-0.18
(3.39)***
-0.16
(2.96)***
-0.18
(3.20)***
-0.17
(3.09)***
-0.18
(3.29)***
LOC 0.08
(1.89)*
0.07
(1.70)*
0.08
(1.90)*
0.08
(1.80)*
0.08
(1.80)*
0.08
(1.79)*
Industry and 
state effects
F = 5.36 
(0.000)
F = 6.03 
(0.000)
5.87
(0.000)
F = 6.05 
(0.000)
F = 6.29 
(0.000)
F = 6.46 
(0.000)
F 34.47
(0.000)
38.22
(0.000)
37.98
(0.000)
37.09
(0.000)
36.62
(0.000)
38.01
(0.000)
R^ 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
N 166 166 166 166 166 166
Absolute values of T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
F-value for industry and state dummies is for F-test whether industry and state dummies have 
coefficients equal to 0.
FIR1, FIR2, FTR3 are calculated from actual observations. FIR 1IV, FIR2IV, FIR3IV are calculated 
from the instruments of 4-digit foreign participation shares. The FOR variables are instrumented in all 
six estimations.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) contain the IV estimations where FOR is
instrumented and FIR is calculated from actual observations. Columns (2), (4) and
283
(6) contain the results when both FOR and FIR are instrumented. The estimated effect 
of FOR is significant positive in all six estimations, indicating the presence of positive 
FDI-induced intra-industry externalities. The estimated effect of FIR differs between 
the two different types of measurement of this variable.
When using inter-industry foreign participation values calculated from actual 
observations, FIR carries a positively or negatively signed coefficient, depending on 
the definition of FIR. Furthermore, the coefficients are small, and do not reach 
significance. In contrast, the results from the estimations where FIR is instrumented 
are different. Its estimated effect is positive in all three estimations, and significant at 
the 5% level. This difference in findings suggests that, when the estimation controls 
for the bias that is caused by the situation that both FOR and FIR contain endogenous 
elements, the findings indicate that both positive intra- and inter-industry intra- 
regional externalities from FDI are being created159.
As for the relative importance of the two types of foreign participation, FIR 
carries coefficients which are somewhat larger in magnitude than the coefficients of 
FOR. However, F-tests indicate that the differences between the two coefficients are 
not statistically significant160. Having said so, it is important to consider that the high 
level of aggregation of industry data makes it difficult to clearly divide between intra- 
and inter-industry externalities proper, obscuring the identification of the underlying 
channels of externalities. This problem appears to apply particularly to externalities
159 This suggests that the state dummies do not control for the endogenous component of FIR. State 
dummies could control for the endogeneity problem of FIR if  this problem exists for all nine industries 
of each state to a similar extent. This seems to be a strong requirement. For a given state, it may be that 
foreign firms in for instance industry 1 are partly attracted to the state due to the productivity level of 
industry 2. However, this does not mean that foreign firms in industry 2 are also automatically attracted 
to the state because of the productivity level of industry 1. If there are differences between the 
reciprocity o f the attraction of industry productivity levels on foreign firms, state dummies are less 
likely to pick up the endogeneity effect related to FIR, which makes instrumented FIR values more 
appropriate.
Test FORI =FIR1 alt, F(l, 122) = 1.43, prob>F = 0.24; test FOR2=FIR2alt, F(l, 122) = 0.13, 
prob>F=0.7187; test FOR3=FIR3alt, F(l, 122)=0.02, prob>F=0.88.
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related to inter-firm linkages. Usually, such linkages are interpreted as inter-industry 
linkages, as buyer-supplier relations are usually established between different 
industries. Because of the use of 2-digit manufacturing industries, it is likely that part 
of these inter-firm linkages are captured as intra-industry externalities161.
Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn from the empirical evidence 
presented in table 6.9. is that both intra- and inter-industry FDI-induced externalities 
do positively affect measured intra-regional Mexican productivity levels. As for the 
relative importance of the effects of buyer-supplier linkages, it may be that their 
presence is somewhat obscured, as the use of highly aggregated data may have 
captured part of the effect of this channel of externalities as intra-industry externalities.
6.6. Inter-Regional FDI-induced Externalities
6.6.1. Estimations Without Distance-related Decay Effect
Thus far, the empirical estimations have focused on externality effects from the 
presence of foreign firms within regions. However, such externality effects may also 
be transmitted between regions. If such externalities arise, the participation of foreign 
firms in one region will be significantly associated with measured Mexican 
productivity levels in other regions within the country.
A first step towards the empirical identification of this type of inter-regional 
FDI-induced externalities is to extend the empirical model by adding variables that 
represent industry-wide foreign investment in regions other than the region in which a
161 A good example is industry 8, containing all industries of metal products & machinery and 
equipment. Within this aggregation of industries, there is a large number of industries carrying out very 
different activities, ranging from metal sheet plating to car assembly to the production o f household 
goods. Looking at the large heterogeneity of activities within this group of industries, it is very likely 
that buyer-supplier relations are responsible for part of the intra-industry externalities in this industry.
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given industry is located.162 For instance, for industry 1 in region 1, this new variable 
would be calculated as the share of foreign firms in total employment in all regions 
excluding region 1 163. Effectively, this interpretation disregards any effect that 
distance may have on the spatial transmission of FDI-induced externalities, as the 
level of foreign participation in a distant region is given equal weight compared to the 
level of foreign participation in a neighbouring region.
The measurement of the extent of regional foreign participation distinguishes 
between foreign participation in similar and dissimilar industries. For a given industry 
in a given region, FORnd is the variable measuring foreign participation in the given 
industry in other regions. FIRnd is the variable measuring foreign participation in 
other regions in other industries. In formula form, this can be stated as:
32
7 ,  ((employeesforeignfirms)indiistry-i 
S * jFORlndy =  — ^ -----------------------------------------------
y ,  (totalemployees)industry-i
g * j  
9 32
Z Z (employeesforeignfirms)
_ h * i g * j
F IR ln dy ------------ g ~ 2 2 ------------------------------
X X (totalemployees) 
h * i g * j
where
Industries i, h = 1 , ..... 9
States j, g = 1 ,2 ,........... 32
162 See Girma and Wakelin (2002) for a similar type of variable; also Smarzynska (2002).
163 The foreign firms’ share in total employment in region 1 being the variable FORI of course.
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In similar fashion, I have calculated FOR3nd and FIR3nd, which represent the intra- 
and inter-industry inter-regional foreign participation levels measured as shares in 
total gross production. The results from the inclusion of these inter-regional foreign 
participation variables into the empirical model are shown in table 6.10164.
Table 6.10. Inter-regional FDI-induced externalities; no distance
RHS vars (l)OLS (2)OLS (3)IV (4)IV (5)IV (6)IV
Constant -0.18
(0.15)
-1.24
(0.77)
3.15
(2.75)***
0.67
(0.43)
1.88
(1.84)*
-0.32
(0-31)
INVm 0.42
(9.45)***
0.42
(9.29)***
0.41
(8.72)***
0.41
(8.62)***
0.44
(9.50)***
0.44
(9.42)***
SCALE 0.11
(1.99)**
0.11
(2.05)**
0.07
(1.22)
0.07
(1.29)
0.08
(1.46)
0.08
(1.42)
FOR -0.03
(1.41)
-0.03
(1.85)*
0.13
(2.55)***
0.12
(2.38)***
0.13
(3.06)***
0.12
(2.82)***
FIR -0.07
(1.26)
-0.07
(1.44)
0.18
(2.49)***
0.16
(2.29)**
0.13
(2.14)**
0.12
(2.05)**
URB 0.16
(3.25)***
0.17
(3.48)***
0.08
(1.67)*
0.10
(2.00)**
0.12
(2.51)***
0.08
(1.28)
DUAL -0.18
(3.03)***
-0.17
(3.10)***
-0.20
(3.58)***
-0.18
(3.37)***
-0.19
(3.53)***
-0.18
(3.31)***
LOC 0.08
(1.86)*
0.08
(1.94)**
0.07
(1.51)
0.07
(1.64)*
0.07
(1.64)*
0.07
(1.67)*
FORnd 0.19
(0.66)
— 0.47
(1.75)*
0.53
(2.07)**
—
FIRnd — -0.36
(0.32)
-0.61
(0.57)
-1.41
(0.96)
Industry and 
state effects
F = 6.89 
(0.000)
F = 7.34 
(0.000)
F = 6.04 
(0.000)
F = 6.07 
(0.000)
F = 6.10 
(0.000)
F = 6.12 
(0.000)
F 83.28
(0.000)
83.64
(0.000)
218.56
(0.000)
268.98
(0.000)
37.40
(0.000)
37.14
(0.000)
R2 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.86
N 166 166 166 166 166 166
Absolute values ofT-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
F-value for industry and state dummies is for F-test whether industry and state dummies have 
coefficients equal to 0.
Estimations (l)OLS, (2) OLS, (3)IV and 4(IV) are OLS and IV results from using FORI; estimations 
IV(5) and IV(6) are IV results using FOR3. FORnd and FIRnd are always calculated from observed 
values.
1641 have also run the estimations using FOR2 and FIR2, but the results do not differ from those 
presented using FOR3 and FIR3.
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The OLS estimations using observed values for the variables FOR and FIR do not 
produce any significant effects of either FORnd or FIRnd165. This would suggest that 
there are no general inter-regional FDI-induced externalities within the manufacturing 
industries. However, the IV estimations present different results. These results 
indicate that, in addition to significant positive effects of intra regional intra- and 
inter-industry foreign participation, inter-regional intra-industry foreign participation 
also has a significant positive effect on measured Mexican productivity levels166. 
Depending on using the foreign firms’ share in total employment or total gross 
production in the empirical model, the estimated effect is significant at the 10% or 5% 
acceptance level. In contrast, the estimated effect of the variable FIRnd remains 
insignificant, which suggests that there are no externalities of an inter-industry nature 
between regions.
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of FORnd is much larger compared to 
the estimated coefficients of intra-regional FOR and FIR. F-tests indicate that the 
estimated coefficients of FORlnd and FOR3nd are significantly different from the 
coefficients of FORI and FOR3167. This would suggest that the presence of foreign 
firms in manufacturing industries in other regions leads to a higher percentage 
increase in the measured level of Mexican productivity compared to foreign 
participation within regions.
However, as mentioned earlier, the variable FORnd does not take into account 
distance between regions at all. Therefore, equal weight is given to foreign investment 
in all parts of the country. In other words, for a given region, foreign investment in a
165 FORnd and FIRnd could not be simultaneously included in the same empirical model, as this 
produces a high level of multicollinearity.
Girina and Wakelin (2002) find a similar significant positive effect o f inter-regional intra-industry 
foreign participation for the UK. In contrast, Smaizynska (2002) finds a significant positive effect of 
inter-regional inter-industry foreign participation.
167 The test statistic for equality of the O-coefficient o f FOR and FORlnd = F(l, 122) = 2.36, prob>F = 
0.13.
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neighbouring region is given equal weight to foreign investment in regions located at 
a large distance. This assumption is strong, especially given the importance of 
geographical proximity suggested by earlier findings in this chapter. Also, empirical 
studies on the effect of geographical proximity on spillovers have produced robust 
evidence that some form of distance decay effect is affecting such externalities (see 
especially Jaffe et al, 1993; Audretsch, 2003; Howells, 2002).
Finally, estimating the effect of inter-regional foreign participation without 
distance controls may alternatively pick up the presence of a competition effect. The 
positive association between the general intra-industry foreign participation in the rest 
of the country and the measured productivity levels of Mexican firms in a region can 
be taken to indicate that there is a positive efficiency effect from the general intra­
industry presence of foreign firms. This would suggest a positive effect from 
increased competition, which is in line with the traditionally assumed effect from 
FDI-related competitive pressure (see Caves, 1996). In any case, the estimated 
positive association is insufficient evidence of the existence of spatial externalities 
from FDI, due to the omission of any form of distance-related decay effect.
6.6.2. Controlling for Distance
There are several ways in which some form of distance-related decay effect can be 
included into the empirical estimation of inter-regional externalities from FDI. 
Effectively, the main difference between these alternative ways is how the concept of 
distance is empirically given form (see Anselin, 1988). One method is to weigh 
foreign participation in other regions by the distance between a given region and the 
other regions, as used by Girma and Wakelin (2001) and Driffield and Girina (2003).
289
They follow Adesera (2000), who empirically estimates cost functions across US 
states and Metropolitan Areas for several industry sectors. In these estimations, 
Adsera (2000) estimates the existence of inter-state externalities, by including 
distance-weighed measures of total state activity168. The distance element is made 
operational by taking the distance or squared distance in kilometres between the 
largest cities of the states (see Adsera, 2000).
In comparison to the FORnd and FIRnd indicators that underlie the inter­
regional FDI-induced externality effects presented in table 6.10., the use of this 
specification of the distance decay effect of inter-regional foreign participation in 
Mexico changes the measurement of these variables in the following manner:
t -t t , , . , - .  -  I? !■ / ,  (employeesforeignfirms) * / , /  , )
FIRldistancejj — ^  ( (  (totalemployees) )  ^ stancej_ g^
where
industries i, h = 1,........... 9
states j, g=  1, 2 , ........... 32
distance j -  g = distance in number of kilometres between state capital cities169.
As a result of the transformation, the foreign participation indicators are weighed with 
respect to any given region based on the distance between regions. This interpretation
168 For a similar construction in an empirical setting of EU regions, see Greunz (2003).
169 See the appendix to this chapter for the distance matrix containing distances between state capital 
cities.
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gives the level of foreign participation in regions located nearby a given region a 
relatively larger weight compared to FDI in regions located at a larger distance, thus 
relating a distance-caused decay effect to possible inter-regional FDI-induced 
externalities.
A second method to account for some form of distance-related decay effect is 
to classify the regions in Mexico according to their participation in a multi-regional 
economic system within the country. Such an interpretation of the distance-related 
decay effect relates the possible occurrence of inter-regional FDI-induced 
externalities to the concept of interaction. The level of interaction between firms in 
different regions may be related to more factors than mere geographical distance. For 
instance, interaction may be related to the level of common practices and customs and 
the sharing of a similar culture. For such reasons, firms that are located in regions that 
belong to a particular multi-regional economic system may be assumed to have a 
higher level of interaction with firms located in this regional system, compared to the 
level of interaction they have with firms located in other regions in the country.
Interpreting the effect of distance in this manner implies that the 32 regions of 
Mexico need to be reclassified into a set of regional economies. Here, I use the 
classification system proposed by Inegi (2001). The 32 regions are classified into five 
regional economies: 1. Central Region (Federal District, Estado de Mexico, Puebla, 
Hidalgo, Morelos and Tlaxcala); 2. Northern Central Region (Guanajuato, Queretaro, 
San Luis Potosi, Durango, Aguascalientes and Zacatecas); 3. Border Region (Nuevo 
Leon, Baja California, Coahuila, Tamaulipas and Sonora); 4. Pacific Region (Jalisco, 
Michoagan, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Colima and Baja California 
Sur); 5. Gulf Region (Veracruz, Yucatan, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, Campeche).
For a given industry in a member region of one of these regional economies,
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intra- and inter-industry inter-regional foreign participation can be related to the 
distance-related decay effect in a dichotomous fashion. On the one hand, foreign 
participation in other regions that belong to the same multi-regional economic system 
is calculated in a similar fashion as FORlnodistance and FIRlnodistance. On the 
other hand, foreign investment in regions that do not belong to the multi-regional 
economic system are assumed to have no effect on the measured level of productivity 
of the given industry.
Finally, a different interpretation of the effect of distance is to focus on 
externalities that arise from the presence of FDI in neighbouring regions. A problem 
with the interpretation of the distance-related decay effect using membership of a 
multi-regional economic system as the underlying assumption is that foreign firms 
located in regions that border such a regional economy are assumed to have no 
possible effects on productivity levels of firms in member-regions of the regional 
economic system. In contrast, the interpretation using neighbouring states focuses 
exclusively on this effect. In essence, for a given region, spatial FDI-induced 
externalities are assumed to possibly arise from foreign participation in neighbouring 
regions; regions that share a border with the given region. Foreign firms operating in 
regions that do not share a border with the given region are assumed to have no effect 
on productivity levels of Mexican firms in the state170.
In sum, I have identified three alternative ways in which to incorporate some 
form of distance-related decay effect into the estimation of FDI-induced externalities 
spilling over between regions in Mexico. All these three alternative distance decay 
effects can be tested using the regional empirical model. The results of the estimations 
are shown in table 6.11.
170 See the appendix to this chapter for the classification of regions with common borders.
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Table 6.11. Spatial externalities: distance-weighed estimations
Variables FORI FORI FORI FOR3 FORI FOR3
Constant 1.61
(0.84)
6.24
(0.60)
1.01
(0.92)
1.70
(1.30)
0.37
(0.28)
1.15
(1.45)
INVm 0.42
(8.87)***
0.42
(8.84)***
0.40
(8.76)***
0.42
(9.15)***
0.42
(8.84)***
0.45
(9.54)***
SCALE 0.07
(1.29)
0.07
(1.23)
0.05
(0.82)
0.06
(1.06)
0.06
(1.03)
0.07
(1.22)
FOR 0.12
(2.39)***
0.12
(2.39)***
0.12
(2.41)***
0.10
(2.07)**
0.12
(2.56)***
0.13
(3.07)***
FIR 0.16
(2.26)**
0.16
(2.27)**
0.19
(2.57)***
0.11
(1.88)*
0.21
(2.88)***
0.10
(1.76)*
URB 0.08
(1.01)
-0.14
(0.28)
0.15
(1.84)*
0.05
(0.79)
0.20
(2.20)**
0.09
(1.68)*
DUAL -0.18
(3.37)***
-0.18
(3.35)***
-0.19
(3.61)***
-0.20
(3.51)***
-0.18
(3.34)***
-0.17
(3.02)***
LOC 0.07
(1.70)*
0.07
(1.69)*
0.07
(1-59)
0.06
(1.47)
0.08
(1.72)*
0.07
(1.82)*
FORdist 0.01
(0.10)
— — -- — —
FIRdist 0.40
(0.46)
— — — —
FORgroup -- — -0.03
(0.91)
-0.03
(104)
— —
FJLRgroup — — 0.08
(0.41)
0.33
(1.49)
— —
FORneighbour — — — — -0.01
(0.30)
-0.006
(0.18)
FIRneighbour — — -- — 0.42
(1.94)**
0.35
(2.64)***
Industry and 
state effects
5.93
(0.000)
6.02
(0.000)
7.09
(0.000)
7.17
(0.000)
5.73
(0.000)
7.25
(0.000)
F 176.82
(0.000)
962.13
(0.000)
136.31
(0.000)
35.80
(0.000)
528.90
(0.000)
163.69
(0.000)
Rz 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 166 166 163 163 162 162
Absolute values ofT-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% level 
of significance. Estimations are heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method 
F-value for industry and state dummies is for F-test whether industry and state dummies have 
coefficients equal to 0.
FORdist, FIRdist: distance decay effect using distance measured in kilometres between capital cities as 
weighing factor;
FORgroup, FERgroup: membership of multi-state regional economy;
Fomeighbour, FIRneighbour: distance decay effect based on shared borders.
The first two empirical estimations contain either FORdist or FIRdist, which are the 
distance-weighed foreign participation shares of regions where the weight is 
calculated by distance in kilometres between state capital cities. The results of this
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specification of the estimated effect of inter-regional FDI-induced externalities 
suggest that there are no significant inter-regional externalities from FDI. Findings of 
a similar insignificant estimated effect of inter-regional foreign participation that are 
based on a similar distance decay parameter are presented in Girma and Wakelin 
(2001) and also Driffield and Wakelin (2003) for the UK.
However, the findings need to be interpreted with caution. One reason for 
caution relates to the fact that the variation of FORdist and FIRdist may be affected 
by measurement problems from two sources. One source is that the distance measure 
assumes that flows occur between capital cities. This may not accurately capture the 
real flows between regions. Furthermore, the distances between capital cities are not 
controlled for any regional variation regarding quantity and quality of infrastructure. 
Therefore, there may be distortions, as the distances in kilometres may not accurately 
reflect distances in travel time.
The second reason for caution is that the estimations suffer severely from 
multicolllinearity problems. One indication for this is that the inclusion of either 
FORdist or FIRdist causes the coefficient of URB to drop considerably and its 
estimated effect is no longer significantly different from 0. This is an indication that 
multicollinearity may have affected the estimations. VTF analysis indicates that the 
inclusion of either one of the distance-weighed variables indeed causes such problems. 
For instance, the estimation including FORdist produces a total average VIF score of 
15, with FORdist carrying the highest VIF score of 20.23; values that are above those 
suggested by Chatteijee, Hadi en Price (2000). Therefore, the estimated coefficients
171do not lend themselves to clear interpretation .
171 In the case of FIRdist, the average VIF score is 34, and FIRdist carries the highest VIF score o f465. 
Furthermore, estimations exluding URB do not appear to suffer less from the multicollinearity 
problem. The estimation that includes FORdist while omitting URB produces an average VTF value of 
18.14, with FORdist having a VIF score of above 20. The values for the estimation using FIRdist are an
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The second specification of the distance-related decay effect uses the variables 
FORgroup and FIRgroup, which represent foreign participation shares in member 
states of regional economies, as defined in Inegi (2001). The estimated coefficient of 
within-industry spatial externalities is negative, whereas the coefficient of the variable 
of between-industry externalities carries a positive sign. However, the estimated 
effects of both variables are not significant. Therefore, these findings suggest that 
there are no spatial FDI-induced externalities between regions, when using the inter­
regional interaction-inspired distance decay specification.
Having said so, these empirical findings have to be interpreted with the 
necessary caution as well. First, it is rather unclear to what extent the regional 
economies as defined by Inegi (2001) represent actual regional economies proper, in 
the sense that they constitute collections of regions that have integrated economic 
processes. As such, it is unclear whether the assumption is correct that firms, 
compared to their level of interaction with firms located elsewhere, have a higher 
level of interaction with firms in the multi-regional economy. In relation to this, an 
important caveat underlying this particular interpretation of the distance decay effect 
is that it entails that foreign investment in a given non-member region that shares a 
common border with a region that does belong to a regional economic system is 
assumed to have no possible externality effect on the neighbouring region. It may be 
that this assumption is too restrictive.
The estimated results presented in the final two columns of table 6.12. give a
clearer indication of the possible effect of foreign investment using neighbouring
states as the criterion for the distance-based decay effect. These results suggest that,
for a given industry, the presence of foreign firms in neighbouring states in similar
average VIF value of 98, with FIRdist having a score of 465. In contrast, the VIF statistics for the 
estimation including URB without FORdist or FIRdist have an average VIF score o f 4, with URB 
carrying a VIF score of 3.95.
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industries does not affect the Mexican productivity level in that industry. However, 
the variable representing foreign participation in other industries in neighbouring 
states carries a positive sign and is significant at either the 5% or 1% acceptance level. 
This result suggests that Mexican firms in a given region benefit from FDI-induced 
externalities from foreign firms located in neighbouring regions, when these foreign 
firms are operating in dissimilar but related industries.
This finding is in contrast to the limited number of studies on FDI-induced 
externalities that have included distance-based controls when measuring the inter­
regional variation of foreign participation172. Evidence from more qualitative studies 
indicates that externalities from FDI do reach further beyond the regional level (see 
Potter et al., 2002). The results presented in 6.12. are in support of this, be it that such 
externalities are subject to a strong distance-decay effect, as they only seem to 
materialise among neighbouring regions. As such, the strength of the distance-related 
decay effect is in line with e.g. Jaffe et al. (1993), who find that knowledge spillovers 
peter out after a relative short geographical distance173.
Distance versus no distance
Findings on the existence of inter-regional externalities from FDI differ markedly, 
depending on whether some form of distance-related decay effect is included in the 
measurement of the inter-regional variation of intra- and inter-industry foreign 
participation. When not including any form of distance-decay effect, the estimations 
produce a significant positive association between measured Mexican productivity 
and intra-industry inter-regional regional foreign participation; a finding similar to
172 Most notably Girrma and Wakelin (2001) and Driffield and Ginna (2003). As mentioned earlier, 
Smarzynksa (2002) does find a similar effect, but does not control for inter-regional distances.
173 See also Greunz (2003) for similar findings of a strong distance decay effect on externalities.
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Girma and Wakelin (2002). In contrast, the incorporation of some form of distance- 
decay effect indicates that, if there are inter-regional FDI-induced externalities, they 
are of the inter-industry kind. This is indicated by the estimated significant positive 
association between measured Mexican productivity and inter-regional inter-industry 
foreign participation, with the distance-related decay effect in the form of the 
neighbouring regions criterion.
Both types of findings need to be interpreted with caution. Setting aside the 
problems of multicollinearity, the findings indicating the existence of intra-industry 
inter-regional externalities appear more likely to capture some form of competition 
effect, rather than the occurrence of inter-regional externalities through the other 
channels of externalities. Due to the omission of any distance-decay specification, this 
type of externality is unrelated to geographical proximity, however.
The findings from the attempts to relate geographical distance to FDI-induced 
externalities indicate that the specific construction of the distance-related decay effect 
influences the empirical estimations. Out of three alternative distance-decay effects, 
the specification where externalities are hypothesised to spill over among 
neighbouring regions is the only distance decay specification that identifies spatial 
FDI-induced externalities. Keeping this draw back in mind, the findings of inter­
industry FDI-induced externalities among neighbouring regions are more appealing, 
compared to the results from the estimations that do not control for distance. The 
findings suggest that when domestic firms want to subject themselves to externalities 
from foreign-owned firms operating in the same industry, they need to locate in the 
same region. When the aim of a domestic company is to enjoy externalities from FDI 
that operates in related but dissimilar industries, its location choice is somewhat less 
restrictive, as these externalities appear to spill over between neighbouring regions, as
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well as in the region where the foreign-owned firm is located.
6.7. Summary and Conclusions
The aim of the chapter is to empirically assess the effect of geographical 
concentration or geographical proximity on the occurrence and type of FDI-induced 
externalities. Using two versions of the improved empirical model developed in 
chapter five, the present findings represent the empirical answers to the questions that 
are posed in chapter three, originating from the discussion on possible relations 
between geographical proximity and FDI-induced externalities.
One of the predicted relations concerns the effect of the level of geographical 
proximity on the occurrence of FDI-induced intra-industry externalities. I use the 
national database to empirically assess this effect. In particular, I compare the 
estimated effect of foreign participation between lowly and highly geographically 
concentrated industries. The results show some interesting features. It appears to be 
important to simultaneously control for both the effect of geographical concentration 
and the effect of the technology gap between Mexican and foreign-owned firms. 
When only considering the effect of geographical concentration, the difference in 
effect of industry-wide foreign participation between the two sets of industries is 
opposite to the hypothesised difference: industries that are lowly geographically 
concentrated benefit from foreign participation, whereas highly geographically 
concentrated industries do not experience positive externalities, according to the 
preferred IV estimations.
The findings are different when simultaneously controlling for the level of 
geographical concentration and the size of the technology gap. These findings indicate
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that geographical concentration does enhance the occurrence of FDI-induced 
externalities, but only in those industries with a relative large level of technological 
differences between Mexican and foreign-owned firms. This suggests that 
geographical concentration enhances positive externalities in those industries where 
negative externalities from competition between the two types of firms are absent.
Finally, the findings on the interaction terms indicate that geographical 
concentration and the technology gap are not necessary conditions for FDI-induced 
externalities to arise. Both the OLS and the IV estimations indicate significant 
estimated effects of the FOR variable. This variable, cleared from any effects of the 
structural factors due to the inclusion of the interaction terms, represents the 
independent effect of industry-wide foreign participation. In addition to the effect 
from this variable, the level of technological differences between FDI and Mexican 
firms and the level of geographical concentration enhance positive FDI-induced 
externalities.
The second interpretation of the relation between geographical proximity and 
FDI-induced externalities is based on a regional perspective. From a regional point of 
view, the presence of foreign firms can lead to externalities among Mexican firms that 
are located in the same region. Also, such externalities may be transmitted between 
regions. In both cases, the concept of geographical proximity is related to the distance 
between the two types of firms.
The small review of empirical attempts to detect these types of externalities 
indicates two important issues. First, when considering this type of effect, it is 
important to consider both externalities that arise within industries as well as 
externalities that occur between industries. In fact, recent arguments suggest that it 
may be more likely to expect positive FDI-induced externalities between industries.
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Second, in order to obtain appropriate estimates of inter-regional FDI-induced 
externalities, it is important to ensure that all types of intra-regional and inter-regional 
foreign participation shares are included in the estimation, in order to ensure that the 
presence of any of these types of FDI-induced externalities is correctly identified. 
Also, it is important to consider distance-related decay effects when estimating inter­
regional externalities.
In order to estimate intra- and inter-regional externalities, I transform the 
national empirical model into a regional one. As is the case for the national database, 
it proves important to include agglomeration variables into the regional model, to 
ensure that the estimations of externality effects from foreign participation do not 
suffer from omitted variable bias. Adding state and industry effects controls for the 
regional and industry dimensions of the regional database.
The findings on the existence of intra-regional FDI-induced externalities are 
important in two respects. First, the estimated effects of both intra- and inter-industry 
foreign participation appear to be influenced by endogeneity issues. The fact that 
measured productivity levels in the regional empirical model influence intra-industry 
levels of foreign participation is in line with the results from the national model 
presented in chapter five. However, there also appears to be an endogenous relation 
between the level of measured productivity in one industry and the level of foreign 
participation in dissimilar but related industries. Therefore, it is important to control 
for endogeneity of both types of intra-regional foreign participation.
Using the IV estimation, the results show significant positive effects of the 
intra- and inter-industry intra-regional foreign participation shares. This indicates that 
both types of foreign participation.create positive FDI-induced externalities. As for 
the relative importance of the two types of foreign participation, the estimated
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coefficients are of similar magnitude, suggesting that both types of externalities are 
equally important. Externalities from inter-industry foreign participation are usually 
interpreted as externality effects from buyer-supplier linkages. However, due to the 
use of highly aggregated data to estimate the regional model in the present study, it is 
likely that part of the positive externality effects from intra-industry foreign 
participation is caused by such buyer-supplier linkages in these broadly defined 
industries.
There is a striking contrast between the findings that include or omit any form 
of distance-related decay effect in the estimations of inter-regional FDI-induced 
externalities. The estimation of inter-regional foreign participation that does not 
consider inter-regional distances indicates that there are significant positive intra­
industry externalities. In contrast, when controlling for distance, the significant 
estimated effect of inter-regional foreign participation indicates that positive FDI- 
induced externalities of the inter-industry type are transmitted between regions. The 
difference in findings indicates that it is important to control for inter-regional 
distances when estimating spatially transmitted FDI-induced externalities.
Finally, the findings from the estimations that do control for distance between 
regions indicate that different distance decay specifications can lead to different 
conclusions. Only one out of the three alternative distance decay specifications 
suggests that there are significant externalities from inter-regional foreign 
participation. This particular distance-related decay effect is constructed on the 
assumption that inter-regional externalities may only occur between neighbouring 
regions. The empirical findings from the use of this particular distance decay 
specification indicate that there are inter-regional FDI-induced externalities that are of 
an inter-industry nature, be it that they are subject to a strong spatial decay effect.
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Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusions
7.1. Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a vast increase in empirical research on the 
identification and quantification of externalities arising from the presence and 
operations of FDI in host economies. The extensive increase in the body of empirical 
evidence does not seem to have lead to a satisfactory level of consensus, however. 
Some conclude from the evidence that externalities from FDI are positive. In contrast, 
others conclude that the presence of FDI may actually hurt domestic firms in a host 
economy, due to the occurrence of negative FDI-induced externalities.
Furthermore, although there is widespread agreement on the likely importance 
of structural factors that influence such externalities, empirical evidence is not clear- 
cut. At present, the level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms is the only accepted 
factor that facilitates or stimulates the occurrence of positive FDI-induced 
externalities. However, the translation of this concept in empirical research in the 
form of the level of technological differences between FDI and domestic firms is open 
to criticism. Not only may such technological differences capture the effect of 
different factors, also some empirical estimations that use this indirect indicator have 
produced findings that are in direct contrast to the absorptive capacity hypothesis.
Empirical estimations of externalities and productivity effects are not confined 
to research on FDI-induced externalities. In fact, contemporary research on 
externalities attaches great importance to the effect of the type of distribution of firms 
and industries over geographical space. From different strands of theory, the premise 
is that firms in a geographical concentration of economic activity may benefit from
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agglomeration economies; external economies that are uniquely related to the 
existence of the geographical concentration of activity. In comparison to firms located 
elsewhere, firms and industries located in such an agglomeration may benefit from 
additional productivity advantages that are specifically related to the existence of the 
agglomeration.
Against the background of the outlined state of affairs in empirical research on 
FDI-induced externalities and the importance attached to geographical concentration 
of industries in empirical studies focusing on agglomeration economies, the present 
study has been devoted to address the following research question:
What is the effect o f geographical concentration or proximity on the occurrence o f  
externalities from FDI in Mexican manufacturing industries?
To provide a satisfactory answer to this research question, three related issues are 
addressed in the study. First, are there overall externalities from the presence and 
operations of FDI in Mexican manufacturing industries? In relation to this, the second 
issue concerns the effect of technological differences on these externalities. Although 
the interpretation of this factor is not clear-cut, previous research does indicate that it 
may influence the occurrence of externalities from FDI; therefore, it needs to be 
considered in the present study. Finally, the analysis of the effect of geographical 
concentration or proximity on the occurrence of externalities from the presence and 
operations of foreign-owned firms responds to the need to identify viable alternative 
determinants of FDI-induced externalities.
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7.2. Structure of the Study
The main body of the thesis starts with chapter two, which provides a synthesis of 
previous theoretical and empirical research on FDI-induced externalities in host 
economies. The chapter starts with an introduction of the concept of externalities and 
discusses the use of it in empirical research on effects from FDI. In addition, I discuss 
the main mechanisms through which externality effects from FDI can be transmitted 
to domestic firms in a host economy. Following this, the chapter presents an extensive 
review of previous empirical research on the statistical identification and 
quantification of FDI-induced externalities. In this review, I discuss empirical 
findings on the effect from foreign participation as found in cross-country studies of 
determinants of economic growth, as well as empirical studies looking at cross­
industry or plant level estimates of determinants of productivity in host economies. In 
this discussion, I pay special attention to underlying estimation issues and problems. 
The last part of chapter two discusses the use of technological differences as 
determinant of FDI-induced externalities and presents related empirical evidence.
The purpose of chapter three is to assess the suitability of the concept of 
geographical concentration or proximity as a determinant of FDI-induced externalities. 
In this chapter, I introduce the concept of agglomeration economies and discuss the 
various types of externalities that may be created as a result of the existence and 
functioning of an agglomeration of economic activity. Furthermore, I discuss the 
underlying mechanisms that create the various types of agglomeration economies, 
comparing them with the mechanisms causing externalities from FDI. Following this 
theoretical assessment of the relations between agglomeration and FDI, I review the 
limited amount of available empirical evidence on relations between FDI and
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agglomeration economies. In particular, I focus on empirical studies on FDI location 
decisions that incorporate agglomeration variables to assess whether foreign-owned 
firms are attracted to regions that contain agglomerations of activity. Furthermore, I 
look at empirical estimations of FDI-induced externalities that include some form of 
assessment of the role of geography, by estimating the effect of regional foreign 
participation Finally, I relate the findings from chapter three to the research question 
of the present study.
The purpose of chapter four is three-fold. First, the chapter introduces and 
develops an empirical model that has been applied in a cross-industry setting to 
statistically estimate whether there are intra-industry externalities from foreign 
participation in a host economy. Second, the robustness of this empirical model is 
tested by comparing estimated FDI-induced externality effects from this model with 
findings from a set of alternatively specified empirical models. Furthermore, these 
empirical findings are considered with special reference to previous research for 
Mexico, as these previous findings are directly related to the empirical findings in the 
present study. Third, the empirical model is used to assess the effect of the level of 
technological differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms as indirect 
indicator of the level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms.
The empirical findings presented in chapter four can be seen as the type of 
evidence from cross-sectional estimates of FDI-induced externalities that has been 
accepted in previous empirical research as sufficient evidence to conclude on the 
existence of such externalities. The main aim of chapter five is to extend the initial 
empirical analysis as presented in chapter four, focusing on estimation issues that 
have been identified in chapter, two. First, I critically assess the theoretical 
explanations for the type of externality effect as found in chapter four. Second, I look
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into the functional form of the empirical model. I determine whether the empirical 
model has the best functional form and assess whether a different functional form has 
implications for the estimated effect of FDI. Third, I address the potential problem of 
omitted variable bias. I identify two factors that may be assumed to be important 
when estimating determinants of productivity levels of Mexican industries and 
determine whether the omission of these two variables has created omitted variable 
bias in the estimation of FDI-induced externalities.
Finally, an important part of chapter five addresses the core criticism that OLS 
estimations of FDI-induced externalities may be upward biased as foreign firms are 
likely to gravitate towards high productivity industries in a host economy. To address 
this problem, I introduce an instrument for the cross-industry variation of industry­
wide foreign participation, which allows for unbiased estimation of externalities from 
FDI. This instrument is used to test for endogeneity of FDI. Following this, I 
compare instrumental variables estimations of FDI-induced externalities with OLS 
findings.
Chapter six uses the empirical model as introduced in chapter four and further 
developed in chapter five to empirically investigate the effects of geographical 
concentration or proximity on the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities. In 
particular, this chapter looks at the effect of geographical proximity in three 
alternative ways. First, the empirical model for national aggregate manufacturing 
industries is used to assess the effect of the level of geographical concentration of 
industries on the existence and level of intra-industry externalities. Next, I transform 
the national empirical model into a regional one, which I use to estimate intra- and 
inter-industry FDI-induced externalities from FDI within regions. Here, the concept of 
geographical proximity is interpreted from a regional perspective, focusing on
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externalities that may arise in a region where a foreign-owned firm is located. Finally, 
I use the same regional model to estimate whether externalities from intra- and inter­
industry foreign participation spill over between regions. Again, the concept of 
geographical proximity is related to geographical distance, focusing this time on 
identifying the negative effect of distance on the interregional transmission of 
externalities from FDI.
7.3. Main Findings and Qualifications
The first main finding that this study has produced is related to the use of the concepts 
of spillovers and externalities in research on effects from FDI. The commonly 
adopted use of the term technological spillovers appears incorrect, as this term does 
not cover all possible externality effects that may arise from the presence and 
operations of FDI. In addition to externalities that are technological of nature, 
pecuniary externalities may also arise from inward FDI, affecting efficiency or 
productivity levels of domestic firms in a host economy. These pecuniary externalities 
are covered by commonly accepted definitions in applied research on FDI-induced 
externalities and should therefore be considered in such empirical research.
Furthermore, the incorrect interpretation that FDI-induced externalities consist 
solely of technological externalities has, at least up until recently, led to a bias in 
research towards the identification of positive externalities. The possibility that the 
presence of FDI may create negative externalities is a feasible one when including 
negative pecuniary externalities as possible externality effect from foreign 
participation.
Therefore, in response to the need to have an alternative term that refers to
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externality effects from the presence and operations of FDI, I introduce the new term 
of FDI-induced externalities in the study, representing the entire range of externalities 
that may arise from foreign participation in a host economy. FDI-induced externalities 
contain both technological and pecuniary externalities; furthermore, they may be of a 
positive as well as of a negative nature.
The second important finding relates to the methodology of the empirical 
estimation of FDI-induced externalities. In particular, the present study takes great 
care in testing the results from the initial empirical model for consistency and for the 
presence of possible biases. Most notably, the present study has produced findings 
that respond to the common criticism that OLS estimations of externalities from FDI 
are upwardly biased, as foreign firms gravitate towards high productivity industries. 
Despite of the serious implications of this criticism, the present study represents the 
first study that specifically tests and controls for the effect of endogenous FDI in a 
cross-sectional setting.
In the study, I have introduced an instrument for the industry-wide foreign 
participation in Mexican industries in the form of the average FDI-intensity of 
manufacturing industries. I use the FDI-intensity of US manufacturing industries as a 
proxy to calculate this instrument. As this instrument meets the requirements of a 
successful instrument, the application of this instrument leads to unbiased estimates of 
FDI-induced externalities in Mexico. As such, it represents the first successful 
empirical application of IV estimation of FDI-induced externalities in a cross- 
sectional setting.
In extension to the validity of the instrument that is introduced in the present 
study, the empirical findings from .the IV estimation represent an important piece of 
empirical counterevidence against the common criticism towards OLS estimates o f
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FDI-induced externalities. Although the criticism is correct in arguing that OLS 
estimates are biased when FDI is endogenous to the empirical model, the criticism 
that such endogeneity will automatically lead to an overestimation of externalities is 
not valid. Foreign firms in Mexico do gravitate towards industries with particular 
productivity levels. However, instead of being attracted to high productivity industries, 
foreign-owned firms gravitate towards low productivity -  labour intensive -  industries. 
Subsequently, IV estimations of FDI-induced externalities indicate that the original 
OLS estimations underestimate the level of positive FDI-induced externalities; IV 
estimations indicate a more significant and larger positive estimated externality effect 
of industry-wide foreign participation.
Important to note is that the findings from the present study can not be taken 
as being in support of previous empirical findings for Mexico that are based on the 
1970s database. Given the present state of affairs, both the existence and the type of 
externalities that arise from foreign investment need to be identified empirically. If 
foreign firms in 1970s were similarly attracted to labour intensive industries, it may 
well be that the empirical estimates of FDI-induced externalities from this previous 
research are downwardly biased. However, it may also be the case that foreign firms 
in that earlier era were concentrating in high productivity industries, in which case 
earlier findings may be biased upwards. Due to the fact that the previous studies on 
Mexico do not test and control for the endogenous component of industry-wide 
foreign participation, it is not possible to assess whether there is a bias in these 
previous studies.
The third main finding concerns the use of the level of technological 
differences between domestic and foreign-owned firms as structural factor influencing 
externalities from FDI. The study has presented arguments and empirical evidence
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that challenge the use of the level of the technology gap as indirect indicator of the 
level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms. Instead of being related to the concept 
of absorptive capacity, the technology gap may alternatively be capturing the extent to 
which domestic and foreign-owned firms are in direct competition with each other. 
Given recent findings that suggest that such competition effects may create negative 
externalities, the level of technological differences may be positive related to the 
occurrence of positive FDI-induced externalities.
The empirical findings in the present study are in support of this alternative 
interpretation. Industries with large technology gaps experience positive externalities 
from foreign participation. In contrast, industries with relative small technological 
differences between FDI and Mexican firms do no benefit from positive FDI-induced 
externalities.
Finally, the study presents a set of theoretical and empirical findings that is 
directly related to the question whether geographical concentration or proximity is an 
important factor to consider when estimating FDI-induced externalities. The 
discussion of theories on agglomeration economies and the assessment of possible 
relations between foreign participation and agglomeration economies have produced 
several possible relations between the two concepts. Given the limitations of the 
present study, not all these relations have been assessed.
One relation that is not addressed in the present study concerns the effect of 
foreign participation on agglomeration economies in the host economy. On the one 
hand, foreign firms may lower the overall level of agglomeration economies, if  they 
do not participate in their local economic environment to the same degree as domestic 
firms. On the other hand, if they do participate, they may create a higher level of 
agglomeration economies, due to additional technological externalities being
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transmitted through channels of externalities. An empirical study into the existence 
and type of this effect of foreign participation would entail an empirical estimation of 
the existence and level of agglomeration economies, followed by some form of 
assessment of the effect of regional and/or sectoral foreign participation on these 
external economies.
Second, the discussion on agglomeration economies distinguishes between 
static and dynamic agglomeration economies. In a similar fashion, externalities from 
FDI may also be static or dynamic of nature. The present study focuses on the 
identification of static externalities, given the type of data that is available for the 
empirical analysis of the study. In order to identify dynamic externalities, panel data 
is required, allowing the estimation of externality effects from foreign participation 
through time.
The empirical findings presented in the study regarding the effect of 
geographical proximity or concentration on the occurrence of static FDI-induced 
externalities are multifaceted. One finding relates to the general specification of the 
estimated empirical models. As the type of geographical distribution of industries 
within a host economy may create external economies, it is important to control for 
this distribution when estimating FDI-induced externalities, in order to avoid omitted 
variable bias.
In the present study, such controls are made in both the national and the 
regional model. The national model contains the variable GINI, which captures the 
inter-state level of geographical concentration of individual industries within Mexico. 
In most cases, this variable carries a significant positive coefficient, suggesting the 
existence of positive agglomeration economies. The regional model controls for both 
urbanisation and localisation economies, incorporating variables that control for intra-
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regional industry size and the level of geographical (over-)concentration of the 
industry with respect to the national average. Both variables carry significant positive 
coefficients in the empirical estimations, indicating that industries are subject to both 
types of agglomeration economies.
Important to mention is that the inclusion of these variables into the national 
and regional model does not provide an answer to the question whether geographical 
proximity or concentration influences the occurrence of FDI-induced externalities. 
Instead, they are included to ensure that the estimated externality effects of FDI are 
not biased due to the omission of agglomeration variables. Such a bias may have 
affected the estimated effects of foreign participation in other empirical studies, as 
they do not control for the presence of agglomeration economies.
The main empirical findings on the effect of geographical proximity on FDI- 
induced externalities are three-fold. First, using the national empirical model, the 
preferred IV estimations indicate that positive externalities are enhanced by 
agglomeration, in those industries that are characterised by large technological 
differences between FDI and domestic firms. Therefore, geographical concentration 
does enhance FDI-induced externalities in those industries where the competition 
effect from industry-wide foreign participation is absent.
Important to note is that a high level of geographical concentration and large 
technological differences between Mexican and foreign-owned firms are not 
necessary conditions for FDI-induced externalities to materialise. The estimations 
show that the variable of industry-wide foreign participation, cleared of any effect 
from the level of technological differences or the level of geographical concentration, 
carries a significant estimated positive coefficient. Geographical concentration and 
technological differences do have additional stimulating effects on these externalities,
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but they do not constitute critical factors in the sense that FDI - induced externalities 
only occur in those industries that are geographically concentrated or have a 
sufficient level of technological differences.
Second, the relevance of geographical proximity is empirically assessed by 
considering the effect of distance on the occurrence of externalities from FDI. With 
the use of a regional model, this interpretation of the effect of geographical proximity 
is tested in two ways, by considering both intra- and inter-industry externalities that 
may occur within regions, as well as between regions.
The estimations from the regional model indicate that both intra- and inter­
industry FDI-induced externalities are important from a regional perspective: for a 
given Mexican-owned share of an industry in a given region, the estimated level of 
labour productivity is significantly positively associated with both intra- and inter­
industry foreign participation in the same region. The positive externality effect from 
inter-industry foreign participation is in line with other recent empirical findings that 
indicate that inter-industry externalities are an important component of overall 
externalities from FDI.
Two remarks need to be made regarding this finding from the regional model. 
First, the estimations are sensitive to the use of OLS and IV estimations. The fact that 
IV estimations of intra-industry externalities indicate a significant positive effect is in 
line with the findings obtained from the national model. However, the findings from 
the regional model indicate that the estimation of the externality effect of foreign 
participation in dissimilar industries is also subject to a bias from endogeneity, as 
OLS and IV estimations differ strongly.
There certainly is a case to be made in support of the findings of the present 
study, as inter-regional foreign participation may be influenced by the level of
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productivity of a given industry in that region. Also, findings from the national 
database indicate that this attraction may be in the form of foreign firms being 
attracted to low productivity industries. Therefore, the finding that the OLS 
estimations of inter-industry intra-regional FDI-induced externalities in the present 
study underestimate these externalities can be supported.
In relation to this, although other empirical estimations also have identified 
positive inter-industry externalities, they have not controlled for the possibility that 
these findings are biased due to endogeneity aspects of inter-industry foreign 
participation. This means that such OLS findings of positive intra-regional inter­
industry FDI-induced externalities need to be interpreted with caution, as they may 
incorporate an endogenous element.
Second, the empirical results in the present study do not differentiate between 
forward and backward linkages. Although inter-industry externalities can arise 
through both types of linkages, the majority of empirical estimates focus on those 
input-output relations where domestic firms act as suppliers to foreign-owned 
companies. It may be that the estimated effects in the present study are imprecise, due 
to both the high level of aggregation of industries and the averaging of inter-industry 
foreign participation into one variable for all industries in a region. Estimates may 
gain in precision when those regional industries are identified that have the strongest 
input-output linkages with a given industry, and the level of foreign participation in 
these selected industries is used in the empirical estimations.
Finally, the empirical estimations address the existence of inter-regional 
externalities from FDI. The results suggest that externalities from FDI are not 
confined to the region in which foreign firms are located. For a given industry in a 
given region, the estimations indicate a significant positive externality effect of
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foreign firms that are located in neighbouring regions. This positive externality effect 
materialises in the form of inter-industry externalities. This suggests that if Mexican 
firms want to benefit from intra-industry externalities, they need to locate in the same 
region as where foreign firms are located. To benefit from inter-industry externalities, 
domestic firms will also have to locate in geographical proximity, be it that this 
proximity is not as restrictive as in the case of intra-industry externalities from FDI.
The cautionary note regarding these particular findings is that they are 
sensitive to the specific construction of the spatial decay parameter that captures the 
effect of inter-regional distances on externality effects from foreign participation. In 
the study, three alternative decay effects are constructed and tested; only the decay 
effect that assumes that externalities may only occur between neighbouring regions 
results in significant inter-industry FDI-induced externalities. Therefore, the findings 
should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence that the specific spatially related 
decay effect is in the form of the neighbouring regions assumption. Instead, the 
findings should be seen as being in support of the notion that geographical proximity 
has an effect on these externalities: FDI-induced externalities may be transmitted over 
geographical space, to areas larger than a specific region where foreign firms are 
located. In this process, geographical distance has a negative effect on the occurrence 
of such externalities. The findings from the present study suggest that this negative 
effect is quite strong, as only neighbouring regions appear to pick up FDI-induced 
externalities.
7.4. Implications for Future Research
The present study is an example of applied empirical research engaged in the
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statistical identification and quantification of FDI - induced externalities. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, the study does not represent a mere 
continuation of this type of research, as it addresses several of the structural problems 
that have remained unaddressed to some extent in previous research. As such, the 
findings from the present study carry implications for future research in this field. Of 
course, these implications must be seen in light of the fact that the present study only 
relates to one particular host economy, relying on a one-year cross-sectional sample 
of industries for its empirical analysis. Keeping these limitations in mind, several 
recommendations can be made.
First, the study identifies problems surrounding the use of the concept of 
externalities in empirical research on FDI effects. The incorrect use of the concept of 
technological externalities has led to a neglect of pecuniary externalities. The latter 
type of externalities needs to be included in applied research on FDI-induced 
externalities, to ensure that the whole range of externalities is picked up. Following 
from this inclusion, it may be possible to start investigating ways how to distinguish 
between technological and pecuniary externalities in empirical studies.
Related to this, further theoretical and empirical research is required regarding 
the existence of negative externalities from FDI. The only explanation for the 
empirically established negative relation between industry-wide foreign participation 
and productivity of domestic firms is that a market stealing effect must have occurred. 
There are two problems with this. First, the study has indicated that the market 
stealing argument can be challenged. In addition to this, no other explanations have 
been offered to explain negative FDI-induced externalities. Second, the study 
indicates that an estimated negative, effect from foreign-participation may be the result 
of a misspecification bias, caused by foreign firms gravitating towards labour
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intensive industries. In short, the only explanation for negative externalities may not 
always be valid, and estimated negative effects from foreign participation may not 
necessarily reflect the presence of negative externalities. These two important 
problems indicate the pressing need for further research efforts regarding negative 
externalities from FDI.
The use of the instrument in the study has proved successful. This implies that 
the instrument can be used in empirical research on FDI-induced externalities for 
other host economies in a similar cross-sectional setting. Furthermore, the instrument 
may also be useful in other settings. For instance, the instrument can be transformed 
to be used in a cross-country setting, by relating the average level of foreign 
participation of the industry-mix of a host economy to the average level of foreign 
participation of the similar industry mix in the US. Also, the instrument may be 
applicable to panel data settings, as the information on FDI-intensity of US 
manufacturing industries is available for several years. One restriction that seems to 
apply to the instrument is that the host economy or set of host economies under 
analysis cannot have a considerable share in US inward FDI. In such a case, the 
endogeneity problem may persist, caused by reciprocal intra-industry FDI flows 
between the US and the host economies that are related to industry productivity levels 
in the host economies. In practical terms, this means that the instrument appears best 
suited to be applied to estimate FDI-induced externalities in developing countries.
The intra-industry level of technological differences between domestic and 
foreign-owned firms as indirect indicator of the level of absorptive capacity of 
domestic firms appears to be an unsuitable tool to identify the effect of absorptive 
capacity on FDI-induced externalities. As mentioned earlier, the argument that the 
level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms may influence the occurrence of
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externalities from FDI appears to be a valid one. However, not only is the indirect 
indicator in the form of the technology gap between domestic firms and FDI open to 
alternative interpretations, it has also produced empirical findings that are in direct 
contrast to the absorptive capacity hypothesis. Therefore, future empirical work 
should focus on the development and application of more direct indicators of this 
level of absorptive capacity.
Finally, the findings concerning the relations between geographical 
concentration and FDI-induced externalities carry five important implications for 
future empirical research. First, empirical studies of FDI-induced externalities do 
generally not control for the possible presence of agglomeration economies in their 
estimations. The failure to do so creates the risk that estimations of FDI-induced 
externalities suffer from omitted variable bias. Of course, this risk is always present in 
empirical research of this type. However, given the strong theoretical and empirical 
evidence from other fields of research that indicate that the type of geographical 
distribution creates productivity effects through externalities, estimations of 
externalities from FDI that aim to minimise the risk of omitted variable bias need to 
consider the possibility that the dependent variable of the estimated models may be 
subject to externalities caused by agglomeration patterns of industries in a host 
economy.
Second, research focusing on the empirical identification of agglomeration 
economies may benefit from the inclusion of variables capturing industry-wide or 
regional foreign participation. Empirical estimates of regional static externalities are 
primarily concerned with the identification of scale effects, by using variables 
capturing the size of individual industries and total regional manufacturing activity. 
Studies on dynamic externalities focus on identifying the effects of regional
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specialisation and diversification variables. In both types of estimations, the level of 
foreign participation may have important effects on the level of agglomeration
economies. As such, the inclusion of foreign participation variables may prove to
make important contributions to empirical work in this research field.
Third, more work is needed on the interpretation of the concept of 
geographical concentration as determinant of FDI-induced externalities. The present 
study provides original indications that the level of geographical concentration 
enhances such externalities. From this finding, further evidence from other host 
economies and other research settings (cross-country, panel data) is needed to gain 
better insight into the relative importance of this type of effect of agglomeration on 
the occurrence and level of externalities from FDI.
Fourth, the present study confirms ideas expressed in recent literature that
inter-industry externalities from FDI are at least as important as intra-industry
externalities. Therefore, future empirical research needs to include both types of 
externalities, when the aim is to identify the entire range of all types of externalities 
that may arise from foreign participation.
Finally, in relation to the point above, further work is needed on the 
appropriate estimation of inter-regional FDI-induced externalities. It appears 
important that all possible forms of intra-regional and inter-regional foreign 
participation are included in an empirical model, to ensure both full and unbiased 
estimation of all possible types of FDI-induced externalities. Also, more care and 
consideration should be given to the construction and incorporation of distance decay 
parameters when estimating such externalities from inter-regional foreign 
participation.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
App. 5.1. Construction of the maquiladora variable
Information on the number of employees working in firms registered as maquiladora 
firms can be obtained from Inegi (2000): ‘National Accounts of Mexico: production, 
salaries and productivity of the maquiladora industries; country totals 1988-1999’1. 
As mentioned in the main text of chapter five, the classification system used in the 
National Accounts is different from the classification system used in the economic 
census (see Inegi, 1994 for description). I have linked the two systems using 
conversion tables published in an appendix to Inegi (1999) ‘National Accounts of 
Mexico: Goods and Services Accounts2. The actual conversion tables apply to 1993- 
1994, which is the relevant period for the 1993 economic census. Table 1 below 
contains the listing of the national accounts activities, the number of maquiladora 
employees per activity and the corresponding 6-digit manufacturing activities from 
the economic census classification system.
App. 5.1. Table 1. National Account activities, total number of maquiladora 
employees and Economic Census manufacturing activities
Table H I.
Activities of national accounts(a) employees
(b)
CMAP (clase level)
Meat and dairy products 
(cames y lacteos)
752 311101,311102,311104,311702,311201,
311202,311203,311205
Processed fruits and vegetables 
(preparacion de frutas y legumbres)
5985 311302,311301,311303,311307, 312124
1 Original title: ‘Sistema de cuentas nacionales de Mexico: la produccion, salarios, empleo y 
productividad de la industria maquiladora total nacional, 1988-1999’ (Inegi, 2000).
Original title: ‘Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico, Cuentas de Bienes y Servicios 1998’ 
(Inegi, 1999)
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Other food products 
(otros productos alimenticios)
2303 311902, 311901,312122, 311903, 312126, 
311304, 311305,311306, 311401, 311407, 
311406, 312123,312121, 312125, 311204, 
312127,312129
Soft drinks and water 
(refrescos y agues)
160 313050
Yam and fabrics of soft materials 
(hilados y tejidos de fibras blandas)
438 321201, 321202,321203, 321204, 321206, 
321211, 321213,321205, 321207
Yam and fabrics of hard materials 
(hilados y tejidos de fibras duras)
5 321111, 321112,321120, 321210
Other textile products 
(otras industrias textiles)
27020 321216, 321321,321209, 321212, 321331, 
321332, 321208, 321214, 321215, 321312, 
321311,321322
Dressing garments 
(prendas de vestir)
49738 321401, 321402,321403, 321404, 321405, 
322001, 322002, 322007, 322005, 322003, 
322004, 322008, 322009, 322006, 322010, 
322011,322012
Leather and footwear 
(cuero y calzado)
9157 323001, 323002,323003, 324001, 324003, 
324002
Sawmills, triplex and wooden boards 
(aserraderos, triplay y tableros)
75 331101,331102
Other products made of wood and cork 
(otros productos de madera y corcho)
18903 332001, 332002, 332003, 331103, 332004, 
331201, 331202, 331203, 331204, 331205, 
331206
Paper and cardboard 
(papel y carton)
2069 341010, 341021,341022, 341032, 321031, 
341033, 341034
Printing and publishing 
(imprentas y editorials)
1403 342001, 342002,342003, 342004
Oil and oil-related products 
(petroleo y derivados)
36 353000, 354002, 354003, 354001
Products from chemical industries 
(quimica basica)
137 351213, 351214, 351211,351212
Synthetic resins fibres
(resinas sinteticas y fibras quimicas)
344 351231, 351214, 351211, 351212
Pharmaceutical products 
(productos de farmaceuticos)
116 352100
Soaps, cleaning materials and cosmetics 
(jabones, detergentes y cosmeticos)
67 352222
Other chemical products 
(otros productos quimicos)
357 351222, 352210,352231, 352232, 352237, 
352238, 352239,352236, 352233,351215, 
351216, 352240
Rubbers and mbber products 
(productos de hule)
2604 355001, 355002, 355003
Plastics and products made of plastic 
(articulos de plastico)
10235 356002, 356003, 356008, 356001, 356004, 
356010, 356011,356005, 356006, 356007, 
356009, 356012
Glass and glass products 
(vidrio y productos de vidrio)
1776 362011, 362021, 362013, 362012, 362022, 
362023, 362024
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Products made from non-metallic minerals 
(productos a base de minerales no 
metalicos)
5552 361100,361201, 361202, 361203, 369113, 
369112, 369124, 369131, 369132, 369121, 
369122, 369123
Primary metal industries 
(industrias basicas de hierro y acero)
239 371001,371002, 371003, 371004, 371005, 
371006, 371008, 371007
Primary non-metallic industries 
(industrias basicas de metales no ferrosos)
946 372003, 372004, 372005, 372007, 372001, 
372001
Metals-based furniture 
(muebles metalicos)
2043 381300
Structural metal products 
(productos metalicos estructurales)
, 1037 381204,381201,381202
Metal products, excluding machinery 
(productos metalicos, excepto maquinaria)
12350 381402,381401, 381405, 381406, 381412, 
381100, 381407, 381408, 381404, 381411, 
381403,381413, 382208
Non-electrical machinery and equipment 
(maquinaria y equipo no electrico)
9017 382101,382102, 382104, 382103, 381203, 
381410, 382202, 382205, 381409, 382201, 
382106, 382203, 382204, 382207
Electric machinery and equipment 
(maquinaria y aparatos electricos)
24392 383101,382206, 383102, 382105, 383305, 
382301
White goods industries 
(aparatos electro-domesticos)
6127 383301,383302, 383303, 383304, 383306
Electronic machinery and equipment 
(equipos y aparatos electronicos)
116386 383204, 382302, 383205, 383201, 383202, 
383206
Electric systems and instruments 
(equipos y aparatos electricos)
34884 383107, 383110, 383108, 383109, 383111
Car bodywork, engines, parts and 
accessories
(carrocerias, motores, partes y accesorios 
para vehiculos automotores)
109665 384121,384122, 384123, 384124, 384125, 
383103,384126
Transport equipment and material 
(equipo y material de transporte)
2323 383105, 384201, 383106, 384205, 383104, 
384202, 384203, 384204, 384206
Other manufacturing activities 
(otras industrias manufactureras)
50835 385004,390012, 385008, 383203, 385001, 
385002, 385005, 385006, 385007, 390001, 
39002, 390008, 390005, 352235, 352234, 
390003, 390004, 390009, 390007, 390010, 
390011
Professional services 
(servicios profesionales)
4396 No manufacturing
Entertainment industries 
(servicios de esparcimiento)
467 No manufacturing
Other services 
(otros servicios)
16452 No manufacturing
(a) Original Mexican description is shown in parentheses
(b) Total number of employees is the average number of employees for the period 1992-1994. 
source: based on data taken from ‘Sistema de cuentas nacionales de Mexico: la produccion, salarios, 
empleo y productividad de la industria maquiladora total nacional, 1988-1999 (Inegi, 2000); Sistema de 
Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico, Cuentas de Bienes y Servicios 1998 (Inegi, 1999); Economic Census 
Mexico (Inegi, 1994).
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As indicated in table 1, each activity corresponds to several 6-digit (clase) industries 
The total number of maquiladora employees is only available for these aggregate 
account activities, not for the individual 6-digit manufacturing industries. In order to 
approximate the number of maquiladora industry employees per manufacturing 
industry of the census classification, I have allocated the total number of maquiladora 
employees of a particular National Account activity to all the clase industries that 
correspond to this activity. I have done this with the assumption that all clase 
industries within a particular National Account activity have the same maquiladora 
intensity in their total number of employees. Under this assumption, I have allocated 
the number of maquiladora employees of a National Account activity to its 
corresponding clase industries, using the shares of each of the clase industries as 
weights for this allocation.
In formula, the total number of maquiladora workers per clase for a given activity 
from the National Accounts is approximated as follows:
f  totalemployeesCLASE \  / \
Maqui= -----     , ~ — I x I totalmaquilaaoraemployeesA CTIVITY);V totalemployeesA CTIVITYJ
Total employees per clase is taken from the economic census 1994;
total employees of an activity is the aggregate number of employees for all the clases
of the activity (calculated with data from the economic census 1994);
total maquiladora employees per activity is taken from table 1.
The variable used in the empirical estimations presented in chapter five is 
obtained by dividing the approximated total number of maquiladora employees per 
clase by the total number of employees per clase.
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Appendix 5.2. Construction of the trade variable
Statistics on the values of Mexico’s export and import flows are classified and 
published under the Harmonised Tariff Systems (HTS). Trade data for Mexico under 
this classification system is available online from the Mexican ministry of economics 
at http://www.economia.gob.mx. For the construction of the trade variable used in the 
empirical estimations presented in chapter five, I have downloaded Mexico’s annual 
trade statistics at the 2 digit level (HTS2) and the 4 digit level (HTS4) for the period 
1990-2000, where the export and import flows represent Mexico’s aggregate trade 
values with the rest of the world.
It proved extremely difficult to link the HTS4 classification system to the 6- 
digit industry level from the Mexican economic census3 . In many cases, the HTS2- 
digit classification matches perfectly with the 4-digit (rama) economic census system. 
At the 6-digit level, the correspondence between the two different classification 
systems becomes much less clear, however. Therefore, I have linked the HTS4 data 
with the 4-digit classification. In some cases, all HTS4 activities from a particular 
HTS2 group could be allocated to one 4-digit economic census industry. Also, in 
some cases several HTS2 groups correspond to one 4-digit Mexican industry. In the 
remaining cases however, such perfect correspondence does not occur, and individual 
HTS4 activities from one HTS2 group have been allocated to different 4-digit 
Mexican industries. The results of the matching of the two systems are shown in table 
1.
3 To the best of my knowledge, conversion tables matching these two classification systems are not 
(publicly) available.
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App. 5.2. Table 1. Mexican 4-digit (Rama) CMAP classification and Harmonised
Tariff System 4
4-digit CMAP 
(rama)
HTS codes
3111 from HTS2-16: 1601,1602,1603 
from HTS2-02: all
3112 from HTS2-21: 2105,2106 
from HTS2-04: all
3113 fromHTS2-16: 1604, 1605 
from HTS2-20: all 
from HTS2-21: 2103, 2104 
from HTS2-03: all
from HTS2-07: 0710, 0711, 0712, 0713, 0714 
from HTS2-08: 0811, 0812, 0813, 0814
3114 from HTS2-19: 1901, 1904 
fromHTS2-21: 2101, 2102 
from HTS2-11: all
3115 from HTS2-19:1902,1903,11905
3116 —
3117 fromHTS2-15: 1501-1518,1520-1522
3118 from HTS2-17: all
3119 from HTS2-18: all
3121 from HTS2-22: 2209 
from HTS2-23: 2301-2307
3122 from HTS2-23: 2308,2309
3130 from HTS2-22: 2201-2208
3140 from HTS2-24: all
3211 from HTS2-50: all; from HTS2-53: all
3212 fromHTS2-51: all; from HTS2-52: all; from HTS2-54: all; 
from HTS2-55: all; from HTS2-56: all
3213 from HTS2-57: all; from HTS2-58: all; from HTS2-59: all 
from HTS2-63: all
3214 from HTS2-60: all; from HTS2-61: all
3220 from HTS2-62: all; from HTS2-65: all
3230 from HTS2-41: all; from HTS2-42: all; from HTS2-43: all
3240 from HTS2-64: all
3311 from HTS2-44: 4401-4413
3312 from HTS2-44: 4414-4421
from HTS2-45: all; from HTS2-46: all
3320 from HTS2-94: all
3410 from HTS2-47: all; from HTS2-48: all
3420 from HTS2-49: all
3511 ~
3512 from HTS2-28: all; from HTS2-29: all; from HTS2-31: all
3513 ~
4 Due to space considerations, the table only shows the HTS codes. A full description o f the activities 
belonging to these codes can be found at http://reportweb.usitc.gov/commodities/naicsicsitc.html.
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3521 from HTS2-30: all
3522 from HTS2-32: all; from HTS2-33: all; from HTS2-34: all 
from HTS2-35: all; from HTS2-36: all; from HTS2-37: all 
from HTS2-38: all
3530 —
3540 from HTS2-27: all
3550 from HTS2-40: all
3560 from HTS2-39: all
3611 from HTS2-69: 6910-6914
3612 from HTS2-69: 6901-6909
3620 from HTS2-70: all
3691 from HTS2-25: all; from HTS2-68: all
3710 from HTS2-72: all 
from HTS2-73: 7301-7311
3720 from HTS2-26: all 
from HTS2-74: 7401-7406
3811 from HTS2-73: 7312-7326 
from HTS2-74: 7407-7419
from HTS2-75: all; from HTS2-76: all; from HTS2-78: all; 
from HTS2-79: all; from HTS2-80: all; from HTS2-81: all
3812 from HTS2-83: 8301-8307 
from HTS2-84: 8401-8406
3813 —
3814 from HTS2-82: all 
from HTS2-83: 8308-8311 
from HTS2-84: 8481-8485
3821 from HTS2-84: 8432-8449, 8451-8468, 8474-8480, 
from HTS2-87; 8701
3822 from HTS2-84: 8413-8417, 8419-8421, 8423-8431 
from HTS2-93: all
3823 from HTS2-84: 8469-8473
3831 from HTS2-84: 8407-8412
from HTS2-85: 8501-8516, 8532-8548
3832 from HTS2-85: 8517-8531
3833 from HTS2-84: 8418, 8422, 8450
3841 from HTS2-87: 8702-8708, 8716
3842 from HTS2-86: all
from HTS2-87: 8709-8715
from HTS2-88: all; from HTS2-89: all
3850 from HTS2-90: all; from HTS2-91: all
3900 from HTS2-71: all; from HTS2-92: all; from HTS2-95: all 
from HTS2-96: all; from HTS2-97: all
source: based on descriptions of individual activities; the HTS descriptions are obtained from 
www.ita.doc.gov (English version) and www.economia.gob.mx (Spanish version); the Rama 
descriptions can be found in Inegi (1994)
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The variable used in the empirical analysis in chapter five, representing trade intensity 
or openness, is constructed for each 4-digit rama industry as follows:
^ 1 9 9 5  ^ ^
X exports+ imports -s-5
VV1991 J  J
Trade j = where;
(l 993production )  
i = 1 ,............... 54 rama industries
1993 production is value of total production of rama industry, taken from hiegi 
(1994)
As Mexico’s trade statistics are published in US dollars and the production statistics 
taken from the economic census are in Mexican pesos, I have re-calculated Mexico’s 
trade values in Mexican pesos, using exchange rate information for the Mexican peso 
and the US dollar available from the National Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico) at 
http://www.banxico.gob.mx. Also, to correct for price fluctuations, I have inflated 
trade values for 1991 and 1992 and deflated trade values for 1994 and 1995, in order 
to make the average trade data for the period 1991-1995 comparable with the 
production data for 1993. The necessary information on inflation is also taken from 
http://www.banxico.gob.mx.
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Appendix 5.3. Calculation of inward FDI intensity of US manufacturing 
industries and linking of US data with Mexican data
The variable that captures the cross-industry variation of foreign participation in US 
manufacturing industries is calculated using data from two datasets. First, annual data 
for the period 1988-1996 concerning the number of employees working in foreign- 
owned firms per US manufacturing industry is available from the Survey of Current 
Business of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The raw data is 
downloadable at http://www.bea.gov. Second, annual data on the total number of 
employees per US manufacturing data is available for the period 1987-19955. For 
fixed year intervals, the information comes from the US economic census. Data for 
the remaining years in this time period comes from the US Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers. Both sets of data are available at http://www.census.govA
After reclassifying the data for some of the industries that are used in the 
Survey of Current Business, the combination of the two datasets allows for the 
calculation of the share of foreign firms in total number of employees per industry as 
a measure of foreign participation. These shares, which are referred to in the main text 
of chapter five as the variable US, are shown below in table 1.
5 The reason for choosing 1995 as cut-off point for the data on' the total number of employees per 
manufacturing industry is that this is the latest available year for which the US industry data in these 
surveys is classified according to SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) Codes. After this year, a new 
classification system has been adopted, NAICS (North American Industrial Classification System), 
which is only partly comparable with the SIC system. As the data from the Surveys of Current 
Business for foreign firms operating in the US for the indicated years is classified under the general 
SIC system, I have chosen 1995 as cut-off point for the Annual Survey data.
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App. 5.3. Table 1. Share of foreign firms in total industry
employment(a)
SIC Manufacturing industries share of foreign firms in total 
number of employees
1.1 Beverages 0.25
1.2. Other
1.2.1. meat products 0.05
1.2.2. dairy products 0.17
1.2.3. preserved fruits and vegetables 0.19
1.2.4. grain mill products 0.07
1.2.5. bakery products 0.17
1.2.6. other food and kindred products 0.17
2.1. industrial chemicals and synthetics 0.71
2.2. drugs 0.63
2.3. soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods 0.46
2.4. other
2.4.1. agricultural chemicals 0.13
2.4.2. other chemical products, nec 0.23
3.1. primary metal industries
3.1.1. ferrous 0.18
3.1.2. non ferrous 0.18
3.2. fabricated metal products
3.2.1. metal cans, forgings and stampings 0.91
3.2.2. cutlery, hardware and screw products 0.05
3.2.3. heating equipment, plumbing fixtures and 
structural metals
0.08
3.2.4. metal services, ordnance and fabricated 
products
0.06
4.1. industrial machinery and equipment
4.1.1. computer and office equipment 0.16
4.1.2.1. engines and turbines 0.06
4.1.2.2. farm and garden machinery 0.17
4.I.2.3. construction, mining and materials handling 
machinery
0.24
4.1.2.4. metalworking machinery 0.05
4.I.2.5. special industry machinery 0.17
4.I.2.6. general industrial machinery 0.14
4.1.2.7 refrigeration and service industry machinery 0.10
4.1.2.8. industrial machinery and equipment, nec 0.04
4.2. electronic and other equipment
4.2.1. audio, video and communications equipment 0.30
4.2.2. electronic components and accessories 0.10
4.2.3.1. household appliances 0.24
4.2.3.2. electronic and other electric equipment, nec 0.25
5.1. textile products and apparel
5.1.1. textile mill products 0.06
5.1.2. apparel and other textile products 0.03
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5.2. lumber, wood, furniture and fixtures
5.2.1. lumber and wood products 0.01
5.2.2. furniture and fixtures 0.03
5.3. paper and allied products
5.3.1. pulp, paper and board mills 0.05
5.3.2. other paper and allied products 0.10
5.4. printing and publishing
5.4.1. newspaper 0.03
5.4.2.1. miscellaneous publishing 0.21
5.4.2.2. commercial printing and services 0.05
5.5. rubber products 0.29
5.6. miscellaneous plastic products 0.05
5.7. stone, clay and glass products
5.7.1. glass products 0.27
5.7.2. stone, clay, concrete, gypsum, etc 0.21
5.8. transportation equipment
5.8.1. motor vehicles and equipment 0.09
5.8.2. other transportation equipment 0.05
5.9. instruments and related products
5.9.1. measuring, scientific and optical instruments 0.10
5.9.2. medical instruments and supplies and 
ophthalmic goods
0.14
5.9.3 photographic equipment and supplies 0.17
5.10. other
5.10.1. tobacco products 0.19
5.10.2. leather and leather products 0.01
5.10.3. miscell manufacturing products 0.07
(a) The share of inward FDI in total number o f employees is the average share for the period 1988- 
1995, except for industries 1.2.3. and 1.2.4. (only 1995 data available), 4.2.3.1. and 4.I.2.8. (data for 
1991-1995 ). Furthermore, industries 5.10.1. and 5.10.2. pose some problems, as disclosure rales only 
allow the publication o f the employment range o f the industry aggregate of foreign firms. For these two 
industries, the share of foreign firms is based on the average of the midpoints of the ranges between 
1988 and 1995.
Source: based on data from the Survey of Current Business (various years) at http://www.bea.gov/.; 
data from Economic of the US and the Annual Survey o f Manufacturers (various years) at 
http ://www.census.gov./
In order to use the variable US as instrument in the empirical estimations presented in 
chapter five, the data presented in table 1 needs to be linked to the classification 
system of the Mexican economic census . Again, as no conversion tables are available, 
this linking exercise is primarily based on the descriptions of the individual activities 
and characteristics as defined in both classification systems. The results of the linking
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exercise are shown in table 26.
App.5.3. Table 2. Matching of 4-digit Mexican industries with US SIC system
CMAP Mexican industries SIC Us industries
31 Productos Alimenticios, bebidas y tabaco
3111 Lndustria de la came 1.2.1 meat products
3112 Elaboracion de productos Lacteos 1.2.2. dairy products
3113 Elaboracion de conservas alimenticias. Incluye 
concentrados para caldos. Excluye las de came y 
leche exclusivamente
1.2.3. preserved fruits and 
vegetables
3114 Beneficio y molienda de cerales y otros productos 
agricolas
1.2.4 grain mil products
3115 Elaboracion de productos de panaderia 1.2.5. bakery products
3116 Molienda de nixtamal y fabricacion de tortillas 1.2.6. other food and kindred 
products
3117 Fabricacion de aceites y grasas comestibles 1.2.6. other food and kindred 
products
3118 lndustria azucarera 1.2.6. other food and kindred 
products
3119 Fabricacion de cocoa, chocolate y articulos de 
confiteria
1.2.6. other food and kindred 
products
3121 Elaboracion de otros productos alimenticios para el 
consumo humano
1.2.6. other food and kindred 
products
3122 Elaboracion de alimentos preparados para animals
3130 lndustria de las bebidas 1.1. beverages
3140 lndustria del tabaco 5.10.1 tobacco products
32 Textiles, prendas de vestir e industria del cuero
3211 lndustria textil de fibras duras y cordeleria de todo 
tipo
5.1.1. textile mill products
3212 Hilado, tejido y acabado de fibras blandas. Excluye 
de punto
5.1.2. apparel and other textile 
products
3213 Confeccion con materiales textiles. Incluye la 
fabricacion de tapices y alfombras de fibras blandas
5.1.2. apparel and other textile 
products
6 For a description of the SIC classification system, see http://www.census.gov. For the description o f  
the Mexican System, see Inegi (1994).
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3214 Fabricacion de tejidos de punto
3220 Confeccion de prendas de vestir 5.1.2. apparel and other textile 
products
3230 lndustria del cuero, pieles y sus productos. Incluye 
los productos de materiales sucedaneos. Excluye 
calzado y prendas de vestir de cuero, piel y 
materiales sucedaneos
5.10.2 leather and leather products
3240 lndustria del calzado. Excluye de hule y/o plastico
33 Industrias de la madera y productos de madera. 
Incluye muebles.
3311 Fabricacion de productos de aserradero y carpinteria 
excluye muebles
5.2.1. lumber and wood products
3312 Fabricacion de envases y otros productos de madera 
y corcho. Excluye muebles.
5.2.1. lumber and wood products
3320 Fabricacion y reparacion de muebles principalmente 
de madera. Incluye colchones
5.2.2. furniture and fixtures
34 Papel y productos de papel, imprentas y editoriales.
3410 Manufactura de celulosa, papel y sus productos. 5.3.1. pulp, paper and board mills
5.3.2. other paper and allied 
products
3420 Imprentas, editoriales e industrias conexas. 5.4.1. newspaper
5.4.2.1 miscell printing
5.4.2.2 commercial printing and 
services
35 Sustancias quimicas, productos derivados del 
petroleo y del carbon, de hule y de plastico.
3511 Petroquimica basica
3512 Fabricacion de sustancias quimicas basicas. Excluye 
las petroquimicas basicas.
2.4.1. agricultural chemicals
3513 lndustria de las fibras articiciales y/o sinteticas
3521 lndustria farmaceutica 2.2. drugs
3522 Fabricacion de otras sustancias y productos 
quimicos
2.3. soaps, cleaners and toilet 
goods
3530 Refinacion de petroleo
3540 lndustria del coque. Incluye otros'derivados del 
carbon mineral y del petroleo
3550 lndustria del hule 5.5. rubber products
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3560 Elaboracion de productos de plastico 5.6. miscell plastic goods
36 Productos minerales no metalicos. Excluye los 
derivados del petroleo y del carbon
3611 Alfareria y ceramica. Excluye materiales de 
construccion
3612 Fabricacacion de materiales de arcilla para la 
construccion
3620 Fabricacion de vidrio y productos de vidrio 5.7.1. glass products
3691 Fabricacion de cemento, cal, yeso y otros productos 
a base de minerales no metalicos.
5.7.2. stone, clay, concrete, gypsum, 
etc
37 Industrias metalicas basicas.
3710 lndustria basica del hierro y del acero. 3.1.1. ferrous
3720 Industrias basicas de metales no ferrosos. Incluye el 
tratamiento de combustibles nucleares.
3.1.2. non-ferrous
38 Productos metalicos, maquinaria y equipo. Incluye 
instrumentos quirurgicos y de precision.
3811 Fundicion y moldeo de piezas metalicas, ferrosas y 
uo ferrosas.
3.2.4. metal services, ordnance and 
fabricated products
3812 Fabricacion de estructuras metalicas, tanques y 
caldera industriales. Incluso trabajos de herreria.
3.2.3. heating equipment, plumbing 
fixtures and structural metals
3813 Fabricacion y reparacion de muebles metalicos.
3814 Fabricacion de otros productos metalicos. Excluye 
maquinaria y equipo.
3.2.1. metal cans, forgings and 
stampings
3.2.2. cutlery, hardware and screw 
products
3821 Fabricacion, reparacion y/o ensamble de maquinaria 
y equipo para fines especificos, con o sin motor 
electrico integrado. Incluye maquinaria agricola.
4.1.2.2 farm and garden machinery
4.1.2.3 construction, mining and 
materials handling machinery
4.1.2.4 metalworking machinery
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4.1.2.5 special industry machinery
3822 Fabricacion, reparacion y/o ensamble de maquinaria 
y equipo para usos generales, con o sin motor 
electrico integrado. Incluye armamento.
4.1.2.1 engines and turbines
4.1.2.6 general industrial machinery
4.1.2.7 refrigeration and service 
industry machinery
3823 Fabricacion y/o ensamble de maquinas de oficina, 
calculo y procesamiento informatico.
4.1.1. computer and office 
equipment
3831 Fabricacion y/o ensamble de maquinaria, equipo y 
accesorios electricos. Incluye para la generacion de 
energia electrica.
4.2.2. electronic components and 
accessories
3832 Fabricacion y/o ensamble de equipo electronico de 
radio, television, comunicaciones y de uso medico
4.2.1. audio, video and 
communications equipment
3833 Fabricacion y/o ensamble de aparatos y accesorios 
de uso domestico. Excluye los electronicos.
4.2.3.1 household appliances
3841 lndustria automotriz 5.8.1. motor vehicles and equipment
3842 Fabricacion, reparacion y/o ensamble de eqquipo de 
transporte y sus partes. Excluye automoviles y 
camiones.
5.8.2. other transportation 
equipment
3850 Fabricacion, reparacion y/o ensamble de 
instrumentos y equipo de precision. Incluye 
instrumenta quirurgico. Excluye los electronicos.
5.9.1 measuring, scientific and 
optical instruments
5.9.2 medical instruments and 
supplies and ophthalmic 
goods
5.9.3. photographic equipment and 
supplies
39 Otras industrias manufactureras
3900 Otras industrias manufactureras 5.10.3 miscell manufacturing 
products
Original Mexican description is shown in parentheses
Source: based on descriptions and definitions from the Economic of Mexico (Inegi, 1994) and the SIC 
classification systems from the Economic of the US (, 1997), available at http://www.census.gov
The information presented in table 2 requires some further remarks. First, four US 
industries remain un-allocated, as no appropriate equivalent Mexican industry can be 
reliably identified. These industries are (2.1) Industrial chemicals and synthetics; 
(2.4.2) Other chemical products, not elsewhere classified; (4.1.2.8) Industrial 
machinery and equipment, not elsewhere classified and (4.2.3.2) Electronic and other 
electric equipment, not elsewhere classified. Second, seven 4-digit (rama) Mexican 
industries do not have a reliable equivalent US industry. These are industries 3122, 
3240, 3511, 3530, 3611, 3612, 3813. Therefore, no scores for these industries are 
available. Third, the sample used in the empirical estimations presented in chapter 
five contains observations for 6-digit Mexican industries. I have taken the scores for 
US industries’ FDI intensity as allocated to the 4-digit Mexican industries and 
allocated these 4-digit scores to the 6-digit industries, depending on which 4-digit 
industry they belong to. As the number of 6-digit industries varies between individual 
4-digit industries, the final result is that 235 out of the original 244 6-digit industries 
have been allocated a score for the US variable .
7 The reason why the problem of unallocated U.S. and Mexican industries leads to the loss of only a 
low number of industries is that the most o f the industries affected are not part of the main sample of 
240 6-digit industries.
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Appendix 5.4. Summary of findings on relation between US and FOR
In the main text of chapter five, the variable US is used as instrument in the 
instrumental variable estimation of FDI-induced externalities. This appendix 5.4. 
presents graphics and summary statistics concerning the type and strength of the 
association between the endogenous variable FOR and the instrument US.
App. 5.4. Figure 1. Scatter plot US and FOR; 4-digit Mexican industries
FOR1
-3-
2 1 05 -3-4
US
The line in figure 1 indicates that the association between the variables US and FOR
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0.01 (N= 44). The results of the bi-variate regression between the two variables are 
shown below in table 1.
App. 5.4. table 1. Regression of FOR on US; 4-digit Mexican industries
Constant US R2 F N
-0.89
(2.25)**
0.442
(2.82)***
0.163 7.965
(0.000)
44
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method
Looking at the results of this simple regression, it appears that the variable US 
explains the cross-industry variation of foreign participation in Mexican 
manufacturing industries reasonably well for IV purposes. The variable US carries a 
positive coefficient, and is significant at the 1% level. Also, the adjusted R2 amounts 
to 0.163, which seems an acceptable level for IV purposes8.
From 4-digit to 6-digit industries
A reliable matching between the variable US and FOR is only possible for 4-digit 
Mexican industries9. This seriously lowers the number of observations. To assess the 
relation between US and FOR at the 6-digit level of Mexican manufacturing 
industries, I have allocated the scores of the US variable to the 6-digit Mexican 
industries, where a 6-digit industry receives the US score according to the 4-digit 
industry to which it belongs (see Inegi, 1994). Similarly to the 4-digit sample, I have
8 The Pearson correlation and the bi-variate regression are obtained from natural log variables. Levels 
estimations produce a better fit. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.57, significant at the 1% level. 
The adj. R2 of the corresponding bi-variate regression is 0.31, with an F-statistic o f 19.63 (0.000)
9 See appendix 5.4.
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run a bi-variate regression, with FOR as dependent and US as independent variable. 
The results are shown in table 2.
App. 5.4. table 2. Regression of FOR on US; 6-digit Mexican industries
Constant US R2 F N
Full sample -1.327
(4.52)***
0.33
(2.77)***
0.03 7.653
(0.000)
235
Outliers
excluded
-0.946
(4.02)***
0.42
(4
0.10 19.43
(0.000)
228
Absolute values of T statistics in parentheses; *, ** and ** * indicating significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Estimations heteroscedasticity-robust using Huber/White/Sandwich method
The results for the full sample of 6-digit industries show that the variable US is 
positively associated with FOR, with the estimated effect being significant at the 1% 
level. However, in comparison to the regression presented in table 1, the R2 in table 2 
has dropped considerably. This drop may pose to be a problem, as one of the two 
criteria of an appropriate instrument is that there has to be a sufficient level of 
association between the instrumental variable and the endogenous variable.
One way to raise the performance of the regression model is to see whether 
there are outliers that have lowered the overall goodness-of-fit. I have re-run the bi- 
variate regression, excluding those gases where the residuals deviate more then 3 
standard deviations from the mean. In total, seven cases meet this requirement. The 
regression results omitting these seven cases are shown in the third row of table 2. 
The coefficient of US has increased in magnitude and remains significant at the 1% 
level. More importantly, the goodness-of-fit of the empirical estimation has increased 
considerably, from 3% to 10%. Although still smaller then the goodness-of-fit of the 
4-digit empirical model, the 10% explanatory power of the bi-variate regression of 
FOR on US seems acceptable for IV purposes.
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Appendix to chapter 6
App. 6 Table 1. Distance between state capital cities; number of kilometres
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 0 2337 4010 1809 502 462 1534 971 504 419 182 787 508 251 484 293
2 2337 0 1606 3988 2115 2322 3727 1382 2733 1918 2340 2972 2804 2110 2667 2497
3 4010 1606 0 5669 4054 3934 5324 3147 4299 3531 4023 4741 4315 895 4322 4033
4 1809 3988 5669 0 2173 1981 674 2497 1295 2227 1677 1572 1283 1879 1361 1604
5 502 2115 4054 2173 0 904 1894 733 869 530 770 1151 957 692 859 852
6 462 2322 3934 1981 904 0 1610 1373 688 821 455 871 776 212 629 386
7 1534 3727 5324 674 1894 1610 0 2473 1030 1921 1460 1089 1136 1608 1096 1321
8 971 1382 3147 2497 733 1373 2473 0 1445 709 1143 1747 1449 1160 1425 1310
9 504 2733 4299 1295 869 688 1030 1445 0 893 432 282 88 580 66 311
10 419 1918 3531 2227 530 821 1921 709 893 0 601 1295 887 609 955 712
11 182 2340 4023 1677 770 455 1460 1143 432 601 0 633 384 302 400 157
12 787 2972 4741 1572 1151 871 1089 1747 282 1295 633 0 370 857 297 525
13 508 2804 4315 1283 957 776 1136 1449 88 887 384 370 0 688 154 331
14 251 2110 895 1879 692 212 1608 1160 580 609 302 857 668 0 522 279
15 484 2667 4322 1361 859 629 1096 1425 66 955 400 297 154 522 0 243
16 293 2497 4033 1604 852 386 1321 1310 311 712 157 525 331 279 243 0
17 580 2775 4415 1375 954 786 1028 1521 85 821 453 197 173 665 151 328
18 507 1823 3489 2102 919 439 1827 1300 807 591 471 1080 895 227 705 506
19 587 2021 3965 1897 85 928 1809 828 989 615 662 1271 901 777 1020 937
20 992 3250 4784 1214 1357 1190 542 1933 488 1381 920 685 576 1068 554 761
21 630 2897 4425 1169 994 821 923 1571 125 1019 558 375 213 706 191 434
22 289 2475 4081 1510 654 497 1245 1230 215 678 153 497 231 365 195 198
23 1990 4111 5891 423 2355 2181 865 2931 1479 2350 1854 1759 1567 2066 1552 1722
24 168 2115 4057 1712 452 563 1429 1028 417 476 210 699 505 351 407 400
25 958 2394 3028 2610 1069 942 2391 1248 1311 539 1033 1584 1315 731 1253 984
26 1649 688 2453 3300 1760 1634 3030 1028 2002 1231 1723 2280 2006 1421 1944 1701
27 1418 3646 5067 381 1601 1436 293 2334 913 1810 1346 1364 938 1494 972 1222
28 581 2740 4353 1610 372 1055 1522 1131 702 822 4804 975 614 822 468 680
29 654 2845 4452 1330 1024 851 951 1601 113 1049 588 405 199 736 221 494
30 819 3077 4468 980 1166 1016 787 1854 315 1049 683 598 365 895 381 624
31 1963 4191 5555 164 2146 2103 838 2904 1458 2352 1891 1741 1546 1982 1392 1701
32 129 1918 3963 1898 373 531 1633 842 603 290 311 885 691 319 583 468
Source: Mexico channel, maps of Mexico, at http://www.trace-sc.com/maps_en.htm (latest date 
accessed 05-02-2004)
See App. 6. Table 2 for corresponding capital cities and states.
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App.6. Table 1. continued
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 580 507 587 992 630 289 1990 168 958 1649 1418 581 654 819 1963 129
2 2775 1823 2021 3250 2897 2475 4111 2115 2394 688 3646 2740 2845 3077 4191 1918
3 4415 3489 3965 4784 4425 4081 5891 4057 3028 2453 5067 4353 4452 4468 5555 3963
4 1375 2102 1897 1214 1169 1510 423 1712 2610 3300 381 1910 1330 980 164 1898
5 954 919 85 1357 994 654 2355 452 1069 1760 1601 372 1024 1166 2146 373
6 786 439 928 1190 821 497 2181 563 942 1634 1436 1055 851 1016 2103 531
7 1028 1827 1809 542 923 1245 865 1429 2391 3030 293 1522 951 787 838 1633
8 1521 1300 818 1933 1571 1230 2931 1028 1248 1028 2334 1131 1601 1854 2904 842
9 85 807 989 488 125 215 1479 417 1311 2002 913 702 113 315 1458 603
10 821 591 615 1381 1019 678 2350 476 539 1231 1810 822 1049 1049 2352 290
11 453 471 662 920 558 153 1854 210 1033 1723 1346 4804 588 683 1891 311
12 197 1080 1271 685 375 497 0759 699 1584 2280 1364 975 405 598 1741 885
13 173 895 901 576 213 231 1567 505 1315 2006 938 614 199 365 1546 691
14 665 227 777 1068 706 365 2066 351 731 1421 1494 822 736 895 1982 319
15 151 705 1020 554 191 195 1552 407 1253 1944 972 468 221 381 1392 583
16 328 506 937 761 434 198 1722 400 984 1701 1222 680 494 624 1701 468
17 0 892 1065 488 178 300 1485 502 1446 1634 966 713 208 1010 1487 588
18 892 0 1004 1295 932 642 2228 578 504 1195 1721 924 962 1241 2265 546
19 1065 1004 0 1441 1114 739 2468 537 1154 1845 1516 287 1032 1388 2061 904
20 488 1295 1441 0 363 703 1405 1105 1741 2590 835 1190 391 472 1408 1091
21 178 932 1114 363 0 340 1353 542 1489 2128 781 828 30 189 1326 728
22 300 642 739 703 340 0 1694 202 1096 1787 996 548 367 530 1673 388
23 1485 2228 2468 1405 1353 1694 0 1896 2797 3488 572 1800 1323 1170 294 2082
24 502 578 537 1105 542 202 1896 0 1082 1706 1198 346 572 732 1918 186
25 1446 504 1154 1741 1489 1096 2797 1082 0 692 2277 1361 1467 1676 2848 829
26 1634 1195 1845 2590 2128 1787 3488 1706 692 0 2916 2123 2158 2371 3483 1520
27 966 1721 1516 835 781 996 572 1198 2277' 2916 0 1229 811 599 545 1518
28 713 924 287 1190 828 548 1800 346 1361 2123 1229 0 854 731 1802 532
29 208 962 1032 391 30 367 1323 572 1467 2158 811 854 0 185 1356 758
30 1010 1241 1388 472 189 530 1170 732 1676 2371 599 731 185 0 1172 918
31 1487 2265 2061 1408 1326 1673 294 1918 2848 3483 545 1802 1356 1172 0 2061
32 588 546 904 1091 728 388 2082 186 829 1520 1518 532 758 918 2061 0
Source: Mexico channel, maps of Mexico, at http://www.trace-sc.com/maps_en.htm (latest date 
accessed 05-02-2004)
See App. 6. Table 2 for listing of corresponding capital cities and states.
App.6. Table 2. States and corresponding Capital Cities
Classification nr 
from App. 6 
Table 1
State Capital City
1 Aguascalientes Aguascalientes
2 Baja California Mexicali
3 Baja California Sur La Paz
4 Campeche Campeche
5 Coahuila de Zaragoza Saltillo
6 Colima Colima
7 Chiapas Tuxtla Gutierrez
8 Chihuahua Chihuahua
9 Distrito Federal Distrito Federal
10 Durango Durango
11 Guanajuato Guanajuato
12 Guerrero Chilpancingo
13 Hidalgo Pachuca
14 Jalisco Guadalajara
15 Mexico Toluca
16 Michoagan de Ocampo Morelia
17 Morelos Cuernavaca
18 Nayarit Tepic
19 Nuevo Leon Monterrey
20 Oaxaca Oaxaca
21 Puebla Puebla
22 Queretaro de Arteaga Queretaro
23 Quintana Roo Chetumal
24 San Luis Potosi San Luis Potosi
25 Sinaloa Culiacan
26 Sonora Hermosillo
27 Tabasco Villa Hermosa
28 Tamaulipas Cuidad Victoria
29 Tlaxcala Tlaxcala
30 Veracruz-llave Jalapa
31 Yucatan Merida
32 Zacatecas Zacatecas
Source: Inegi (1999)b Anuario Estadistico, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Inegi, Aguascalientes
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App. 6. Table 3. States with shared borders
State neighbours State Neighbours
1 .Aguascalientes Zacatecas, Jalisco, San Luis 
Potosi
17. Morelos Distrito Federal, Mexico, 
Guerrero, Puebla
2.Baja 
California
Baja California Sur, Sonora 18. Nayarit Sinaloa, Durango, Jalisco, 
Zacatecas
3.Baja
California Sur
Baja California 19. Nuevo Leon Tamaulipas, Coahuila, San 
Luis Potosi, Zacatecas
4.Campeche Tabasco, Yucatan, Quintana 
Roo
20. Oaxaca Chiapas, Veracruz, Puebla, 
Guerrero
5. Coahuila Chihuahua, Durango, 
Zacatecas, Nuevo Leon
21. Puebla Veracruz, Oaxaca, Guerrero, 
Morelos, Distrito Federal, 
Tlaxcala
6. Colima Jalisco, Michoagan 22. Queretaro Guajanuato, Hidalgo, San 
Luis Potosi, Mexico, 
Michoagan
7. Chiapas Tabasco, Veracruz, Oaxaca 23. Quintana Roo Yucatan, Campeche
8. Chihuahua Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, 
Coahuila
24. San Luis Potosi Zacatecas, Nuevo Leon, 
Tamaulipas, Veracruz, 
Hidalgo, Queretaro, 
Guanajuato
9. Distrito 
Federal
Mexico, Tlaxcala, Morelos, 
Puebla
25. Sinaloa Sonora, Chihuahua, Durango, 
Nayarit
10. Durango Sinaloa, Chihuahua, 
Coahuila, Zacatecas, Nayarit
26. Sonora Baja California, Sinaloa, 
Chihuahua
11. Guanajuato Michoagan, Jalisco, San Luis 
Potosi, Quaretaro
27. Tabasco Campeche, Chiapas, 
Veracruz
12. Guerrero Michoagan, Mexico, 
Morelos, Puebla, Oaxaca
28. Tamaulipas Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, 
Veracruz
13. Hidalgo, Veracruz, Mexico, Queretaro, 
San Luis Potosi, Tlaxcala
29. Tlaxcala Hidalgo, Puebla, Distrito 
Federal, Mexico
14. Jalisco Colima, Nayarit, Zacatecas, 
Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, 
Michoagan
30. Veracruz Tabasco, Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Hidalgo, San Luis 
Potosi, Tamaulipas
15. Mexico Distrito Federal, Guerrero, 
Michoagan, Queretaro, 
Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, Morelos
31. Yucatan Quintana Roo, Campeche
16. Michoagan Colima, Jalisco, Guenajuato, 
Mexico, Guerrero
32. Zacatecas Nayarit, Durango, Coahuila, 
Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, 
Aguascalientes
Source: common borders identified using digital map of Mexico, at www.inegi.gob.mx 
(last date accessed 05-04-2004)
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Internet sources of data and data descriptions
1. Internet site of the Mexican Ministry of the Economy. Accessed for obtaining trade 
data for the construction of the trade variable used in chapter 5. 
http://www.economia.gob.mx.
Unfortunately, the service has been terminated. The last successful online consultation 
that I made of the trade database on this website was around 08-2003. The paper 
version of published Mexican trade statistics is Anuario Estadfstico del Comercio 
Exterior de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Inegi, Acuascalientes, for the years 1991- 
2001 (containing the data for the period 1990-2000)
2. Internet site of the US International Trade Administration, accessed for the full list 
descriptions of the HTS Codes; Page-title: HTS/SIC/SITC/NAICS/ENDUSE 
Description Lookup, at http://reportweb.usitc.gov/commodities/naicsicsitc.html (latest 
access at 10-02-2004)
3. Internet site of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, accessed for the data on the 
operations of foreign owned manufacturing firms, in the US; main page from which 
the data-files are available: Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Balance of 
Payments and Direct Investment Position: http://www.bea.gov./bea/di/dilfdibal.htm 
(latest access at 10-02-2004)
4. Internet site of the US Economic Census, accessed to obtain data to calculate the 
total number of employees per US .manufacturing industry, use in chapter 5 (see also 
the appendix to chapter 5) Data for 1987-1992 are from the 1992 Economic Census,
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Industry Series Final, at http://www.census.g0 v/pr0 d/www/abs/manu-min.html#mm
Data for 1993, 1994 and 1995 are from the Annual Survey of Manufactures page, at 
http://www.census.gov/mcd/asm-asl.html (latest access at 10-02-2004)
5. Internet site named the Mexico Channel, containing maps and relative distance 
information for the republic of Mexico, accessed to calculate the distance in 
kilometres between the state capital cities (see chapter 6). Available at 
http://www.trace-sc.com/maps_en.htm (latest access at 10-02-2004)
6. Internet site of the Mexican Central Bank, accessed for information on the 
exchange rate between the Mexican Pesos and the US dollar and data on inflation. 
Available at http://www.banxico.org.mx/gPublicaciones/FSPublicaciones.html 
(latest access at 10-02-2004)
